

# Empires and Entrepots

The Dutch, the Spanish Monarchy  
and the Jews, 1585-1713

JONATHAN I. ISRAEL



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JONATHAN I. ISRAEL

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## PREFACE

The articles and essays collected in this volume focus on the conflict between two great maritime empires, those of Spain and the Dutch, in the period 1585–1648, and the complicated aftermath as well as the far-reaching ramifications of that encounter. Accordingly the volume combines broad geographical sweep, taking in much of Europe, the Mediterranean, Africa, Asia and the Americas, with what I hope may fairly be described as a compact and reasonably orderly thematic core. Even those articles devoted to single individuals such as the Walloon noblemen Gabriel de Roy, or the Portuguese New Christian economic writer, Manuel López Pereira, are concerned with political and mercantile careers which were profoundly influenced, even largely shaped, by the effects of the global struggle between Spain and the Dutch as it evolved after 1585.

But what was the nature of this confrontation of empires which forms the thematic heart of this book, an encounter which in a less warlike format persisted even after the Peace of Münster (1648) ended the Eighty Years' War – until Spain and the Dutch finally became allies against France, in 1673? For it was far from being a routine matter, a conflict of a familiar type. Not only were the Spanish and Dutch empires after 1600 both key politico-economic components of the world as it then was; not only did the two empires differ in character radically from each other: in their separate ways both were also fundamentally novel and quite unique phenomena.

It is by no means always recognized that this is so, the Spanish imperium often being treated as if it were merely much larger but not otherwise significantly different from other great empires of the time and of the past. Fernand Braudel believed that the post-1590 Dutch empire of trade was in essence much like earlier trade-based empires revolving around a sequence of rising and falling entrepôts such as Venice, Genoa, Bruges and Antwerp. But it is surely much more convincing to classify the Dutch trading empire after 1590 as an entity radically different from previous entrepot-based empires. Whereas the predecessors were all regional in scope, or in the case of Antwerp not fully global, the Dutch empire of trade was the first which was truly global. Whereas earlier

entrepôts were largely if not exclusively based on the traffic in high-value goods of low bulk, involving relatively few ships and problems of transportation, the Dutch trading system was based not on bulk carrying (as is usually assumed) but – though not before 1590 – on a combination of bulk carrying and hegemony over the ‘rich trades’, a pattern which was to some extent repeated later with the ascendancy of Britain but which had certainly never occurred previously. Finally, while no previous entrepot-based empire, least of all Antwerp, had at the same time been a major European power in a broader political and military context, the Dutch seaborne empire was the first to combine trade hegemony with great power status on land as well as at sea, a pattern again subsequently repeated in the case of eighteenth-century Britain but unprecedented at the time.

In early modern times the entrepot phenomenon had a significance for all empires, and indeed all political and economic life, which was unquestionably much greater than in previous eras or than was to be the case later, after the Industrial Revolution. Railways, steamships, air-freight, and telecommunications have created a world in which commodities and manufactures are shifted from one part of the globe to another in a regular, even, controlled, and predictable stream, eliminating the factors which once made the entrepot phenomenon central to European life. But, before the Industrial Revolution, as was pointed out originally by the Dutch economist T.P. van der Kooy and has been more recently restated by P.W. Klein, the flow of goods from one part of the world to another, even one region of a country to another, was so irregular and unpredictable that there was no possibility of achieving any sort of steady distribution, any balancing of supply and demand, any sort of price stability, except by stockpiling great reserves of commodities in central storehouses, or entrepôts.<sup>1</sup> The basic need for these central reservoirs of goods to iron out the unevenness and ensure a certain regularity of flow and stability of prices was bound to bestow enormous power and influence, political as well as economic, on the main entrepôts and this, in turn, led to a process of unending struggle, on the one side to expand and, on the other, to curb them.

But as against the entrepot-based empire, the seventeenth-century world also knew the more traditional type of imperial hegemony based on monarchical power, territory and relative administrative efficiency. Of these territorial empires endowed with large bureaucracies first Spain and then, after 1659, France was supreme. But until the late seventeenth century Spain was the only such empire which was truly global in scope at any rate, or particularly, during the period that the Portuguese crown was joined to that of Spain (1580-1640) when Spain ruled not only vast

<sup>1</sup> See P.W. Klein, *De Trippen in de 17<sup>e</sup> eeuw: een studie over het ondernemersgedrag op de Hollandse stapelmarkt* (Assen, 1965), pp.3-13.

stretches of the New World and the Philippines and her European and North African dependencies but also protected the Portuguese empire in Africa and Asia as well as in Brazil.

In many ways an immense territorial empire such as that of Spain was a much more imposing affair than any entrepot-based imperium could be. Controlling large blocks of territory, an empire such as that of early seventeenth-century Spain seemingly disposed of far greater resources of population, revenues, administrative machinery and military organization than even the most favoured trading empire could. In culture and religion a territorial empire such as Spain was also much more disciplined and authoritarian than the entrepot empires of the day. It was in the nature not just of the Dutch Republic but any entrepot-empire of early modern times to tolerate religious minorities at home and to make no attempt to change the religion and culture of subject populations in the empire. But it was quite otherwise with Spain, a power uniquely firmly committed to enforcing the Counter Reformation and the supremacy of the Catholic faith and uniquely successful, both at home in the Peninsula, and in her overseas empire, in breaking down other religions and cultures and acculturating and Catholicising her subject populations. It may be that this cultural and religious programme was far from wholly successful either among the Indians of Spanish America or the former Muslims and Jews of Spain itself. But what was achieved in this direction was remarkable and unparalleled and, boosted by the endeavours of the Inquisition, appeared at the time more imposing than it actually was. And what is true of culture and religion is true also of institutions and administration. Historians, quite rightly, put much emphasis on the failure of the Spanish crown during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries to integrate the viceroyalties of Catalonia, Valencia, Aragón and Mallorca institutionally into the framework of Castile. But before 1640 the failure of the Spanish crown to incorporate large parts of the Iberian Peninsula into a common institutional framework was less striking than the rock-like solidity of Castile's administrative and institutional grip over the Spanish American viceroyalties and dependencies and the apparent solidity of Castile's hold over Portugal, southern Italy and the Spanish Netherlands. Even after the revolts of Catalonia and Portugal in 1640, after which Spain's power seemed much less formidable than before, Spain was still the main power in the New World and the principal counterweight to the rising power of France in Europe. It was only after the Peace of the Pyrenees (1659), and the humiliating failure of Spanish efforts to reconquer Portugal in the 1660s, that it came to be recognized that Spain was now irreparably weakened and no longer the chief rival to France for the leadership of Europe.

During the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century, the encounter between the rival empires of Spain and the Dutch had a fundamental



character, an absoluteness and intensity such as no other European or world conflict then had. In Spanish eyes the Dutch were 'rebels', 'heretics' and usurpers of the economic order, inevitable enemies who challenged the basic principles – royal authority, Catholic allegiance, and closed, bureaucratic methods of regulating economic and social life – on which the world's greatest empire, the Spanish Monarchy, rested. Initially, during the reign of Philip II (1556–98), the Spanish crown was chiefly motivated in its struggle with the Dutch by a determination to crush rebellion and heresy and reassert Spanish sovereignty over the northern Netherlands. During the reign of Philip III (1598–1621), however, under the lethargic guidance of the duke of Lerma, there was an immediate and fundamental shift away from questions of sovereignty and religion, though these continued to influence the struggle at any rate down to the 1620s and to add to its intensity. After 1598 the main element in the conflict was Spain's ministers' perception of Dutch maritime expansion as posing a fundamental threat to their empire. It was in the years 1598–1605 that the Dutch ousted the Portuguese from their previous hegemony in the trade to the East Indies and captured the traffic in pepper and spices. It was at precisely the same time that the Dutch wrested the Guinea trade from the Portuguese and replaced the English as the main challenge to Spanish power and navigation in the Caribbean. At the same time, the Dutch tightened their grip on the Scheldt estuary, throttling Antwerp, the main entrepot of the Spanish Netherlands, and, in 1607, at the battle of Gibraltar, became the first Europeans to inflict a crushing naval defeat on Spain off her own coast. Under Lerma, Spain's chief minister from 1598 to 1618, under Balthasar de Zúñiga, leading minister from 1618 to 1622, and under Olivares, the principal architect of Spanish policy from 1622 until his downfall in 1643, the central objective of Spain's war against the Dutch was to disband the Dutch East and West India Companies, force Dutch evacuation of the Indies east and west, break the Dutch stranglehold on the Scheldt, and generally weaken if not destroy the Dutch mercantile system. In this respect, however different in others, Lerma and Olivares had more in common with each other than either had with the attitudes of Philip II.

A considerable part of this volume, including two of the three new pieces, those on the Spanish Netherlands and Spanish policy and strategy in the New World, deals with the statecraft of the Count-Duke of Olivares. There has, of course, recently been a strong upsurge of interest in this fascinating statesman in the wake of J.H. Elliott's masterly *The Count-Duke of Olivares. The Statesman in an Age of Decline* (1986). This work is in many, and perhaps most respects, all but definitive. There is only one aspect – Olivares' role in the government of the Spanish Indies – where the reader will encounter any serious disagreement with the views of Professor Elliott. For the rest it is a matter only of minor differences of interpretation. Yet I do feel that these have a certain significance, that

there still has not been enough emphasis (though there is now much more than there used to be) on Olivares the mercantilist, and on the *Almirantazgo*, and that the Count-Duke's role in the government of the Spanish Netherlands and in determining Spanish strategy against the Dutch requires further comment. Recent assertions by other historians who write about this period of Spanish history strengthen me in my conviction that there is still a good deal of confusion about Olivares' Dutch policy, his objectives in the Low Countries and north-west Germany, and his strategic preoccupations following the outbreak of war between France and Spain, in 1635, which needs to be cleared up.

The third of the new pieces, that dealing with the Spanish embargoes against the Dutch of 1585-90, 1598-1608 and 1621-47, once again takes up what is perhaps the most important single issue in this volume: namely Spain's attempt, over several decades, to use her unrivalled control of territory, resources and routes to attack the Dutch trading system head-on by political means. The enforcement of these embargoes was one of the central formative principles of Spanish policy and diplomacy for more than half a century. More significantly still the imposition of these embargoes was, in my view, the most important single factor determining the distribution and redistribution of commercial power between England, the Hansa towns and the Dutch during the first half of the seventeenth century. The embargoes were also the single most important aspect, at any rate after 1598, of Spain's intervention in Portugal. In dealing with this central issue I have resumed my critique of Braudel. Some of my friends have suggested that I have pressed this too strongly and perhaps I have. Yet I remain convinced that Braudel's conception that the rise of Dutch world trade primacy rested on underlying shifts in subsistence, grain prices and shipping capacity and that it neither was, nor could be, seriously affected by a 'mere' political challenge such as the Spanish embargoes is not just wrong in the sense that historians are ordinarily in error but an altogether fundamental misconception which, as long as it continues to command acceptance, makes it quite impossible to understand what the Dutch trading system really was and what the Dutch-Spanish conflict after 1590 was really about. It is precisely because Braudel was a historian of immense creative power and unrivalled influence that his ideas about trade and the impact of mercantilist policies on commercial life in early modern times need to be brought in question.

London, 2 September 1989

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## A CONFLICT OF EMPIRES: SPAIN AND THE NETHERLANDS, 1618-1648

"SINCE THEY DERIVE ALL THEIR GAINS FROM TRADE WITH SPAIN AND Italy", claimed the marqués de Aytona, referring to the Dutch in the Spanish Council of State in July 1622, "should they lose this commerce, they shall be less powerful enemies and we can expect a good settlement favourable to Spain".<sup>1</sup> This assertion of one of Philip IV's senior ministers well illustrates the thinking that lay behind Spanish policy at the outset of the Spanish-Dutch struggle of 1621-48. Essentially, Philip's ministers aimed to weaken the United Provinces sufficiently to win a *buen concierto*, an agreement settling the various issues in Spanish-Dutch relations, mostly relating to commercial and colonial matters, to the advantage of the Catholic Monarchy. The principal means by which it was proposed to achieve this, and that which was primarily used, was the application of economic pressure on a scale that had never before been attempted and with which there was to be nothing comparable until Napoleon's Continental System more than a century and a half later. In the conflict of 1621-48 the land war was mostly rather static and often perfunctory. The famed army of Flanders played a largely secondary and defensive role. As regards Spain at least, it was in the sphere of economic warfare that the major effort was made, producing a considerable impact not only on the Netherlands and Spain itself but on much of the rest of Europe.

By any measure, the second Spanish-Dutch war was a key formative episode in early modern history and yet curiously, until very recently, it has attracted virtually no scholarly interest. Partly perhaps this may be due to a lingering tendency to regard the conflict as a continuation of the Dutch struggle for independence which, to all intents and purposes, was won by 1609 when the first Spanish-Dutch war ended. A common assumption, at any rate, is that there is an essential continuity between the wars, that the struggle of 1621-48 was merely the second phase of a so-called Eighty Years War in which a declining but incorrigibly obstinate Spain exhausted itself in-

\* An earlier version of this paper was read to the Dutch History Seminar at the Institute of Historical Research, University of London, January 1976. It is based on research forming part of a long-term project, supported by the Social Science Research Council, on the social and economic context of Spanish-Dutch conflict and rapprochement in the period 1618-60. I should also like to record my gratitude to Professor K. W. Swart and Professor J. H. Elliott for their help and advice with this article.

<sup>1</sup> *Consulta*, 6 July 1622, fo. 5: Archivo General de Simancas, Estado, legajo (hereafter A.G.S. Est.) 2036.

effectually striving to suppress the political and religious independence of an increasingly vigorous republic. And this, except perhaps for old-fashioned Dutch patriots, does not constitute a very edifying subject. Nevertheless, there has long been good cause for doubting such an interpretation. Decades ago it was shown that the way in which the Spanish-Dutch rupture was presented publicly in the United Provinces in 1621 was largely determined by domestic political considerations and especially the need to convince the Dutch people of the necessity of a war for which there was enthusiasm only in certain quarters.<sup>2</sup> The mission of Archduke Albert's delegate, Petrus Peckius, from Brussels to The Hague in March 1621, was deliberately twisted by the *stadhouder*, Prince Maurice, and his circle to look like an uncompromising demand that the States General submit to the sovereignty of Philip III when in fact it was nothing of the kind. The actual Spanish demands of 1621, satisfaction of which was the condition for renewal of the truce, were that freedom of worship be conceded to the Dutch Catholic minority, that the river Scheldt be reopened and that the Dutch withdraw from the Indies east and west. This too has long been known<sup>3</sup> and yet, until recently, little or nothing has been done to take the analysis further, and to consider how serious Spain was in making these demands, why they led to the type of war that ensued and how Spanish and Dutch thinking changed as the struggle proceeded. Nor has much thought been given to the enormous impact of this struggle on the countries involved.

The view of the second Spanish-Dutch war put forward recently by José Alcalá-Zamora in a major Spanish contribution to our knowledge of Europe in this period,<sup>4</sup> though it stops short at 1639, is unquestionably a dramatic advance on the meagre picture that preceded it. "Spain's struggle from 1621 to 1639", concluded Alcalá-Zamora, "was more a fight for economic survival, under threat of constriction and paralysis by the Dutch, than a quest to realize a programme of territorial expansion or hegemony".<sup>5</sup> Alcalá-Zamora,

<sup>2</sup> M. G. de Boer, "De hervatting der vijandelijkheden na het twaalfjarig bestand", *Tijd. Gesch.*, xxxv (1920), pp. 34-49; I. Schöffer, "De crisis van de jonge Republiek, 1609-1625", *Algemene geschiedenis der Nederlanden*, ed. J. A. van Houtte *et al.*, 12 vols. (Utrecht, 1949-58), vi, pp. 57-8.

<sup>3</sup> De Boer, *op. cit.*, p. 35; Pieter Geyl, *The Netherlands Divided, 1609-1648* (London, 1936), p. 84; J. J. Poelhekke, *'T Uytgaen van den Treves: Spanje en de Nederlanden in 1621* (Groningen, 1960), pp. 37-41.

<sup>4</sup> José Alcalá-Zamora y Queipo de Llano, *España, Flandes y el Mar del Norte, 1618-39* (Barcelona, 1975). I first read Alcalá-Zamora after completing the original draft of this piece. In the present version an attempt is made to condense the analysis as much as possible where it agrees substantially with that of Alcalá-Zamora.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 475-6. In another recent work Peter Brightwell, though he makes several important points regarding colonial rivalry, in general leans towards an older view, seeing the Spanish crown as being insistent above all on maintaining the territorial integrity of the empire, and leaves out of the account much of the economic reasoning: Peter Brightwell, "The Spanish System and the Twelve Years Truce", *Eng. Hist. Rev.*, lxxxix (1974), pp. 270-92.

convinced that the struggle was essentially for domination of the North Sea and the Baltic, concentrates on Spanish naval activity and ambitions in north European waters,<sup>6</sup> though he does consider that the Spanish war effort was intended to damage Dutch interests in all parts. However, Alcalá-Zamora did not use any Dutch or Flemish sources, printed or manuscript, and although his work is based on the rich Spanish archival material at Simancas, he confined himself only to certain sections of it.<sup>7</sup> The result is that his documentary base is relatively narrow — indeed, rather too narrow for what he attempts. Major aspects of the conflict in the north, especially the effect of Spanish actions on the Dutch but also, in some cases, the Spanish actions themselves, such as the great river blockade of 1625-9 or the attack on Dutch North Sea fishing, are treated too cursorily, with many features distorted or omitted. Furthermore, Alcalá-Zamora, pre-occupied with the north, barely touches on Spanish actions against the Dutch in the south which, arguably, are no less crucial and possibly more so. With Alcalá-Zamora we have an extremely significant new picture, but one that is rather roughly sketched and in need of both modification and extension, particularly by reference to a fuller range of sources, Spanish and non-Spanish.

In Spain, Flanders and Portugal (which was then attached to the Spanish crown), discussion of Spanish-Dutch relations was intense throughout the period of the Twelve Years Truce (1609-21) and, from 1618, the Dutch question was a chief concern of no less than four royal councils at Madrid, those of State, War, Portugal and the Indies. In all those councils, and also at Brussels, at least among the Spanish officials, and at Lisbon, it was the general view that the truce of 1609 had been utterly ruinous both for Spain and for the empire as a whole and that it was vital, on its expiry in April 1621, to put an end to the situation that had arisen from it, either by negotiating different terms or by war. Some influential officers and officials such as Luis de Velasco, Carlos Coloma and Juan de Villela, openly preferred war, advising that Spain should only seem to want a new truce for the sake of appearances.<sup>8</sup> Others, more aware of the chronic state of the royal

<sup>6</sup> Alcalá-Zamora, *op. cit.*, pp. 46-8, 67, 172.

<sup>7</sup> The Simancas series containing relevant material of importance which are unused by Alcalá-Zamora are the rough drafts of *consultas* relating to the Low Countries (A.G.S. Est. 2138-2160), royal correspondence with Flanders (A.G.S. Est. 2230-2246), letters from ministers in Flanders to the king (A.G.S. Est. 2300-2321), *consultas* relating to Spain and Portugal (A.G.S. Est. 2645-2664), and the *consultas* for the relevant years of the *consejo de guerra* and *consejo de hacienda*. On these papers, see M. van Durme, *Les Archives générales de Simancas et l'histoire de la Belgique*, 4 vols. (Brussels, 1964-73), and G. Parker, *Guide to the Archives of the Spanish Institutions in or concerned with the Netherlands, 1556-1706* (Brussels, 1971).

<sup>8</sup> Velasco to Philip III, 11 Feb. 1619; A.G.S. Est. 634 doc. 321; Villela to Philip III, 22 Dec. 1620; A.G.S. Est. 2309; "Carta de Don Xroval de Benavente para su Mg<sup>d</sup> haz<sup>do</sup> relacion de las cosas de Olanda", 9 June 1620: Brit. Lib., Add. MS.14005, fos. 34-40.

finances, on balance preferred new terms.<sup>9</sup> But all, virtually without exception, agreed that war was better than the old terms. The advice of Georges de Henin, a Walloon official who was almost alone at Madrid in urging that Spain should at all costs avoid war and seek a respite from struggle (a respite which in his view was desperately needed if the many internal problems of the country were to be solved), was dismissed by Balthasar de Zúñiga, Olivares's uncle and the most influential minister of the period, as well-intentioned but hopelessly confused.<sup>10</sup>

The general conviction in the Iberian world that the truce was a disaster was based mainly on the obvious fact that the years of truce had coincided with a transformation of the Spanish-Dutch relationship to the disadvantage of Spain. Clearly the truce years were a period of dramatic expansion in Dutch navigation and trade and Philip III's ministers were inclined to link the two phenomena as cause and effect.<sup>11</sup> The truce had removed all obstacles to Dutch trade with Spain and Portugal,<sup>12</sup> had left Antwerp blockaded while Amsterdam continued to usurp the functions that had once been Antwerp's,<sup>13</sup> and enabled the Dutch to dominate Europe's north-south carrying trade, including the vital flow of Baltic grain, copper and naval stores to the Iberian peninsula and Italy, to an extent that had never been seen before.<sup>14</sup> This in turn meant that a very large proportion of the silver leaving Spain proceeded to Holland, thus making possible further Dutch investment in navigation and trade and bringing the Dutch a decisive advantage over such rivals as the English and the Hanseatic towns.<sup>15</sup> It was also evident that Dutch and Dutch Jewish merchants were, by such means as misusing grain licences and smuggling in quantities of false copper coinage, using their success in Spain and Portugal to evade the king's trade regulations and to extract additional silver illegally, thereby increasing further

<sup>9</sup> *Consulta* of the Brussels junta, 3 Apr. 1620, and Albert to Philip III, 14 Apr. 1620: *Correspondance de la cour d'Espagne sur les affaires des Pays-Bas au XVII<sup>e</sup> siècle*, ed. H. Lonchay and J. Cuvelier, 6 vols. (Brussels, 1923-37), i, docs. 1466 and 1468.

<sup>10</sup> "Jorge de Henin muestra las consideraciones . . ." and the memorandum on this of Balthasar de Zúñiga: A.G.S. Est. 2851.

<sup>11</sup> Brit. Lib., Egerton MS.2078, fos. 45-52; Brit. Lib., Add. MS.14005, fos. 34-40.

<sup>12</sup> "Olandeses. Discurso sobre el prorrogar mejorar o romper las treguas con ellos", 15 Jan. 1620: Brit. Lib., Add. MS.14005, fo. 46.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*; Carlos Coloma to Philip III, Cambrai, 8 June 1620: A.G.S. Est. 2308.

<sup>14</sup> *Consulta* of the Council of Portugal, 28 May 1618, and memorandum of Francisco Retama: A.G.S. Est. 634.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.* The export of silver to Asia was of course crucial to the operations of the East India Company: Kristof Glamann, *Dutch-Asiatic Trade, 1620-1740* (Copenhagen and The Hague, 1958), pp. 51-3; for the role of Spanish silver in Dutch-Russian trade, see S. Hart, "Amsterdam Shipping and Trade to Northern Russia in the Seventeenth Century", *Mededelingen van de nederlandse vereniging voor zeegechiedenis*, xxvi (1973), pp. 26-9.

the alarmingly adverse balance of Ibero-Dutch trade.<sup>16</sup> Significantly in these years a number of Spanish writers, such as Sancho de Moncada,<sup>17</sup> were inclined to see in the unfavourable trade balance the most important cause of Spain's economic decline and it was a widespread belief in the peninsula that it was an increasingly poorer Spain that was financing Dutch growth.

A second feature of the truce deplored by Philip III's ministers was the added impetus that it had lent to further Dutch expansion in the East and West Indies.<sup>18</sup> By 1619, when the Dutch East India Company established its principal Far Eastern base at Batavia, the Portuguese had already lost several possessions and much of their share of the spice trade.<sup>19</sup> In the Americas the Dutch had made less progress and indeed had at first shown some inclination to respect the rather vague clause of the 1609 truce which implied that they were excluded from the king of Spain's Indies. There was at any rate a marked reduction in Dutch activity in the Caribbean after 1609.<sup>20</sup> However, Dutch involvement in the Brazilian sugar trade had continued and, from about 1615, numerous incidents showed that Dutch ambitions in the Americas were reviving. The exploits of a squadron under Van Spilbergen off the Pacific coasts of Peru and Mexico in 1615 caused particular indignation in Madrid. The overthrow of Oldenbarneveldt in 1618 removed any lingering tendency in Holland to accept exclusion from the New World and, although the West India Company was not finally formed until June 1621, after the outbreak of war, Spanish officials in Brussels, who carefully scrutinized commercial initiatives in Holland, knew by 1620 that it would be set up and that short of the use of force or the negotiation of dramatically new terms, there was no way of preventing the Dutch making rapid gains in Spanish America.<sup>21</sup>

A third substantial disadvantage of the truce for Spain resulted from the shift in economic power: increasing wealth enabled the Dutch to acquire, besides the world's largest navy, the only standing army in Europe remotely comparable in strength to that of Spain and this, in turn, facilitated the extension of Dutch influence through Europe

<sup>16</sup> Albert to Philip III, Ghent, 18 Aug. 1618: A.G.S. Est. 2305; memorandum of the conde de Benavente, 12 Sept. 1620: A.G.S. Est. 2309.

<sup>17</sup> Sancho de Moncada, *Restauración política de España* (Madrid, 1746 edn.), pp. 12, 17, 21-2, 53-6.

<sup>18</sup> Memorandum of Juan de Çirica: A.G.S. Est. 634, doc. 318; Philip III to Albert, 12 Jan. 1620: *Correspondance de la cour d'Espagne*, ed. Lonchay and Cuvelier, I, doc. 1450.

<sup>19</sup> *Consulta* of the Council of Portugal, 28 May 1618: A.G.S. Est. 634. Of the most valuable Asian commodity, pepper, the Dutch handled over twice as much as the Portuguese by 1621: Glamann, *op. cit.*, p. 74.

<sup>20</sup> C. Goslinga, *The Dutch in the Caribbean and on the Wild Coast, 1580-1680* (Assen, 1971), pp. 82-3.

<sup>21</sup> Albert to Philip III, Brussels, 28 Feb. 1619: A.G.S. Est. 2306; Pedro de San Juan to Juan de Çirica, Brussels, 29 Feb. 1620: A.G.S. Est. 2308.



and beyond in a way that contrasted all too obviously with the meagre international role played by the republic before 1609. Moreover, this spreading Dutch influence seemed to be devoted specifically to one aim — that of checking Spain at every point. In Germany, by 1620, the republic had occupied Emden, much of Jülich-Cleves, and in addition the vital fortress of Papenmütz (Mondorf) on the Rhine between Cologne and Bonn<sup>22</sup> and, by providing men and money elsewhere, was assuming the lead in obstructing Habsburg ambitions in central Europe. In Italy, the United Provinces had succeeded France as the main foreign threat to the Spanish ascendancy and, by agreements and military and naval co-operation with Venice and Savoy, had become a powerful force in the central Mediterranean area.<sup>23</sup> In North Africa, where Spain held coastal strongholds from Larache to Oran as a barrier between Islam and Spain, and Islam and the Protestant powers, there was a remarkable growth in Dutch involvement from 1608, using Dutch and Moroccan Jews as intermediaries; by 1621 the republic was the main supplier of arms and manufactures to North Africa and the chief ally of the sultan of Morocco in his confrontation with Spain — a fact that caused much disquiet in Madrid, especially as it coincided with a marked resurgence in Muslim piracy around the coasts of Spain, Portugal and Sicily.<sup>24</sup>

The truce that Madrid would have settled for in 1621 was one that would have reversed the shift that had occurred in the years 1609-21. The three conditions were intended precisely to secure such a reversal. The demand for religious rights for Dutch Catholics, though invariably placed first and undoubtedly of consequence, was nevertheless the least important of the three as is shown by the lesser emphasis placed on it by Spanish ministers in any discussion of the proposed terms.<sup>25</sup> Partly, this requirement derived from the traditionally militant Catholic stand of the Spanish crown, but it was also a shrewd political move, not only in that Dutch compliance with it would serve Spanish prestige internationally but also because the Dutch Catholics were

<sup>22</sup> *Consulta*, 12 Nov. 1620: A.G.S. Est. 2034; Brit. Lib., Add. MS.14005, fo. 35.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, fos. 35, 45; Alfred van der Essen, "L'alliance défensive hollandovénétienne de 1619 et l'Espagne", in *Miscellanea historica in honorem Leonis van der Essen*, 2 vols. (Brussels and Paris, 1947), ii, pp. 819, 829.

<sup>24</sup> See the discourse of Carlos Coloma printed in Antonio Rodríguez Villa, *Ambrosio Spínola, primer marqués de los Balbases* (Madrid, 1904), pp. 385-6; Sultan Moulay Sidan to the States General, Marrakesh, 10 Apr. 1611, and other documents: *Les sources inédites de l'histoire du Maroc de 1530 à 1845*, ed. H. de Castries, 2nd ser., *Archives et bibliothèques des Pays-Bas*, 6 vols. (Paris and The Hague, 1906-23), i, pp. 668-71.

<sup>25</sup> Poelhekke, 'T Uytgaen van den Treves, pp. 37, 40; memorandum of Juan de Cirica: A.G.S. Est. 634, doc. 318. A recent article seems to make the mistake of confusing the religious issue of 1621 with the very different and more decisive religious issue that prevailed before 1598: see G. Parker, "Why did the Dutch Revolt last Eighty Years", *Trans. Roy. Hist. Soc.*, 5th ser., xxvi (1976), p. 62.

such a large and potentially active minority in the republic. In Madrid the mounting religious strife in the United Provinces after 1609 — both the growing dissension among the Protestants, and the persistence of the Catholics in the face of increased Calvinist pressure — was regarded as the one solid gain from the truce,<sup>26</sup> and anything likely to undermine Dutch domestic stability still further was considered highly desirable. At the same time the demand explicitly acknowledged Dutch political and religious independence and demonstrated the changed and strictly limited nature of Spanish aims. The second condition, concerning the Scheldt, was doubtless partly meant to involve the interests of the Southern Netherlands in those of the empire as a whole with respect to the confrontation with the Dutch Republic. However, it is quite clear that the revival of Antwerp was above all intended to restore part of Europe's north-south carrying trade to direct Spanish control and reduce the role of Holland, thereby stripping the Dutch of the gains they had made since the closure of the Scheldt and particularly since 1609.<sup>27</sup> The last demand, concerning the Indies, reflected the fears of the councils of the Indies and of Portugal. The Spanish intention was to prevent the formation of the West India Company, secure unqualified acceptance from the States General of Dutch exclusion from the New World and salvage at least a part of the Portuguese-Asian trade. In other words, the third condition was designed to bring Dutch colonial expansion to a complete halt.

The Spanish conditions, though they did not directly threaten the existence of the republic, stood no chance whatever of being accepted, precisely because they did threaten its prosperity and well-being. The very groups who stood to lose most from war and were least swayed by thoughts of liberating Flanders from the Spanish yoke, the merchants of Holland, would have had to make the greatest sacrifices to obtain a new truce. The almost miraculous economic boom of the previous twelve years simply could not continue beyond 1621 whether the States General gave in to Spanish pressure or not. In the circumstances the unenthusiastic were forced into the camp of Prince Maurice and the war party. Nevertheless, mere rejection of the Spanish terms was quite inadequate as a popular explanation and justification of the war. The status of the Scheldt was of concern to relatively few and its opening would actually have favoured some parts of the country,<sup>28</sup> while colonial commerce hardly seemed a

<sup>26</sup> Brit. Lib., Add. MS.14005, fos. 36<sup>v</sup>-37; *consulta*, 30 July 1621, fo. 5: A.G.S. Est. 2035.

<sup>27</sup> Coloma to Philip III, 8 June 1620, fo. 2: A.G.S. Est. 2308.

<sup>28</sup> Isabella to Philip IV, 22 Sept. 1621: *Correspondance de la cour d'Espagne*, ed. Lonchay and Cuvelier, II, doc. 109. Indeed, some Zeeland towns, notably Flushing, seemed quite anxious that it be reopened; see A. Gielens, "Onderhandelungen met Zeeland over de opening der Schelde, 1612-13", *Antwerpsch archievenblad*, 2nd ser., vi (1931), pp. 194-9.

fundamental issue in the four inland provinces now faced with heavier taxation and other burdens. Consequently, there was some reversion in the Dutch popular pamphlets of 1621 to the stirring themes of an earlier epoch:<sup>29</sup> the cruel and oppressive Spaniard was determined still to place the Dutch once again under his despotic rule. At the same time, however, there was added some additional propaganda more relevant to the times. War, it was held, would serve both the economic and political interests of the republic.<sup>30</sup> The economic argument, which was to play a major role in Dutch as well as Spanish thinking throughout the struggle, perhaps made little sense with respect to Holland, but in other areas, notably Zeeland where the truce had brought stagnation rather than growth,<sup>31</sup> war did offer some real attractions, especially the prospect of trade with the Americas and privateering. As for political aims Dutch pamphleteers claimed that the republic would never be fully secure while Spain remained so powerful, and that numerous advantages would follow were Spain to be weakened. It is difficult to see that they were wrong.

The conflict envisaged in Brussels and Madrid during the course of the deliberations of 1618-21 was emphatically not a war of conquest. Spanish officials, mindful of the strength of the Dutch defences, proposed either a limited use of the army of Flanders in conjunction with economic pressures or else, in some cases, of economic pressures alone. Cristóbal de Benavente, *veedor general* of the army of Flanders, urged the conquest of Cleves and a limited thrust in the Arnhem region, combined with embargoes in the peninsula and the Spanish viceroyalties in Italy, and a river blockade in Flanders and north-west Germany.<sup>32</sup> Others such as Carlos Coloma made similar proposals.<sup>33</sup> Hurtuño de Urizar, however, a Basque official of long experience in Flanders, proposed keeping the army entirely on the defensive and defeating the republic by economic means alone — in particular, the breaking of the Dutch north-south carrying trade by embargo.<sup>34</sup> The peculiarly Spanish inclination towards a systematic use of embargoes had, in fact, been generally apparent both in Spain and Flanders since the sporadic attempts at such action in the years 1598-1607. Philip

<sup>29</sup> Anon., *Propositie ghedaen vanden Ambassadeur Peckius* (The Hague, 1621; Knuttel 3187); anon., *Aen-merckinge op de propositie vanden Ambassadeur Peckius* (Amsterdam, 1621; Knuttel 3196), p. 8, states that Peckius had demanded that: "We should recognize the king of Spain as our lord and submit ourselves to the Spanish yoke"; see also anon., *Den Compaignon vanden verresien den Waerschouwer* (The Hague, 1621; Knuttel 3204), fo. 2<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>30</sup> *Den Compaignon*, fos. 3-4.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, fo. 3; anon., *Resolutie by de heeren Raeden ende Vroetschappen der Stadt Aherlem [sic] ghenomen* (Haarlem, 1630; Knuttel 4009), p. 8; F. Snapper, *Oorlogsinvloeden op de overzeese handel van Holland, 1551-1719* (Amsterdam, 1959), pp. 63, 65-6.

<sup>32</sup> Brit. Lib., Add. MS.14005, fos. 37-9.

<sup>33</sup> Rodríguez Villa, *Ambrosio Spínola*, pp. 387-9.

<sup>34</sup> Recommendations of Hurtuño de Uriçar, 3 Feb. 1618: A.G.S. Est. 2847.

III's embargoes had undoubtedly made some impact.<sup>35</sup> It was an appealing argument that much greater success could be achieved simply by maintaining the embargoes longer and with more determination than before. Thus, embargo had a central place in all Spanish strategic thinking of the period. The strategy actually decided on in the first instance was that favoured by most officials, a limited land war combined with economic pressure.

The expiry of the truce in April 1621 was followed not by any immediate outbreak of hostilities, but by months of general uncertainty both in the Low Countries and the peninsula, to which the death of Philip III a few days before the expiry added considerably.<sup>36</sup> However, to those in the know, the situation in the spring and summer of 1621 was much less unclear than it was generally, since there was no sign of any shift in previously stated positions at either Madrid or The Hague, and the young king, Philip IV, was clearly resolved to follow the path indicated by his father. The inaction of the army of Flanders was in fact due to its lack of preparedness and especially its lack of cash.<sup>37</sup> Only in the economic sphere did the conflict begin in earnest in April 1621. Dutch vessels were ordered out of all ports of the empire in Europe and North Africa and everything owned or manufactured by subjects of the republic was placed under a total embargo. A massive exodus took place from Flanders, the peninsula and southern Italy. At San Sebastián the entire Dutch contingent left port on the day of the expiry,<sup>38</sup> while on the Spanish east coast the viceroy of Valencia within five days expelled 41 Dutch vessels including 11 from the salt pans of La Mata alone.<sup>39</sup> Eventually, however, the land war began also. Spínola, commander of the Flanders army, first of all moved against Dutch-occupied Jülich which fell after seven months of siege in February 1622; during the summer of 1622 he invaded Dutch Brabant capturing Steenberghe and laying siege to Bergen-op-Zoom. This siege, though not discussed by Alcalá-Zamora, was in fact a major turning-point of the war. It was not merely unsuccessful but rather a ruinous failure in which Spínola's strike-force of 18,000 men melted away through death and desertion to 7,000 in only a few months.<sup>40</sup> Not surprisingly,

<sup>35</sup> J. H. Kernkamp, *De handel op den vijand, 1572-1609*, 2 vols. (Utrecht, 1931-4), ii, pp. 227-8, 252, 260, 271; E. Sluiter, "Dutch-Spanish Rivalry in the Caribbean Area, 1594-1609", *Hispanic Amer. Hist. Rev.*, xxviii (1948), pp. 170, 176-7.

<sup>36</sup> Isabella to Philip IV, 26 July 1621: *Correspondance de la cour d'Espagne*, ed. Lonchay and Cuvelier, ii, doc. 73; Poelhekke, *'T Uytgaen van den Treves*, pp. 1-3.

<sup>37</sup> *Consultas*, 17 and 30 July 1621: A.G.S. Est. 2035.

<sup>38</sup> Martín de Amezcuita to Philip IV, 14 Apr. 1621: A.G.S. Guerra 873.

<sup>39</sup> Viceroy of Valencia to Philip IV, 18 Apr. 1621: Consejo de Aragón, Archivo de la Corona de Aragón, Barcelona (hereafter A.C.A. C.A.), 684 86/2.

<sup>40</sup> *Consulta*, 27 Oct. 1622, fo. 3: A.G.S. Est. 2036.

the setback caused a considerable shock in Madrid and indeed provoked a marked reaction against the whole concept of using the army to put pressure on the republic.<sup>41</sup> Spanish ministers, with Olivares increasingly prominent among them,<sup>42</sup> concluded that besieging Dutch towns was nothing but a waste of men and money. The Council of State reckoned that in Flanders in 1622 it had spent to no purpose some 3,700,000 ducats from the Spanish and Italian revenues.<sup>43</sup> The decision to dispense entirely with the army as a means of putting pressure on the Dutch, though not finally taken until after 1623, was certainly in the making. In December 1623 Brussels was instructed to reduce the monthly expenditure on the army from 300,000 to 250,000 ducats and to increase naval spending in Flanders from 20,000 to 70,000 ducats a month.<sup>44</sup>

The Breda campaign of 1624-5, the most famous Spanish success of the war and the inspiration for one of Velázquez's greatest paintings, was begun on Spínola's own initiative, possibly to redeem his reputation, but in any case to the utter dismay, when they learnt the news, of Philip IV's ministers in Madrid.<sup>45</sup> Breda was even better fortified than Bergen-op-Zoom and it was considered in Madrid that, even if Breda fell, the siege would serve only to decimate once again both the army and the king's coffers. Indeed, even Spínola's triumph, the taking of Breda and the enormous impact of its capture in the capitals of Europe, failed to weaken in the least the conviction now deeply entrenched in Spain that besieging Dutch towns was completely pointless, leading inevitably and only to "little fruit and much cost".<sup>46</sup> There was some half-hearted discussion as to whether Dutch territory could be usefully invaded without besieging towns, but from this nothing emerged. After the fall of Breda, Isabella, Philip's aunt and the governess of the Southern Netherlands, was instructed to keep the army strictly on the defensive.<sup>47</sup> During the period 1625-35 the army of Flanders remained under these orders and, apart from the brief invasion of 1629 to Amersfoort intended to force the lifting of the siege of Den Bosch by the Dutch, fought only *guerra defensiva*. The Breda campaign, then, led to what by any standard is an extraordinary situation. A predominantly land power, much weaker than its opponent at sea, having won a resounding victory on land, resolved to dispense with its land forces and defeat its enemy by economic pressure alone.

<sup>41</sup> *Consultas*, 23 Oct. 1622, and 16 Sept. and 26 Oct. 1623: A.G.S. Est. 2037.

<sup>42</sup> *Consultas*, 14 and 24 June 1623: A.G.S. Est. 2037.

<sup>43</sup> *Consulta*, 14 Apr. 1623: A.G.S. Est. 2037.

<sup>44</sup> La Cueva to Philip IV, 4 Jan. 1624: A.G.S. Est. 2038; Isabella to Philip IV, 7 Jan. 1624: A.G.S. Est. 2038.

<sup>45</sup> *Consultas*, 18 Sept. and 5 Dec. 1624: A.G.S. Est. 2038.

<sup>46</sup> *Consultas*, 11 Mar., 29 June and 28 Sept. 1625: A.G.S. Est. 2039.

<sup>47</sup> Rodríguez Villa, *Ambrosio Spínola*, pp. 440, 446-7; Alcalá-Zamora, *España, Flandes y el Mar del Norte*, p. 210.

This economic pressure certainly included a measure of naval warfare. Spain possessed in 1621 substantial naval forces at Cádiz, Lisbon, on the Basque coast and elsewhere and, in 1621, new *armadas* were established in Flanders and Galicia and at Gibraltar. However, these forces were not used, at any rate before 1639, to challenge the Dutch navy as such. Their role was to protect Spanish and Portuguese traffic, especially the Atlantic *flotas*, and to disrupt Dutch commercial shipping. As regards the latter, especially high hopes were placed on the *armada* of Flanders and, initially, on the Gibraltar squadron, on which some 150,000 ducats yearly was spent in the early 1620s.<sup>48</sup> But the squadron and straits of Gibraltar in the event posed a much less considerable hindrance to the Dutch Mediterranean trade than Spanish ministers had hoped. Although some Dutch vessels were lost at Gibraltar, the Dutch admiralty colleges countered the threat by forming the *straetvaert* into large, heavily armed convoys, usually of over fifty vessels carrying some seven hundred guns, convoys that were too strong for the Gibraltar squadron to tackle.<sup>49</sup> Despite this, the Mediterranean convoy system was a major nuisance and expense for Dutch merchants and added considerably to the strain on the resources of the Dutch navy. Nevertheless, only the *armada* of Flanders caused heavy losses to the Dutch at sea.

At first, the *armada* of Flanders grew slowly. In 1622 there were only four *coningsschepen* (king's ships), though these captured a dozen Dutch vessels in that same year, mostly carriers of salt and wine from western France.<sup>50</sup> After the capture of Bergen-op-Zoom, however, the build-up in the Flemish ports acquired new momentum.<sup>51</sup> By 1625 there were twelve *coningsschepen*, a number of privateers and plans for acquiring up to fifty royal vessels and, although expansion ceased with the financial collapse of 1629 in Flanders, there were, throughout the 1630s and 1640s, some twenty large warships in Philip's northern *armada*. To this force the Dutch admiralty authorities could find no answer. Having formed the *straetvaert* into a costly convoy system, the Dutch were by 1625 forced to use convoys on every route to the Danish Sound, Norway and Muscovy, as well as to London, Yarmouth, "Scotland" (usually Newcastle), St. Malo, Nantes,

<sup>48</sup> La Cueva to Philip IV, 22 Sept. and 26 Dec. 1621: A.G.S. Est. 2310; Philip IV to commander of the *armada del estrecho*, 2 Feb. 1623: A.G.S. Guerra 888.

<sup>49</sup> Records of the Admiralty Colleges, verzameling Bisdom, Algemeen Rijksarchief, The Hague (hereafter A.R.A. Bis.), vol. 48 ii, pp. 89, 164, 491. The fifty-one *straetvaerders* of the convoy of May 1622 carried a total of 720 guns, an immense armament for the time.

<sup>50</sup> "Relacion de las pressas q ha hecho el armada", 8 Oct. 1622: A.G.S. Est. 2312.

<sup>51</sup> A.R.A. Bis. 52, fo. 106; A.R.A. Bis. 53, fo. 140; A.R.A. Bis 54, fo. 305; A.R.A. Bis. 55, fo. 63<sup>v</sup>.

Bordeaux and Bayonne.<sup>52</sup> However, it was simply not possible to convey all Dutch sea-borne trade by convoys and, in any case, the *armada* was too powerful for any but the strongest escort squadrons. Immense effort was put into blockading the *armada*'s bases, Ostend, Nieuwpoort and Dunkirk, with usually thirty and often more Dutch warships patrolling the Flemish coast, but it was impossible, given the conditions of the time (especially after storms and during the long winter nights), to make the blockade fully effective.<sup>53</sup> The *armada* consequently carried out some extremely punishing sweeps,<sup>54</sup> the first in November 1625 when several dozen Dutch vessels were seized and sunk. From January to March 1627 the *armada*, together with the privateers, took 38 Dutch and English vessels and sank a further 18. In the first two months of 1628 the *armada* sank 3 vessels and captured 36 Dutch and English prizes, valued at 400,000 ducats — or more than the entire cost of maintaining the army of Flanders for a period of six weeks. In the winter of 1636-7 the *coningsschepen* took 35 prizes and in 1642, among numerous others, captured a convoy of 9 returning from Archangel with furs and caviare worth 130,000 ducats. In view of such losses it is not surprising that, as Spanish officials noted with satisfaction, freight and insurance rates in Holland were forced up drastically.<sup>55</sup> Between 1625 (when it was already much higher than in 1621) and 1645, the cost of shipping timber from Norway to Holland increased by over 50 per cent and at times by nearly 100 per cent. The benefit of this sharp rise in Dutch costs was of course mainly enjoyed by Holland's competitors.

The *armada* of Flanders, besides disrupting Dutch merchant shipping, was also employed against another major pillar of Dutch prosperity — the North Sea fisheries. It had long been a Spanish aim to attack the famous herring fishery, which was thought to account for some three-fifths of the total Dutch fish revenues, earning over 600,000 ducats yearly.<sup>56</sup> Some herring-busses were sunk as early as

<sup>52</sup> Papers of the Dutch Admiralty Colleges (hereafter A.R.A. adm.) 2456, Res. Coll. Zeeland, 21 Feb., 29 June, 11 July and 3 Oct. 1626; the Bordeaux convoys sometimes took the Calais *vaerders* and others with them; at other times separate convoys were organized for Calais, Rouen, St. Malo and Nantes.

<sup>53</sup> A.R.A. Bis. 51, fos. 18-19; A.R.A. Bis. 52, fos. 71-2; A.R.A. Bis. 53, fo. 33. The blockade force was strengthened and its official fire-power raised from over 600 to over 700 guns in 1627: A.R.A. Bis. 54, fos. 305<sup>v</sup>-307.

<sup>54</sup> Alcalá-Zamora, *op. cit.*, p. 205; La Cueva to Philip IV, 23 Apr. 1627: A.G.S. Est. 2318; Isabella to Philip IV, 11 Mar. 1628: A.G.S. Est. 2321; E. Stols, *De Spaanse Brabanders of de handelsbetrekkingen der zuidelijke Nederlanden met de Iberische wereld* (Brussels, 1971), pp. 172-6.

<sup>55</sup> La Cueva to Philip IV, 6 Mar. 1628: A.G.S. Est. 2321; J. Schreiner, "Die Niederländer und die norwegische Holzausfuhr im 17. Jahrhundert", *Tijd. Gesch.*, xlix (1934), p. 324.

<sup>56</sup> *Analecta Vaticano-Belgica*, 2nd ser., *Nonciature de Flandre*, vi (1938), pp. 658-9; P. J. Blok, "Een merkwaardig aanvalsplan gericht tegen visscherij en handel der vereenigde Nederlanden in de eerste helft der 17de eeuw", *Bijdragen en mededelingen van het historisch genootschap*, xix (1898), pp. 8-9.

1622 but the real pressure began in October 1625 when the *armada* caught the South Holland division of the herring fleet off the Scottish coast, destroying 80 busses according to Spanish sources and 60 according to reports from Newcastle.<sup>57</sup> The States General assigned as many warships as was feasible to the protection of the fisheries (19 in 1626) but the overburdened admiralty colleges, hampered by a constant shortage of cash, could not cope.<sup>58</sup> Even when naval escorts were up to strength, which was rare, it was difficult to shield the herring fleets from attack because the size and complexity of their nets compelled the busses to spread over a wide area. In 1626 there were more losses, while in October 1627 the Dunkirkers crushed part of the naval escort and captured and sank many dozens of herring-busses.<sup>59</sup> Another heavy attack occurred in 1632, while in August 1635 the *armada* ravaged the Zuider Zee division of the *grootte visscherij* on its way to the fishing grounds, capturing 906 herring-men and sinking 89 herring-busses, according to Spanish sources, and over 100, according to the town of Enkhuizen, which took the heaviest loss.<sup>60</sup> In 1637 well over one hundred more busses were destroyed; and in 1639,<sup>61</sup> and again in 1642, when Zierikzee alone lost 18 herring-busses, there was further considerable damage.<sup>62</sup> Some idea of the scale of losses to the Dutch herring towns is given by the reports of the States of Holland to the States General on the situation at Maassluis, the leading herring port of the South Holland area supplying the Rotterdam market.<sup>63</sup> The South Holland fleets formed one of the three main groups of fleets, those of Zeeland, South Holland and the Zuider Zee constituting the Dutch herring fishery. The three were of roughly equal size though the Zeeland fleets formed a slightly smaller entity than the other two.<sup>64</sup> From 1631 to 1634 Maassluis, besides losing 25 non-herring fishing craft, lost 162 busses with their nets, affecting nearly two thousand fishermen; another 50 were lost in the years 1635-7 when Enkhuizen, in fact, took much heavier losses. Herring-busses, sizeable craft with an average crew size of ten, though often manned by as many as sixteen men, were

<sup>57</sup> *Consulta*, 25 Nov. 1625: A.G.S. Est. 2039; A.R.A. Bis. 52, fos. 260<sup>v</sup>, 271, 277; *Calendar of State Papers: Venetian*, 1625-6, p. 213.

<sup>58</sup> A.R.A. Bis. 54, fos. 130, 139, 163<sup>v</sup>, 165-6.

<sup>59</sup> *Consulta*, 8 Oct. 1627: A.G.S. Est. 2041.

<sup>60</sup> A.R.A. adm. 2458, Res. Coll. Zeeland, 29 July 1632; A.R.A. Bis. 62, fo. 191; *Memorial histórico español*, 49 vols. (Madrid, 1851-1948), xiii, pp. 247-8, 272, 308; *Calendar of State Papers: Venetian*, 1632-6, pp. 44-5.

<sup>61</sup> *Memorial histórico español*, xiv, pp. 201-2.

<sup>62</sup> Lieuwe van Aitzema, *Historie of verhael van saken van staet en oorlogh in, ende ontrent de Vereenigde Nederlanden*, 14 vols. (The Hague, 1667-71), v, pp. 360-1.

<sup>63</sup> A.R.A. Bis. 62, fo. 59; Aitzema, *op. cit.*, vi, p. 624.

<sup>64</sup> The naval escort for the Zeeland fleets was fixed in ratio of 5:7 or, in some years, of 4:6 as against both the South Holland and Zuider Zee divisions: A.R.A. Bis. 50, fo. 60, and A.R.A. Bis. 52, fo. 72.



officially reckoned as being worth over 5,000 guilders each, so that in this seven-year period Maassluis lost one million guilders worth of herring gear, the equivalent of 350,000 Spanish ducats. If one counts this as half the damage suffered by one-third of the total herring fleet during about half of the period of heavy Spanish pressure (surely a conservative estimate), the total damage, without counting loss of herring sales or ransoms paid for captured fishermen, may well have been in excess of twelve million guilders. Nevertheless, despite the extent of this destruction, Spanish naval activity has scarcely figured in recent accounts of the herring fishery in the seventeenth century,<sup>65</sup> though it has been suggested, contrary to what was once commonly believed, that the herring fleets were in fact in decline well before the first Anglo-Dutch war of 1652-4. It has been noticed that certain herring fleets, notably those of Schiedam and Delftshaven, both belonging to the South Holland division,<sup>66</sup> contracted markedly in the first half of the century. What should be noted in addition, however, is that the decline at Schiedam at least, from an average of 49 busses in the decade 1616-25 to only 23 in the decade 1626-35 (a loss of more than half) is very abrupt, suggesting not a gradual process but a sharp setback in the 1620s and 1630s — caused, surely, by Spanish naval action. Certainly other factors besides the Dunkirkers can be pointed to as contributing to the herring recession in these years. The river blockade damaged herring sales, at least briefly, while the salt shortage contributed to the sharp increase in herring prices in Holland after 1627<sup>67</sup> and, possibly, to the slight shrinking in the proportion of herring in Dutch exports to the Baltic.<sup>68</sup> But these phenomena were also consequences of Spanish actions and ones designed to complement the activity of the *armada* and, to that extent, they would tend to strengthen the argument that there is a direct link between Spanish pressure and the decline of the Dutch herring fishery.

Yet the *armada* of Flanders, for all its undoubted effectiveness, should not be seen as being in itself Spain's alternative to the army of Flanders as the principal means of attacking the Dutch. When Philip

<sup>65</sup> Kranenburg does not mention the Spanish campaign and nor does van der Woude in his study of the Noorderkwartier, though it is mentioned in some older works such as that of de Jonge: H. A. Kranenburg, *De zeevisserij van Holland in de tijd der Republiek* (Amsterdam, 1946); A. M. van der Woude, *Het Noorderkwartier*, 2 vols. (A. A. G. Bijdragen, xvi, Wageningen, 1972); J. C. de Jonge, *Geschiedenis van het Nederlandsche zeewesen*, 5 vols. (Haarlem, 1858-62), i, pp. 235-6, 262.

<sup>66</sup> Kranenburg, *op. cit.*, pp. 33-4, 217-18; H. Wätjen, "Zur Statistik der holländischen Heringfischerei im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert", *Hansische Geschichtsblätter*, xvi (1910), p. 159.

<sup>67</sup> N. W. Posthumus, *Nederlandsche prijsgeschiedenis*, 2 vols. (Leiden, 1943-64), i, p. 85, and ii, pp. 277, 658.

<sup>68</sup> A. Christensen, *Dutch Trade to the Baltic about 1600* (Copenhagen and The Hague, 1941), diagram 20; van der Woude, *Noorderkwartier*, ii, p. 406.

IV's ministers stated, as did the duque del Infantado in July 1622, that the "greatest hostility that can be shown to the Dutch is to deprive them absolutely and totally of their commerce, increase the *armada* of Flanders and arrange matters at the Straits [of Gibraltar] so that they enter and leave [the Mediterranean] with difficulty",<sup>69</sup> what they meant was that naval action was to be part of a wider programme in which the embargoes were to be the main element. Alcalá-Zamora, though he misses several of the main points concerning the Dunkirkers and their effect, nevertheless maintains that the naval offensive was the principal Spanish weapon and dismisses the embargoes, on which he says little, as unworkable, ineffective and of only marginal importance.<sup>70</sup> In fact, however, Spain kept within fairly modest limits in taking the offensive at sea. Annual expenditure on the *armada* of Flanders never exceeded 600,000 ducats and was usually more in the region of 400,000 ducats or less — about one-eighth of the spending on the army.<sup>71</sup> Arguably, the new commercial system was considerably costlier, required a greater administrative effort and had a far heavier impact on the Dutch and Iberian economies.

The departure of several hundred Dutch vessels from Philip IV's European dominions in April 1621, though it severely jolted Europe's commercial structure, was only a first step in the laying of the embargoes. Dutch flags and passports were no longer seen in the peninsula, but Dutch merchants were able, at first, to continue their trade there by various means. Dutch cargoes were transported in neutral shipping, especially English and Hanseatic,<sup>72</sup> while some Dutch vessels continued to visit Spanish-controlled ports under the pretence of being neutrals. Even so, the setback was considerable. Many of the eight to nine hundred Dutch vessels which had traded annually with the Spanish territories during the last years of the truce<sup>73</sup> could no longer be used, causing a serious slump in shipping in Holland.<sup>74</sup>

<sup>69</sup> *Consulta*, 6 July 1622, fo. 1<sup>v</sup>: A.G.S. Est. 2036.

<sup>70</sup> Alcalá-Zamora, *España, Flandes y el Mar del Norte*, pp. 182-4.

<sup>71</sup> "Relacion de lo q SM<sup>d</sup> ha menester . . ." gives 600,000 ducats for the peak year 1626: A.G.S. Hacienda 621; the *consulta* of 8 Dec. 1630 gives under 300,000 ducats for 1631: A.G.S. Est. 2148; and the "Relacion de la provision . . ." gives 349,800 for 1644: A.G.S. Est. 2062.

<sup>72</sup> H. Taylor, "Trade, Neutrality and the 'English Road', 1630-48", *Econ. Hist. Rev.*, 2nd ser., xxv (1972), pp. 236-60; H. Kellenbenz, *Unternehmerkräfte im Hamburger Portugal- und Spanienhandel, 1590-1625* (Hamburg, 1954), p. 63.

<sup>73</sup> Francisco de Retama, in his "Consideraciones . . .", fo. 4, estimates 821 vessels yearly: A.G.S. Est. 2847; Alcalá-Zamora, in what is presumably a misprint, gives the figure of 8,000: Alcalá-Zamora, *op. cit.*, p. 179.

<sup>74</sup> La Cueva to Philip IV, 17 Oct. 1621: A.G.S. Est. 2310; La Cueva to Philip IV, 11 Mar. 1622: A.G.S. Est. 2311. That there was a shipping slump in Holland in or around 1621 is not in dispute; however, the phenomenon is usually explained without any reference to Spain. See Christensen, *Dutch Trade to the Baltic*, p. 88; M. Bogucka, "Amsterdam and the Baltic in the First Half of the Seventeenth Century", *Econ. Hist. Rev.*, 2nd ser., xxvi (1973), pp. 437-8.

Moreover Dutch ships still trading with the peninsula after April 1621 had to sail mainly with foreign crews, which forced thousands of Dutch seamen out of the carrying trade, though there was now the alternative of an expanding navy and the newly-founded West India Company. The carrying of salt from Portugal, in which a high proportion of the Dutch ships visiting the peninsula had been involved was continued, though sporadically, with French and particularly Scottish crews — as the States General explained to the Moroccan sultan, baffled as to why numerous Scots sailors were suddenly falling into the hands of his captains off Portugal and why The Hague desired him to treat these Scotsmen as he would Dutchmen.<sup>75</sup> Yet despite the early impact of the embargoes, ministers in Madrid, aware that the Dutch could not easily be forced to give in and confronted daily by evidence of loopholes, were at first highly dissatisfied with the working of their measures.

Little by little the embargoes were extended and refined. Local authorities in the ports were instructed to insist that neutral shippers to the peninsula bring certificates from their ports of embarkation, signed by magistrates and stating that cargoes had not originated in the republic and were not owned by Dutch subjects.<sup>76</sup> Ships owned by neutrals but built in Holland after the expiry of the truce were also placed under embargo. Appeals from the royal Council of Finance, disturbed by the shortage of copper after 1621,<sup>77</sup> and from the authorities concerned with organizing American trade in Seville,<sup>78</sup> hampered by the growing shortage of naval stores, that Dutch ships be allowed with German crews to bring at least some supplies, were repeatedly rejected: it was made clear in the Council of State that the exclusion of the Dutch was to take priority over every other consideration no matter how vital. Early in 1622 the *corregidores* (district officers) of the Castilian ports, under new instructions, began inspecting neutral shipping more methodically than previously and the first English and Hanseatic ships were seized for carrying Dutch goods.<sup>79</sup> In Galicia similar new boarding procedures were introduced in 1623-4 by the captain-general, the marqués de Cerralvo.<sup>80</sup> Nevertheless evidence continued to accumulate that local officials were often less than zealous in imposing the embargoes and that the system of

<sup>75</sup> States General to Moulay Sidan, The Hague, 20 Jan. 1623: *Les sources inédites de l'histoire du Maroc*, ed. Castries, 2nd ser., *Archives et bibliothèques des Pays-Bas*, 1, pp. 261-2.

<sup>76</sup> *Consulta*, 27 Nov. 1621: A.G.S. Est. 2645.

<sup>77</sup> *Consulta*, 7 July and 3 Nov. 1621: A.G.S. Est. 2645.

<sup>78</sup> Antonio Domínguez Ortiz, "Guerra económica y comercio extranjero en el reinado de Felipe IV", *Hispania*, xxiii (1963), p. 73.

<sup>79</sup> *Corregidor* of Guipúzcoa to Philip IV, 1 May 1622: A.G.S. Est. 2847.

<sup>80</sup> Cerralvo to Philip IV, Corunna, 26 May 1623: A.G.S. Guerra 898; Cerralvo to Philip IV, 19 Feb. 1624: A.G.S. Guerra 901.

certificates was as yet very imperfect.<sup>81</sup> A case particularly noted in Madrid was that of a New Christian of Lisbon, Jorge Rodríguez, who had been arrested for infringing the embargoes and in whose possession was a letter from a Jewish merchant of Hamburg, Duarte Esteves de Piña, revealing that the senate of Hamburg was openly providing merchants with false certificates asserting that they had sworn before magistrates that they were complying with the embargoes, when in fact no such oaths were actually taken. In October 1623 the crown, using special commissioners, simultaneously put into effect an *embargo general* in Andalusia and Portugal, seizing 160 neutral and ostensibly neutral vessels, including 44 (the largest group) in San Lúcar and 33 in Cádiz.<sup>82</sup> Trade was brought to a standstill for months and there was a storm of protest from foreign ambassadors, but the exceptionally thorough search that took place led to numerous foreign merchants suffering fines and confiscations for acting as intermediaries for the Dutch and the arrest of several secret correspondents of Dutch merchants who had been operating along the coast from Málaga to Lisbon.

Such findings made it clear that there was a limit to how far commercial regulation could be tightened while employing the existing administrative machinery.<sup>83</sup> If more was to be achieved, new and more efficient institutions were needed. Already in December 1622 Philip IV had set up a new central economic committee, the *junta de comercio*, to advise on virtually every aspect of Iberian economic life, but with the specific purpose of finding means of rendering the measures against the Dutch more effective.<sup>84</sup> Also in 1622 it was decided that implementation of the embargoes could no longer be entrusted to the ordinary local administration, particularly not in the most vital areas, Andalusia and Portugal, and plans were accordingly drawn up for establishing more specialized and readily disciplined officers. Commissioners of commerce were appointed in Seville, San Lúcar, Lisbon, Oporto, Bilbao and other ports and also in the Canaries and the Azores where the Dutch had begun to go for many of the products they could no longer obtain in the peninsula.<sup>85</sup> Then in October 1624, in a crucial step towards a reformed commercial administration, Philip IV set up the *almirantazgo de los países septentrionales*, based in Seville, to supersede completely the previous

<sup>81</sup> Fernando Alvia de Castro to Philip IV, Lisbon, 8 and 19 Oct. 1622: A.G.S. Est. 2847; Kellenbenz, *Unternehmerkräfte*, p. 26.

<sup>82</sup> Instructions to Pedro de Arze: A.G.S. Contaduría Mayor de Cuentas (hereafter A.G.S. C.M.C.) 2267 expediente 10; papers relating to the *embargo general* in San Lúcar: A.G.S. C.M.C. 1437; Pedro de Arze to Philip IV, Cádiz, 18 Feb. 1624: A.G.S. Guerra 895; Kellenbenz, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

<sup>83</sup> *Consultas*, 6 July, 28 Sept. and 8 Oct. 1622: A.G.S. Est. 2036.

<sup>84</sup> Philip IV to Montescarlos, 1 Dec. 1622: A.G.S. Est. 2847.

<sup>85</sup> "Los comissarios q su M<sup>d</sup> ha nombrado para lo del comercio": A.G.S. Est. 2847.

arrangements for the control of trade between Andalusia and northern Europe.<sup>86</sup> Partly, the *almirantazgo* was intended to organize heavily armed convoys sailing between San Lúcar and Dunkirk, but in this it was not very successful. Its major importance was as an extremely formidable customs apparatus which by 1626 was staffed by sixty regular officers operating in all the Andalusian ports. In 1625 an *almirantazgo* was also established in Flanders, based at St. Winokbergen near Dunkirk, with the purpose of acting in conjunction with the body at Seville.<sup>87</sup> In the Southern Netherlands and eventually also in the Hanseatic towns the *almirantazgos*, using a system of permanent residents, were able to develop a considerably more sophisticated framework of procedures and certificates than had previously existed. In addition, to handle the many cases arising from infringements of the embargoes with reasonable dispatch, the crown removed such cases from the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts and set up a special judicial structure for commercial cases at the head of which it placed the *tribunal mayor del almirantazgo* formed in 1625 at Madrid.

Clearly the impact of the new methods was considerable. If the *embargo general* had only a temporary effect, the new boarding procedures, the *almirantazgos* and the commercial courts transformed conditions in Spain's ports for good. The city administrations of Seville, San Lúcar, Málaga and elsewhere protested repeatedly that their trade was being ruined,<sup>88</sup> but the crown remained unmoved. Philip IV's ministers preferred to suffer loss of trade and commercial revenues if in so doing they could injure the Dutch. The pressure was unrelenting. One Spanish writer declared that:

with the *almirantazgo* all the trade of the entire world passed to Holland and Amsterdam . . . for the *almirantazgo*, armed with the decrees against contraband, especially that of 15 October 1625, closed the door to all commerce, of friends and enemies alike, with their certificates, inspections, condemnations and confiscations such that within a short time, Spain was without trade, ships, supplies or foodstuffs, customs revenues fell and the produce of the country was without means of exit.<sup>89</sup>

And indeed, the evidence for the contraction of those sectors of Castilian commerce in which the Dutch had predominated until 1621, while the share of neutrals sharply increased, is generally so substantial that the historian has either to attribute the phenomenon to problems of supply affecting the Dutch alone, of which there is no indication, or accept that in large measure the Dutch were shut out of

<sup>86</sup> Royal *cédula*, 4 Oct. 1624: A.G.S. Est. 2847; Domínguez Ortiz, "Guerra económica y comercio extranjero", pp. 78-9.

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 79.

<sup>88</sup> *Consulta de parte*, 11 Aug. 1627: A.G.S. Est. 4126; *consulta* of the *junta de comercio*, 30 Jan. 1626 and 28 Sept. 1627: A.G.S. Est. 2645; Seville to Philip IV, 7 Sept. 1627: A.G.S. Est. 2646.

<sup>89</sup> "Causas por donde creció el comercio de Olanda y se hizo vn monopolio vniuersal": Brit. Lib., Add. MS.14005, fo. 27.

Castile by Spanish action. The export of Andalusian salt, which had been carried only by the Dutch, dwindled in the four years 1621-5 to virtually nothing.<sup>90</sup> Indications of a chronic shortage of copper, timber and other naval stores from 1621 are so frequent that it can scarcely be doubted that the supply of these materials to Spain was interrupted. In exporting to and carrying from Bilbao, Santander and San Sebastián, the English, French and other neutrals took a dramatically increased share of the trade from 1621 while at the same time the total value of trade to the north Castilian ports was almost exactly 10 per cent lower in the years 1621-4 than it had been in 1617-20 and, after 1625, much more than 10 per cent lower.<sup>91</sup> The conclusion must surely be that the Dutch carrying trade to Castile largely collapsed.

In eastern Spain, as in Castile, economic warfare against the Dutch was waged with considerable determination. The crown had three initial aims in the east of the peninsula:<sup>92</sup> to halt the supplying of Valencia, Barcelona and Alicante by the Dutch with the grain and fish which traditionally had been imported there in massive quantity, to deny the Dutch the use of the salt pans, especially those of La Mata and Ibiza, and to prevent the entry of Dutch goods into Castile from the neighbouring French port of Bayonne via Navarre and Aragón. In 1623 a fourth aim was added when, prompted by the *junta de comercio*, the crown sought to exclude spices from the Dutch East Indies, previously a major import at Alicante, by decreeing that in future, whatever merchants and ships brought the spices, only Portuguese spices registered in Lisbon could be admitted.<sup>93</sup> These aims, despite some evasion facilitated by the great strength of local institutions in the eastern viceroyalties, were on the whole achieved. As in Castile new boarding and inspection procedures were introduced at the ports and trade contracted, with sharp falls both in the importing of foodstuffs and the export of local wines, soap and fruit.<sup>94</sup> At a time when salt was short in much of Europe, the salt pans of Valencia and Ibiza fell almost into disuse owing to the efforts of the viceroys of Valencia and Mallorca to drive the Dutch away.<sup>95</sup> Spices were

<sup>90</sup> *Consulta*, 8 Mar. 1626: A.G.S. Hacienda 621.

<sup>91</sup> "Diezmos del mar de Castilla" gives the yearly revenue totals for the various north coast ports for 1617-28: A.G.S. C.M.C. 1950 expediente 1.

<sup>92</sup> "Para la prohibición del comercio de los rebeldes", sections on Aragón, Catalonia and Valencia: A.G.S. Est. 2847.

<sup>93</sup> Protest of the *arrendador* of the *aduana* of Alicante: A.C.A. C.A. 603 12/16; "Discurso sobre la prohibición de la entrada de pimienta de la India oriental en Alicante": A.C.A. C.A. 603 12/28.

<sup>94</sup> *Consulta*, 12 Sept. 1630: A.G.S. Est. 2648; "Diputats del gnl del reyno de Valencia", 24 Jan. 1629: A.C.A. C.A. 576.

<sup>95</sup> Viceroy of Valencia to Philip IV, 11 Feb. 1623: A.C.A. C.A. 603 doc. 5. Pedro Martínez de Vera stated that no salt was extracted from La Mata in 1622 owing to the "wars of Flanders": Pedro Martínez de Vera to Nicolas Mensa, 9 Mar. 1623: A.C.A. C.A. 603 doc. 6.

checked systematically for Lisbon seals, much to the distress of the city council of Alicante.<sup>96</sup> The loophole through Navarre proved extremely difficult to close and the cortes at Pamplona fought its hardest to resist the jurisdiction of the *tribunal mayor del almirantazgo* in Navarre; but it indicates the extent of royal determination that the question of Castilian procedures and jurisdiction in checking trade became the foremost constitutional issue in Navarre and remained so throughout the 1620s.

More important than the campaign in eastern Spain, however, though likewise unmentioned by Alcalá-Zamora, was the campaign in Portugal. The Portuguese ports were a major market for naval stores and one of the largest for Baltic grain, as well as being an important source of supply for sugar and other Brazilian products, and wines, olive oil and fruit; moreover, at Setúbal lay the richest salt pans in all Europe. Portuguese trade was in fact of fundamental importance in the overall structure of Dutch European commerce since much of the Dutch Baltic trade depended directly on it;<sup>97</sup> and Portugal, in the sphere of European trade, was in fact Philip IV's most vital possession after Andalusia. Consequently, throughout the period from 1621 until the Portuguese secession in 1640, the regulation of Portuguese commerce was a major preoccupation in Madrid. The decision to circumvent the local Portuguese administration, which in Spain was regarded as being particularly unreliable, was put into effect even before that relating to Andalusia. Despite the fact that since annexation in 1580 Madrid had been wary of antagonizing Portuguese feeling and had mostly left Portugal's administration as it was, from 1623 the crown did not hesitate to use Castilian officers to impose the embargoes and placed them under the jurisdiction not of the Council of Portugal but of the Council of War, staffed mainly by Castilian noblemen. Considerable tension developed between Portuguese and Castilian officers in Portugal, and also between the two councils in Madrid,<sup>98</sup> but there was no relaxation of the pressure. Diego López de Haro, who directed the operation in the Lisbon-Setúbal area, introduced the new boarding procedures and, by May 1623, reported to Madrid that the Dutch had given up Lisbon and were being driven from Setúbal.<sup>99</sup> One vessel manned by Scots escaped from Setúbal only by threatening López de Haro and his

<sup>96</sup> Alicante to Philip IV, 14 Mar. 1624: A.C.A. C.A. 603 12/3; viceroy of Valencia to Philip IV, 15 Jan. 1624: A.C.A. C.A. 603 12/14. On Ibiza, see the *consulta* of 8 Aug. 1631: A.G.S. Guerra 1030.

<sup>97</sup> Bogucka, "Amsterdam and the Baltic", pp. 437-8.

<sup>98</sup> López de Haro to Philip IV, Lisbon, 12 Aug. and 23 Sept. 1623: A.G.S. Guerra 898; *consulta* of the Council of Portugal, 2 Sept. 1624: Brit. Lib., Egerton MS.1131; and Brit. Lib., Egerton MS.1135, fo. 199v.

<sup>99</sup> López de Haro to Philip IV, Lisbon, 7 Jan. 1623: A.G.S. Guerra 895; López de Haro to Philip IV, 5 Feb. 1623: A.G.S. Est. 2847; López de Haro to Philip IV, 19 May 1623: A.G.S. Guerra 988.

guards with a salvo of musket fire. Subsequently Castilian commissioners were also used in investigations at Oporto, Aveiro, Faro and elsewhere.<sup>100</sup> The Lisbon city council complained endlessly that the Castilian officers were ruining Portugal's trade with northern Europe,<sup>101</sup> but these complaints, though supported by the Council of Portugal, made no headway in the Council of State, which supported the Council of War. Spanish ministers did not deny that the new procedures were causing or contributing to the economic depression in Portugal but held that, if slump was the price of damaging the Dutch, then they were determined to pay it.<sup>102</sup> At Lisbon and Setúbal the slump was to continue, despite the granting after 1630 of licences to a limited number of Dutch shippers to take salt, until the revival in Dutch-Portuguese trade began in 1641. At Faro in the Algarve Dutch shipping almost entirely disappeared until 1641 and, despite a marked increase in neutral and especially Hanseatic traffic, the increase was a mere fraction of the massive loss caused by the absence of the Dutch.<sup>103</sup>

In Italy there was further scope for Spain in the economic struggle with the United Provinces. Italy, like Spain and Portugal, had since the 1590s imported via Holland great quantities of Baltic grain and other north European products.<sup>104</sup> Even in years of good harvest Dutch shipping was used extensively to carry Sicilian grain to Naples and Genoa and also in Italian coastal trade generally. Italy was also dependent on Dutch shipping to bring wool and salt from Alicante and La Mata. Generally, the Dutch-Italian trade was believed to be balanced heavily in favour of the Dutch, with Italy's stock of cash being drained gradually into the financing of other Dutch activities in the same way as Spanish silver.<sup>105</sup> The embargoes of April 1621 were imposed in the Spanish viceroyalty of Naples (in area the largest state in Italy), and in Sicily, Sardinia and the duchy of Milan,<sup>106</sup> while

<sup>100</sup> *Consulta* of the *junta de comercio*, 28 Apr. 1624: A.G.S. Est. 2847; *consultas*, 13 Jan. 1627 and 24 May 1628: A.G.S. Est. 2646.

<sup>101</sup> *Elementos para a história do Município de Lisboa*, ed. E. Freire de Oliveira, 6 vols. (Lisbon, 1882-91), iii, pp. 154, 417, 458, 525, 567, and iv, p. 145; V. Rau, *A exploração e o comércio do sal de Setúbal* (Lisbon, 1951), pp. 166, 174.

<sup>102</sup> *Consulta* of the Council of State, 27 Sept. 1624: Brit. Lib., Egerton MS.1131, fos. 288, 290-1.

<sup>103</sup> V. Rau, "Subsídios para o estudo do movimento dos portos de Faro e Lisboa durante o século XVII", *Anais da Academia portuguesa de história*, 2nd ser., v (1954), pp. 219-27.

<sup>104</sup> H. Wätjen, *Die Niederländer im Mittelmeergebiet zur Zeit ihrer höchsten Machtstellung* (Berlin, 1909), pp. 122-3, 393, 398-403; G. Coniglio, *Il vicereame di Napoli in secolo XVII* (Rome, 1955), pp. 52 note, 110, 120 note; C. Trasselli, "Sul naviglio 'Nordico' in Sicilia nel secolo XVII", in *Homenaje a Jaime Vicens Vives*, 2 vols. (Barcelona, 1965-7), ii, pp. 689-702.

<sup>105</sup> *Consulta*, 6 July 1622, fo. 5: A.G.S. Est. 2036. See also Antonio Serra, *Breve trattato delle cause che possono far abbondare li regni d'oro e d'argento dove non sono miniere* (1613), repr. in *Scrittori classici italiani di economia politica*, ed. P. Custodi, Parte antica, 7 vols. (Milan, 1803-4), i.

<sup>106</sup> Philip III to Italian viceroys, 27 Mar. 1621: A.G.S. Est. 1883; Brit. Lib., Add. MS.18787, fos. 223<sup>v</sup>-4.



Genoa, with which Spain had close ties, and the Papacy were subjected to heavy pressure not to deal with the Dutch in the matter of grain supplies.<sup>107</sup> The force of the Spanish measures in Italy, though doubtless rather less in overall impact than in the Iberian peninsula, was nevertheless considerable. The harvest of 1621-2 was bad throughout Italy, yet the Dutch were, except for a few specially licensed cases, prevented from carrying supplies to Naples, and they did not transport Sicilian grain; Genoa, despite maximum diplomatic effort in Madrid, could not obtain Spanish consent to call in the Dutch. Moreover, the viceroy of Naples who infringed the embargoes through fear of the consequences of food shortage in the largest city in Italy, was rebuked by the king with special severity and left in no doubt that in future he had to face riots in the streets rather than again call in the Dutch.<sup>108</sup> The Dutch were certainly cut out of the carrying trade between Spain and Italy with considerable injury to many Genoese merchants who had hitherto supplied Italy with Spanish products using Dutch shipping.<sup>109</sup> Of course, the republic still had reliable entrepôts at Livorno and Venice; and after 1630, at Naples, as in Portugal and Spain, the crown began to issue grain licences to Dutch shippers in times of food shortage. Nevertheless, it is clear that Dutch trade with Italy suffered through Spanish action in a variety of ways and that a substantial number of Dutch ships and crews, attempting to trade under foreign flags, were seized in Sicily and Naples during the course of the war.<sup>110</sup>

In northern Europe Spanish power in 1621 was based principally on Flanders and the adjoining areas of Germany where Spain maintained *plazas fuertes* (fortified strongholds). In this region economic warfare against the republic was waged in two phases, one of which, a total river and canal blockade, lasted only the four years from 1625 to 1629. Before and after these years only a limited embargo was in effect but it nevertheless deprived the Dutch of one of their best customers for shipping in Europe. Where Dutch ships had formerly crowded Flemish ports, from 1621 to 1646 they were almost completely absent and Flemish merchants used English and French shipping.<sup>111</sup> Furthermore, not only did they dispense with the Dutch in their carrying trade but, knowing only too well the rigours of the

<sup>107</sup> Philip IV to viceroy of Naples, 22 Jan. 1622: A.G.S. Est. 1884.

<sup>108</sup> Viceroy of Naples to Philip IV, 17 Mar. and 2 June 1622, and viceroy of Naples to Mateo de Aróstegui, 3 Mar. 1622: A.G.S. Est. 1884.

<sup>109</sup> Castañeda to Philip IV, Genoa, 22 June 1624: A.G.S. Est. 1936; Castañeda to Philip IV, 14 Oct. 1624: A.G.S. Est. 2038.

<sup>110</sup> Castañeda to Philip IV, 4 Dec. 1624: A.G.S. Est. 1936; viceroy of Sicily to Philip IV, 14 Sept. 1641: A.G.S. Est. 1893. There were 115 Dutch sailors prisoner in Sicily in 1629: A.R.A. Bis. 56, fo. 39.

<sup>111</sup> Stols, *De Spaanse Brabanders*, pp. 121-9; J. de Smet, "Le mouvement de la navigation au port d'Ostende, 1640-55", *Bulletin de la Commission royale d'histoire*, xciv (1930), pp. 208-14.

*almirantazgos*, ceased also importing Dutch cloth and manufactures via the *binnenstromen* (inland waterways) for re-export to the peninsula, Spanish Italy and Spanish America.<sup>112</sup> From 1622, however, Spanish ministers in Madrid began working towards something rather more rigorous. One of the most vital sectors of Dutch commerce was the export, via the inland waterways, of immense quantities of foodstuffs, materials and manufactures to the Spanish Netherlands, Liège and the Cologne region, and the importing by the same routes of Rhine and Maas timber, Flemish flax and other materials. The revenues collected by Isabella from this traffic were substantial, amounting in 1623 to over 800,000 florins or 270,000 Spanish ducats, the largest part from the Maas *comptoirs* and about 25 per cent from the *plazas fuertes* on the German routes, especially the Rhine, Lippe and Ems;<sup>113</sup> understandably, Philip's aunt was reluctant to relinquish them. The pressure from Spain however was such that in July 1625<sup>114</sup> a full river and canal blockade against the Dutch was put into effect, while in October the republic replied to this "insolent and tyrannical edict" with their own ban on inland trade,<sup>115</sup> a move interpreted in Brussels as an attempt to avoid loss of prestige. The Dutch ban was subsequently removed in 1627 in response to domestic pressure.

The blockade, contrary to the view of Alcalá-Zamora who alleges that it was ineffective,<sup>116</sup> had an enormous impact. Fleets of barges were turned back at Antwerp, and on the Maas, Rhine, Ems and other Flemish and German waterways.<sup>117</sup> Spanish claims that what remained of Zeeland's trade now collapsed totally, that the common people of Holland suffered heavily from the loss of outlets for their herring and other produce, and that Dutch cheese prices fell by half (not to mention one report that Dutch cheese, butter and wine prices tumbled to virtually nothing) are doubtless rather exaggerated, but nevertheless grounded in fact.<sup>118</sup> Cheese and butter prices in 1625-6, while they rose sharply at Antwerp and Brugge,<sup>119</sup> in Holland collapsed to almost their lowest level of the seventeenth century, and

<sup>112</sup> Stols, *op. cit.*, p. 161.

<sup>113</sup> Isabella to Philip IV, Brussels, 18 Apr. 1624, and enclosed list of river revenues: A.G.S. Est. 2038.

<sup>114</sup> Anon., *Ordinantie ons Heeren des Conincx, inhoudende verbodt vanden coophandel mette gherebelleerde provintien* (Brussels, 29 July 1625; Knuttel 3584); Aitzema, *Van staet en oorlogh*, ii, pp. 75-9. The ban was imposed on the Scheldt, Maas, Rhine, Lippe and Ems (at Lingen) and at Groenlo (Grol).

<sup>115</sup> Placcaet of 15 Oct. 1625: A.R.A. archive of the States General 4947 ii; A.R.A. adm. 2457, Res. Coll. Zeeland, 14 Oct. 1627.

<sup>116</sup> Alcalá-Zamora, *España, Flandes y el Mar del Norte*, pp. 184-6, 297-9.

<sup>117</sup> *Consulta*, 28 Sept. 1625: A.G.S. Est. 2039.

<sup>118</sup> La Cueva to Philip IV, 17 Sept. and 2 Oct. 1625: A.G.S. Est. 2315; *Analecta Vaticano-Belgica*, 2nd ser., vi, p. 661.

<sup>119</sup> *Dokumenten voor de geschiedenis van prijzen en lonen in Vlaanderen en Brabant, xv<sup>e</sup>-xviii<sup>e</sup> eeuw*, ed. C. Verlinden *et al.*, 3 vols. (Brugge, 1959-65), i, pp. 63, 85, 104-5, 112, and iii, pp. 712, 720, 734-5, 739.

there were sharp falls also in wine, herring and other fish prices.<sup>120</sup> At the same time Flemish flax and fruit and German timber and wine were held back causing, according to Spanish sources,<sup>121</sup> among other effects a rise of 30 per cent in the cost of shipbuilding timber in Holland. There was also a total ban on correspondence, which disrupted much of Antwerp's insurance business in the republic. However, the blockade was soon defeated by its own drastic effect. Food shortage, ruinous price rises and mounting difficulty in supplying the Spanish garrisons led in June 1626 to the lifting of the ban on the importing of butter, cheese, grain and herring.<sup>122</sup> In other respects, however, the blockade continued. Spices, wines, sugar, cloth, bricks, soap and Newcastle coal were the Dutch commodities most affected, while the ban on the Rhine continued to hamper Dutch shipbuilding. The importing of sugar from Holland via Antwerp, a thriving activity until 1625, remained at a mere fraction of its previous level.<sup>123</sup> Rhenish wine continued to be largely absent from Dutch exports to northern Europe.<sup>124</sup> The river blockade, with the exception of a special ban on Rhine timber, was finally called off, not in 1630,<sup>125</sup> but in April 1629. The reason was not that the blockade was ineffective, nor that it annoyed the German princes, though it did annoy them considerably,<sup>126</sup> but simply that it was proving too damaging to Flemish commerce, was causing too much discontent in the Southern Netherlands, and was depriving Brussels of sizeable funds at a time, during the Mantuan Succession crisis in northern Italy, when considerable Spanish resources were being diverted from Flanders and

<sup>120</sup> Posthumus, *Nederlandsche prijsgeschiedenis*, ii, pp. 262, 474, 500, 708-9, 776, 807.

<sup>121</sup> La Cueva to Philip IV, 2 Jan. 1626: A.G.S. Est. 2316.

<sup>122</sup> A.R.A. adm. 2684, Res. Coll. Zeeland, 20 June 1626; *Relazione veneziane: Venetiaansche berichten over de Vereenigde Nederlanden van 1600-1795*, ed. P. J. Blok (Rijks geschiedkundige publicatiën, vii, The Hague, 1909), p. 190.

<sup>123</sup> H. Pohl, "Die Zuckereinfuhr nach Antwerpen durch portugiesische Kaufleute während des 80 jährigen Krieges", *Jahrbuch für Geschichte von Staat, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Lateinamerikas*, iv (1967), pp. 355-8; the article, however, gives no explanation as to why sugar importing from Holland collapsed in 1625.

<sup>124</sup> J. M. Bizière, "The Baltic Wine Trade, 1563-1657", *Scandinavian Econ. Hist. Rev.*, xx (1972), pp. 125-32.

<sup>125</sup> Alcalá-Zamora is inaccurate on this: Alcalá-Zamora, *España, Flandes y el Mar del Norte*, pp. 297-8. See Isabella to Philip IV, 3 Mar. 1629: A.G.S. Est. 2322; anon., *Nieuwe Liiste van t' Recht vande Licenten . . . lancx de riviere van Antwerpen, Sas van Gendt . . .* (Antwerp, Apr. 1629); H. H. G. Wouters, "Het Limburgse Maasdal gedurende de tachtigjarige en de dertigjarige oorlog", in *Limburg's verleden: Geschiedenis van Nederlands Limburg tot 1815*, ed. E. C. M. A. Batta et al., 2 vols. (Maastricht, 1960-7), ii, p. 200.

<sup>126</sup> *Consulta*, 16 Feb. 1628: A.G.S. Est. 2328. The lifting of the river blockade was apparently proposed by Olivares, worried at the condition of Flanders, in January 1629: *consulta*, 9 Jan. 1629, in *Correspondance de la cour d'Espagne*, ed. Lonchay and Cuvelier, ii, doc. 1334; see also Hurtuño de Urizar to Philip IV, 8 June 1629: A.G.S. Est. 2322.

the Brussels administration was facing an exceptionally difficult financial situation.

In Germany the Spaniards were driven from Wesel, Rheinberg, Lingen, Orsoy and their other lower Rhine and Ems bases in the years 1629-34, and thereby lost any remaining capacity to damage Dutch interests on German waterways. However, besides the north Rhine region, there remained another area of Germany offering important assets to Spain in the economic struggle with the republic — the north German maritime zone. In the years 1626-9, during which the armies of the emperor and the Catholic League largely overran north Germany, Madrid endeavoured to establish, in co-operation with the emperor and the king of Poland, a combined Spanish-German navy at Wismar, to be paid for largely by Spain, and intended to secure northern Germany, dominate the Baltic and impose a measure of Habsburg control on the Baltic trade.<sup>127</sup> This project, with its obvious dangers for the Dutch republic, collapsed with the Swedish invasion of 1630 and the capture of the materials and cash already gathered by Spain at Wismar. However, there remained a less grandiose scheme which had long attracted Spanish attention and which was more easily realizable — that of persuading the Hanseatic towns to accept a measure of Spanish influence in the regulation of their trade, while in return filling the vacuum in the carrying trade to the peninsula left by the departure of the Dutch. Spain had to have Baltic grain, copper and naval stores, and it would clearly constitute a major gain were these to be supplied by the Hanseatic towns acting as rivals to the Dutch rather than as their intermediaries.<sup>128</sup> It was grasped in Madrid that purely commercial factors, such as freight rates and shipping resources, told against the north Germans, but it was considered that forging new Spanish-Hanseatic links was precisely the sort of shift that could be achieved by Spain's unrivalled territorial and administrative power. The Hanseatic towns did not like either the residents sent to them from Flanders and Spain or the rigorous inspection of cargoes by customs authorities in the peninsula, but although friction over certificates and boarding continued throughout the Spanish-Dutch war, the Hanseatic towns were forced to accommodate themselves both to the *almirantazgos* and to the residents, especially with the development of substantial Spanish-Danish commercial co-operation from 1628 onwards.<sup>129</sup> Although it has been questioned whether the Hanseatic towns managed to increase their Iberian trade after the outbreak of the Spanish-Dutch war,<sup>130</sup> it is

<sup>127</sup> Alcalá-Zamora, *op. cit.*, pp. 267-76.

<sup>128</sup> *Consulta*, 8 Oct. 1622: A.G.S. Est. 2036.

<sup>129</sup> *Consulta*, 14 May 1628: A.G.S. Est. 2328; *consulta*, 1 Sept. 1629: A.G.S. Est. 2329; H. Kellenbenz, *Sephardim an der unteren Elbe* (Wiesbaden, 1958), p. 144.

<sup>130</sup> Christensen, *Dutch Trade to the Baltic*, p. 89.

perfectly clear that except for Emden, which being under Dutch occupation was embargoed in common with the Dutch,<sup>131</sup> Spanish-Hanseatic trade expanded dramatically. Hamburg became Spain's principal supplier of Baltic products and organized a massive convoy system.<sup>132</sup> Over 50 Hamburg vessels sailed to the peninsula in 1625, most of the tonnage bound for west Andalusia and Portugal. The Hamburg convoys of 1627 and 1629 were also of over 50 vessels each, while that of 1633 was of 43; in each case San Lúcar was the port most visited. Lübeck, despite the Baltic depression of the 1620s, which was in fact mainly a Dutch depression, also greatly increased its business with the peninsula, culminating in the decade 1630-9 when two and a half times as many Lübeck vessels visited the peninsula as in the decade 1610-19.<sup>133</sup> Like Hamburg, and in the face of continuing Dutch hostility, Lübeck formed its Iberian trade into convoys, that of 1626 consisting of 17 vessels loaded with grain, masts, ropes and copper. Much of the Lübeck commerce, however, involved Portuguese salt and largely collapsed in the 1640s when the Dutch returned in force to the Portuguese salt pans. Other north German ports that notably increased their traffic to the peninsula until 1641 were Danish-controlled Glückstadt, Friedrichstadt, Stettin and Danzig itself.<sup>134</sup>

In general the Spanish measures against the Dutch can be said to have been one of the principal factors determining Dutch economic development — and indeed that of all Europe — in the period 1621-48. Until 1621 the Dutch carried Baltic grain chiefly to the Iberian and Italian peninsulas. In the 1620s, while the Hanseatic grain trade was thriving, the Dutch Baltic trade entered a severe slump owing at first largely to Spanish measures, and in the years 1626-30 to a combination of Spanish measures and Swedish action against Danzig and the Prussian ports.<sup>135</sup> From 1630 Dutch Baltic trade revived, aided by a run of exceptionally bad harvests in Portugal, Spain and North Africa but, as has been shown,<sup>136</sup> instead of carrying to Lisbon, Seville, Valencia and Naples, the Dutch now carried mainly to western France, especially Bordeaux, from which port the grain was often carried on in

<sup>131</sup> *Consulta*, 27 Nov. 1621: A.G.S. Est. 2645.

<sup>132</sup> A.R.A. Bis. 53, fos. 76<sup>v</sup>, 111; A.R.A. Bis. 54, fos. 96<sup>v</sup>-97, 239, 253<sup>v</sup>; Kellenbenz, *Unternehmerkräfte*, pp. 61, 63; Kellenbenz, *Sephardim an der unteren Elbe*, p. 144.

<sup>133</sup> A.R.A. Bis. 53, fo. 111; W. Vogel, "Beiträge zur Statistik der deutschen Seeschifffahrt im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert", *Hansische Geschichtsblätter*, xxxiii (1928), pp. 135-41.

<sup>134</sup> *Consultas of the junta de estado*, 28 Sept. 1627 and 3 Jan. 1628: A.G.S. Est. 2328; Kellenbenz, *Sephardim an der unteren Elbe*, p. 144; A. Jürgens, *Zur schleswig-holsteinischen Handelsgeschichte des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts* (Berlin, 1914), pp. 197, 203-7.

<sup>135</sup> Bogucka, "Amsterdam and the Baltic", pp. 434-5, 437-8; Christensen, *op. cit.*, pp. 88, 104, 315-16.

<sup>136</sup> Bogucka, *op. cit.*, pp. 438-9. Bogucka demonstrates the shift but entirely misunderstands the reason for it, offering the unconvincing explanation that trade with the Iberian peninsula had become unprofitable.

English and French vessels. Only from 1641, with the revival in Dutch-Portuguese trade, was Dutch grain-carrying restored to full health. No less affected than grain was salt. If the Dutch were denied Iberian salt, they were also deprived of the Caribbean supplies which they had been exploiting sporadically since the 1590s.<sup>137</sup> In 1621 the Spaniards began building forts at the Caribbean salt pans and, in the December of that year, the first convoy of Dutch *zout-vaerders* (salt-ships) returned empty to the Zuider Zee from the Venezuelan coast.<sup>138</sup> By the late 1620s very little Caribbean salt was reaching Holland. It is true that in shifting the focus of their carrying trade from the peninsula to western France, the Dutch were able to obtain La Rochelle salt without difficulty, except during the sieges of the Huguenot town by the French government, but French salt matched the Iberian product in neither quality nor quantity.<sup>139</sup> Salt prices in Amsterdam, from being stable at just over 5 guilders per barrel during the truce, rose to over 10 guilders in the period 1628-34 and did not again fall below 8 guilders until after the Portuguese secession<sup>140</sup> — and all this despite the collapse of Dutch salt-carrying to Italy and a marked shrinking in Dutch salt exports to the Baltic.<sup>141</sup> The sharp rise in the price of salt in turn affected a wide range of Dutch food prices.<sup>142</sup> In addition, a number of other consequences resulted from France's replacement of the peninsula as Holland's chief trading partner in the west, notably the virtual disappearance of Spanish and Portuguese wines from north European markets combined with the dramatic boom of viticulture in the Bordeaux region.<sup>143</sup> All Dutch merchants involved in European carrying were affected by these great changes, some very seriously. One of the major indicators of the effectiveness of the Spanish measures was the setback sustained by the Dutch Jews. Amsterdam Jewry, a group which had specialized in the Iberian trade, was, despite the prominent role it played in the trade with western France and North Africa, so hard hit by the changes of 1621 that it was only after Portugal's secession from Spain that it began finally to recover. As late as 1641 there were still only 89 Jewish depositors with the Amsterdam Wisselbank, as compared with 106 in 1620.<sup>144</sup>

Arguably one of the most important consequences of the Spanish

<sup>137</sup> Goslinga, *The Dutch in the Caribbean*, pp. 126-37.

<sup>138</sup> A.R.A. Bis. 48 ii, fo. 170.

<sup>139</sup> *Consulta*, 12 Sept. 1658: A.G.S. Est. 2091.

<sup>140</sup> Posthumus, *Nederlandsche prijsgeschiedenis*, i, pp. 215, 217-18, and ii, pp. 291-2, 453, 633, 778.

<sup>141</sup> Christensen, *Dutch Trade to the Baltic*, diagrams 9 and 10.

<sup>142</sup> Posthumus, *op. cit.*, i, p. 85, and ii, pp. 277, 500, 658.

<sup>143</sup> Bogucka, *op. cit.*, p. 438; Bizière, "Baltic Wine Trade", pp. 124, 127, 132.

<sup>144</sup> A.R.A. Bis. 49 i, fos. 113<sup>v</sup>-114<sup>v</sup>; J. G. van Dillen, "Vreemdelingen te Amsterdam in de eerste helft der zeventiende eeuw. I, De Portugeesche Joden", *Tijd. Gesch.*, 1 (1935), pp. 14-16.

measures was the setback to new drapery production in Holland and the general transformation of the Dutch textile industry, accompanied by the temporary advance of new drapery output in Flanders and a more permanent advance in England, and due particularly to loss by the Dutch of key markets controlled by Spain. Until about 1621 the manufacture of a wide range of cheap, light draperies had steadily developed in several Dutch towns and particularly at Leiden, the centre of the Dutch textile industry. As with Flemish and English new draperies a large part of Dutch production was destined for export to southern Europe and especially Andalusia and Portugal. Although N. W. Posthumus, the great historian of the Leiden cloth industry, assigned no role to Spain in his account of the decline of Dutch new drapery output after 1621,<sup>145</sup> the evidence for the loss of the territories controlled by Spain as textile markets for the Dutch is so considerable that there can scarcely be doubt that it did indeed constitute a serious blow. Certainly in Brussels it was assumed that Spain had inflicted great damage on Holland's cloth industries and, by 1626, it was estimated that some 40,000 textile workers had been thrown out of work in the republic since 1621, many having to go abroad in search of work.<sup>146</sup> The corresponding growth in output of similar types of textiles in Flanders and England strongly suggests that as a result of the Spanish measures these rivals were able to take over what Holland was losing.<sup>147</sup> Of course, as it happened, Leiden managed to compensate for its losses in new draperies by expanding its production of old draperies, the celebrated *lakens* which were more suited to north European markets; but although the overall value of textiles produced at Leiden undoubtedly increased between 1621 and 1648 (old draperies being much costlier than new draperies), in terms of quantity of cloth produced and of labour required Leiden in fact declined. During the 1620s the Dutch also completely lost their former prominence in the carrying of Castilian wool from Bilbao and San Sebastián to northern Europe — first to the English, then to the French and, after 1630, once again to the English — and ceased also to carry such vital dyestuffs as Mexican cochineal, Campeche wood and Guatemalan indigo from Seville and Cádiz; these changes however were probably much less harmful to Dutch industry than the loss of markets. Very little Spanish wool was used at Leiden until after 1635 when the French textile centres of Normandy and Brittany, which had traditionally used much more Spanish wool than Holland, were cut

<sup>145</sup> N. W. Posthumus, *De geschiedenis van de Leidsche lakenindustrie*, 3 vols. (The Hague, 1908-39), iii, pp. 930-2 ff.

<sup>146</sup> La Cueva to Philip IV, 27 Mar. 1626: A.G.S. Est. 2316.

<sup>147</sup> Stols, *De Spaanse Brabanders*, pp. 147-50; E. Coornaert, *La draperie-sayerie d'Hondschoote* (Paris, 1930), pp. 50, 53, 57; P. Deyon and A. Lottin, "Évolution de la production textile à Lille aux XVI<sup>e</sup> et XVII<sup>e</sup> siècles", *Revue du Nord*, xlix (1967), pp. 31-2.

off from their supplies by the outbreak of the Spanish-French war, and Leiden did not go over to a virtual dependence on Spanish wool until after 1648. However, it is noteworthy that the price of Mexican cochineal on the Amsterdam exchange rose sharply in the 1620s, remained high throughout the war and fell steeply again from 1646 as the embargoes began to be lifted.<sup>148</sup> Indigo prices in Holland rose likewise as Guatemalan indigo became scarce, though here the East India Company was able to profit from the situation by importing limited supplies from Asia; with the return of Guatemalan indigo in the mid 1640s, indigo prices in Amsterdam dropped by nearly 50 per cent.

Yet for all the evidence that the Spanish measures affected Dutch interests substantially, for various reasons which require explanation, the Dutch Republic was not weakened and the States General came nowhere near being forced to sue for a truce on Spanish terms. Moreover the war did so much damage to the economies of Spain and Portugal that Spanish ministers began to consider whether the disadvantages of the war for Spain were not even greater than what they continued to regard as the disadvantages of the truce. Already before 1621 there had been some disagreement in Madrid as to whether war or a new truce on Spanish terms was the better alternative; after 1621 the range of disagreement widened. By 1623 a small junta, consisting of Agustín Messía, Fernando Girón and the bishop of Segovia, and delegated to assess the contacts being made between Brussels and The Hague, was strongly criticizing the views of such hard-liners as the marqués de Montesclaros, head of the *junta de comercio*, and the Cardinal de la Cueva, the chief Spanish minister in Brussels.<sup>149</sup> The Dutch were supposedly willing to agree to a new truce on the terms of 1609, plus a few lesser concessions, but would go no further. Montesclaros and La Cueva persisted in maintaining, for all the ruinous cost to the king and the collapse of trade, that the previous truce had been worse than the present war. They even held that it was better to suffer military setbacks and lose some Flemish towns than settle again for the terms of 1609.<sup>150</sup> The bishop of Segovia and those who thought like him, by contrast, considered that, given the state of the finances and the risk of mutiny and other disasters in Flanders, Philip had no choice but to compromise; the war, they believed, was worse for Spain than the previous truce. The matter was decided at the highest level. Philip, guided presumably by Olivares, who inclined to the hard line, put a stop to the discussion; there was to be no

<sup>148</sup> Posthumus, *Nederlandsche prijsgeschiedenis*, i, pp. 415-16, 420-1.

<sup>149</sup> *Consulta* of the junta deliberating contacts with the Dutch, 5 Mar., 4 and 14 July 1623, and junta to Olivares, 5 July 1623: A.G.S. Est. 2147.

<sup>150</sup> *Consulta*, 14 Nov. 1623: A.G.S. Est. 2147.



settlement on terms close to those of 1609. Major concessions by the Dutch were essential.<sup>151</sup>

From 1623 until the start of the Mantuan Succession crisis in Italy in 1628 the respective Spanish and Dutch stands remained essentially unchanged. However, the diversion of Spanish funds and troops to Italy in 1628, which very substantially weakened the Spanish position in the Low Countries, led to a resumption of heavy pressure from moderates in both Madrid and Brussels. At the time, the principal point of contact between Spanish and Dutch was at the talks being conducted by officials of both sides at Roosendaal in Dutch Brabant over a proposed exchange of prisoners. Isabella used the occasion to sound out the Dutch and met with a somewhat conciliatory initial response which included some mention of the Scheldt being re-opened in the event of a new truce being arranged.<sup>152</sup> Many, possibly most, Spanish officials, and still more Isabella and Spínola, now considered that the king should quickly come to a settlement. In the end, after protracted and at times bitter argument in Madrid, the opportunity, if such it actually was, was allowed to slip by. Traditionally, this failure to respond has been blamed on the alleged monumental inflexibility and blindness to reality of Olivares himself.<sup>153</sup> Certainly he was now personally determining Spanish policy to a much greater degree than in the early 1620s, but it is by no means clear that he was acting so imprudently. It needed considerable courage not to panic in the circumstances that prevailed in 1629 when there was a real prospect of the simultaneous collapse of Spanish power both in the Netherlands and north Italy. As the Roosendaal talks proceeded Olivares became convinced that the Dutch were not negotiating in earnest, but simply holding out bait as part of their scheme for exploiting to the utmost an unrivalled opportunity to weaken Spain.<sup>154</sup> When in the summer of 1629 the Dutch forces lay siege to Den Bosch, the most vital Spanish fortress town in north Brabant, he was confirmed in this belief. Olivares in any case was right in thinking that in 1629 Spain was negotiating from a position of exceptional weakness and that there was no reason to think that this weakness would long continue. If the European situation, and Olivares normally looked at matters in a European perspective, promised the Dutch great successes, it was also one fraught with dangers for them, owing to the Habsburg

<sup>151</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>152</sup> Isabella to Philip IV, 13 Aug. 1628 and 3 June 1629: *Correspondance de la cour d'Espagne*, ed. Lonchay and Cuvelier, ii, docs. 1265, 1405; Aitzema, *Van staet en oorlogh*, ii, pp. 907 ff.; J. Cuvelier, "Les negociations de Roosendaal, 1627-30", in *Mélanges d'histoire offerts à Henri Pirenne*, 2 vols. (Brussels, 1926), i, pp. 73-80.

<sup>153</sup> Cuvelier, *op. cit.*, pp. 74, 78; Rodríguez Villa, *Ambrosio Spínola*, pp. 480-92.

<sup>154</sup> *Consulta*, 2 June 1629 "voto del conde duque", and *consulta*, 29 Aug. 1629: A.G.S. Est. 2043.

victories in Germany, the crushing of Denmark, and the occupation of much of north Germany by Catholic forces. And indeed, despite the situation at Den Bosch, it seemed highly probable in 1629, barring the unexpected, that once Spain extricated itself from Italy, it could in combination with the emperor have put heavier pressure than ever on the republic.

Olivares's assessment that the republic was not in earnest in wanting a truce in 1629 was based at least in part on information sent to him from Flanders by Spanish officials, who were following the political situation in the republic and recognized that the Dutch war party was still much stronger than the peace party.<sup>155</sup> And in this analysis, Olivares's informants were undoubtedly correct. This continued preponderance of the hard-liners in the United Provinces may appear at first sight to tell against the notion that Spain succeeded in inflicting considerable damage on the Dutch economy. The *stadhouder* Frederik Hendrik (1625-47) and the military leadership were doubtless likely to favour war because their influence was much greater in war than in peace-time. But this is no answer for, as Spanish observers saw, the strength of the Dutch war party derived not from the *stadhouder*, the army or the French, but from massive support from the city administrations and provinces of the republic. Wars that are extremely expensive and have been several years in progress are not normally popular. Moreover, besides the general evidence that Spain did damage to the Dutch economy, it should be noted that it was widely realized in the republic during the 1620s that Dutch trade was contracting under Spanish pressure because, despite various increases in duties, total customs receipts for Holland failed to increase while those for several parts of the country actually fell.<sup>156</sup> Besides this, the additional taxation needed for the war was often highly unpopular, as is shown by the case of the increase in 1624 of the tax on butter in Holland which caused riots at Alkmaar, Haarlem, Amsterdam and Enkhuizen and the killing of several burghers by the troops called out to quell them.<sup>157</sup> All this presents the historian with a problem.

Actually, opinion over the war in the republic was deeply divided but, for several reasons, those who wished to fight on had the greater influence at all levels of Dutch government. Dutch society in the golden age, for all its confidence and prosperity, was racked with tensions. The republic had a far larger Catholic minority than

<sup>155</sup> Pedro de San Juan to Olivares, 30 Aug. 1629, and Juan Boberio to Olivares, 13 Nov. 1629: A.G.S. Est. 2322.

<sup>156</sup> A.R.A. Bis. 54, fos. 93-94<sup>v</sup>; de Jonge, *Nederlandische Zeewesen*, i, p. 240; Snapper, *Oorlogsinvloeden*, pp. 70-1, 73.

<sup>157</sup> La Cueva to Philip IV, 15 June 1624, and "avisos de Amsterdam", 3 and 10 June 1624: A.G.S. Est. 2314; see also La Cueva to Philip IV, 16 Apr. 1626: A.G.S. Est. 2316.

England and this minority, estimated at 40,000 in Amsterdam alone, considered pro-Spanish and suspected of collusion in the fall of Amersfoort to the Spaniards in 1629, was rigorously excluded from any part in the political process.<sup>158</sup> Also, the Protestant majority was in turn sharply split between Remonstrants and Counter-Remonstrants.<sup>159</sup> Since the overthrow of Oldenbarnevelde in 1618 most city councils in the republic had been linked with the staunchly Calvinist Counter-Remonstrant party and associated politically with the *stadhouder*. At the same time factions opposed to the Counter-Remonstrants remained active and, with the support of many who opposed the war, gathered strength, particularly in Holland. Since the Counter-Remonstrants, a dominant but threatened group, had always presented themselves as the patriotic party and preached the necessity of war with Spain, Dutch local government was in effect in the hands of an embattled faction, representative of only a section of Dutch society and strongly inclined to continue the war for local political and religious reasons. The more those opposed to the Counter-Remonstrants spoke of the need for a truce, the more the latter sought to overwhelm their opponents with votes and printed propaganda advocating war.

This however is only part of the answer. For whatever the ideological stand of the Counter-Remonstrants, they could surely not for so long have dominated enough city administrations, and therefore the provincial states, had they not had the assistance of important economic forces and effective economic propaganda. Curiously, it was maintained by the Dutch war party with only somewhat less persistence than it was in Madrid that the truce of 1609 had been a disaster for their trade and, like Montesclaros and La Cueva, they argued that whatever the disadvantages of the war, the situation was nevertheless still better than that of the truce.<sup>160</sup> The Counter-Remonstrants claimed that several regions, notably Zeeland, had declined during the truce, implied and sometimes openly stated that it was actually better for Dutchmen to do without trade to the peninsula, and held that in any case the war had not adversely affected the common man. And, indeed, Zeeland had stagnated during the truce. It is true, of course, that Zeeland's trade dwindled still more after 1621 and that everyone in Zeeland knew it: the States of Zeeland declared in the States General in 1627 that its customs revenues had

<sup>158</sup> *Analecta Vaticano-Belgica*, 2nd ser., v, p. 162. Geyl mentions an estimate that one quarter of the population of Holland was Catholic in 1624 and one third of that of Friesland and Groningen: Geyl, *Netherlands Divided*, p. 144.

<sup>159</sup> Aitzema, *op. cit.*, ii, p. 919, and iii, pp. 54-60; the Counter-Remonstrant war party dominated most completely in Friesland and Zeeland.

<sup>160</sup> Willem Usselinckx, *Waerschouwinge over den Treves . . .* (Flushing, 1630; Knuttel 4016); *Resolutie . . . der Stadt Aherlem*, pp. 8-9, 14; anon., *Klare Aenwijsinge dat de vereenigde Nederlanden gheen Treves met den Vyandt dienen te maecken* (The Hague, 1630; Knuttel 4014), pp. 8 ff.

fallen every year since 1616 owing to Spanish action.<sup>161</sup> But this did not lessen in the slightest Zeeland's fierce support for the Counter-Remonstrants and the war. On the contrary the war was regarded as the salvation of Zeeland, for the funds and seamen of Middelburg and Flushing, driven from local and European trade, found new opportunities in the West India Company, itself born of war, and the privateering, chiefly at Portuguese expense, which was supported by the Company. This crucial shift, a frequent theme of La Cueva's reports to Madrid,<sup>162</sup> made Zeeland the staunchest supporter among the seven provinces of the West India Company and was the most dramatic instance of several investment and employment shifts within the Dutch economy which favoured the war party. The East India Company, like the West India Company, strongly opposed peace with Spain, even after the secession of Portugal,<sup>163</sup> not only in the hope of acquiring additional Portuguese possessions in Asia, but because the slump at home favoured it by causing a flow of cash from European into colonial commerce. The other major beneficiary of the war, and therefore of the slump in European trade, industry and the fisheries, was Dutch agriculture. If Spanish ministers were right, as surely they were, that the export of foodstuffs via the *binnen-stromen* was of vital importance to the Dutch, it cannot be denied that the war increased this importance — except briefly in the years 1625-6. The Dutch and Spanish armies, by far the largest and most costly armies in Europe, encamped close together in fixed positions along the canals and rivers of the Low Countries and north-west Germany, did not pilfer their food in the style of the armies in the rest of Germany. They represented a fixed and strong demand and paid in cash. The huge sums spent on the food supplies of the Dutch forces may be viewed as a subsidy paid by the Dutch maritime towns to inland agriculture, while expenditure on the Spanish forces was also in a sense payment by the non-noble populace of Castile and Naples to the Dutch farmers. In this respect the Counter-Remonstrants were right to argue that their war by no means injured the common man.

After the failure of the Roosendaal talks the character of the Spanish-Dutch struggle was soon considerably changed by events. In 1630, strengthened by the capture of the Mexican silver fleet in 1628, West India Company forces gained their first substantial foothold in the Americas — the Pernambuco region of northern Brazil.

<sup>161</sup> A.R.A. Bis. 54, fo. 94; La Cueva to Philip IV, 18 Oct. 1627: A.G.S. Est. 2319.

<sup>162</sup> La Cueva to Philip IV, 15 Jan. and 4 Feb. 1627: A.G.S. Est. 2318; La Cueva to Philip IV, 6 Mar. 1628: A.G.S. Est. 2321.

<sup>163</sup> Aitzema, *Van staet en oorlogh*, vi, p. 87. As it happens, the end of the Spanish-Dutch war and the revival of Dutch trade with Spain from 1647 did in fact coincide with a remarkable loss of momentum in the development of the East India Company: Glamann, *Dutch-Asiatic Trade*, p. 16.

In 1632 Frederik Hendrik launched the most successful Dutch offensive of the war at home, capturing Venlo, Roermond, Sittard, Maastricht and Limburg in rapid succession. With this breakthrough in the Maas valley Spanish power in Flanders, severely curtailed by the low level of remittances from Spain following the Mantuan war, the loss of the silver fleet, and the crushing of Habsburg forces in Germany in the unexpected force of the Swedish invasion, came close to collapse. A wave of revulsion against the war swept the Southern Netherlands, and Isabella, in her panic and much to the displeasure of Philip IV and Olivares,<sup>164</sup> gave way to pressure to convene the previously almost defunct States General of the southern provinces. The representatives of the southern provinces at once opened negotiations with the Dutch States General, thus initiating the most public and formal of the various rounds of talks that took place during the conflict, those of 1632-4. The Dutch, seemingly on the verge of massive victories, were understandably in no mood to offer anything to Spain.<sup>165</sup> In return for a truce the Dutch States General demanded the total withdrawal of Spanish forces from the Low Countries and north-west Germany, the continued closure of the Scheldt, the restitution of Breda, the annexation of all the places captured by the Dutch plus those parts of the hinterland of Den Bosch still occupied by Spain, the *status quo* in the Indies east and west, numerous tariff concessions and such freedom of movement and private religious practice for Jewish subjects of the republic in the Spanish territories as Dutch Protestants would enjoy.

This, of course, was an opening position and the Dutch were prepared to yield somewhat on certain points.<sup>166</sup> Nevertheless, even the most conciliatory Flemish delegates were appalled by the vast gulf that now existed between the two sides. Olivares was thoroughly disgusted with the whole affair.<sup>167</sup> He was totally opposed even to considering the Dutch terms, whether regarding Europe or the Indies. Besides looking on the talks as disreputable, originating as they did in circumstances verging on rebellion against the crown, he regarded the Dutch ambitions for territory on the Maas and Rhine, as well as in Brazil, as incompatible with the essential interests of Spain which he, in distinction perhaps to other Spanish ministers, saw as being strategic as much as economic and colonial. The Dutch now held almost all the Maas and lower Rhine crossings formerly possessed by Spain and, in Olivares's view, unless Spain recovered the major Maas crossings, especially Venlo and Maastricht, and at least one key Rhine crossing,

<sup>164</sup> *Consulta*, 2 Mar. 1633: A.G.S. Est. 2151.

<sup>165</sup> M. G. de Boer, *Die Friedensunterhandlungen zwischen Spanien und den Niederlanden in den Jahren 1632 und 1633* (Groningen, 1898), pp. 66-8.

<sup>166</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 90.

<sup>167</sup> *Consulta*, 29 May 1633 "voto de Olivares", and *consulta*, 16 June 1633 "voto del sr conde duque" (drafts): A.G.S. Est. 2151.

preferably Rheinberg (the "whore of war"), Flanders would no longer serve as a viable base, or *plaza de armas*, for Spanish power in northern Europe.<sup>168</sup> Deprived of all her Maas and Rhine strongholds, Spain in Flanders, as the conde-duque subsequently put it, would be "locked in a cage".<sup>169</sup> To secure a Spanish-Dutch compromise at this time, Olivares was prepared to offer the Dutch Breda, Steensweet, one million ducats and concessions in the sugar market at Lisbon in return for northern Brazil, the disbandment of the West India Company, and Venlo, Maastricht and Rheinberg, it being understood that the Dutch would keep their other conquests.<sup>170</sup> But as matters stood he saw that there was not the slightest chance of the Dutch accepting these terms. Most of the conde-duque's colleagues in Madrid were as indignant as he was at the Dutch "condiciones indecentes", as they were termed by the duke of Alva, most of all that regarding the Jews,<sup>171</sup> and when the Dutch suggested, in view of the impasse reached concerning the Indies, that the proposed truce relate to Europe only, leaving the war to continue in Asia and the Americas, the indignation spread to the councils of Portugal and the Indies.<sup>172</sup> It was consequently, despite the now catastrophic condition of both army and finances, much easier for the conde-duque to fling back the Dutch terms in 1634 than it had been in 1629.

With the breakdown of the talks of 1632-4, continued Spanish weakness in Flanders and Swedish success in Germany, it seemed to Olivares that what was now needed was a major effort by Spain to swing the European balance of power back in her favour. Only thus could Spain wrest reasonable terms from the republic. For several years heavier taxes had been levied in Castile, Portugal and Naples and, by September 1634, Spanish ministers were planning to spend the enormous sum of 5½ million ducats in Flanders — that is, against the Dutch — in 1635. The sending of Ferdinand, the cardinal-infante, to the Spanish Netherlands, because of his exploits against the Swedes in Germany in 1634 during the march from Milan, and the subsequent outbreak of war between France and Spain in May 1635, has never been sufficiently recognized as being a move intended, essentially, to swing the balance against the Dutch. It has even been written, quite erroneously, that when the Spanish-French war began in 1635, the "war against the Dutch was at once abandoned".<sup>173</sup> In

<sup>168</sup> "Voto del conde-duque", 16 Oct. 1633 (draft): A.G.S. Est. 2151.

<sup>169</sup> Olivares to the cardinal-infante, 15 Dec. 1636: Bayerische Staatsbibliothek (hereafter B.S.), MS. cod. hisp. 22, fo. 33v.

<sup>170</sup> "El conde duque mi s<sup>or</sup> sobre la tregua" (undated 1633, draft): A.G.S. Est. 2151.

<sup>171</sup> *Consulta*, 16 Mar. 1634: A.G.S. Est. 2048.

<sup>172</sup> *Consulta* of the Council of the Indies, 4 Mar. 1634: A.G.S. Est. 2150.

<sup>173</sup> G. Parker, "Spain, Her Enemies and the Revolt of the Netherlands, 1559-1648", *Past and Present*, no. 49 (Nov. 1970), p. 92.

fact, no sooner was the French invasion of Flanders in 1635 repulsed than Ferdinand, aided by a diversion of Dutch forces due to a successful surprise attack on Schenkenschans in July, invaded Dutch-occupied territory with 26,000 men capturing Goch, Cleves and Gennep, while another Spanish force retook Limburg.<sup>174</sup>

The Spanish offensive of 1635 against the Dutch, though a departure from the concept of *guerra defensiva* of 1625-34, was nevertheless consistent with the strategic maxims formulated in Madrid in 1622-4 in that Ferdinand, attacking where he could penetrate quickly, while still posing a threat, nevertheless studiously avoided besieging any well-fortified towns. The taking of Schenkenschans on the Gelderland border, an unexpected stroke of luck, breached the entire Dutch defensive system in the east, opening an easy route, north of the rivers, into the heart of the republic. The event caused dismay throughout the United Provinces and so elated the conde-duque that, with his usual extravagance of phrase, he assured Ferdinand that, in holding Schenkenschans, he could not win more glory were he to capture Paris or The Hague.<sup>175</sup> The purpose of the offensive was made clear when Ferdinand entered into new truce talks with the Dutch at Kranenburg in the duchy of Cleves. In line with Olivares's aspirations Spain demanded Venlo, Maastricht, Rheinberg and Dutch withdrawal from the Americas, offering in return Schenkenschans, Goch, Gennep, Cleves, Breda and a large cash sum.<sup>176</sup> Once again, the talks broke down.

To Olivares the capture of Schenkenschans signified not just a vital breach in the Dutch defences but also the chance to fortify a line running from Eindhoven via Helmond and Gennep to the Rhine, which would undoubtedly have proved extremely dangerous for the Dutch and would have virtually cut off Venlo and Maastricht from the rest of Dutch-occupied territory.<sup>177</sup> Although in 1636 the conde-duque and his colleagues gave priority to the French front, there was a great reluctance to do so. Remarkably enough, the start of the war with France coincided with a completely new phase in the Spanish-Dutch war in which Spain for the first time since 1622 resumed

<sup>174</sup> Cardinal-infante to Philip IV, 24 Dec. 1635: A.G.S. Est. 2050; A. Waddington, *La république des Provinces-Unies, la France et les Pays-Bas espagnols de 1630 à 1650*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1895-7), i, pp. 272-3.

<sup>175</sup> Olivares to the cardinal-infante, 14 Mar. 1636: B.S. MS. cod. hisp. 22, fo. 12; Brit. Lib., Add. MS. 14007, fos. 53<sup>v</sup>, 57-60; F. H. Westermann, *Rückblick auf die Geschichte des Herzogthums Cleve ... vom Jahre 1609 bis 1666* (Wesel, 1830), pp. 189-90.

<sup>176</sup> Cardinal-infante to Philip IV, Gennep, 11 Oct. 1635: A.G.S. Est. 2050; Martin de Axpe to the cardinal-infante, Kranenburg, 27 Oct. 1635: *Correspondance de la cour d'Espagne*, ed. Lonchay and Cuvelier, iii, doc. 219; Aitzema, *Van staet en oorlogh*, iv, pp. 223-4.

<sup>177</sup> "El conde duque sobre los puntos principales del ultimo despacho de Flandes", 19 Sept. 1635: A.G.S. Est. 2153; *consulta*, 16 Nov. 1635 "voto del conde duque": A.G.S. Est. 2153.

deliberate use of the army of Flanders as a major means of squeezing the United Provinces. In the years 1635-9, in both Flanders and Madrid, there took place a continuing strategic debate as to whether it was in principle better for Spain to direct her main effort against France or the republic and, in general, there was a marked preference for concentrating against the latter.<sup>178</sup> It was argued that although it was easier to invade France and take French towns than to penetrate Dutch territory, there was little to be gained by doing so. It was thought that Spain's best prospect for breaking the Franco-Dutch alliance was to maintain the pressure that had been kept up for so long and use the exceptionally large funds available in the years 1635-8 to gain the additional bargaining counters needed to secure a satisfactory settlement with the republic. However, this general preference was partially checked by the fear of leaving France with a free hand and, in particular, the risk of a French invasion of Italy. Thus the Spanish invasion of France from Flanders in 1636, which caused such panic in Paris, was nothing more than a short-term preventive strike which, in Madrid, was considered by no means as important strategically as holding the gains made at the expense of the Dutch in 1635. When Ferdinand, as a result of the effort against France, nevertheless lost Schenkenschans in April 1636 there was a great storm of anger and dismay in Spain, including one of the worst rages of Olivares's entire career.<sup>179</sup>

In 1637, however, the Dutch theatre of war was once again the centre of operations and, although Ferdinand was too slow to prevent Frederik Hendrik's encirclement of Breda and the subsequent loss of the town, he did break the Dutch line in the Maas valley, recapturing Venlo and Roermond and isolating Maastricht; despite this he was rebuked in Madrid both for the loss of Breda and for not penetrating further and laying siege to Grave or Nijmegen.<sup>180</sup> The offensive of 1637 was the final attempt on land to acquire more bargaining pieces from the Dutch. The loss of Breda also put an end to plans for initiating a new phase of amphibious warfare, using heavily armed barges on the canals running north from Breda. In the three years 1635-7 Spain had spent over 15 million ducats in Flanders with only modest gains, and yet the funds available for offensive action against the Dutch as a result of the increased taxation in the peninsula were not yet exhausted.<sup>181</sup> The stalling of the offensive on land was due to

<sup>178</sup> *Consultas*, 8, 25 and 26 Feb. 1637: A.G.S. Est. 2051; *consulta*, 7 Oct. 1637: A.G.S. Est. 2052; *consulta* of the *junta de estado*, 7 Mar. 1638: A.G.S. Est. 2053.

<sup>179</sup> *Consulta*, 17 June 1636: A.G.S. Est. 2051; B.S. MS. cod. hisp. 22, fos. 17<sup>v</sup>-19<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>180</sup> *Consulta*, 7 Oct. 1637 "voto del conde duque": A.G.S. Est. 2052.

<sup>181</sup> B.S. MS. cod. hisp. 22, fos. 30<sup>v</sup>, 41<sup>v</sup>; officially, the cardinal-infante was receiving 500,000 ducats monthly during the first half of 1638.



the increasing co-ordination of the French and Dutch attacks on Flanders and the mounting difficulty of supplying the Southern Netherlands with Spanish and Italian troops, especially after the capture of Breisach by the French in 1638 which effectively closed the Rhine route to Spain. The last phase of the Spanish offensive to end the Dutch war consequently took place at sea. In 1639 two large *armadas* were dispatched from Spain, one to Brazil to try to end the most troublesome of Spanish-Dutch embroilments in the colonial sphere by recapturing Pernambuco, and the other to the Channel to force supplies through to Flanders and challenge the Dutch to a decisive battle for supremacy at sea. Both initiatives failed utterly, with the battle of the Downs ending in a major disaster for Spain with 32 warships destroyed by the Dutch under Admiral Tromp.<sup>182</sup> The losses involved in the two setbacks, naval and financial, were overwhelming. From 1639 Spain neither did, nor could, endeavour any longer to acquire gains from the Dutch by force and, weakened further by the paralysing effect of the revolt of Catalonia and the breakaway of Portugal, both in 1640, was reduced to the role of a shattered power striving only to keep what it still held against superior forces. In 1641 Portuguese Brazil followed Portugal itself and severed its links with Spain.

The loss of southern Brazil, and with it all prospect of recovering any part of the territory, was actually much less decisive in determining Spanish-Dutch relations in the 1640s than one might suppose. Brazil had, of course, been the single most difficult point of contention in the various negotiations of the 1630s and, in the long run, its loss cleared the path to peace by making plausible the exclusion of the Dutch from Spanish America without depriving the West India Company of all *raison d'être*. But in the medium term, as was soon realized in Madrid,<sup>183</sup> the implications of the loss of Brazil for Spanish-Dutch relations were not particularly auspicious. The West India Company itself, contemplating a reduced Spain and seemingly an easy task for itself in Brazil, now had less reason than ever for agreeing to relinquish its other American ambitions, and was indeed far from doing so as is shown by the sending of the expedition under Hendrik Brouwer to Chile in 1643. In any case the crux of the problem lay not in the Indies but in the United Provinces, where Frederik Hendrik and the war party were still dominant and, aided by French money and influence, had every intention of keeping the war in progress. The *stadhouder*, despite considerable ill-health, showed a continuing zest for leading the Dutch forces and conquering more Flemish territory which, indeed, the recent collapse of Spanish power

<sup>182</sup> Alcalá-Zamora, *España, Flandes y el Mar del Norte*, pp. 429-34.

<sup>183</sup> J. J. Poelhekke, *De Vrede van Munster* (The Hague, 1948), appendix iv, pp. 547-51.

promised to facilitate. In the city administrations, though losing ground in Holland, the Counter-Remonstrants still had the upper hand. Moreover, there can be little doubt that Spanish ministers were correct in their somewhat pessimistic forecast. Indeed, opposition to a Spanish peace in the republic, despite a wavering Holland, remained so strong after 1641 that, despite enormous efforts by Madrid, Brussels and those in the United Provinces who wanted peace, there was no significant breakthrough in the Spanish-Dutch talks at Münster until the winter of 1645-6.<sup>184</sup>

The breakthrough, when it came, took place essentially because of a crucial shift in the balance of political forces within the republic which substantially increased the power of those interests involved in European commerce. Although the resurgence of Dutch-Portuguese trade from 1641 made good one of the principal setbacks that Dutch commerce had suffered from the Spanish economic measures, the embargoes and the Dunkirkers continued to register a substantial effect which, it may be argued, in the gradually changing circumstances of Dutch domestic politics in the 1640s actually produced better results for Spain than during the years when the embargoes had included Portugal. The Dutch continued to be shut out of every Spanish port except insurgent Barcelona, and also out of southern Italy and Flanders. The effectiveness of the Dunkirkers against Dutch merchantmen and fishing fleets alike, especially in the years 1641-3 when very heavy losses were suffered by the Dutch, was such that Dutch marine insurance and freight rates now reached their highest levels of the entire war.<sup>185</sup> At the same time the flow of capital from European into colonial commerce, which had served the Dutch war party so well in the 1620s and 1630s, now completely ceased and, indeed, moved strongly back. By 1641 West India Company shares were already losing value as it became clearer that judged as a commercial enterprise the company made no sense: it had to fight both Spaniards and Portuguese to make its way, and colonial warfare was so costly that it could make no profit. However, after 1641, responding to the failure either to complete the conquest of Brazil or to reduce military spending there, and the Chilean fiasco, the company's shares began to fall much faster, so that by 1645 they stood at well under half the value they had held in 1640,<sup>186</sup> and the company carried a mere fraction of the political weight in the United Provinces that it had done formerly. Elsewhere on the Dutch

<sup>184</sup> *Consulta of the junta de estado*, 3 June 1646: A.G.S. Est. 2065; *Colección de documentos inéditos para la historia de España*, ed. M. Fernández Navarrete et al., 112 vols. (Madrid, 1842-95), lxxxii, pp. 317, 331-45.

<sup>185</sup> Aitzema, *Van staet en oorlogh*, v, pp. 360-1, and vi, p. 216; Schreiner, "Die Niederländer und die norwegische Holzausfuhr im 17. Jahrhundert", p. 324.

<sup>186</sup> Goslinga, *The Dutch in the Caribbean*, p. 509.

political scene the other champions of war were also losing ground. The hard-line Counter-Remonstrants were virtually stripped of all power in the town councils of Holland, and interests hostile to the ambitions of the *stadhouder* and intent on promoting European trade began to become more assertive.<sup>187</sup> The contention of the war party that Spain in Flanders was a continuing threat to Dutch security was increasingly countered by pointing out that France in Flanders would now be an even graver threat. For a time Frederik Hendrik and the army pressed on with their campaigns, recapturing Gennep after a hard siege in 1641 and, in 1644 and 1645 after fighting through a formidable complex of canals and forts, the *stadhouder* conquered, much to the advantage of Zeeland, the towns and districts of Sass van Ghent and Hulst in Flanders. Hulst, however, was the last campaign. From 1645 Holland refused any longer to provide funds for the war and, since Holland with its great wealth supplied more than the other six provinces put together, this brought the army to a complete halt.

Peace was finally forced through in the years 1646-8, almost entirely owing to the pressure of the great commercial centres of Holland and against continuing strong resistance — especially in devoutly Calvinist Friesland, in Utrecht where the nobility was influential and closely linked with the *stadhouder*, and above all in Zeeland which fought to the last to keep the war alive.<sup>188</sup> Even after the signing of the treaty of Münster, formally ending the twenty-seven year war, the issue was far from dead. "Those of Amsterdam", Spain's first ambassador to the republic informed Philip IV in 1649, "are our best friends and those who contributed most to the peace and who contribute still to maintain it despite the wishes of other towns".<sup>189</sup> Amsterdam moreover soon obtained its reward. Trade between Spain and Holland flowered so rapidly from 1647, as the carrying trade of Holland's competitors to Spain, Flanders and southern Italy slumped, that it was soon once again a key element in Dutch European commerce. Indeed, in some respects, such as the greater dependence of Dutch textile manufacturing on Spanish wool, Spanish-Dutch economic relations in the years after 1647 were closer than they had ever been. Before long it was again the case that when Spanish ministers viewed with alarm the outflow of silver from Spain to northern Europe in payment for imports of food and manufactures, what preoccupied them almost exclusively was its movement to Holland.<sup>190</sup>

The struggle of 1621-48, obviously, was essentially a victory for the United Provinces, yet in many ways the treaty of Münster was less

<sup>187</sup> Geyl, *Netherlands Divided*, pp. 139-40.

<sup>188</sup> Poelhekke, *De Vrede van Munster*, pp. 515-17, 529.

<sup>189</sup> Brun to Philip IV, 27 Aug. 1649, and *consulta*, 15 Sept. 1650: A.G.S. Est. 2070.

<sup>190</sup> *Consulta*, 26 Dec. 1649: A.G.S. Est. 2070; *consulta*, 5 Feb. 1650: A.G.S. Est. 2072; *consulta*, 24 Aug. 1656: A.G.S. Est. 2088.

an ending than a turning-point in the Spanish-Dutch confrontation as it had begun to develop since the time of the Twelve Years Truce. Spain had gone to war to weaken the republic in order to solve the problems posed by increasing Dutch influence both economic and political. In fact, as a result of the conflict, as well as of other factors, it was Spain that was weakened. Nevertheless Spain remained the centre of a large empire of crucial importance in international affairs and trade, and many of the specific problems that had arisen during the truce were to reappear after the treaty of Münster. The Dutch largely dominated commerce with Spain itself and became by far the leading European interloper in Spanish America, especially at Cartagena and Buenos Aires.<sup>191</sup> Furthermore it was more important than ever for Spain, increasingly threatened by the rising power of France and England, to prevent the republic from reinforcing her enemies. In 1621 Madrid had sought a solution through war; the solution that was attempted from 1648 onwards was to try to forge a special political relationship with the United Provinces, both as a counterweight to France and England, which Spanish ministers claimed were a threat to the well-being of the republic as well as to Spain (as indeed they were), and also to provide the political means with which to moderate the force of Dutch economic penetration.<sup>192</sup> Although most of the points in dispute at Münster had been settled in favour of the republic, with Dutch Catholics remaining without the right of public worship, the Scheldt staying closed and the Dutch keeping their conquests, there had been one solid Spanish gain: the republic formally acknowledged and accepted the total exclusion of its subjects from all the territories of Spain in the Indies.<sup>193</sup> From this starting-point Spanish ministers started on a new path after 1648 to obtain by pressure and agreement a series of further concessions in commerce and navigation,<sup>194</sup> to keep constant check on the working of these agreements by means of Spanish representatives and agents in Holland, and to secure the co-operation of the States General in their implementation by every political means at Philip IV's disposal. In this way, after 1648, relations with the Dutch Republic continued to be a major pre-occupation of those who governed the Spanish empire.

<sup>191</sup> *Consulta*, 7 Oct. 1651: A.G.S. Est. 2076; *consulta* of the Council of the Indies, 19 Apr. 1652: A.G.S. Est. 2078.

<sup>192</sup> *Consultas*, 15 and 25 Sept. 1650: A.G.S. Est. 2072; "Parecer del conde de Peñaranda sobre union con Olandeses": A.G.S. Est. 2081.

<sup>193</sup> *Consulta*, 6 Aug. 1650, fos. 2<sup>v</sup>-3: A.G.S. Est. 2072; Poelhekke, *De Vrede van Munster*, pp. 359-60.

<sup>194</sup> *Consulta*, 3 July 1650: A.G.S. Est. 2072; *consulta*, 2 Oct. 1651: A.G.S. Est. 2076.

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## THE HOLLAND TOWNS AND THE DUTCH-SPANISH CONFLICT, 1621-1648

Although the province of Holland surpassed by far the other six Dutch provinces in wealth and population during the Golden Age, there were nevertheless major political episodes in which Holland failed to exercise effective leadership or exert decisive influence. Indeed, it could even occur that a clear majority of the voting members of the province of Holland, with Amsterdam, the Republic's richest and largest city taking the lead, could fail to get its way when the other provinces were split three against three. One highly instructive such episode was the prolonged political battle within the Republic that continued through most of the second Dutch-Spanish war of 1621-1648 over whether or not to accept Spanish proposals for a truce or peace. Although this subject is not much discussed or very familiar today, for a quarter of a century during the Golden Age, it loomed as the most important issue in Dutch life second only to the rivalry between the Counter-Remonstrant and Remonstrant factions. Over many years it was referred to in the deliberations of the Dutch provincial assemblies and city administrations simply as the *grootte saecke* or the *grootte werck* to mark it off from the mass of less significant questions. The problem for the historian is that almost all of the relevant secret resolutions of the States of Holland have been lost. To reconstruct the story, he must rely, for the most part, on the records of the various city councils.

While Dutch-Spanish negotiations proceeded almost without break in the years 1621-1628, through various intermediaries, it was only in the winter of 1628-1629, that Philip IV finally dropped his insistence that the Dutch Republic must make a number of concessions before he would accept a truce. In January 1629, the Spanish king signed a secret authorization for the Archduchess Isabella, governess of the Southern Netherlands, empowering her to conclude a truce of long duration, on the lines of that of 1609, without requiring any concession by the Dutch that did not figure in the earlier truce, and in February, he also authorized her, should there be any difficulty in renewing the terms of 1609, to agree to a simple armi-

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stice, valid for from four to six years, without any conditions whatever except that it apply in the East and West Indies as well as in Europe<sup>1</sup>. At that time, there was a painful awareness, in both Brussels and Madrid, that the entanglement with France in Italy over the Mantuan succession question, compelling the deployment of large forces in Italy, and starving the Flanders army of cash and supplies, was causing a marked swing in the balance of power in the Low Countries against Spain. 'And if they should besiege such a place as Bolduque [*'s-Hertogenbosch*] or Breda', wrote Isabella to Philip, in February 1629,

we can see no way of saving it, for we have no money with which to bring out a field army ... and in the fortified strongholds, there are no munitions or essential supplies for their defence ... and the troops are in such a state that I do not know how they have suffered such misery, for most have not been paid for four months<sup>2</sup>.

Isabella communicated Philip IV's readiness to sign a long truce, without any Dutch concession, to Frederik Hendrik through her representative to the Roosendaal talks on prisoner exchanges, Jan Kesselaer, heer van Marquette, who imparted the message to his Dutch counterpart, Gerard van Berckel, burgomaster of Rotterdam. Frederik Hendrik then consulted, as was his usual procedure, a small, advisory, inner committee of the States General. However, for some months, no reply whatever was communicated via Roosendaal to Brussels<sup>3</sup>, not owing to any long-term intention to prevent the truce, but because, with the preparations for the descent on *'s-Hertogenbosch* well advanced, the stadholder and his advisors had no wish to miss a unique opportunity to win a major military triumph. Two months before the start of the great siege, Isabella wrote to Philip of her growing anxiety over the lack of Dutch response to the truce offer<sup>4</sup>. However, soon after the commencement of the siege, Berckel was sent by the stadholder to confer again with Marquette, examine Philip IV's authorization to Isabella and obtain

1. Algemeen Rijksarchief Brussels (hereafter ARA Brussels) SEG 200, fo. 62, Philip IV to Isabella, Madrid, 14 Feb. 1629; Philip's key authorization to Isabella was dated 12 Jan. 1629, see Brit. Lib. MS. Add. 14,005, 'Relacion de lo que ha passado en el tratado de las treguas', fo. 218v; Lieuwe van Aitzema, *Historie of Verhael van Saken van Staet en Oorlogh in, ende omtrent de Vereenigde Nederlanden* (15 vols.; The Hague, 1657-1671) ii, 908; both Waddington and Cuvelier are inaccurate here, as they state that Philip IV only came to this point months later, while the siege was actually in progress, A. Waddington, *La République des Provinces-Unies, La France et les Pays-Bas Espagnols de 1630 à 1650* (2 vols.; Paris, 1895-7) i, 67; J. Cuvelier, 'Les Negociations diplomatiques de Roosendaal (1627-30)', *Mélanges d'Histoire offerts à Henri Pirenne* (2 vols.; Brussels, 1926) i, 79.

2. ARA Brussels, SEG 200, fo. 57, Isabella to Philip, Brussels, 13 Feb. 1629.

3. Brit. Lib. MS. Add. 14,005, fol. 218v.

4. ARA Brussels, SEG 200, fo. 119, Isabella to Philip, 27 Mar. 1629.

the details of the thirty-four years truce that was being offered<sup>5</sup>. The Dutch response of May and June 1629 stimulated new hopes for an early settlement in Brussels and Madrid and, by late July, the Spanish king was expressing his joy that a very long truce was all but signed<sup>6</sup>. But after their initially positive reply, the Dutch side again began to delay plainly with a view to holding matters up until after the fall of 's-Hertogenbosch<sup>7</sup>. Isabella tried to threaten that if the town fell, the Spanish offer would be withdrawn. Finally in desperation, the Spaniards launched their August invasion across the Veluwe, with the aid of the Emperor, culminating in the capture of Amersfoort.

The Dutch States General, with both the siege of 's-Hertogenbosch and the Spanish occupation of the Veluwe continuing, on 5 September, debated in secret whether it was now time to reveal the Spanish truce offer to the provinces and city governments, but decided not to do so yet<sup>8</sup>. Berckel was directed to excuse the prolonged delay to Marquette on the ground that the matter was of such importance, with so many interested parties in the Republic, that lengthy consultation was unavoidable<sup>9</sup>. Then, on 21 September, the States General instructed Berckel to inform Marquette that the Republic would only agree to proceed if the Infante undertook to withdraw the Spanish and Imperial forces from Veluwe unconditionally<sup>10</sup>. A few days later, Philip wrote from Madrid urging Isabella afresh to 'make the peace or truce, as of when and with the conditions that are obtainable, without any restriction at all'<sup>11</sup>. On 2 October took place a crucial secret debate in the States General: it was announced that Berckel had received assurances from the archduchess, through Marquette, that the Spanish and Imperial forces would in fact be withdrawn from the Veluwe shortly and unconditionally<sup>12</sup>. Thereupon, the States General, having sought the agreement of Frederik Hendrik, resolved to lay the Spanish proposal of a thirty-four year truce between Spain and the United

5. 'Maer also sich desen verleden Somer', stated Aitzema somewhat vaguely, 'weder occasie van by eenkomste tot Roosendaal op 't subject als voren presenteerde: so heeft de H. Marquette aldaer dese materie weder opgegeven aen de Burgemeester Berckel vertoonende ende te lesen ghevende de Procuratie van den Koninck van Spagnien op d'Infante gedateerd de 12 January 1629', *Van Staet en Oorlogh*, II, 908; this crucial meeting took place on 18 May, see ARA Brussels, SEG, 200, fo. 251, Isabella to Philip, 18 May 1629.

6. *Ibidem*, SEG 201, fo. 119, Philip to Isabella, 26 July 1629.

7. Cuvelier, 'Les negociations', 79.

8. Gemeentearchief (hereafter GA) Amsterdam, Algemeen Bestuur, no. 11, 'Extracten uit de secrete resolutiën van de Staten Generaal, 1622-1635', fo. 181v.

9. *Ibidem*, fos. 182-v, Berckel to Marquette, Rotterdam, 9 Sep. 1629.

10. *Ibidem*, fos. 182v-183; ARA Brussels, SEG 201, fo. 233, Isabella to Philip, 30 Sep. 1629: Isabella despatched a special messenger to Roosendaal to deliver the assurance.

11. *Ibidem*, fo. 219v, Philip to Isabella, 27 Sep. 1629: 'me a parecido dar de nuevo facultad a V. Alteza (como lo hago) para que pueda hazer la Paz o Tregua como quando y con las condiciones que pudiere sin limitacion ninguna'.

12. GA Amsterdam, 'Extracten', fos. 184-185.



Provinces before the provinces and city councils, asking the deputies to return to The Hague within ten days with the answers of their respective provinces.

The hectic rush with which this initial debate was conducted in Gelderland, a province which had inclined toward peace with Spain since the expiry of the earlier truce in 1621, on account of the heavy taxation and other burdens that the war involved, was described by Alexander van der Capellen in his *Gedenkschriften*<sup>13</sup>. In Gelderland, feeling ran strongly in favour of the truce both in his own quarter, that of Zutphen, and in the rest of the province. In Overijssel, peace feeling was also strong and the States of that province were likewise quick to support the truce moves<sup>14</sup>. In Utrecht, despite some resistance on the part of the city of Utrecht which, both in 1629-1630 and again in 1632-1633, opposed the truce proposals, the province, dominated by a *trêviste* nobility, likewise declared in favour. In Holland, however the affair progressed more slowly. The *gecommitteerde raden* of the province wrote to the city administrations, bringing the Spanish offer formally to their attention, only on 6 October. Thus by the time that the Amsterdam city council discussed the proposal on 9 October, Overijssel, Gelderland and Utrecht had all come out in favour and the truce movement had acquired a formidable momentum. Amsterdam too, keenly aware of the burdens and uncertainties of the war and the exhaustion of the Republic's finances, resolved to throw its great weight behind the initiative<sup>15</sup>.

Beside Amsterdam, it was, as Van der Capelle noted, Rotterdam that showed the most inclination toward a truce. Rotterdam debated the *hoochwichtich ende important poinct* on 11th October and, after prolonged discussion with some dissenting voices, agreed to support the moves to end a war which it thought involved excessive cost and losses to the Republic<sup>16</sup>. In addition, Dordrecht and Alkmaar<sup>17</sup> were emphatically in favour. Delft debated the *grootte saecke* on the same day as Rotterdam and decided, not surprisingly in a town with quite a strong commitment to the West India Company, that the 'charter given to the West India Com-

13. *Gedenkschriften van jonkheer Alexander van der Capellen, 1621-1632* (2 vols.; Utrecht, 1777) I, 549, 551-552, 555-556; Algemeen Rijksarchief, The Hague (ARA), Provinciale Resoluties, vol. IX, Gelderland, 7 Oct. 1629.

14. *Ibidem*, vol. CCCCLXXXVI, Overijssel, 2 Oct. 1629.

15. GA Amsterdam, Vroedschaps Resoluties, vol. XVI, fol. 109, 9 Oct. 1629: 'Insiende van d'eene syde de swaerigheyd ende onsekerheyd van uytkomst van der oorlogh ende de uytputtinghe der financien en van andere syde lettende op 't voorsz. advisen ende inclinatie van de Prince.

16. Van der Capellen, *Gedenkschriften*, I, 555; GA Rotterdam, Vroedschaps Resoluties, 11 Oct. 1629: after referring to the 'onheylen van d'alverslindende oorlog' and the uncertainty of its outcome, continues 'maer insonderheyt geconsidereert de staet en gelegentheyt van financien dat sodanigh geepui-seert ende wtgeputtet syn, dat in 't toekomen nauwelycke immers niet sonder peryckel van intestine swaericheyden gevonden souden kunnen werden'.

17. GA Alkmaar, Stadsarchief no 43, fo. 281v: 'is nae deliberatie verstaen dat men van wegen dese stede goede genegendheyd heeft om tot een goede verseekeerte trefve te mogen comen'.

pany should be confirmed before response is made to the truce offer<sup>18</sup>; nevertheless, Delft appears to have sided unequivocally with the truce party in the States of Holland during the preliminary deliberations of October and November. The towns of the Noorderkwartier and some small towns of South Holland adopted no stand at all initially, requiring their deputies simply to gage the mood in the province and report back. Thus Schiedam considered the Spanish proposal on 9 October, but took no definite stand for or against<sup>19</sup>, while Enkhuizen resolved a day later by *pluraliteyt van advijsen* that its representatives should simply hear the views of the other towns and seek clarification with respect to the West India Company, the struggle in Germany and consultation with the Republic's allies<sup>20</sup>. Hoorn likewise made no further initial response than to require more information<sup>21</sup>. Schoonhoven was more explicitly hostile, the majority of its council considering that the

war should be continued if the finances of the land were in any way able to bear it, but that if not, its representatives should align with the best point of view or that of the majority<sup>22</sup>.

Only two Holland towns were resolved from the first to reject the Spanish approach outright – Haarlem and Gorkum<sup>23</sup>. What, however, made the opening debate in the States of Holland, on 13 October, rather ominous for the *Trêvestes* was that besides the outright rejection by Haarlem, the third largest city of Holland, Leiden, the second city of the province, without rejecting the initiative there and then, was distinctly cool adopting a very different stand from that of Amsterdam and Rotterdam. After deliberating the truce offer at great length, on 11 October, the Leiden *groote vroedschap* resolved that the 'said truce offer should not as yet be refused outright, but that neither should the aforesaid negotiation be proceeded with', but that the Leiden deputies should endeavour to delay and that in the

18. GA Delft, Resolutie-boek, IV, 11 Oct. 1629; Rijksarchief in Zeeland, papers of the States of Zeeland (hereafter RAZ sz) no. 2099, Zeeland deputies in The Hague to States, 11 Nov. 1629; De Laet lists ten directors of the WIC chamber of the Maas from Delft for the period 1621-1636, as against nine from Rotterdam, Joannes de Laet, *Iarlyck verhael van de verrichtingen der geoctroyeerde West-Indische Compagnie* (4 vols.; The Hague, 1931-1937) I, 35.

19. GA Schiedam, Vroedschaps Resoluties, 9 Oct. 1629.

20. Archiefdienst Westfriese Gemeenten (hereafter AWG), Enkhuizen, Vroedschaps Resoluties, 10 Oct. 1629.

21. AWG, Hoorn, Vroedschaps Resoluties, 11 Oct. 1629.

22. Streekarchief Krimpenerwaard, Schoonhoven, Vroedschaps Resoluties, 7 Oct. 1629: 'soo verstaen de meeste leden dat men de oorloch soude continueren ingevalle de finantie vant land t'selve eenichsins can lijdē, soo niet, sullen de Gecommitteerden haer mogen conformeren met de meest ofte beste advijsen.

23. GA Haarlem, Vroedschaps Resoluties, 9 Oct. 1629; GA Gorkum, Vroedschaps Resoluties, 9 Oct. 1629.

meantime, the regime should consider and resolve to establish a better and firmer order and regulation for the greater security of both the religious and secular affairs of the state of this Republic<sup>24</sup>.

For several years, especially since the victory of the liberal opponents of the Counter-Remonstrants on the Amsterdam *vroedschap* in the mid-1620s<sup>25</sup>, and an accompanying marked increase in Remonstrant activity in Amsterdam and Rotterdam, Leiden, like Haarlem, had showed a marked anxiety for the future prospects of the Counter-Remonstrant faction in the province and mounting hostility to the changes in the religious and political atmosphere in Amsterdam and Rotterdam. Thus with its resolution of 11 October, Leiden firmly linked together in the Dutch political arena the question of Dutch-Spanish relations with the overriding domestic issue of the day, though in fact this linkage had already occurred, earlier in the year, in the arguments between the Holland towns over whether or not to launch a military offensive against the Spanish Netherlands. Leiden was to proceed gradually from this initial position, in the autumn in 1629, to form together with Haarlem, some of the towns of the Noorderkwartier, and later for a time also Gouda, the core of a formidable Holland war party.

After the opening debate in the States of Holland on the Spanish offer, on 13 October, the deputies reported to their respective city councils revealing the range of disagreement within the province and pressing those that had not yet adopted a stand to do so. Through October, there was a good deal of discussion of the question, both in the city administrations and the States of Holland, accompanied by frequent reference to the views of the stadholder. The Hoorn *vroedschap*, having learnt that many towns of the province favoured the truce but that most had substantial reservations concerning the West India Company, the domestic situation, circumstances in Germany and the question of consultation with France and England, agreed that a 'firm, secure truce or peace with the king of Spain would be much to the advantage of the land', but that before it would consent, adequate assurances had to be obtained from the German Emperor, the Republic's allies consulted, and the West India Company maintained in full vigour<sup>26</sup>. Enkhuizen delayed until 27 October and then aligned itself with Leiden, resolving that before it would agree to the truce itself being discussed the 'present public religion and

24. GA Leiden, Secretarie Archief 448, fo. 139v, 11 Oct. 1629: 'hebben die van selve vroetschap ... geresolveert dat de voorsz. aenbyedinge van Trefves nyet soo plotselick voor alsnoch behoort te werden afgeslagen, ende dat oock voor alsnoch in de voorsz. handelinghe nyet behoort getreden te werden maer dat men istuck mette beste gratie sal soucken te delajieren ende dat men ondertusschen ... by de regieringe behoort te werden gedelibereert en geresolveert om beter en vaster ordre ende reglement te stellen opte geestelickheyt van selve ...'.

25. Johan E. Elias, *De vroedschap van Amsterdam, 1578-1795* (2 vols.; Haarlem, 1903-1905) I, lxxii, lxxiv, lxxvii, lxxviii.

26. AWG, Hoorn, Vroedschaps Resoluties, 15 Oct. 1629.

regime should be firmly established<sup>27</sup>. Rotterdam, reviewing the progress of the truce moves on 22 October, noted that most of the towns of the province had serious reservations about the truce especially regarding the securing of religion and regime within the Republic, the West India Company, and relations with the Republic's allies, but resolved nevertheless to continue to press for prompt acceptance of the truce 'for reasons already mentioned and especially owing to the chronic lack of public funds'<sup>28</sup>. The Leiden *vroedschap*, on 26 October, again instructed its deputies to insist on prior secure establishment of 'regime and religion' in the Republic before consenting to any further truce proceedings and 'in case the concluding of the said points (concerning regime and religion) should be put off or delayed, that then the said deputies must reject the truce offer outright'<sup>29</sup>. Frederik Hendrik, for his part<sup>30</sup>, professed strict neutrality in the deliberations, but nevertheless seemed to lean toward the truce party, asserting that the occasion was especially favourable for a prestigious settlement and criticizing some of the points put forward by the war towns particularly that concerning consultation with allied monarchs; he pointed out that none of these supposed allies had lifted a finger to assist the Republic during the dangerous weeks of the Spanish invasion of the Veluwe.

On 10 November, in a key session of the States of Holland, all the towns, excepting only Medemblik and Schoonhoven whose deputies were absent, formally presented their *advysen* on the *groote saecke* in the presence of the stadholder. While only Haarlem and Gorkum rejected the thirty-four year truce altogether, besides the nobility only three towns, Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Dordrecht were unreservedly in favour of prompt acceptance<sup>31</sup>. All the rest required various conditions to be met first, though of these, Delft and Alkmaar did also show considerable

27. AWG, Enkhuizen, Vroedschaps Resoluties, 27 Oct. 1629: 'dat voor en aler ten principalen in 't selve stuck te handelen, sal vast gestelt de tegenwoordige publyque religie ende regeringe en alles gecommuniceert met de geallieerde princen'.

28. GA Rotterdam, Vroedschaps Resoluties, 22 Oct. 1629.

29. GA Leiden, Secretarie Archief 448, fo. 144: 'ingevalle de vaststellinge der voorsz. poincten souden werden getrainneert ofte gedelayeert dat alsdan de voorsz. gecommiteerden de voorsz. aenbydinge van Trefves sullen hebben af te slaan'.

30. *Ibidem*, fos. 142-v; Van der Capellen, referring to early October, reports the prince's view as being that 'men moet resolveeren tot continuatie van oorlogh, ende onderhout van 't volck nu in dienst synde, alsoo hy andersints niet soude kunnen uytrichten, ofte om den trefves aentenemen, kunnende met meerder reputatie de wapenen niet afleggen'; the editor of the memoirs, misreading the passage apparently, placed the heading in the margin 'De Prints inclineert tot continuatie van oorlogh', which seems to be incorrect, see Van der Capellen, *Gedenkschriften*, I, 548; Aitzema, moreover, confirms that the prince, though professedly neutral, 'meer voor, als tegen sprack', see L. van Aitzema, *Verhael van de Nederlantsche Vreede Handeling* (The Hague, 1650) 2 parts, I, 127.

31. GA Leiden, Secretarie Archief 448, fo. 144v: 'waer van twee waren de voorsz. aengeboden handeling plat affslaende, drie totte selve inclinerende, ende alle de vordere insisterende om eerst ende alvorens te delibereren ende resolveren op seeckere andere poincten de vastheyt ende verseeckerheyt van staet deser Landen concernerende'.

keenness for the truce. The Zeeland deputies in The Hague reported to the States of Zeeland that the Holland nobility, Dordrecht, Delft, Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Gouda (which, it seems, they may have mentioned in mistake for Alkmaar<sup>32</sup>) were inclined to accept the truce offer, but disagreed to some extent over the conditions, while the rest of the province, other than the two towns that rejected talks outright, had strong reservations which they insisted must be satisfied before they would assent to further truce proceedings, but were not, as yet, authorized by their respective towns to discuss these points in detail<sup>33</sup>. Having heard the *advysen*, Frederik Hendrik left the chamber without saying a word. On being pressed afterward to impart at least some advice to the assembly, he made known, through *Raadpensionaris* Cats, that he remained neutral on the chief point, but that he deemed the occasion opportune for a long truce and that (in clear contradiction of Leiden and Enkhuizen) the

affairs of religion and regime of these lands must be separated from this negotiation with the enemy and that each must be dealt with apart, without one having to wait until the other be arranged.<sup>34</sup>

After hearing the prince's advice, the States went on to deliberate whether or not to proceed to more detailed discussion of terms and conditions, but despite heavy pressure from Amsterdam and Rotterdam, the majority followed Leiden in wishing to recess and refer the discussion back to the *vroedschappen*. This move largely stripped the truce initiative of whatever momentum remained and the following weeks were attended by little or no further progress apart from a marked increase in public discussion of the Spanish truce offer stimulated both by a wave of printed pamphlets that were issued at this time, particularly in certain towns strongly committed to the war party, and by some fiery denunciations of the truce

32. I have not so far been able to determine the position of Gouda during the 1629-1630 talks; during 1632-1633, Gouda was one of the war towns.

33. RAZ sz 2099, Zeeland deputies in The Hague to sz, 10 Nov. 1629; 'werden in tegenwoordicheyt van syn Extie. de advysen van alle de Leden over de groote saecke ingebracht. Haarlem en Gorcum alleen sloegen de handelinghe aff. De Edelen, Dordrecht, Delft, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Gouda waren daer toe genegen; maer lettende op de WestIndische Compagnie en eenige anderen pointen de welke de selve Leden hare niet eenparig en verclaren; de andere Steden verstonden datt alvoren geresolveert moesten werden opde conservatie vande voorsz. WestIndische Compagnie, vastsettinghe vande Regieringe en Religie binnen s'lants, In wat pointen men staen soude met de Keyser en opde communicatie te doen aende Geallieerde Coningen, In welcke besoigne de selve seyden noch geen last te hebben maer die van huis te moeten haelen'.

34. GA Leiden, Secretarie Archief 448, fo. 164v: 'zyne Extie. hadde verklaert eerstelick opte saecke selfs, dat hem die indifferent was en oversulcx ingevalle de hoogstgemelte Staten goetvinden te tracteren van Trefve dat sy het nu met reputatie connen doen, ende ter contrarie ingevalle men den oorloch soude willen continueren, dat de selve nyet defensive, maer offensive soude moeten gevoert werden...datmen de saecke van religie ende regieringe deser Landen moste separeren vande handelinghe metten viandt, ende dat elck apart moste werden gedaen sonder dat het een nae het ander behoefde te wachten'.

moves from the pulpit by various Counter-Remonstrant preachers. Among the pamphlets that appeared were the supposedly secret *Consideratien* against the truce which were submitted by the West India Company directors to the States General, early in October, and which were printed significantly, in Haarlem by the printer to the *vroedschap*, Adriaen Rooman, the *Remonstrantie* of the pretender to the Bohemian crown, printed at Leeuwarden, the *Tractaet tegen Pays*, published at The Hague, and *Discours Aengaende Den Treves* which appeared at Haarlem<sup>35</sup>. That public opinion was running quite strongly against the ending of the Spanish war may be inferred from the fact that virtually all the pamphlets were hostile to the truce and that it was the *trévistes* who, at the time, sought to restrain public opinion. Late in November, the Rotterdam city fathers instructed their deputies in The Hague to urge the speeding up of the proceedings in the States and to propose in the assembly that

order should be imposed generally that this matter should not be discussed from the pulpit and against the issuing and printing of pamphlets whether for or against the truce.<sup>36</sup>

In Rotterdam itself, the Counter-Remonstrant *predikanten* received a stern warning from the burgomasters to cease their pronouncements on the subject.

On 7 December, the States of Holland conducted a second full presentation of *advysen* from the towns assembled. Little had changed since 10 November, except that Schoonhoven and Purmerend now joined Haarlem and Gorkum in fully rejecting the initiative while most towns were now better prepared to enter into detailed discussion of the issue and its implications<sup>37</sup>. Leiden's deputies were authorized to proceed

not on the matter of the truce itself, but only on the following points and subjects: firstly and above all that better order shall be put in the affairs of this state, that is that the placards of the States General already issued as permanent edicts against the forbidden gatherings and conventicles of the Remonstrants together with those against the banned Remonstrant *predikanten* be maintained and properly executed and that all those who are already in any public office or position in the regime or justice of these lands, or

35. See the *Consideratien ende redenen der E. Heeren Bewind-hebbers vande Geoctrojeerde West-Indische Compagnie inde vergaderinghe vande ... Staten Generaal ... overgelevert nopende de teghenwoordige deliberatie over den Treves met den Coning van Hispanien* (Haarlem, 1629) (Knuttel 3909); *Remonstrantie, van weghen den Coninck van Bohemen Aen de ... Staten Generaal ... Op het Tractaet van Trefves* (Leeuwarden, 1629) (Knuttel, 3914); *Discovrs over Den Nederlantschen Vrede-handel Ghestelt door een Liefhebber des Vaderlandts* (Leeuwarden, 1629) (Knuttel, 3917); *Tractaet tegen Pays, Treves, en Onderhandelinge met den Koningh van Spaignien* (The Hague, 1629) (Knuttel, 3918); *Discovrs Aengaende Treves of Vrede, Met de Infante ofte Koning van Hispanien* (Haarlem, 1629) (Knuttel, 3919).

36. GA Rotterdam, Vroedschaps Resoluties, 26 Nov. 1629.

37. GA Leiden, Secretarie Archief 448, fo. 169.

hereafter should be elected to such, should be of the religion publicly established here, or at least accept it, and all should promise to uphold and maintain the said religion and placards<sup>38</sup>.

In addition, Leiden's deputies were authorized to discuss the West India Company, the German war and other questions forming the background to Dutch-Spanish relations. Frederik Hendrik having received the *advysen* from *Pensionaris* Cats, communicated through him to the States, on 8 December, his view that a Dutch-Spanish truce, should it be proceeded with, would be placed on a firmer basis were the Southern Netherlands States General to be involved and sign and swear to the agreement and were it to be accompanied by a dismantling of key fortifications including the Spanish fortresses of Lingen, in Germany, to the east of Overijssel, and Zandvliet and others, Dutch and Spanish, on the Schelde below Antwerp<sup>39</sup>. The prince thus took the initiative in the States of Holland with a view to breaking the deadlock between the towns and assisting the truce party. Four towns at once rejected the stadholder's proposals but a clear majority, including Leiden, agreed that it should be referred back to the city councils for their decision. However, in the chambers of the *vroedschappen*, the prince's proposals met with a more generally negative reaction. Leiden judged that the 'proposal of his excellency, with reverence, would not obtain the desired security of the said negotiation'<sup>40</sup>. Hoorn deemed the prince's recommendations to be of *grootte consideratie* but ones that could be taken no further until the main pre-conditions for truce talks had been settled within the States of Holland<sup>41</sup>. Meanwhile the *trévistes* urged Frederik Hendrik's recommendations on the opposition as being the means of procuring the additional security that they sought<sup>42</sup>.

On 13 December, the States of Holland formally reviewed the state of opinion within the province for the third time. Five towns were now against<sup>43</sup>, five only were for, considering that the archduchess's offer should now be responded to

38. *Ibidem*, fo. 167, 'te treden in besoeigne nyet op de saecke van Trefve selfs, maer alleenlick opte naevolgende poincten en saecken. Te weten datmen eerst en̄ alvorens beter ordre sal stellen opte saecken van desen staeten, dat is maintneneren ende behoorlick executeren de placcaten der Ho: Mo: Heeren Staten Generaal die voor desen verklaert sijn voor ewige edicten jegens de verboden vergaderingen en̄ conventiculen der Remonstranten, mitsgaders jegens de wtgeseyde Remonstrantse Predicanten geemaneert, ende dat alle die gene die alrede in eenige publiq dyensten ofte Staten van regieringe ofte Justitie deser Landen syn, ofte noch namaels daer toe verkozen sullen werden, sullen syn van religie publiquelick alhier aengenomen, ofte ten minsten de selve toegedaen, ende alle de selve sullen beloven de voorsz. religie ende Placcaten te honthouden ende te maintneneren'.

39. *Ibidem*, fo. 169; GA Rotterdam, Vroedschaps Resoluties, 10 Dec. 1629.

40. GA Leiden, Secretarie Archief 448, fo. 169v.

41. AWG, Hoorn, Vroedschaps Resoluties, 11 Dec. 1629.

42. GA Rotterdam, Vroedschaps Resoluties, 11 Dec. 1629.

43. The fifth town, evidently, was Brielle.

positively, albeit requiring Spanish acceptance of the stadholder's proposed conditions, while all the rest, including Leiden, Enkhuizen, Hoorn and presumably Gouda, understood that Frederik Hendrik's points would not procure the necessary security and that their own conditions had to be met before they would agree to proceed<sup>44</sup>. At this, it was proposed by the nobility that a way out of the deadlock had to be found and a final decision arrived at and that a possible means to this would be a special inner committee of the States, made up both of towns in favour of and against the truce, selected to confer with the stadholder, to work out and then refer back to the full assembly a sound preparatory basis for the truce talks. Some towns readily agreed, but many, including Leiden objected and the assembly adjourned for some hours for private thought and discussion. On resuming in the afternoon, it was found that there was now a majority in favour of the nobility's recommendation, yet despite heavy pressure Leiden, Haarlem and others still refused to accept it. Finally, however, after the despatch of letters by the States to various resisting *vroedschappen*, some of the latter, including Leiden acquiesced in the setting up of the special inner committee<sup>45</sup>.

The inner committee consisted of representatives of the nobility, Dordrecht, Amsterdam and Alkmaar which were all inclined to the truce, Haarlem that flatly rejected it, and Leiden and Enkhuizen which had strong reservations. However, Haarlem, which, like Gorkum, rejected all preparatory conferences as well as truce talks proper, refused to participate which thereby placed the committee squarely in the hands of the peace party. Without Haarlem, the body soon came to the recommendation, over the objections of Leiden, that a positive initial response should be made to Isabella, indicating readiness to renew the terms of 1609, but with the participation of the southern States General and the dismantling of Zandvliet, Lingem and other fortresses as well as assurances from the German Emperor and the Catholic League that they too would acknowledge and respect such a Dutch-Spanish truce. Significantly, there was to be no insistence on the explicit resignation of sovereignty over the United Provinces by Philip IV, or that Spanish, Italian and other foreign troops be withdrawn from the Southern Netherlands, nor were France and England to be consulted<sup>46</sup>. The proposals only

44. GA Leiden, Secretarie Archief 448, fos. 170-v: 'dat voorsz. last van respectieve principalen verscheide wesende, oock heeft veroorsaect dispariteyt van opinien als hebbende vyff der gemelte Leden de praesentatie van viandt simpelick afgeslagen, andere vyff gemeint in effecte, datmen van wegen dese Republique de voorsz. praesentatie van den viandt behoorden metten eersten te beantwoorden, ende daerbij te verklaren datmen van dese syde genegen is totte handelinge ... ende de vordere Leden van welgemelte vergaderinge hebbende geoordeelt, dat metten voorsz. voorslach van syne Extie. de gemeynde verseeckertheit der voorsz. handelinge nyet en souden werden getroffen'.

45. *Ibidem*, fo. 172v, 16 Dec. 1629; the Leiden deputies on the inner committee were instructed to press, for the 'totale renunciatie van koninge van Spagnien van Souveraniteyt deser Landen, het verrecken vande wtkeemse Garnisoenen ende het vaststellen van een kerckelicke ordonnantie'.

46. *Ibidem*, fo. 175v.



served however to sharpen still further the dissension in the States with agreement only that the matter be referred back to the city administrations for further deliberation. The States broke up having fixed its next session to begin on 8 January 1630.

Before this happened though, on 17 December, a new complication was introduced into the situation when it was learned that the Venetian ambassador had informed Frederik Hendrik that he had received information from the Venetian embassy in Paris that Louis XIII and Cardinal Richelieu had indicated that they favoured an active resumption of the old Franco-Dutch alliance and proposed to make war on Spain, invading Artois and Hainault with some 45,000 men, should the Republic launch its own offensive on the Spanish Netherlands with an army of similar size. The effect of this news within the States of Holland was to induce yet more dissension with Amsterdam, Rotterdam and their allies insisting that the Republic should deliver an initial answer to Spain first, before considering the French offer, and their opponents arguing that it was preferable to respond first to France. Frederik Hendrik, however, successfully skirted this impasse with his advice that the Republic should first answer the Venetian ambassador provisionally, then speedily decide on the financial provision for the army and navy so as to maintain both on a viable war footing, and finally reply to the Spanish truce offer, all in such a way as to keep both sets of negotiations alive to the profit of the Republic<sup>47</sup>.

Although the general conjuncture confronting the United Provinces was thus becoming more complex in late December 1629 and early January 1630, and there was a good deal of further discussion in the *vroedschappen*, the lines of division in the States of Holland showed little sign of shifting. Rather the councils tended to harden their previous position. Thus Amsterdam resolved to employ 'all means to help push and advance (the truce negotiation) on'<sup>48</sup>. Leiden, seeing that it had entirely failed to influence the inner committee, determined to oppose any subsequent such conference and reverted to its earlier absolute refusal to proceed with truce talks until and unless its requirements were met<sup>49</sup>. Enkhuizen re-iterated its insistence that religion and regime must be firmly established before it would agree to proceed with negotiations with the enemy<sup>50</sup>. Schiedam now followed Leiden and Enkhuizen in demanding a *goede kerkelycke ordonnantie* before being ready to deliberate on the truce proper<sup>51</sup>. Schoonhoven determined to

47. *Ibidem*, fos. 174-v.

48. GA Amsterdam, Vroedschaps Resoluties, vol. XV, fo. 135, 31 Dec. 1629.

49. GA Leiden, Secretarie Archief 448, fo. 177, 7 Jan. 1630.

50. AWG, Enkhuizen, Vroedschaps Resoluties, 7 Jan. 1630.

51. GA Schiedam, Vroedschaps Resoluties, 7 Jan. 1630.

persist with Haarlem, or if Haarlem should conform with the other deputies (in agreeing to enter into truce talks), to do likewise but that in such case, before the negotiation should begin or be allowed, that regime and religion should be firmly established

as well as assurances obtained from the German Emperor and the West India Company maintained<sup>52</sup>. Alkmaar, interestingly, continued to favour the truce, but at the same time resolved to press for a stricter ordering of religion and regime<sup>53</sup>.

The French ambassador appeared before the States General on 26 December, proposing, on behalf of his master, an arrangement between France and the Republic whereby either Louis XIII would initiate hostilities with Spain, shortly, or else assist the Republic continue its war with Spain to the extent of one million guilders yearly, under condition that the United Provinces would not conclude any truce or peace with Spain without the assent of His Most Christian Majesty. Against this dramatic background, the States of Holland resumed their deliberations on the Spanish truce offer, during the second week in January, falling at once into profound disagreement<sup>54</sup>. To resolve the deadlock, Frederik Hendrik proposed that the deputies be sent back to the respective city administrations to emphasize the urgency of the situation and press those that had been delaying the proceedings to reconsider their position. After some sharp exchanges, the States did then resolve to send back the deputies and agreed to despatch a special missive to Haarlem pointing out that only a small fraction of the province rejected truce talks altogether and that whichever way the matter was settled, it simply had to be decided speedily 'because long deliberation on this issue can not be otherwise than prejudicial to this state'<sup>55</sup>. Leiden duly reviewed its position on 14 January, but then produced precisely the same instructions for its deputies as before. A similar missive as that despatched to Haarlem was read to the Schoonhoven *vroedschap* on 16 January, but produced only an unanimous resolution *met Haarlem ende Gorcum the persisteren* and conform with the majority only if those towns did<sup>56</sup>. On 18 January, the Zeeland deputies in The Hague reported to Middelburg that although the States of Holland had by then been considering the *groote saecke* for 'many days', a decision remained as remote as ever, progress being effectively blocked, according to what they had been able to discover, 'by Haarlem, Leiden, Briel, Gorinchem, Schoonhoven and some small towns of the Noorderkwartier'<sup>57</sup>.

The Haarlem *vroedschap*, after some delay, answered the States with a long reso-

52. Streekarchief Krimpenerwaard, Schoonhoven, Vroedschaps Resoluties, 16 Dec. 1629.

53. GA Alkmaar, Vroedschaps Resoluties, 5 Jan. 1630.

54. GA Leiden, Secretarie Archief 448, fo. 180.

55. GA Haarlem, stadsarchief, kast 3/4 no. 12, fos. 364-365, States to Haarlem, 12 Jan. 1630.

56. Streekarchief Krimpenerwaard, Schoonhoven, Vroedschaps Resoluties, 16 Jan. 1630.

57. RAZ sz 2113, deputies in The Hague to sz, 18 Jan. 1630.

lution, dated 31 January, which after being printed subsequently, first in an unauthorized version, was then reprinted by the *vroedschap* itself on the ground that it considered itself obliged to correct the inaccuracies in the allegedly pirated version<sup>58</sup>. Considering the special clear script in which the resolution was taken down in the city council's minutes, however, it seems likely that it was its intention to publish the resolution from the first. In this tract, which ends with a resounding resolution to persist in rejecting the truce offer outright, Haarlem chiefly stressed the grave dangers which it considered the proposed truce would pose for the ruling political faction in Holland, the Counter-Remonstrant party. The truce, it argued, would inevitably be accompanied, as had been the Twelve Years Truce, by a resurgence of both the Remonstrants and the Catholics who would be aided and encouraged from the Southern Netherlands. Where the States of Holland claimed in its missive that regime and religion would be safe-guarded, complained Haarlem, the contrary was already permitted in 'certain towns':

for while the *predikanten* and other honest persons are beginning to be expelled from towns, Arminians are entering into the regime, Papists are finding position and office in the town militias and other institutions, the Arminian preachers who are the cause of many disturbances are not prevented but protected, so that one sees the unrest and disturbances grow daily<sup>59</sup>.

In addition, in a reference to general economic considerations, which was rare in the *vroedschap* resolutions on the *grootte saecke*, Haarlem maintained that the Republic enjoyed its greatest prosperity precisely whilst it was at war with Spain, arguing that during the past truce 'business had diminished', Zeeland had declined and Dutch shipping had been subject to arrests in Spain and Portugal<sup>60</sup>.

The unyielding persistence of the war towns through January 1630, led by Haarlem and Leiden, brought the truce moves in the province of Holland finally to a halt. Increasingly exasperated, Rotterdam had resolved on 20 January to 'enter upon the path which is indicated in the ninth article of the Union of Utrecht'<sup>61</sup>, meaning that so grave an unresolved issue should be put to the stadholder as final arbiter, but in fact there was to be no further significant step toward the breaking of the deadlock in the province of Holland during 1630. Despite this, the question

58. See the *Resolutie By de Heeren Raeden ende Vroetschappen der Stadt Haerlem, Ghenomen op seeckere Missive aen haerlieden ghesonden van d'E. Groot Moghende Heeren Staten van Hollandt ende West-Vrieslandt, nopende 't stuck vanden Treves* (Haarlem, 1630) (Knuttel, 4010); see also W. P. C. Knuttel, *Catalogus van de Pamfletten-Verzameling berustende in de Koninklijke Bibliotheek* (8 vols.; The Hague, 1889-1916) I, part ii, nos. 4008-4010; so far, I have been unable to see the earlier version.

59. *Resolutie der Stadt Haerlem*, 11-12.

60. *Ibidem*, 8-9.

61. GA Rotterdam, Vroedschaps Resolutie, 20 Jan. 1630.

of the Spanish truce offer remained very much alive in the public mind and was fed by a further batch of printed pamphlets. The subject was also raised during the summer in the States General by the English ambassador, giving rise to some further deliberation in the States of Holland and the *vroedschappen*. Enkhuizen, for instance, re-iterated twice during the autumn of 1630 that it would permit no truce talks until religion and regime had first been firmly established<sup>62</sup>. Some of the pamphlets, interestingly, touched on the economic aspects of the *groote saecke* rather more freely than did the city council resolutions. One attack on the *trêvis-tes*, the *Klare Aenwysinge*, pointed out that the proposed truce would lead to a great revival of Dutch commerce with Spain, Portugal and Italy which would enable the Spanish king to make arbitrary arrests and seize Dutch property whenever he chose. The same tract asserted that wages, prices of agricultural produce, houses, rents and bequests were all as buoyant as during the past truce and that although, officially, Iberian and South Italian trade was lost, in reality, through neutrals and other means, it was being continued, remarking that this was well known to, and would be confirmed by, the weavers of Leiden and Haarlem<sup>63</sup>.

Following the halting of truce moves in 1630, the second major round of truce talks, during the second Dutch-Spanish struggle, took place during the years 1632-1633. On this occasion, the initiative arose from a direct approach by the South Netherlands States General, gathered at Brussels, to the States General of the United Provinces and a good deal more actual negotiation between the two sides took place<sup>64</sup>. The context in which the new moves began, in October 1632, was considerably different from that of 1629. Philip IV had extricated himself from his entanglement with Louis XIII in Italy, but his treasury was exhausted. Frederik Hendrik's triumphant advance up the Maas valley, capturing Venlo, Roermond, Maastricht and Limburg in rapid succession, had reduced Isabella to despair, further demoralized the much weakened Spanish army of Flanders, and aroused such revulsion against the war and the Spaniards in the Southern Netherlands, that Spanish rule appeared to be on the verge of collapse. It was in a state of panic that Isabella gave in to pressure to convene the southern States General and permitted it to enter at once into truce talks with the Dutch. Furthermore, whereas in 1629 the conflict in Central Europe had been going badly for the Pro-

62. AWG, Enkhuizen, Vroedschaps Resolutie, 17 Sept. and 2 Dec. 1630.

63. *Klare Aenwysinge Dat de Vereenigde Nederlanden, gheen Treves met den Vyandt dienen te maecken sijnde het derden deel van't tractaet tegens Peys, Treves, ende Onderhandelinge met den Vyant* (The Hague, 1630) (Knuttel, 4014): 'De Leytsche ende Haerlemsche wevers weten dat wel, ende sul- len ons dat als de beste getuygen daer van zijnde certificeren'.

64. On the actual talks, see: M. Gachard, ed., *Actes des Etats Généraux de 1632* (Brussels, 1853) and M. G. de Boer, *Die Friedensunterhandlungen zwischen Spanien und den Niederlanden in den Jahren 1632 und 1633* (Groningen, 1898).

testants, with the Habsburgs dominant in North Germany, by 1632, the Catholic forces in Germany had been flung back by the hammer blows of the Swedish advance. And yet, though the Spanish position was certainly weaker in 1632 than three years previously, it would be wrong to infer that Philip was now even more anxious than before to sign a long truce with the Dutch Republic<sup>65</sup>. The breakdown of royal authority in the Southern Netherlands had proceeded so far, that Philip and Olivares were inclined to believe that no acceptable agreement with the Dutch was possible until Spanish power in the Low Countries had been revived. Moreover, whereas in 1629, the Dutch had had no firm foothold in the Americas, by 1632, the West India Company held Pernambuco and a considerable area of Northern Brazil. Accordingly, whereas Philip's councils of Portugal and of the Indies, in Madrid, had wished for a speedy end to the war in 1629, in 1632, they had much greater reservations, maintaining that without total Dutch withdrawal from Brazil no truce should be entered into, for a permanent Dutch presence there, it was asserted, would pose an intolerable threat to the empires of both Portugal and Spain.

It was revealed to the deputies of the Dutch States General that the States at Brussels had requested peace or a truce, at the beginning of October 1632. The deputies were asked to obtain resolutions from their respective provinces within a few days as to whether they were now ready to respond. There then took place a somewhat hurried procedure reminiscent of that of October 1629<sup>66</sup>. As before, Gelderland promptly came out in favour, as did Overijssel and Utrecht, although in the latter province, the city, which maintained that regime and religion should be firmly established before talks with Spain be entered into, was again overruled, much to its displeasure<sup>67</sup>, by the *trêviste* nobles and clergy. Zeeland, Friesland and Groningen, adhering still to their hard line, delayed for some weeks though they too eventually agreed to the negotiations, albeit with strong reservations<sup>68</sup>. Once again, the initiative lay squarely in the hands of Holland, the towns of which were written to by the *gecommitteerde raden* of the States on 3 October and asked to present their *advysen* within three days, although few in fact did so promptly.

Amsterdam deliberated the initiative on 5 October and, referring once again to scarcity of public funds, vigorously supported the moves<sup>69</sup>. The next day, the

65. See J. I. Israel, 'A Conflict of Empires: Spain and the Netherlands, 1618-1648', *Past and Present*, LXXVI (1977) 67-68; see above, 34-35.

66. Van der Capellen, *Gedenkschriften*, I, 658.

67. RAZ sz 2102, Zeeland deputies in The Hague to sz, 19 Oct. 1632: 'de Staedt Utrecht inde vergaderinge van provincie was byde andere steden en leden overstemt'; GA Utrecht, Vroedschaps Resoluties, 'Consideration vande vroetschap', 26 Oct. 1632.

68. The first of these three to do so, five days after the submission of Holland's resolution to the States General, was Groningen, see ARA, SG, loketkas 198, resolution of Groningen, 23 Oct. 1632.

69. GA Amsterdam, Vroedschaps Resoluties, XV, 265.

Dordrecht *vroedschap* resolved unanimously to employ every means at its disposal to advance the truce talks<sup>70</sup>. The nobility, Rotterdam, Alkmaar, Medemblik and even Purmerend and Gorkum likewise decided promptly in favour<sup>71</sup>. However, it was also clear that a large part of the province was by no means so warmly disposed as these towns to the prospect of an early end to the war. Enkhuizen authorized its deputies to consent to talks if the truce were to be made excluding the king of Spain, but to speak against it otherwise<sup>72</sup>. Hoorn consented provisionally, but with very strong conditions, including the demand that Dunkirk, Oostende, Antwerp and other towns of the Southern Netherlands should be garrisoned by Dutch troops indefinitely<sup>73</sup>. Gouda's deputies were instructed only to hear the *advysen* of the other towns and then report back<sup>74</sup>. Haarlem's deputies were instructed to agree to hear the detailed offer of the other side but not yet to agree to any further negotiation<sup>75</sup>. Leiden's representatives were likewise instructed, but with the added reservation that all seven provinces had to be unanimous before they would agree to talks<sup>76</sup>.

On 9th October, the Haarlem *vroedschap* did decide to agree to peace or truce talks, but at the same time adopted the specific hard line to which it adhered through the 1632-1633 negotiations and which came to be shared by the provinces of Zeeland, Friesland and Groningen. Haarlem consented to meet with 'those of the other side' strictly under the condition that the Spanish king and Infanta Isabella were excluded from the proceedings<sup>77</sup>, that all Spanish, Italian and other foreign troops were withdrawn from the Southern Netherlands, that Antwerp, Rheinberg, Breda, Orsoy, Lingen and other towns be garrisoned indefinitely by Dutch troops, that the reformed faith be tolerated freely in the Southern Netherlands as well as that the Schelde would remain closed and other conditions. Enkhuizen assented to negotiations for peace or a truce on the same day as Haarlem<sup>78</sup>. For some weeks however, Leiden stood out from the other opposition towns in

70. GA Dordrecht, Vroedschaps Resoluties, 6 Oct. 1632; 'dat het vz. werck met alle middelen van devoir soo int publick als int particulier byde leden (des noot syñ) sal werden gevordeert ten eijnde dat het selve op het spoedichste ten effecte mach werden gebracht'.

71. GA Delft, Resolutie-boek, IV, 8 Oct. 1632: 'verstonden de heeren Edelen, Dordrecht, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Gorinchem, Alckmaar, Medemblick ende Purmerend dat men behoort te comen en acceleren de handelingen'; Delft itself joined with the other peace towns.

72. AWG, Enkhuizen, Vroedschaps Resoluties, 6 Oct. 1632.

73. *Ibidem*, Hoorn, Vroedschaps Resoluties, 6 Oct. 1632.

74. GA Gouda, Oud-Archief, no 50, fos. 45v-46.

75. GA Haarlem, Vroedschaps Resoluties, 5 Oct. 1632.

76. GA Leiden, Secretarie Archief 449, fos. 1-4v, 9 Oct. 1632.

77. GA Haarlem, Vroedschaps Resoluties, 9 Oct. 1632: 'dat den Coninck van Hispanien, mitsgaders d'Infante hertoginne van Brabant, buyten dese tractatie ende onderhandelinge gesloten en dat hare qualiteyten ofte namen tot geene aggregaetien ofte approbation int alderminsten gebruyckt sullen werden'.

78. AWG, Enkhuizen, Vroedschaps Resoluties, 9 Oct. 1632.

withholding consent to negotiate with the Brussels delegates at all and protesting repeatedly that it would not yield<sup>79</sup>. On 15 October, against the single vote of Leiden, the States of Holland finally agreed to make known its readiness to proceed, in the States General. A week later, a delegation of the States of Holland, consisting of *Raadpensionaris* Cats, the *heer* Van Brederode, and Nanning van Foreest, secretary of Alkmaar, appeared before the Leiden *vroedschap* and endeavoured with numerous arguments to contrive that it conform with the rest of the province<sup>80</sup>. Leiden did then relent as regarded entering into talks and preliminary discussion in the States of Holland, but continued to insist that there should be no substantive negotiation until all seven provinces of the union had declared themselves willing, three being yet to do so.

During November and December 1632, the States of Holland debated the form and content of the proposed peace negotiations. In particular, there was considerable argument as to whether the Brussels States General should be dealt with as a free and sovereign body or be acknowledged to be subject to Spain. The majority, the peace party, pushed hard for inclusion of the king of Spain and after some weeks of discussion were able to get their way. Gouda pressed resolutely for exclusion of the king of Spain and the Infanta at any rate during November<sup>81</sup>. Hoorn strove until 14 December to procure the exclusion of Spain but then, yielding to the pressure of the majority, dropped its insistence<sup>82</sup>. Leiden's deputies were instructed to press for negotiations as with 'free States that have thrown off the yoke or sovereignty of Spain' as far as possible, but then to yield if this could not be obtained<sup>83</sup>. Holland, led by Amsterdam and Rotterdam, was thus free by December to exert pressure in the States General on the three provinces that persisted in pressing for exclusion of Spain. 'Those of Holland', commented Aitzema,

were more moderate [than Zeeland, Friesland and Groningen], considering that if Spain were excluded, they would then not enjoy freedom of commerce in Spain, Italy and other lands of the king<sup>84</sup>.

In order to present a united front to the delegates of the Southern Netherlands, the United Provinces, headed by Holland, were compelled to present terms so harsh as to cause outright dismay in Brussels and indignation in Madrid. In addition to withdrawal of foreign troops, the transfer of many towns, demolition of

79. GA Leiden, Secretarie Archief 449, fos. 4v-8.

80. *Ibidem*, fo. 8v-9.

81. GA Gouda, Oud-Archief, vol. 50, fo. 48v.

82. AWG, Hoorn, Vroedschaps Resoluties, 14 Dec. 1632.

83. GA Leiden, Secretarie Archief 449, fo. 13v, 7 Dec. 1632.

84. Aitzema, *Nederlantsche Vreede Handeling*, I, 194.

fortresses and toleration of Calvinism in the South, retention of Dutch conquests in the East and West Indies and continued closure of the Schelde, there were major tariff demands sought by Zeeland to prevent the use of Flemish ports to circumvent Zeeland tolls on the Schelde and the condition that the Dutch Jews should have the same freedoms, throughout the Spanish empire in Europe, as would other Dutch subjects<sup>85</sup>. As the negotiations proceeded through the spring of 1633, therefore, and as it became clearer that these terms would simply have to be somewhat watered down if a final Dutch-Spanish settlement was to be reached, friction between the war and peace factions, both within the States General and the States of Holland, tended to persist as the war party endeavoured to prevent the making of concessions. Thus when the peace talks reached their climax in the late spring and early summer of 1633 and the gap between the two sides was narrowed to the point that there seemed to be a real likelihood of an early end to the war, the Dutch war party again began to assert itself to its utmost. Zeeland, Friesland and Groningen adopted a progressively more hostile tone in their pronouncements on the talks. The city of Utrecht, breaking constitutional convention, notified the States General directly that it regarded its being overruled by the nobility and clergy of the province as illegal and refused to accept that the province of Utrecht was supporting the moves<sup>86</sup>. The Holland war towns readied themselves for further rounds of argument in the States of Holland.

By late May, 1633, there were two major remaining points of disagreement. One was the issue of the Indies where the Spaniards were insisting that the Republic must make concessions and, in particular, agree to withdraw from Brazil, and the other, that of the Meierij of 's-Hertogenbosch, a rich, thickly populated and overwhelmingly Catholic region which, though still partly in Spanish hands, was demanded by the Dutch on the ground that it all pertained to the town and seat of the bishopric, which they had captured in 1629. As an inducement to give up Pernambuco, Philip was offering the Dutch substantial financial compensation. These crucial remaining points were referred back by the Dutch States General to the provinces, and by the provinces to their members, so that in the first week of June, the *groote saecke* lay again in the hands of the Holland *vroedschappen*. Amsterdam now carried its rift with the West India Company so far that while it instructed its deputies to press for retention of Pernambuco up to a point, rather than allow the talks to break down, to agree to abandon Brazil in return for mo-

85. The demand concerning the Jews is rather perplexing, for no Dutch demand caused more annoyance in Madrid at this time, such that it appears unlikely that it was prompted by any peace town and yet it was, of course, normally Amsterdam that concerned itself with the Jews; on the place of the Jews in the Dutch-Spanish conflict, see my article 'Spain and the Dutch Sephardim, 1609-1660', *Studia Rosenthaliana*, XII (1978) 1-61; see below, 355-415.

86. ARA, SG, loketkas 198, Resolution 8 July 1633 on missive of Utrecht to States General, 27 May 1633.



netary compensation<sup>87</sup>. Rotterdam authorized its representatives to assent to whatever was necessary to bring an end to 'this sorrowful and burdensome war'<sup>88</sup>. Dordrecht resolved to do all that was possible to bring the negotiations to a successful conclusion<sup>89</sup>. Delft, more cautious over the colonial issue than the other peace towns, assented to further concessions except that matters relating to the Indies should be referred back<sup>90</sup>. At the same time, on the other hand, Haarlem's deputies were instructed to refuse any further concession<sup>91</sup>. While Gouda, still militant, determined to recommend continuation of the war outside of Europe in both the East and West Indies<sup>92</sup>. Hoorn and Enkhuizen once again expressed strong support for the great colonial companies, urging continuation of the Dutch-Spanish struggle outside of Europe<sup>93</sup>. Leiden characteristically insisted that Dutch Brazil be kept and all the Meierij acquired<sup>94</sup>. The meeting of the Schiedam vroedschap broke up inconclusively. Although there was no explicit statement in the Rotterdam and Dordrecht resolutions that these towns were now ready to abandon Brazil, given the context, it seems clear that this is their significance. Until June 1633, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Dordrecht and Alkmaar, the core of the Holland peace party had commanded a solid majority in the provincial assembly and had successfully enforced step after step in the direction of peace. Over Brazil and the Meierij however, that majority dissolved and from June onwards, it proved impossible to secure any further progress in the talks. Indeed they were only precariously kept alive during the next six months owing to the vigorous determination of the Holland peace towns. In early August, the States of Holland debated the advice of Frederik Hendrik, who seems to have discarded his former leaning toward the peace camp by this time, that if the enemy did not give way over the Meierij and the Indies within a month, reckoned from 29 July, then the negotiations should be broken off by the Dutch side. Haarlem wanted this deadline to be strictly enforced<sup>95</sup>, as did Enkhuizen, Schoonhoven<sup>96</sup> and other towns.

87. GA Amsterdam, Vroedschaps Resoluties, XVI, fos. 1-v; Waddington, *La République*, I, 198-202; De Boer, *Die Friedensunterhandlungen*, 104.

88. GA Rotterdam, Vroedschaps Resoluties, 9 June 1633.

89. GA Dordrecht, Vroedschaps Resoluties, 6 June 1633: 'is eenpaerlick en eenstemmenlick geresolveert en gepersisteert, dat d'heeren die de voorsz. saecke vertrouweert is, alsnoch met allen ijver ende devoir sullen poogen te volvoeren, ende alle haer actien daer toe dirigeren, dat den Vreden ofte treves mach getroffen en geeffectueert werden'.

90. GA Delft, Resolutie-boek, IV, 6 June 1633.

91. GA Haarlem, Vroedschaps Resoluties, 7 June 1633.

92. GA Gouda, Oud-Archief 50, fo. 68, 7 June 1633.

93. AWG, Hoorn, Vroedschaps Resoluties, 13 June 1633, Enkhuizen, Vroedschaps Resoluties, 6 June 1633; on the issue of occupying Flemish harbours, interestingly, Hoorn strove longest among the Holland war towns and by early June was left completely isolated.

94. GA Leiden, Secretarie Archief 449, fos. 45v-46, 8 June 1633.

95. GA Haarlem, 4 Aug. 1633.

96. Streekarchief Krimpenerwaard, Schoonhoven, Vroedschaps Resoluties, 8 Aug. 1633; this resolution suggests that Schoonhoven still inclined towards the war camp.

Peace towns such as Rotterdam, by contrast, considered that contact should certainly not be broken off, that no limit should be set and that with the aid of the Almighty a way to peace would be found<sup>97</sup>. The deadlock produced delay and later, in November, a second dead-line was set. Again the peace camp fought the proposal, Delft for instance resolving that the 'deputies [from Brussels] should be kept here and not made to go back, before it is seen what outcome the Almighty in this most important matter shall be pleased to grant'<sup>98</sup>. On 2 December, the States of Holland voted again as to whether to break off negotiations finally and send back the Brussels deputies. Four votes only were cast in favour of a complete break – those of Haarlem, Leiden, Gouda and, intriguingly, the nobility. Those which voted for keeping the Brussels representatives in The Hague were seven – Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Delft, predictably, and also Edam, Monnikendam, Medemblik and Purmerend. Eight towns adopted a middle position favouring the sending back of the deputies but not a final breaking off, but 'met clare en uyt-druckelijcke woorden te kennen gheven dat men den handel hout voor gecontinueert': these were Dordrecht, Gorkum, Schiedam, Schoonhoven, Brielle, Alkmaar, Hoorn and Enkhuizen<sup>99</sup>. One wonders, with regard to the switch in the position of the nobility, whether this might have been connected with the shift in Frederik Hendrik's own stance. At length, after several weeks more wrangling, negotiations with Brussels were finally broken off at the end of December 1633.

After December 1633, apart from a brief flurry of truce moves initiated by the Cardinal-Infante in 1635-1636, there were no other substantive negotiations between Spain and the Republic until 1643 when the Munster talks began in earnest. Throughout this lengthy prolongation of the war, opposition to a Spanish peace, though steadily waning, did survive as an active force within the States of Holland, its last outpost being Leiden which even following ratification of the treaty of Munster, alone among Holland towns refused, in June 1648, to comply with the States General's request that public festivities be arranged throughout the Republic to celebrate the Peace<sup>100</sup>. Taking a broad view of the Dutch-Spanish conflict of 1621-1648, the significance of this persistent war sentiment in Holland lies not only in that it contributed substantially to frustrating the hopes for peace of Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Delft and Dordrecht over many years, but also in that it allows much insight into the deeper meaning of the long struggle both for Holland and Dutch life of the Golden Age generally. Lengthy wars involving burdensome taxation are not usually popular. Thus when the heavy taxation and the ma-

97. GA Rotterdam, Vroedschaps Resoluties, 10 Aug. 1633.

98. GA Delft, Resolutie-boek, IV, 30 Nov. 1633.

99. See J. J. Poelhekke, *Frederik Hendrik. Prins van Oranje. Een biografisch drieluik* (Zutphen, 1978) 404-405.

100. GA Leiden, Secretarie Archief 963, fo. 237,4 June 1648.

ny other heavy burdens imposed by the struggle, including very extensive disruption to Holland's European trade, are taken into account, it must seem extraordinary that support for the conflict remained vigorous for so long. What makes the phenomenon still more remarkable is that the nobility which tended in most European countries to hold war-making in higher esteem than much of the rest of society, in Holland, Utrecht, Gelderland and Overijssel were, at least for much of the time, in favour of peace. There is no denying that outside the three war provinces, the main support for the conflict came from certain particular towns, notably Haarlem, Leiden, Gouda, Utrecht, Hoorn and Enkhuizen. The question becomes still more perplexing if one refers back to the years 1607-1609, when the Dutch entered for the first time into truce talks with Spain. At that time, many towns, including Haarlem and Leiden, which later adhered to the Holland war party, then supported Oldenbarnevelt and his truce moves<sup>101</sup>. Gouda, which in 1632-1633 belonged to the militant opposition, was, before 1609, more desirous of a Spanish peace than any other Holland town<sup>102</sup>. More remarkable still, what significant resistance that there was in the States of Holland, in 1607-1609, to the truce policy emanated from Amsterdam<sup>103</sup>. The attitude of Amsterdam in 1607-1609, however, affords a valuable insight into the nature of later developments and an apt starting-point from which to work toward a general explanation for the subsequent divisions among the Holland towns during the second Spanish war. At the time of Oldenbarnevelt's truce moves, the strict Calvinist party had recently come to dominate within the Amsterdam *vroedschap*. This meant of course a shift in religious policy in the city. It also involved the ascendancy of a political faction which was quite sharply defined and delineated as regards familial connections from the party of those later to be known as the Remonstrant regents. Of course, there is nothing new in asserting that the future Counter-Remonstrants and their opponents were political groupings and networks of patronage as much as religious parties. What needs to be stressed, though, is that any political grouping exercising extensive patronage and great influence over local economic administration, procedures and taxation will inevitably be, or tend to become, an economic faction also. In a highly complex economy, such as that of seventeenth-century Holland, interests naturally vary and in the nature of things where opposing groups fight for power, the rival political and politico-religious bodies become identified with competing economic interests.

Amsterdam undoubtedly was devoted above all to sea-borne commerce. But by 1607-1609, there was, as was to be still more the case after 1621, a deepseated

101. Jan den Tex, *Oldenbarnevelt* (5 vols.; Haarlem-Groningen, 1960-1972) II, 575.

102. A. M. van der Woude, 'De Goudse magistraat en de strijd tegen de koning', *Bijdragen voor de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden*, XIII (1959) 101-107.

103. Den Tex, *Oldenbarnevelt*, II, 562, 575, 607, 658; Elias, *Vroedschap van Amsterdam*, I, xlix, 1, liii.

contradiction between the requirements of the European carrying trade on the one hand and of colonial commerce on the other<sup>104</sup>. While the former suffered from the stringent embargoes imposed by the Spanish crown against Dutch shipping and goods in Spain, Portugal, Spanish North Africa and southern Italy, from 1598 onwards, and from the beginnings of Flemish privateering, colonial trade gained both from the war-time opportunity to attack Portuguese and Spanish trade and possessions in the Far East and the Americas and, indeed, also from the set-backs to European trade, which caused a major diversion of investment and energy from European into colonial trade. The loss of access to Portuguese and Andalusian salt, one of the principal Dutch imports from southern Europe and re-exports to the Baltic, not only directly caused Dutch exploitation of the Venezuelan salt-pans in the years 1598-1609, but accorded Caribbean salt a commercial value in Europe that it could not possibly have gained without the Spanish embargoes and which was at once removed in 1609 with the commencement of the truce<sup>105</sup>. In no small measure, the same was also true of spices and sugar with disruption and embargo in Europe stimulating direct contact with the East Indies and Brazil. Thus Dutch colonial trade, both in its origins and its later progress, in part lived off the misfortunes of the European carrying trade. The victory of the hard-line Calvinists at Amsterdam, as is well known<sup>106</sup>, not only marked the triumph of a church faction and patronage network, but the ascendancy of the East India Company and those who aspired to the setting up of a West India Company. The Amsterdam city council first decided in 1606 to support plans for a West India Company and from then, until the mid 1620s, remained the chief patron of the West India interest.

The West India Company is certainly the clearest instance in seventeenth-century Holland of a specific economic entity with a pronounced political orientation. After the establishment of the company in 1621, the Amsterdam chamber was heavily dominated by Counter-Remonstrants and South Netherlanders, the Remonstrant regents having only a tiny representation<sup>107</sup>. During the mid 1620s, as the Counter-Remonstrants lost their domination of the city administration and there occurred a resurgence of Remonstrant religious activity, tolerated by the *vroedschap*, amid the friction and general unrest in the city, the Company openly took sides with the Counter-Remonstrant minority of the *vroedschap*, calling on

104. Israel, 'Spain and the Netherlands', 66; see above, 33 and below, 355-415.

105. Engel Sluiter, 'Dutch-Spanish Rivalry in the Caribbean Area, 1594-1609', *Hispanic American Historical Review*, XXVIII (1948) 170, 176-178; C. Goslinga, *The Dutch in the Caribbean and on the Wild Coast, 1580-1680* (Assen, 1971) 82-83.

106. Elias, *De vroedschap van Amsterdam*, I, xlix, 1; W. J. van Hoboken, 'The Dutch West India Company; the Political Background of its Rise and Decline', in: J. S. Bromley and E. H. Kossmann, ed., *Britain and the Netherlands*, I (London, 1960) 48.

107. *Ibidem*, 50-54.

the stadholder to intervene against the Remonstrants. Thus well before the truce talks of 1629, the *vroedschap* majority, led by Andries Bicker, and the Company were all at once opponents in religion, politics and economic policy. With the campaign by the so-called Libertine majority of the city council to terminate the Spanish war, a policy threatening the most vital interests of the Company, and the withdrawal by Bicker's brother, Cornelis, of his large investment in the Company's shares, relations deteriorated almost to the point of a feud. Members of the Amsterdam *vroedschap* who remained heavily involved in the West India Company, such as Reynier Reael and Simon van der Does<sup>108</sup>, at the same time as they identified with the Counter-Remonstrants in religion and opposed the Bicker faction politically, publicly pressed for continuation of the Spanish war.

The victory of the Remonstrants in Amsterdam and the break with the Company brought about the hegemony of the European carrying interest in the *vroedschap* and growing appreciation of its needs. This also fitted in well with the particular business enterprises of Bicker himself. Moreover, at this very point, the needs of European trade were especially pressing and particularly opposed to those of colonial commerce. Dutch European carrying traffic suffered from much heavier Spanish pressure after 1621 than it had before 1609<sup>109</sup>. Effective exclusion from Spain, Portugal and southern Italy, combined with the increasingly damaging activity of the Dunkirkers, which rarely captured heavily armed India-men, but took hundreds of *fluyts* sailing to and from France, Italy, England and Norway, made a very considerable impact indeed. The contraction in Mediterranean trade, moreover, adversely affected Baltic commerce, for much of the Baltic grain and timber was destined for Mediterranean markets, especially those that were now closed, while among the leading Dutch exports to the Baltic were Iberian salt and herring, supplies of which depended on adequate provision of salt in Holland.

Beside Amsterdam, two other Holland towns which may be said to have been highly sensitive to Spanish economic pressure were Rotterdam and Dordrecht. Rotterdam, a major centre of European carrying, where the West India Company was relatively weak, was at the same time a strong-point of the opponents to the Counter-Remonstrants. Dordrecht's principal interest, economically, lay in the busy inland river traffic of which it was a focal point and within which carrying to Antwerp and the Southern Netherlands figured large. The general contraction of river and canal-borne commerce between the two parts of the Netherlands, caused by a variety of war-time measures, and especially by the great river bloc-

108. These two were among those Heeren XIX of the Company who signed the remonstrance to the States General in October 1629 bitterly attacking the truce moves.

109. See above, 15-22.

kade imposed by the Spaniards during the years 1625-1629<sup>110</sup>, undoubtedly had considerable adverse consequences for Dordrecht and goes far to explain the exceptional fervour for peace evinced by Dordrecht during the 1629-1633 truce and peace negotiations. Other ports seriously affected by the Spanish embargoes and Flemish privateering were Hoorn and Enkhuizen which between them furnished a large part of the shipping employed in Baltic and Mediterranean trade. But there, the Counter-Remonstrant faction, which had already been dominant well before 1618, sustained both itself and the local economy through the relatively huge expansion in East and West India Company activity during the 1620s and 1630s. It appears that there was a particularly intimate connection in the West Frisian ports between the town councils and the Noorderkwartier chamber of the West India Company. Of eleven West India Company directors from the town of Hoorn between 1622 and 1636, for instance, no less than four were also burgomasters of Hoorn and at least three others were also members of the *vroedschap* during the 1632-1633 negotiations<sup>111</sup>.

In addition to the clash of interests as between European and colonial trade, however, there existed within the province of Holland a still deeper contradiction of interest, as between sea-borne commerce and manufacturing, which like the former difference, became linked to Remonstrant and Counter-Remonstrant rivalry. Leiden and Haarlem had built up their woollen, linen and dying industries rapidly in the late sixteenth century, helped by the ruin of the textile industries of the Southern Netherlands and the great migration of Flemish and Walloon cloth workers and employers to the United Provinces. Gouda developed into a significant secondary centre of textile production somewhat later, mainly during the first quarter of the seventeenth century. From an early stage, however, Dutch cloth producers were keenly aware of their all-too-evident vulnerability to foreign competition and particularly of the increasingly formidable threat that the textiles of Lille, Hondschoote, Valenciennes, Tilburg, Liège and elsewhere would pose once recovery in the Southern Netherlands began, as it soon did<sup>112</sup>. With an industrious, highly skilled and experienced work force, good communications and significantly lower wage rates, Southern Netherlands cloth output could not, indeed, be otherwise than highly menacing from the moment recovery began. As early as 1585, Leiden, Haarlem and Delft were pressing for a ban on commerce

110. *Ibidem*, 23-24; for further information on Dordrecht during the second Dutch-Spanish war, see my *The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World, 1606-1661* (Oxford, 1982), 167, 201, 231, 242.

111. AWG, OAH, III, see name lists at the heads of *vroedschaps-resoluties*; De Laet, *Jaerlyck Verhael*, 36.

112. N. W. Posthumus, *De geschiedenis van de Leidsche lakenindustrie* (3 vols.; The Hague, 1908-1939) III, 955-963; *Idem*, ed., *Bronnen tot de geschiedenis van de Leidsche textielnijverheid* (6 vols.; The Hague, 1910-1922) IV, xi; S. C. Regtdoorzee Greup-Roldanus, *Geschiedenis der Haarlemmer Bleeke-rijen* (The Hague, 1936) 22, 27, 38, 267.

with the Spanish Netherlands so as to prevent wool and other raw materials for industry being supplied there and to shut out Flemish fabrics<sup>113</sup>, predictably, Amsterdam and other trading towns resisted fiercely. From these beginnings, arose a prolonged rivalry between Leiden and Haarlem on the one side, and Amsterdam and Rotterdam on the other, which arguably greatly contributed to the deep rift between the four leading towns of Holland over many decades.

In 1607-1609, the Holland war-party, led by Amsterdam, had had powerful supporters in Leiden and Haarlem, and Amsterdam had hoped to form an opposition block with them against the truce moves. As it happened though, Oldenbarnevelt's supporters in the city councils of the textile towns carried the day and Amsterdam was left isolated. The consequence of this development, however, was the immediate loss by the cloth towns of the substantial tariff protection that they had enjoyed during the last phase of the first Dutch-Spanish war, under the tariff list introduced in 1603. The entire range of manufactures entering the United Provinces from, or through, Spanish-controlled territory, suddenly paid only a tiny fraction of the duty payable before the truce<sup>114</sup>. The impost on Southern Netherlands woven linen, for instance, fell to one-fifth of its war-time level. Of course, loss of protection, during the truce, was largely compensated for by the vigorous growth that occurred in Holland's European sea-borne trade during the truce years. New markets were acquired, especially for says and other new draperies, in the various countries of the Spanish Monarchy. But at the same time, the growing demand from the merchant exporters of Holland sucked in increasing quantities of cloth from the Southern Netherlands and in effect assisted its industrial recovery. Accordingly, while some, though not all, Dutch textile activities continued to expand until the resumption of war, in 1621, Spanish Netherlands competition was also being felt more keenly during these years. The overthrow of Oldenbarnevelt in 1618 and subsequent ascendancy of the Counter-Remonstrants, however, led to a sharp resurgence of protectionism in the States of Holland fomented especially by Leiden and Haarlem.

The assertion that is often put forward that tariffs on imported manufactures were normally kept very or relatively low during the Dutch Golden Age<sup>115</sup>, at the insistence of the great commercial towns, actually requires drastic qualification, indeed contradiction, as regards the years of the second Dutch-Spanish struggle. Even before the expiry of the truce, the States of Holland deliberated whether to raise the tariffs on manufactures produced in 'enemy' territory, or reaching the

113. Den Tex, *Oldenbarnevelt*, I, 273, 276, 282.

114. *Groot Placcaet-boek*, I, 2388-2389, 2404-2405, 2458, 2466-2467; Regtdoorzee Greup-Roldanus, *Haarlemmer Bleekerijen*, 255-256; C. G. Cobet, *Bijdrage tot de geschiedenis der belastingen in Nederland* (Leiden, 1864) 133.

115. See J. G. van Dillen, 'Leiden als industriestad tijdens de Republiek', *Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis*, LIX (1946) 35-36.

United Provinces through enemy territory, and there was pressure to increase duties on raw wool exports 'tot beter conservatie van de Inlandsche manufacturen'<sup>116</sup>. In 1623, the States General, at Leiden's demand, prohibited altogether the export of local (*hierlandsche*) uncombed wool, both to Spanish and neutral territory, and tightly restricted exports of combed wools<sup>117</sup>. In July 1625, the protectionist drive of the early 1620s continued with the re-introduction by the States General of the war list of 1603, a list which involved considerable tariff increases on all foreign manufactures but with a special additional tariff on goods manufactured in, or entering the Republic through, Spanish-controlled territory<sup>118</sup>, as well as heavier duty on exported foreign wools. At provincial level meanwhile, as a supplementary war-time measure, tax payable on the different types of Spanish Netherlands cloth sold in Holland was raised by three and four times, while duty on Liège *lakens* remained unchanged<sup>119</sup>.

Despite these measures, some Flemish manufactures doubtless still entered the Republic while local raw wool seeped out. The Leiden city council certainly continued to receive complaints about diversion of wool supplies. In addition, Leiden and Haarlem undoubtedly lost export markets in Spain, Portugal and Italy, though there were pamphleteers who denied this. Spanish ministers were not altogether wrong in believing that their measures adversely affected Dutch textile production, as is indicated by the steady decline of say output at Leiden from the early 1620s, at a time when Flemish and English exports of new draperies to the Iberian peninsula were increasing. But with Southern Netherlands competition reduced, other cloth output and, after 1635, especially the famous *lakens*, which were much costlier cloths than says, expanded<sup>120</sup>. It is true that measured in terms of quantity of output, the gains of war were cancelled out by the losses, so that total production stagnated at a more or less even plateau between 1621 and 1648, but the value and profitability of Leiden's production rose steadily throughout the war. Moreover, many of Leiden's competitors in the Southern Netherlands, having lost access to the Dutch market, were forced into recession. That Leiden had the upper hand during the 1620s and 1630s over its chief Southern Netherlands rivals is further suggested by the marked increase in the migration of skilled

116. *Resolutien Staten van Holland*, 1621, see the *beschrijving* and discussion of point 10 of March and point 9 of April.

117. *Groot Placcaet-Boek*, I, 1172-1173, 22 April 1623, re-issued 8 June 1630.

118. *Ibidem*, I, 2415-2416, 12 June 1625; another war-time protectionist measure was the ban of January 1630 on the importing of rough woven linnen (*tijcken*) into the United Provinces from Flanders and Brabant.

119. *Groot Placcaet-Boek*, I, 1900, 1901, 1909; J. G. van Dillen, ed., *Bronnen tot de geschiedenis van het bedrijfsleven en het gildewezen van Amsterdam, II (1612-1632)* (RGP LXXVIII; The Hague, 1932) 415.

120. Posthumus, *De Leidsche lakenindustrie*, III, 1179-1180, 1184.



workers from Liège to Leiden during those years, whereas after 1648, the drift was very much in the other direction<sup>121</sup>.

Following the conclusion of the Dutch-Spanish war in 1648, the advantageous position of the Dutch textile industry was at once lost, with a sharp increase in imports from the Southern Netherlands into the United Provinces and a marked weakening in the competitive position of Leiden in particular<sup>122</sup>. Admittedly, the celebrated economic theorist of seventeenth-century Leiden, Pieter de la Court, placed relatively little emphasis on the loss of protection and the withdrawal of the war-time tariff list as reasons for the post-1648 weakening of Leiden's position, preferring to blame excessively tight guild controls over the processes of production; but he was well aware that the Dutch textile industry had flourished best during the long war, attributing this to the damage suffered by the textile industries of northwest Germany and the destruction wrought by the French in Flanders, after 1635<sup>123</sup>. Thus it may be gathered that when Haarlem declared that the Spanish war was no bad thing economically, while Amsterdam and Rotterdam referred to the burdens and losses caused by the struggle, no real contradiction was involved. For Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Dordrecht, the conflict was damaging; for Leiden, Haarlem, Gouda and also Utrecht, it was beneficial.

Thus it may be said, in conclusion, that economic as well as internal political and religious rivalries caused the sharp split between the two groups of Holland towns which is the most important feature of the Dutch response to the Spanish truce and peace initiatives of 1629-1633. Or rather economic rivalry, between two competing sets of interests, formed an inherent part of the domestic political and religious rivalry which prevented any prompt or unified Dutch response to the peace proposals. It is true that the Holland town councils themselves seldom referred to the economic context in their deliberations over the truce moves, but it would seem that this was simply to avoid appearing to be motivated by local rather than national interest. Thus even where there is such reference, as by Haarlem in its long resolution of January 1630, the *vroedschap* concerned tried to justify its case with arguments that allegedly applied to Amsterdam and Zeeland rather than to itself. In 1629-1630, desire for stricter exclusion of Remonstrants and Catholics from office was repeatedly asserted to be the main motive of the opposition towns and, undoubtedly, it was a major concern; and yet, not all the towns by any means that desired stricter exclusion of Remonstrants supported the policy of

121. *Idem*, 'De industriële concurrentie tusschen Noord- en Zuid-Nederlandsche nijverheidscentra in de XVIIe and XVIIIe eeuw', *Mélanges d'histoire offerts à Henri Pirenne* (Brussels, 1926) I, 372-373.

122. *Ibidem*, 373-378; P. D. Huet, *Mémoires sur le commerce des Hollandais* (Amsterdam, 1717) 82.

123. Though De la Court did also criticize the lack of tariff protection, see Pieter de la Court, *Het welvaren van Leiden. Handschrift uit het jaar 1659* (The Hague, 1911) 29-30, 100-102; Th. van Tijn, 'Pieter de la Court. Zijn leven en zijn economische denkbeelden', *Tijdschrift voor geschiedenis*, LXIX (1956) 351, 360.

Leiden and Haarlem; Alkmaar, for instance, supported the peace moves. During the 1632-1633 deliberations, on the other hand, there was scarcely any mention of exclusion of Remonstrants as an issue, yet Leiden and Haarlem continued to lead the resistance to peace, even when supposedly the chief issues were the West India Company and the Meierij, in which neither had much, if any, direct concern.

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## FREDERICK HENRY AND THE DUTCH POLITICAL FACTIONS, 1625-1642

FREDERICK HENRY figures indisputably as a major European statesman and military leader of the Thirty Years War period; and yet, until the recent massive study of his life and work by Professor J. J. Poelhekke,<sup>1</sup> the literature about him had remained remarkably sparse. Apart from the much shorter but still useful biography published by P. J. Blok in 1924,<sup>2</sup> there previously existed no systematic treatment of his political rôle. The few brief evaluations to be found in the writings of other Dutch historians<sup>3</sup> mostly just reiterate Blok's basic propositions which, indeed, as far as they go, are mainly, though not entirely, accurate. Blok saw Frederick Henry as an exceedingly cautious and astute politician who threaded his way between the rival factions in the States General and Dutch provincial assemblies usually by steering a middle course and to some extent retaining the support of all. He was a master of gradual methods and subtle compromise. Robert Fruin, the father of modern Dutch historiography, applied to him the dictum *fortiter in re, suaviter in modo*. Gradually, he enhanced his own authority as Stadholder, using a small clique of leading members of the States General to manage and manipulate the votes of that body as well as of the provinces and influential towns. Eventually, encouraged by the kings of France and England, he evinced unmistakably monarchical tendencies which, in the end, however, were thwarted by the watchful regents of Holland.

Poelhekke's work has certainly refined and elaborated on Blok's picture in some respects and yet, despite its bulk, it is striking that relatively little space is devoted to Frederick Henry's dealings with the political factions and to the problem of how he actually managed

1. J. J. Poelhekke, *Frederik Hendrik, Prins van Oranje. Een biografisch drieluik* (Zutphen, 1978).

2. P. J. Blok, *Frederik Hendrik. Prins van Oranje* (Amsterdam, 1924).

3. See, in particular, Pieter Geyl, *Oranje en Stuart* (1939) (repr. Arnhem, 1963), pp. 13-15; Pieter Geyl, *Geschiedenis van de Nederlandse Stam* (3 vols. Amsterdam/Antwerp, 1948-9), i. 396-7 ff. E. H. Kossmann, 'The Low Countries, 1621-1648', *New Cambridge Modern History*, IV (ed. J. P. Cooper, 1970), pp. 374-5; J. H. Kluiver, 'De Republiek na het bestand, 1621-1650' [The New] *Algemene Geschiedenis der Nederlanden*, VI (1979), pp. 352-6.

the States General, provinces and city councils (*vroedschappen*). These unavoidable questions, however, lie at the very heart of what is still in some ways the enigma of Frederick Henry. It is frequently maintained that the prince relied on the strictly Calvinist Counter-Remonstrant party, strongest in Zeeland, Utrecht, Friesland and Groningen, to support his military ambitions, his pro-French policy and his alleged desire to prolong the struggle with Spain. On the other hand, as Poelhekke confirms,<sup>1</sup> he also depended, particularly in the early years, on the so-called Arminians among the Holland regents whose political position he strengthened, in part because he was personally averse to the intolerant religious and politico-religious attitudes of the Counter-Remonstrants, but in part also because he considered that he needed the Arminians as a political counter-weight to the Counter-Remonstrants.<sup>2</sup> But while Poelhekke is acutely conscious of the seeming contradictions in Frederick Henry's position, it cannot be said that he deals with this problem in any way conclusively. Apart from being brief on the subject, it seems that he was also mistaken on certain points. What follows is an attempt to move a little closer to a precise account of Frederick Henry's style of leadership and manner of handling the Republic's politics.

Frederick Henry's predecessor as stadholder, his elder brother Maurice, had held undisputed sway in the Republic from his successful *coup d'état* against Oldenbarnevelt, in 1618, until his death in April 1625. But, despite this, it is certainly the case that Maurice's authority and prestige were, in some respects, eroded during the early 1620s. This was due partly to the failure of his purely defensive strategy in the renewed war against Spain after 1621, and his only too evident inability to coax the provincial assemblies into voting enough finance for even this limited warfare. Breda, one of the key fortress towns of the Netherlands, was on the point of being lost to the Spaniards when Maurice died, and the credit of the Republic was rapidly sinking. Besides this, there was the increasingly ominous outlook in Germany where the Protestant coalition had suffered defeat after defeat and the Habsburgs registered impressive gains. 'Here', as one Dutch observer expressed it in 1625, 'there is nothing but gloom for the present and fear for the future.'<sup>3</sup> And while military and financial failure had sapped the stadholder's prestige, the underlying bitterness and tension generated internally by Maurice's brusque repression of the Arminian party had persisted unabated. Indeed, in some of the Holland city councils, particularly Amsterdam and Rotterdam, the grip of the Counter-Remonstrants was being

1. Poelhekke, *op. cit.* pp. 180-1, 212-13.

2. 'We zien de prins zijn leven lang met deze twee groepen worstelen'; Kluiver, *loc. cit.* p. 355.

3. *Nicolaes van Reigersberch, brieven aan Hugo de Groot*, ed. H. C. Rogge (Amsterdam, 1901), p. 23.

weakened in a way which placed the whole future of Maurice's style of government fundamentally in question.

In the overthrow of Oldenbarnevelt and his subsequent handling of the States of Holland, Maurice had relied a good deal on the dominant orthodox Calvinist faction in the Amsterdam *vroedschap* headed by Reynier Pauw.<sup>1</sup> Like most groupings in the *vroedschappen*, this clique was in reality less motivated by considerations of doctrine and church organization than by sheer political opportunism spiced in the case of Amsterdam by a strong commitment to the East and West India Companies<sup>2</sup>, and therefore also to the war against Spain. While Pauw's faction evidently remained more popular with the bulk of the Amsterdam populace than its Arminian rivals, the adverse effects of the resumed war with Spain on Dutch European as distinct from colonial trade seem to have had a disastrous impact on the standing of the Pauw group among the upper echelons of the city's bourgeoisie. Already by 1622, when three of the four newly elected burgomasters, including Antonie Oetgens, were Arminians, the political ascendancy of the Counter-Remonstrants in the Amsterdam *vroedschap* was visibly crumbling and by 1624 it had disintegrated.<sup>3</sup> It is true that the political Arminians in the Amsterdam *vroedschap* were not yet quite in the majority, and that in any case the general climate in the country was still too hostile to allow any relaxation in the repression of religious Arminianism, that is Arminian preaching and church services; but the much increased strength of the Remonstrants together with the split between Pauw's adherents and a splinter group of Counter-Remonstrants led by Jacob Gerritsz. Hoyng<sup>4</sup> meant that the stadholder could no longer rely on Amsterdam to back Counter-Remonstrant policies and attitudes.

The fact that Frederick Henry had never associated himself with Maurice's harsh measures against the Remonstrants and was known to have Arminian sympathies undoubtedly lent added momentum to the resurgence of both political and religious Arminianism at this time.<sup>5</sup> As a youth, the prince had been tutored by Johannes Uytenbogaert, now leader of the Dutch Arminian churchmen in exile, and was a close friend of Cornelis van der Mijle,

1. Johan E. Elias, *De Vroedschap van Amsterdam, 1578-1795* (2 vols. Haarlem, 1903-5), i. lxxii-lxxiv, 191-202.

2. W. J. van Hoboken, 'The Dutch West India Company; the Political Background of its Rise and Decline', in J. S. Bromley and E. H. Kossmann (eds.) *Britain and the Netherlands* (London, 1960), pp. 48 ff.; J. I. Israel, 'The Holland Towns and the Dutch-Spanish Conflict', *Bijdragen en Mededelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden*, vol. 94 (1979) 62-6; see above, 64-68.

3. Elias, *op. cit.* i. lxxvii.

4. Jacob Gerritsz. Hoyng (1593-1625) died in July 1625. He had been a director of the West India Company since 1622 and was burgomaster of Amsterdam in 1618, 1620 and 1621; see Elias, i. 202-4.

5. Sir Dudley Carleton and Sir Albert Morton to Lord Conway, 4 July 1625. PRO SP 84/128, fos. 14-15.

Oldenbarnevelt's son-in-law, who returned from exile and was restored to favour at The Hague within weeks of Maurice's death.<sup>1</sup> But while Frederick Henry seems indeed to have had a deep aversion to religious intolerance of any hue and would certainly have done something for his friends in exile in any case, there is no evidence that he had any particular inclination towards religious Arminianism as such, and it would be quite wrong to assume that the new stadholder's subsequent policy of promoting the political Arminian factions in the *vroedschappen* was simply a consequence of his sympathies and upbringing. Determined though he was to force an end to the harsher aspects of the repression, there was nothing to prevent the prince, after 1625, from endeavouring to prolong the political domination of the party committed to the Spanish war and to colonial expansion. He certainly had not the slightest intention of undermining the established Reformed Church as reorganized by the Synod of Dordrecht, in 1619, or of bringing about the ecclesiastical changes desired by the Arminian clergy.

An important point to grasp is that some months elapsed before Frederick Henry had a chance to turn his attention to internal affairs and that in the interim, the greater part of 1625, the political Arminians achieved fresh gains which made it quite impossible, except by the most drastic means, to go back to even a modified version of Maurice's style of government. While Frederick Henry succeeded his brother at once as captain-general of the Republic's forces, he was not formally installed in the provinces as stadholder, with all the political accoutrements of that office, until some months later.<sup>2</sup> In any case, the demands of the 1625 campaign against the Spaniards absorbed all his attention until late in the autumn, preventing him during these crucial months from influencing internal political developments and appointments:

that which is most considerable [reported an unnamed English diplomat in The Hague to London, in August 1625] is that Amsterdam, having when the Arminian faction was here at their Highest, orthodox magistrates was, by adhering fast to the late Pr. of Orange, the chiefe cause of reformacon and now the dissension of those magistrates chiefly the two burgomasters Paw [Pauw] and Honings [Hoyng], having made a gap for Bas [Dirk Bas] and other Arminians to enter into authority out of which the former are quite excluded, in case this Prince of Orange should prove otherwise affected than his brother, the same cause may produce the like effects of alteracon specially yf the faction should be countenanced by France, as it was heretofore when the orthodox partye was sustayned by England.<sup>3</sup>

By the time that Frederick Henry could begin to assert his authority internally, the States of Holland, and to some extent those of the other

1. Blok, pp. 9, 78, 80

2. Poelhekke, *Frederik Hendrik*, pp. 157-8.

3. PRO SP 84/128, fo. 114.

provinces, were already deeply split. Indeed, the most thoroughly divided province was that of Utrecht. The old tussle for supremacy between the provincial nobility, or *ridderschap*, and the city of Utrecht had been fiercely resumed. The very procedure of nominating Frederick Henry stadholder of Utrecht intensified the battle as a good deal turned on the precise terms of the prince's appointment. The Utrecht nobles, formerly supporters of Oldenbarnevelt, political Arminians and, in some cases, crypto-Catholics by faith, desired to accept the prince under the terms of Maurice's appointment of 1590 which restricted the stadholder's influence tightly and assigned the *ridderschap* a major say in elections to the city's *vroedschap*. It was the Counter-Remonstrant party, headed by burgomaster Johan van Weede who then dominated the *vroedschap*, which pressed for the retention of the revised terms of 1618 which had greatly enhanced Maurice's power in the province and assigned to the stadholder a major say in the *vroedschap* elections.<sup>1</sup> The result was a compromise reached in June 1625, but one closer to the wishes of the city than of the *ridderschap*. However, the battle between the Utrecht nobles and the city was to continue throughout Frederick Henry's stadholdership.

The deep divisions in the provinces and *vroedschappen* by the autumn of 1625, and the raging controversies over religion, confronted Frederick Henry with a bleak choice. He had either to restore some semblance of unity by throwing his weight into the scales against the resurgent Arminians or else to find some sufficiently safe and reliable means of balancing the parties against each other, leaving the power and effectiveness of the state and its armed forces unimpaired, for the Counter-Remonstrants were much too strongly entrenched to be totally thrust aside. Either course was fraught with obvious risks. Yet in many ways, the former option must have seemed the less practicable. If Maurice had failed to command enough leverage with the States of Holland to obtain adequate finance even with a measure of help from Amsterdam, what chance was there of doing so if the stadholder were to be openly at odds with Holland's chief city where, exceptionally, the stadholder wielded virtually no influence on *vroedschap* elections? In the main, the Counter-Remonstrants were relative newcomers in Dutch urban politics and tended to come from lower down the social scale than their rivals. They posed as the popular party and their greatest asset was the support that they enjoyed in the cities, including Amsterdam.<sup>2</sup> But for precisely this reason, the orthodox party in the *vroedschappen* tended to be reluctant to vote new taxes and step up fiscal pressure. Shortly after Frederick Henry's assumption of military command, several secret conferences took place between representatives of the

1. Poelhekke, *Frederik Hendrik*, pp. 94-96.

2. PRO SP 84/141, fos. 24, 25.



provincial assemblies at the prince's camp over whether or not a diversionary offensive should be launched in a last attempt to save Breda. The prince found that while the eastern provinces were keen to besiege Wesel or another Spanish base on the eastern border, and Zeeland pressed for an attack on Flanders, Holland, through its *Raadpensionaris*, Antonie Duyck, a committed Counter-Remonstrant, insisted on a continued defensive posture.<sup>1</sup> The fact was that though the Holland Counter-Remonstrants on occasion paid lip-service to the cause of liberating the South Netherlands from Spain and Popery, they habitually preferred the cheaper course of remaining strictly on the defensive.

What the prince had to find was a means to manage the *vroedschappen* and provinces so as to co-ordinate strategy, raise essential taxation and place the entire war-effort on a viable basis. In this regard, the political Arminians offered distinct advantages, for they would to a considerable degree remain dependent for their offices and power on the prince's favour. In return, he could expect more co-operation than Maurice had enjoyed regarding war-finance. But then, of course, the Remonstrants were known as the *Trevisten*, or 'pacificators' as Carleton called them,<sup>2</sup> the group committed to seeking a new truce or peace with Spain. Poelhekke saw this as the central contradiction in Frederick Henry's policy during the early years: the prince's decision to back the political Arminians won him the temporary support of Amsterdam but was incompatible with his long-term objective of conquering extensive territory in the South Netherlands. Poelhekke thus tended to what is, in fact, the conventional view among Dutch historians, that Frederick Henry, as Kossmann put it, was 'possessed by the ambition to reconquer the Southern Netherlands',<sup>3</sup> though it is noteworthy that on this point Blok was much more cautious and, in fact, more accurate than the others.<sup>4</sup> For there is no evidence that that was the prince's objective, at least not before 1632 or 1633. In any case, such an aim, until 1629, would have been wholly impracticable. Apart from the still apparently superior strength of the Spanish army of Flanders, the South Netherlands constituted a veritable maze of fortifications, dikes and canals scarcely less formidable as a fortress territory than the Republic itself. Moreover, there was the expansion of Habsburg power in North Germany to reckon with. The prince certainly hoped for a victory or two with which to enhance his own prestige, restore that of the Republic and check the rising tide of Habsburg power, but for a long period such aims had nothing to do with schemes for conquering or partitioning the South Netherlands.

1. Carleton to Conway, 10/20 May 1625, PRO SP 84/127, fos. 52-53.

2. PRO SP 84/128, fos. 14<sup>r-v</sup>.

3. Poelhekke, pp. 181, 212, 314, 406; Kossmann, *loc. cit.*

4. Blok, pp. 150, 155.

Indeed, Frederick Henry's political Arminianism, including his willingness to work for an early end to the Spanish war, was much more marked than his support for religious Arminianism. His attitude to church politics was soothing and conciliatory, but his one real concern was to halt all persecution; beyond that he was indifferent to Arminian teaching as such. In effect, in the religious sphere he strove to be neutral, the 'indifferent and moderate course which his Excy hath hitherto holden', as the younger Carleton noted in January 1626, 'being little satisfactory to either [party]'.<sup>1</sup> When the prince's old teacher, Johannes Uytenbogaert, returned to Holland from Antwerp in September 1626, the prince ensured his safety but refused to receive him or favour him officially.<sup>2</sup> While the placards prohibiting Remonstrant prayer meetings and other religious activity quickly ceased to be enforced in many localities, the stadholder repeatedly reiterated his commitment to maintain the Reformed Church as established at Dordrecht and not to allow it to be in any way subverted. Despite repeated appeals for their release, the group of Remonstrant preachers whom Maurice had incarcerated at Louvesteyn were kept there by Frederick Henry until 1631, and even then were allowed to escape rather than actually released. The prince wanted toleration for the Arminians, but flatly rejected all pretensions that 'their teaching and doctrine is the only approved doctrine and religion of the wholle reformed church.'<sup>3</sup>

Such was the strength of feeling in many quarters against the Arminians that it took several years completely to halt the persecution. The prince's most crucial step followed a disturbance at Schoonhoven in April 1627. The town's adamantly Counter-Remonstrant magistracy had called in a detachment of English troops of the local garrison to break up an Arminian prayer meeting. The incident led to heated exchanges in the States of Holland and the adoption of a firm stand by the stadholder. He constrained what was still the majority faction in the province to accept that the burgo-masters should no longer have the right, as they had since 1618, to call on the military for assistance against Arminian religious activity. Troops were to be used in future only 'in case of publique tumults and violences when there could be noe other remedie used', but not to suppress peaceful meetings, lawful or otherwise, except on the express order of the States General or of himself as captain-general.<sup>4</sup> 'Many members of the assemblée of Holland', commented Carleton,

1. Carleton to Conway, 8/18 Jan. 1626, PRO SP 84/131, fo. 7<sup>v</sup>.

2. Blok, p. 80.

3. Carleton junior to Conway, 23 Oct./2 Nov. 1626. PRO SP 84/132, fo. 115<sup>v</sup>.

4. PRO SP 84/133, fos. 132<sup>v</sup>-4; *Reigersberch, Brieven*, pp. 88-89; Blok, p. 81. Evidently in Utrecht, the prince had already indicated in February 1626 that he would not permit the use of troops to enforce the placards; see Uytenbogaert to Grotius, 14

appeared much offended who understood that the authoritie of the States Generall was flatly cryed downe and that the meaning of the placate was perverted and that soe long as his Excie should use such a course there was little power in the Magistrates, whoe have noe other strength of themselves than a scoute with halfe a dousen serjeants.

And so it proved. From 1627 onwards, regular and largely unhindered Arminian gatherings became a feature of life through much of the country, despite a continuing and systematic drive on the part of the hard-line Counter-Remonstrant faction in the States of Holland, headed by Leiden and Haarlem, and including Alkmaar, Gouda, Enkhuizen, Brielle, Schoonhoven and several other towns,<sup>1</sup> to reverse the process and secure strict enforcement of the placards.

To prevent religious dissension from paralysing the state, to weaken the orthodox party and strengthen his own hand, Frederick Henry chose to build up the so-called Arminian faction – that is, not declared religious sectarians, but ‘Arminians in hart and faction, dissemblinge themselves soe farre as to frequent the [established] Churches and to come to the communion’. The stadholder wished the latter to be an effective political counter-weight to the Counter-Remonstrants and their popular backing. Once embarked on this course, the prince had to act vigorously; hence his political Arminianism was a much more definite and urgent impulse than his rather faint inclination towards the Arminian clergy. In short, he systematically manipulated the *vroedschap* elections.<sup>2</sup> At Amsterdam, by 1627, the political Arminians had won an outright victory, albeit essentially owing to the support of the local regent class; in that year, all four burgomasters – Dirk Bas, Antonie Oetgens, Geurt Dircksz. van Beuningen and Andries Bicker – were liberal on religious matters and adversaries of the strict Calvinists. Elsewhere, however, the impetus came from the prince. In December 1626, Carleton reported to London that ‘at Utrecht and Delft . . . certaine bitter Arminians are crept into the Magistracie by the nominacon of the Burgers, but by the Election of the Prince of Orange whom the late Prince had in the time of Reformacon displaced for Arminianisme’.<sup>3</sup> At Nijmegen, a town where the prince was in a particularly strong position to influence the outcome of *vroedschap* elections, he brought in a whole clique of Arminians at the beginning of 1627,<sup>4</sup> causing in the process

Feb. 1626, *Briefwisseling van Hugo Grotius* ed. P. C. Molhuysen and B. L. Meulenbroek, III (1961), pp. 18–19.

1. Gemeentearchief (hereafter GA), Leiden, Secretarie Arch. 447, fo. 305; *Resolutien van de Staten van Holland en West Vriesland van het jaar 1524 tot het jaar 1795* (277 vols n.d., n.p.) (hereafter Res. Holl.), 5 May, 21 May, 14, 29 June and 30 July 1627.

2. Lieuwe van Aitzema, *Historie of Verhael van Saken van Staet en Oorlogh in, ende omtrent de Vereenigde Nederlanden* (15 vols. The Hague, 1657–1671), ii. 67; *Gedenkschriften van jonckbeer Alexander van der Capellen* (2 vols. Utrecht, 1777), i. 438.

3. PRO SP 84/132, fo. 190; *Brieven en onuitgegeven stukken van Johannes Wtenbogaert* ed. H. C. Rogge (7 vols. Utrecht, 1868–75), vol. III, part i. 62–63.

4. Van der Capellen, i. 437–8.

a distinct rise in the political temperature of Gelderland. There took place fierce battles for control of the *vroedschappen* of Alkmaar and Gouda, again with the prince supporting the Remonstrants.<sup>1</sup>

And yet the stadholder's power to decide the outcome of *vroedschap* elections where his intentions went against the trend of local opinion was, undeniably, rather limited. Although in the autumn of 1627 he further bolstered the Arminian clique in the Utrecht *vroedschap* with the support of most though not all of the *ridderschap*, imposing the liberal Jan Florissen Nieuwpoort as one of the city's burgomasters, Johan van Weede nevertheless kept his grip and the city remained a bastion of Counter-Remonstrant policies. During the fierce religious disputes of 1627-8 in the States of Utrecht, while the Arminian cause was backed by the *ridderschap* and the towns of Wijk bij Duurstede and Amersfoort where the *vroedschap* was itself deeply split, Johan van Weede rallied the Utrecht, Rhenen and Montfoort *vroedschappen* together with the clergy in support of a hard-line orthodox stand.<sup>2</sup> At Nijmegen, though the Arminians, backed by the prince, now represented a powerful force, the Counter-Remonstrants nevertheless retained the upper hand.<sup>3</sup> At Delft, the *vroedschap* was rent down the middle.<sup>4</sup> The inevitable consequence of such a policy, as the prince must have foreseen, was to perpetuate and widen the divisions which particularly plagued the States of Holland, Utrecht and Gelderland. Historians, when referring to the Dutch politics of this period are, and have long been apt to speak of a confrontation between 'the Holland party' and the stadholder. But it is a fundamental misconception to think in this way. Throughout the period of Frederick Henry's stadholdership there were two quite distinct Holland parties continually at odds with each other: Leiden, Haarlem, Gouda, Enkhuizen and other towns formed a powerful bloc which opposed the faction headed by Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Delft and Dordrecht. As has been seen, the prince certainly did not choose such a political strategy on account of religion, to which, at bottom, as both English and Venetian diplomats noted, he was neutral and indifferent.<sup>5</sup> Nor indeed was the lenient, pro-Arminian stand on church matters adopted by the Amsterdam and Rotterdam *vroedschappen* and like-minded groupings motivated to any very significant extent by religious conviction. Religion was the pretext for the dissension, but no more than in 1618 was it the basis. The political Arminians, noted an English observer in The Hague in 1626, persevered 'not for love of truth, but for love of revenge, of money and of rule'.<sup>6</sup> 'For I am sure', he added, speculating as to the

1. *Brieven, Wtenbogaert*, iii. i, 85, 91.

2. *Brieven, Wtenbogaert*, iii. i, 138, 150-2, 158, 174-5.

3. *Ibid.* iii. ii, 326; iii. iii, 177-8, 358; Poelhekke, *Frederik Hendrik*, pp. 164, 182.

4. *Brieven, Wtenbogaert*, iii. ii, 259.

5. PRO SP 84/132, fo. 248<sup>v</sup>; Blok, p. 79; Poelhekke, *Frederik Hendrik*, pp. 165-7.

6. PRO SP 84/132, fo. 250<sup>r</sup>.

likelihood of the Dutch signing a new truce with Spain to which he considered Frederick Henry to be 'inclinable', that 'no man will alleage conscience, nor religion, who hath any knowledge of this state'. The prince's approach to handling the Dutch assemblies, and that of those who became his intimates, was purely a matter of political calculation.

The great seventeenth-century Dutch historian Aitzema accounted Frederick Henry's manipulations of the *vroedschappen* as essentially a means of balancing the Remonstrants and Counter-Remonstrants against each other to make himself the indispensable arbiter of their quarrels and render both dependent on his will.<sup>1</sup> In fact, this view is not quite exact; it suggests a greater measure of aloofness from the factions than the stadholder actually displayed. Whatever his neutrality on church affairs, the prince, until the summer of 1633, subtly and consistently worked hand in hand with the political Arminian cliques in managing the *vroedschappen* and provincial assemblies. This was his chosen method of procuring money for his campaigns, forging a coherent military strategy and determining Dutch foreign policy. The attractions of the Arminians for the prince were precisely that they were a small, partly noble, partly urban group which included numerous able but vulnerable and mostly unpopular men. Perhaps no incident demonstrates more clearly how dependent even the Arminian burgomasters of Amsterdam were on the prince's support (and on the detachments of troops which, at their request, he had stationed in the city in the late 1620s) than the furore over the expulsion from Amsterdam of the stridently Calvinist and anti-truce preacher, Adriaan Smout, at the height of the truce talks with Spain in January 1630.<sup>2</sup> 'This in all appearance', noted Sir Henry Vane at The Hague,

had not the Prince of Orange formerly sent garrisons to support and maintain the authority of the magistrat against the common people would have been the cause of great disorders and mutinies amongst them.<sup>3</sup>

So sharp was the disparity of views between *vroedschap* and populace that according to Vane, 'of the 36 of Amsterdam [the *vroedschap*] in which consists the govt. of the towne, there are but 8 of the Contraremonstrants, all the rest being Arminians and the common people of the towne against them.'<sup>4</sup>

But while the stadholder aligned himself with the Arminian faction until 1633, the small circle of close personal advisers on whom he

1. Aitzema, *Historie*, ii. 67; Poelhekke also seems to me to place too much emphasis on Frederick Henry's alleged neutrality; Poelhekke, *Frederik Hendrik*, pp. 156-7.

2. On this episode, see Aitzema, *Historie*, ii. 197; Jan Wagenaar, *Vaderlandsche Historie, vervattende de Geschiedenissen der nu Vereenigde Nederlanden* (21 vols. Amst. 1749-59), II. 76-86; Poelhekke, *Frederik Hendrik*, pp. 210, 211, 331.

3. Vane to Dorchester, 10/20 Jan. 1630, PRO SP 84/141, fos. 20<sup>v</sup>-21.

4. Vane to Dorchester, 13/23 Jan. 1630, PRO SP 84/141, fo. 25.

relied to organize the votes of the *vroedschappen* and assemblies were, with a few exceptions, the same experienced personnel on whom his brother Maurice had depended. François van Aerssen,<sup>1</sup> perhaps best-known of Maurice's associates, an arch-foe of Oldenbarnevelt and of the latter's son-in-law (Frederick Henry's friend, van der Mijle) was too closely identified with the Counter-Remonstrant cause to adapt to the new rôle which Frederick Henry had in mind for his managers; he fell from favour<sup>2</sup> and only finally became one of the prince's intimates after the *volte-face* of 1633. Antonie Duyck, *Raadpensionaris* of Holland, was inevitably a good deal involved *ex officio* in decision-making until his death in 1629, but he too was closely associated with Counter-Remonstrantism<sup>3</sup> and was never one of the prince's confidants. Adriaan de Manmaker, a leading figure of the States of Zeeland, being the representative of the 'first noble' of the province and another uncompromising Counter-Remonstrant, likewise fell from favour.<sup>4</sup> Nevertheless, by and large those who had risen to prominence in the provincial assemblies and in the States General's various secret committees, during the later years of Maurice, continued in their functions as the key political managers, organizers and negotiators under Frederick Henry. For example, in the conferences with the French ambassador in The Hague which preceded the Franco-Dutch treaty of Compiègne – a development of great importance to the Republic which took place whilst Maurice was still stadholder in 1624 – the principal Dutch negotiators were Nicolaas van den Bouckhorst, heer van Noordwijck, then a leading representative of the *ridderschap* in the States of Holland who subsequently acted for many years as Frederick Henry's chief manager in Holland; Sweder van Haersolte,<sup>5</sup> who became Frederick Henry's regular organizer of the States of Overijssel; and Arnold van Randwijck,<sup>6</sup> subsequently and for many years one of the two regular managers of the States of Gelderland.

It is incorrect to argue, as do Geyl and Poelhekke,<sup>7</sup> that there existed a standing secret committee, or *Secreet Besogne*, of the States General formally empowered to confer on a regular basis with the

1. On van Aerssen's early diplomatic career, see S. Barendrecht, *François van Aerssen, Diplomaat aan het Franse Hof (1598-1613)*, (Leiden, 1965).

2. *Brieven, Reigersberch*, p. 100.

3. *Brieven, Wienbogaert*, iii. i, 222-3.

4. F. Nagtglas, *Levensberichten van Zeeuwen* (2 vols. Middelburg, 1890), ii. 125-7.

5. Sweder van Haersolte tot Swalucenborch (1582-1643), member of the Overijssel *ridderschap*, became a member of the States General for Overijssel in 1621. In 1630, he organized the appointment of the stadholder's son, Prince Willem, then three years old, as general of the cavalry, and it was chiefly through his influence, a year later, that the boy received the right (survivorship) to inherit his father's offices in Overijssel; see *Nieuw Nederlandsch Biografisch Woordenboek* (hereafter NNBW), ed. P. C. Molhuysen *et al.* (10 vols. Leiden, 1911-37), vi. 677.

6. Arnold van Randwijck (1574-1641), member of the *ridderschap* of the Nijmegen quarter of Gelderland; see NNBW, iii. 995-6.

7. Geyl, *Oranje en Stuart*, p. 14; Poelhekke, *Frederik Hendrik*, pp. 324-5.

stadholder and make the major strategic, military and foreign policy decisions. In fact, for every new step in foreign policy, the States General appointed a fresh *ad hoc* secret committee, in theory from among the membership of the States General as a whole; before every campaign, a new *ad hoc* committee, known as the *gedeputeerden op 't employ van 't leger*, was chosen, just as was a fresh committee every year actually to accompany the prince on campaign and confer with him on all military and political matters in his camp. This might suggest, with so many new committees being constantly formed, that in reality the stadholder had very little control over the advisers appointed to confer with him. But actually, the names of the committee members vary only in the case of the minor committees such as those chosen to deal with less important diplomatic business. On any matter of real substance, though the committees were constantly formed and reformed, the same key personages were nominated again and again. For instance, among the eight commissioners who negotiated the alliance with England of October 1625, were Noordwijck, Duyck, Simon van Beaumont,<sup>1</sup> an Arminian who rose to prominence in 1625 and was for some years one of Frederick Henry's two managers of the States of Zeeland; Floris, count van Culemborch, who acted together with Randwijck as the prince's manager of the States of Gelderland; and Goosen Schaffer who was for many years the prince's manager of the States of Groningen, a province of which Frederick Henry was not actually stadholder.<sup>2</sup> The alliance with Denmark, arranged almost simultaneously, was handled on the Dutch side by seven commissioners, including Randwijck, Haersolte, Culemborch and Schaffer.<sup>3</sup> The team appointed by the States General to deal with the delicate Jülich-Cleves negotiations of 1629-30 included Noordwijck, Haersolte, Culemborch and Vosbergen.<sup>4</sup> When Charles I sent Sir Henry Vane as his ambassador extraordinary to The Hague in November 1629 for top-level secret consultations with his ally, the eight representatives nominated by the States General to confer with him included none other than Noordwijck, Randwijck, Beaumont, Haersolte, Schaffer and Adriaan Ploos, the nobleman who was the prince's manager of the States of Utrecht.<sup>5</sup> The elaborate series of Franco-Dutch talks of 1625-30, which led to the renewal of the French subsidy arrangement in June 1630, were handled on the Dutch side by Noordwijck, Beaumont, Haersolte, Schaffer, Ploos,

1. Simon van Beaumont (1574-1654), a Dutch minor poet; from 1611, pensionary of Middelburg; he alone among Frederick Henry's managers seems to have been closely linked with the Arminian cause; see P. J. Meertens, *Letterkundig leven in Zeeland in de zestiende en de eerste helft der zeventiende eeuw* (Amsterdam, 1943), pp. 299, 301.

2. L. van Aitzema, *Verbael van de Nederlantsche Vreede Handeling* (2 vols The Hague, 1650), i. 97-100.

3. *Ibid.* i. 71-72.

4. *Ibid.* i. 116.

5. Aitzema, *Historie*, ii. 939; Ploos' noble title was that of heer van Tienhoven.

Jan Veldriel, burgomaster of Dokkum and one of the prince's two organizers of the States of Friesland, and, finally, Dirk Bas, head of the Arminian faction at Amsterdam.<sup>1</sup>

As in foreign policy, so in strategy and military matters. The key negotiators of the Republic's foreign policy also repeatedly accompanied the prince during his campaigns. At the siege of Grol in 1627, for instance, the provinces' 'deputies in the field' were Randwijck (Gelderland), Haersolte (Overijssel), Schaffer (Groningen), Vosbergen (Zeeland), Pieter van Waltha (Friesland) who was the prince's other manager of the States of Friesland, Hartevelt (Utrecht), Jacob van Broekhoven, the Counter-Remonstrant burgomaster of Leiden (Holland), and Oetgens (Holland), the Arminian burgomaster of Amsterdam.<sup>2</sup> In May 1626, the committee to review the vital matter of the Dutch and Spanish river blockades which had by then almost totally disrupted the inland trade of the Low Countries, included Noordwijck, Randwijck, Haersolte, Schaffer and Vosbergen.<sup>3</sup> The 1631 '*gedeputeerden op't employ van 't leger*' who planned the invasion of Flanders that took place that summer was, once again, composed of Frederick Henry's managers of the provincial assemblies, including Noordwijck, Randwijck and Beaumont.<sup>4</sup>

While only Beaumont seems to have been linked with the Arminians before 1625 as a former supporter of Oldenbarnevelt, Noordwijck, Ploos, Veldriel, Waltha, Haersolte, and, in fact, every single one of Frederick Henry's managers can be shown to have been active in blunting Counter-Remonstrant pressure in the provincial assemblies during the late 1620s and in promoting the political Arminian faction in the *vroedschappen*. In this way, the prince collaborated with the Arminians essentially in order to control the assemblies, obtain funds and achieve the formulation of coherent strategies and policies. It is true that there was probably never a time when Frederick Henry was ever wholly satisfied with the co-operation that he received. Uytenbogaert refers to the prince's displeasure in late 1626 on finding that the Arminians whom he had just brought into the *vroedschappen* were less than fervent in seconding his demands for subsidies and new taxes.<sup>5</sup> Even so, it is undeniable that during the prolonged disputes over war-finance in the States of Holland during the later 1620s, it was invariably the Arminian towns

1. Aitzema, *Verhael*, i, 155-6.

2. Res. Holl. 2 July 1627; Aitzema, *Historie*, ii, 147.

3. Algemeen Rijksarchief, The Hague (hereafter ARH) SG 3185, fo. 165"; J. I. Israel, 'The States General and the strategic regulation of the Dutch river trade, 1621-36', *Bijdragen en Mededelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden* (hereafter BMGN), vol. 95 (1980), pp. 476-7; see below, 107-8.

4. GA Amsterdam, Algemeen Bestuur, no. 11, fos. 199-200. Secret. res. SG, 8, 30 Apr. 1631.

5. Wtenbogaert, iii, i, 72; Carleton to Conway, 31 Mar. 1628. PRO SP 84/136, fo. 246.



which supported Frederick Henry and the Counter-Remonstrant towns which obstructed his requests. In April 1626, the requested additional finance for the prince's planned attack on Oldenzaal was chiefly obstructed by Leiden, Gouda and Delft (the latter then still split half and half between the factions).<sup>1</sup> For many months during 1627, Haarlem, Leiden, Enkhuizen, Brielle and other opposition towns persisted in refusing to vote any further war funds until the religious controversy was settled to their satisfaction.<sup>2</sup> During the spring of 1629, as prince and States General prepared their massive assault on 's-Hertogenbosch, the drive to extract the necessary finance from the States of Holland was obstructed for some time by Haarlem, Enkhuizen, Schoonhoven and Edam, but on this occasion not by Leiden.<sup>3</sup> At the same time, Friesland, Groningen and Zeeland were opposed to the blow being struck in Brabant, the northern provinces preferring to attack Lingen; the prince had to obtain consent for his plan in the States General by mobilizing Gelderland, Utrecht and Holland.

But, of course, Frederick Henry's political Arminianism was tempered by a strong admixture of caution, subtlety and tact. He took great pains to avoid embittering the Counter-Remonstrants against himself. By insisting on the preservation intact of the established Reformed Church, he thwarted the Arminian clergy and ensured that the orthodox had to look to himself to preserve what was most essential to their cause. Though van Aerssen was in disfavour, Frederick Henry took care not to alienate him completely. Nor were the Counter-Remonstrants totally excluded from the secret committees. It was, on the contrary, fundamental to Frederick Henry's whole style of leadership carefully to balance the factions against each other. As during the Grol campaign of 1627, it was usual for the 'deputies in the field' to include two representatives from Holland, the most important province, against one from each of the others. Moreover, it was the States General's custom in Frederick Henry's day to appear to balance the two Holland factions against each other, that is to appoint one representative from either party. Thus at the siege of Grol, the influence of the Arminian Amsterdam burgomaster, Oetgens, was ostensibly offset by the presence of the Leiden burgomaster Jacob van Broeckhoven whom Frederick Henry seems to have been at some pains to cultivate. During the crucial spring months of 1629, confronted as in previous years with Counter-Remonstrant obstruction in the States of Holland, the prince wrote direct to Broeckhoven

1. Res. Holl. 4, 9, 16 and 17 June 1626.

2. 'Voor en al eer het stuck van de religie vast gesteldt sal zyn', Res. Holl. 30 Apr. 1627; see also 21 May, 30 July, 2 Aug. 1627.

3. Res. Holl. 10 and 21 March 1629; Arnoldus Montanus, *'t Vermeerderde Leven en Bedryf van Frederik Henrik prinse van Oranjen* (Amsterdam, 1653), pp. 186-7; *Mémoires de Frédéric Henri Prince d'Orange* (Amsterdam, 1733), p. 53; J. I. Israel, *The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World* (Oxford, 1982), pp. 174-5.

appealing to him to deflect Leiden's vote away from the opposition on that occasion.<sup>1</sup> And sure enough, in that year Leiden did not join Haarlem in trying to block the extra war subsidies.

But however much tempered by his elaborate tact, Frederick Henry's programme was political Arminian not only in the sense that he collaborated with the Remonstrant cliques in the *vroedschappen* and that he relied on them to support his military plans and diplomacy, but in his willingness to ignore the interests of the colonial companies which were closely identified with the Counter-Remonstrants,<sup>2</sup> and to countenance an early end to the war with Spain. There are several contemporary English references to the Prince of Orange being 'inclined' to a new truce or peace with Spain in the opening years of his stadholdership.<sup>3</sup> Early in 1628, after the Dutch victories at Oldenzaal and Grol but with anxiety in the Republic rising due to the overrunning of most of North Germany by Habsburg forces and their allies, and at a time of temporarily frigid relations with France, Frederick Henry put out specific peace feelers of a kind which occasioned brief jubilation at Brussels and Madrid.<sup>4</sup> Through the Dutch representative at the joint Dutch-Spanish prisoner exchange talks then in progress in Flanders, Gerard van Berckel – a strongly pro-peace Arminian burgomaster of Rotterdam – the stadholder conveyed word to Olivares and Philip IV that he was ready to consider not merely a new truce but one on terms less favourable to the Republic than those of 1609. Admittedly, in itself this is no more conclusive than the assurances brought from The Hague to Brussels in the autumn of 1625 by Mme 'T Serclaes, the noble lady who for some years had been acting as an intermediary between stadholder and Infanta, to the effect that the prince genuinely wished to end the war.<sup>5</sup> In 1628, the Republic faced a situation of exceptional danger and it is arguable that the prince was merely engaging in a stratagem. To grasp the extent of Frederick Henry's political Arminianism fully one must, above all, consider his attitude and policy during the prolonged Dutch-Spanish truce and peace negotiations of 1629–30 and 1632. Despite noting that the Venetian ambassador in The Hague reported to Venice in November 1629 that the prince was supporting the truce moves,<sup>6</sup> and despite knowing that both Aitzema and van der

1. GA Leiden Sec. Arch. 447, fo. 99<sup>r-v</sup>, vroedschap res., 2 Feb. 1629.

2. See Israel, 'The Holland towns', above 65–67.

3. PRO SP 84/126, fo. 193; no. 128, fo. 115 and no. 132, fo. 250.

4. Algemeen Rijksarchief, Brussels (ARB) SEG 126, Spinola to Infanta, Madrid, 30 Apr. 1628; Archivo General de Simancas (AGS), Estado 2042, consulta junta de estado, 23 Apr. 1628.

5. ARB, Papiers d'Etat et d'Audience 1379, 'Rapport de Mme. Serclaes' (22 Sept. 1625).

6. *Capita Selecta Veneto-Belgica*, I (1629–1631). *Studies van het Nederlands Historisch Instituut te Rome* ed. J. J. Poelhekke (The Hague, 1964), p. 36; Poelhekke, *Frederik Hendrik*, p. 313.

Capellen state that the prince backed the truce,<sup>1</sup> Poelhekke has argued that Frederick Henry's actions and statements were merely stratagems intended to mislead the Arminians, hasten the *rapprochement* with France (which indeed did take place as a result of the 1629–30 negotiations) and frighten the Dutch war-party into being more forthcoming with regard to finance.<sup>2</sup> That Frederick Henry can in earnest have sought peace with Spain at this early date simply does not fit in with Poelhekke's view of the prince as the would-be conqueror of Flanders and Brabant. But the fact is that he did seek a truce.

Although the Spanish offer of a thirty-four year truce was evidently generally unpopular,<sup>3</sup> at least in Holland, Zeeland and the northern provinces, there was a concerted attempt in October and November 1629 to rush a favourable decision through the provincial assemblies and States General. Van der Capellen notes not only that Gelderland, Overijssel and Utrecht came out in favour of the truce, but that their resolutions were settled at break-neck speed before the Counter-Remonstrant opposition had had a chance to organize itself.<sup>4</sup> This was true even in Utrecht where the city was fiercely opposed to the truce. Before the public debate began in October, Frederick Henry had for several months been considering the Spanish offer in secret with his circle of political intimates and managers. The fact that Berckel who was a known advocate of peace with Spain had been entrusted by the prince with 'this underhand treaty', as Carleton called it, already suggested the drift of what was to follow. As early as July, Sir Thomas Roe had astutely reported to London that

it may be counted a paradoxe to thinke that their prosperitie at Boisleduc [s-Hertogenbosch] will facilitate a peace: which I doe for many reasons believe, though others suppose they wille be blowne up with Insolence. But I doe consider they doe not dessigne great conquests, but a securitie which this Towne may give them and the expense is so immense that they will be glad to take breath.<sup>5</sup>

It was the prince who chose the moment and dictated the initial pace with which the Spanish terms were put before the States General, provincial assemblies and *vroedschappen*. Carleton reported to London how Antonie Duyck, *Raadpensionaris* of Holland, who was *ex officio*

1. Aitzema, *Verbael*, i. 127; the latter subsequently states that 't afbrecken van die handelinge was de geboorte van een tractaet met Vranckrijk'; see van der Capellen, i. 568, 563.

2. Poelhekke, *Frederik Hendrik*, pp. 309–14.

3. 'L'universale di questi popoli,' reported Gusoni, 'per raggione et per genio abborrisse ogni accomodamento con la Spagna; ma li piu reputati et auttorevoli del governo vi si dimostrate hormai inclinati'; *Capita*, i. 76.

4. ARH Provinciale Resoluties vol. 9, res. St Gelderland, 7/17 Oct. 1629; and vol. 486, res. S. Overijssel, 2/12 Oct. 1629; van der Capellen i. 549, 551–2, 555–6.

5. Roe to Dorchester, 15/25 July 1629, PRO SP 84/139, fo. 231.

party to the secret deliberations, though not one of the prince's managers, was forced to go along with his policy 'contrary to his owne minde which certainly was ever against Truce and Treaty with Spaine'. 'Some few there are', he wrote, 'among the States (as I heare) of opinion, that all is but a strategem of his Excy. to feede the enemy with hopes of peace, and to advance the affaires of the state the better . . . but I confesse that considering the persons of the men he hath trusted, I much misdoubt the intention.'<sup>1</sup>

Overijssel declared first in favour of truce talks, the province's prompt response being organized by none other than Haersolte.<sup>2</sup> In Utrecht, the opposition of the powerful Counter-Remonstrant faction was speedily elbowed aside due to the adroitness of van Ploos.<sup>3</sup> It is true that these provinces had in any case long been *trêviste* and had opposed the pro-war fervour predominant in Holland and Zeeland in 1621, but the fact remains that it was the prince's friends who steered these resolutions through. In the other provinces, the prince's intimates worked in the same direction if mostly with less success. From the resolutions of the States of Friesland, one learns only that Veldriel was deputed by the States General to go to Leeuwarden and explain the position, but not whether he worked for or against the truce.<sup>4</sup> But it is not to be doubted that in fact he pressed in favour in view of the fact that his colleague Goosen Schaffer met both the Groningen assembly and *vroedschap*, emphasizing both the propitiousness of the moment for a truce and the chronic position of the state finances which, he claimed, could only be remedied by means of a truce.<sup>5</sup> Both States and *vroedschap* nevertheless voted against entering into truce talks. Similarly, in Zeeland, Simon van Beaumont who had been deputed to explain the position to the States of that province, pressed hard in favour of the truce, much to the displeasure of both the provincial assembly and his own city, Middelburg.<sup>6</sup> Zeeland, usually regarded in Dutch historiography as a bastion of support for the stadholder, on this occasion acted most forcefully of all against the prince's policy. Indeed Flushing, conventionally supposed to have been the Zeeland town most under his influence, went so far as to propose that the province lodge a formal protest in the States General about the prince's conduct in allowing truce contacts with Spain to develop to such an extent without the province knowing anything about them.<sup>7</sup> And if the prince's intimates worked

1. Carleton to Dorchester, 12/22 Sept. 1629, PRO SP 84/140, fo. 40.

2. Van der Capellen, i. 555.

3. *Ibid.* i. 555, 569.

4. Rijksarchief in Friesland, Leeuwarden, Res. S. Friesland 9/19, 10/20 Oct. 1629.

5. GA Groningen, vroedschap res., 3/13, 5/15 Oct. 1629.

6. Van der Capellen i. 556; *Notulen van de Ed: Mog: Heeren Staeten van Zeelant d' Anno 1629*, pp. 363, 369-70.

7. *Ibid.* p. 370: 'Dogh hebben die van Vlissingen verklaert expresselyck gelast te zyn van haer principalen, dat men in den voorsz. Brief aen de Gedeputeerde mede zal infereren, dat sy syn Excellentie ende de Leden van de Unie zullen vertoonen, dat de

assiduously for the truce in the six lesser provinces, this is precisely what they did also in Holland. On the death of Duyck in the midst of the deliberations, Jacob Cats, pensionary of Dordrecht, was elected to serve as acting *Raadpensionaris*. In the opening week of discussions in the States of Holland, Cats, according to Carleton, aspiring to fill Duyck's place

complying with the Prince of Orange and the Arminian party for this purpose, hath bin very busy to make the [Spanish] offer seeme plausible; so that having first bin some daies with his Excy at the Busse ['s-Hertogenbosch], to take his instructions; from there he made a circuit into North-Holland through most of the Townes, to induce them to accept this truce; and to come to the assembly with good resolutions; and others of the comitie Counsell [*gecomitteerde raad*] of Holland, packed and made for this businesse, visited the other Townes to informe them of the occasion of the assembly at hand. But things succeeded not according as the Arminians had promised themselves for although Mons. Buckhorst [Noordwijck], a man wonne to this businesse your Lordship may easily coniecture by what meanes, though he hath bin otherwise ever against the Arminians, had thought to have carried the voice of the noblesse and drawn at least some part of the Townes after him with a long premeditat oration persuading the acceptacon of the truce, and representing the seasonableness of the time, now that the Spaniard is lowe and the States victorious; his turne being to speak after him, Aerssens took the matter in hand and showed many important reasons why the States ought not to treat with Spaine, and said that this was rather a tyme to make greater advantage uppon the enemy during their disorder and confusion.<sup>1</sup>

The campaign vigorously pursued by Noordwijck and Cats to secure acceptance in the States of Holland was supported by Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Delft, Dordrecht and the Holland nobility, but the opposition, headed by Haarlem and Leiden, rallied most of the small towns and the peace party found their path completely blocked.<sup>2</sup> There ensued months of stalemate in the States of Holland. Outside Holland, the provinces were deadlocked three against three. Throughout these months the prince stuck to his policy.<sup>3</sup> The Counter-Remonstrants responded with a vigorous popular publicity campaign, strident preaching from the pulpit and, at Amsterdam, actual incitement of the populace against the burgomasters. As has been seen, against this pressure, the prince supported the Amsterdam *vroedschap* with troops. In November, John Quarles, writing to Lord

Heeren Staten van Zeelant seer vreemt vinden, dat zoo verre in dese handelinge is geprocedeert zonder voorweten van de provincie van Zeelant. De andere zes leden hebben onnodigh geaght dat deselve clause in den voorsz. Brief zoude werden geinfereert.<sup>7</sup>

1. Carleton to Dorchester, 5/15 Oct. 1629, PRO SP 84/140, fos. 71-72.

2. Rijksarchief in Zeeland, Middelburg (RAZ), SZ 2099, Zeeland deputies in The Hague to States of Zeeland, 11 Nov. 1629; van der Capellen, i. 555; Israel, 'Holland Towns', pp. 44-46.

3. Montanus, *'T Vermeerderde Leven*, p. 581.

Dorchester from Delft, confirmed that Frederick Henry while publicly pretending to be neutral continued to work for the truce, commenting that the 'most eminent man in opposition to this truce is Aerssens and most of the townes (of Holland) do cleave to his opinion'.<sup>1</sup> When, on 10 November, the States of Holland voted again concerning the truce, in the presence of the stadholder, and were again split, many towns followed Haarlem and Leiden in demanding the secure establishment of 'regime and religion' in the Republic before deciding on renewal of the truce talks.<sup>2</sup> In answer, the prince made known his view that the issue of the truce should on no account be mixed with the internal debate over church matters but dealt with entirely separately. This did nothing to lessen the opposition. On 7 December, Holland again split five votes against five, the rest of the towns adopting intermediate positions.<sup>3</sup> After this, the prince tried a new initiative to break the impasse, advising that the proposed negotiation would be placed on a securer basis if the South Netherlands States General were to be formally involved, and the outlying Spanish fortresses at Lingem, Zandvliet and elsewhere were demolished as part of the truce terms.<sup>4</sup> This was designed to meet some of the objections of the opposition. However, the *vroedschappen* of Leiden, Hoorn and other Contra-Trevist towns flatly contradicted the stadholder, maintaining that such provisions would not in fact place a new truce on a securer footing.<sup>5</sup> Thus once again, the stadholder's path was blocked by internal opposition.

The deliberations over the Spanish offer dragged on inconclusively during most of 1630, but by the spring, seeing that the deadlock was unlikely to be broken, Frederick Henry switched his attention to securing the *rapprochement* with France and preparing his next campaign. But this change must be understood as being tactical rather than being part of any grandiose, long-term scheme of conquest. Frederick Henry 'hath bin and is still affected to the Truce', noted Sir Henry Vane in August 1630.<sup>6</sup> The preparations for the Dutch campaign of 1630 again present the familiar paradox of the war towns obstructing the plans and the peace towns actively supporting the stadholder's strategy. In some bewilderment, Vane referred to the

1. Quarles to Dorchester, 5/15 Nov. 1629, PRO SP 84/140, fo. 121.

2. RAZ SZ 2099, Zealand deputies to SZ, 10 Nov. 1629; GA Leiden Sec. Arch 448, fo. 164<sup>v</sup>.

3. *Ibid.* Sec. Arch 448, 169<sup>v</sup>.

4. *Ibid.* fo. 169; GA Delft vroedschap. res. 10 Dec. 1629; GA Rotterdam vroedschap res. 10 Dec. 1629.

5. GA Leiden, Sec. Arch. 448, fo. 169<sup>v</sup>; 'hebben die vande selve vroetschappe om pregnante redenen geoordeelt dat de voors. voorslach van syne Extie, onder reverentie de gemeynde verseeckertheyt van 't voors. tractaet nyet en soude geven.'

6. PRO SP 84/142, fo. 15; see also Joseph Cuvelier, 'La correspondance secrète de l'Infante Isabelle (1621-1633)', *Bulletin de l'Institut historique belge de Rome* IV (Rome/Brussels, 1924), p. 117.

Remonstrant [party] pressing the making of an offensive warre and laying on the hundredth penny presently to be collected; which they conceive will be so heavie, as the common people will not be able to beare it, but that finding their purses to smart, they will conclude for a peace. The Contraremonstrant seeing this will not by no means consent to the laying on of the hundredth penny, nor of making an offensive warre, or scarce thinking of putting their army into the field this yeare other then for defence.<sup>1</sup>

During the interval between the 1629–30 and the 1632 truce negotiations, Frederick Henry continued his policy of strengthening the Arminian and pro-peace element in the *vroedschappen*.<sup>2</sup> To buttress his somewhat weak position in the States of Zeeland, the prince removed Adriaan Manmaker<sup>3</sup> as his representative as ‘first noble’ of Zeeland – a man, in Vane’s words, ‘that was much employed and trusted by the last prince in the businesses of Barneveldt’ – and replaced him with the more pliable Johan de Knuyt<sup>4</sup> who subsequently emerged, after the eclipse of Beaumont in 1633, as his chief manager of that province. The stadholder’s resolve to pursue an Arminian policy, moreover, was further stiffened by developments elsewhere in the European struggle. The ending of the 1628–31 Franco-Spanish conflict in North Italy over the Mantuan succession, under the treaty of Cherasco of June 1631, at once deprived the Dutch of the benefit that they had received from the diversion since 1628 of Spanish troops and funds to Milan, and fed the stadholder’s growing doubts about the real long-term intentions of the French crown. Since 1625, and still more after the Anglo-Spanish peace treaty of 1630, Frederick Henry evinced a marked disinclination to rely on either England or France for support. Indeed, he considered both powers totally unreliable, pointing out to those who had argued that England and France should have been consulted during the truce deliberations of 1629, that neither power had lifted a finger to help the Republic during the Imperialist intervention in Gelderland and Utrecht in 1629.<sup>5</sup> He certainly had not the slightest thought of tying the Republic to any long-term anti-Habsburg alliance when he embarked on his most successful military campaign, the push along the Maas culminating in the capture of Maastricht in 1632.

The rôle of the States General’s ‘deputies in the field’ was especially notable in 1632, because the preliminary peace talks of that year began in September, in the prince’s camp, immediately after the fall of Maastricht. Overijssel’s representative was again Haersolte, Zeeland’s again Beaumont.<sup>6</sup> Of the two Holland representatives, the

1. Vane to Dorchester, 24 Feb./4 Mar. 1630. PRO SP 84/141, fo. 89.

2. Vane to Dorchester, 10/20 Sept. 1630. PRO SP 84/142, fo. 78.

3. Nagtglas, *Levensberichten*, ii. 125–7.

4. On de Knuyt, see Poelhekke, *Frederik Hendrik*, pp. 421–3, 427–9, 558–9.

5. GA Leiden Sec. Arch. 448, fo. 165.

6. PRO SP 84/145, fo. 22.

Arminian was Cornelis van Teresteyn,<sup>1</sup> burgomaster of Dordrecht and one of the prince's most active supporters in the States of Holland both during and after his Arminian phase, while the Counter-Remonstrant was van den Meer, from the staunchly pro-war town of Haarlem.<sup>2</sup> Initially, the stadholder's intention was to obtain the prompt acquiescence of the provinces in formal peace negotiations to be held at Maastricht between representatives of the States General and of the Infanta and the South Netherlands States General, then convened at Brussels. This would have been to negotiate with his army encamped at his side. Frederick Henry wrote repeatedly from Maastricht to The Hague demanding a speedy response from the provinces.<sup>3</sup> Teresteyn, Beaumont and Haersolte, but significantly not van den Meer, who was kept at the prince's side, were sent in person to organize matters in the States General and their respective provinces.<sup>4</sup> Teresteyn communicated the prince's formal advice to the States of Holland, that while His Excellency was 'indifferent' on the main point, the States General's decision must be reached 'as promptly as possible, without loss of time'.<sup>5</sup> But the pretence at neutrality notwithstanding, it was patently obvious what was the prince's desire. Leiden's deputies protested in the States of Holland over the way matters were being handled, though without directly criticizing the stadholder.<sup>6</sup> Through Jacob Cats, still, along with Noordwijck, the prince's leading organizer in the States of Holland, heavy pressure was brought to bear on Leiden to desist from its opposition. In October, the States General dispatched a delegation to put pressure on the anti-truce States of Friesland, consisting of Waltha and Boreel, the Arminian pensionary of Amsterdam.<sup>7</sup> In November, a similarly weighted pro-peace delegation, consisting of Dr Marienburg, burgomaster of Deventer, and Jacob Cats was sent to Zeeland. Cats evidently harangued the Zeelanders with such force that he contrived to get even Flushing to acquiesce provisionally in the peace talks.<sup>8</sup>

Because of the long delay, the substantive negotiations began only in December 1632, after the prince had disbanded his army for the

1. Cornelis van Teresteyn (1579-1643) entered the Dordrecht *vroedschap* in 1606, and was burgomaster of Dordrecht in 1621-4, 1634-6, and 1643; see NNBW V. 897-8.

2. PRO SP 84/145, fo. 22; Aitzema, *Verhael*, i. 186.

3. GA Leiden, Sec. Arch. 449, fo. 3<sup>v</sup>; Carleton to Lord Treasurer, 9/19 Oct. 1632. PRO SP 84 145 fo. 55<sup>v</sup>.

4. GA Gouda vroedschap res. 6 Oct. 1632; van der Capellen, i. 657.

5. GA Delft vroedschap res. 8 Oct. 1632.

6. GA Leiden, Sec. Arch. 449, fos. 4, 5 (9 Oct. 1632): Leiden protested 'dat de voorne Gecommitteerden van dese syde int Leger sich nopende de voors. admissie vande Gedeputeerden van d'andere zyde ende communicatie mette selve, nyet volgens d'ordre vande regeringe deser Republieque en hebben gedragen ende dat sulx voortaan nyet meer behoort te werden geleden.'

7. W. Marienburg to Deventer vroedschap, 11/21 Oct. 1632. GA Deventer, Repub. I, 19.

8. According to Johannes Heinsius, 'D'haerange die mijn heer Cats, wel tegen sijn



winter, and at The Hague in place of Maastricht. But despite the lost opportunity and unremitting French and Swedish pressure, the Dutch peace party retained the initiative, essentially due to Frederick Henry's backing. Concessions were wrung from Brussels, and substantial compromises on the initial Dutch position were forced through the States General.<sup>1</sup> The negotiating committee appointed by the States General to deal with the Brussels representatives was composed of the prince's usual managers, including Beaumont and de Knuyt for Zeeland, and Noordwijck and Adraan Pauw who had been elected *Raadpensionaris* of Holland in April 1631, for Holland. However, there were ominous signs from the beginning that such was the opposition to peace with Spain, in certain quarters at least, that the prince's familiar technique of manipulating the provinces was again likely to break down. Beaumont and de Knuyt were plainly unable to handle the States of Zeeland. In a tense meeting of April 1633 at The Hague between the prince and several Zeeland representatives to the States General, Frederick Henry had to answer complaints about the growing rumours in Zeeland that he favoured a settlement with Spain.<sup>2</sup> The stadholder answered candidly enough that indeed he was not averse to settling with Spain provided the terms were reputable and secure.

The elaborate negotiations of 1633 broke down during the summer owing to disagreement between the parties over border demarcation in Brabant and, especially, over Brazil. While Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Dordrecht were prepared to go so far as to sacrifice the Dutch gains in Brazil to secure peace with Spain, sentiment in favour of the West India Company was too strong elsewhere for this to be acceptable either to the States of Holland as a whole or to the States General.<sup>3</sup> Most of the Holland towns now swung behind Haarlem and Leiden which, once again, were leading the opposition. It was during these summer months of 1633 that Frederick Henry finally concluded that his policy of collaboration with Amsterdam and of seeking peace with Spain simply could not work. His *volte-face*, after some months of vacillation, had virtually nothing to do with French or Swedish pressure. In his efforts to derail the proceedings during the spring, the French ambassador, Hercule de Charnacé, had been thoroughly frustrated.<sup>4</sup> It was simply that by the summer of 1633,

herte, heeft gedaen is soo krachtich geweest, dat sij, tot Vlissingen inclus, tot handelinge heeft doen verstaen'; *Kronijk van het Historische Genootschap gevestigd te Utrecht*, 5th ser. vol. 3 (1867), pp. 299-300.

1. See above, 60-63.

2. M. G. de Boer, *Die Friedensunterhandlungen zwischen Spanien und den Niederlanden in den Jahren 1632 und 1633* (Groningen, 1898), pp. 141-2.

3. G.A. Amsterdam vroedschaps resoluties XVI, fos. 1-1<sup>v</sup>; GA Dordrecht, vroed. res. 6 June 1633; de Boer, p. 104.

4. See Charnacé's notes of his audience with Frederick Henry on 14 Mar. 1633, *Archives ou correspondance inédite de la Maison d'Orange-Nassau*, ed. G. Groen van Prinsterer, 2nd ser. 5 vols (Utrecht, 1857-61) iii. 36-37.

Frederick Henry had become convinced that there was too much internal opposition in the Republic to peace with Spain for his previous policy to succeed. His managers, Beaumont and de Knuyt for Zeeland, Schaffer and Waltha for Groningen and Friesland, simply could not deliver the votes of those provinces.<sup>1</sup> Because of the problem of Brazil, from which Philip IV and Olivares were determined to force Dutch evacuation by whatever means, Noordwijck and Pauw were unable to muster a majority of the States of Holland. Even so, the prince had good reason to hesitate. To break with Amsterdam and Holland's new *Raadpensionaris*, who had shown himself an eager proponent of peace with Spain, was no simple or easy matter. It meant for certain that the prince's grip on the States of Holland would be loosened and that, in future, Holland would be less readily disposed to vote funds for his campaigns. Inevitably, it meant army cuts. Furthermore, he had to be absolutely sure that he had cast-iron guarantees of support and regular subsidies over a long period from France, a power of which he remained wary, for France, should he switch his policy, would henceforth have to act as a surrogate for Amsterdam as the driving force behind the stadholder's party. This in turn would mean that the prince would have to surrender part of the Republic's and his own much-prized freedom of action in international affairs and become in some measure the tool of Richelieu.

The change in the prince's policy dated from August 1633 when he advised the States General to end the deadlock in the negotiations with the Brussels States General by insisting that the Dutch demands over the Indies and the disputed territory in Brabant be accepted within a month or else the negotiation be broken off.<sup>2</sup> Charnacé was suddenly much heartened and reported to Paris that it now seemed likely that the prince would abandon the Dutch peace party and align himself with France.<sup>3</sup> In fact, the Amsterdam faction succeeded in delaying the breaking off of the peace talks until December 1633, but from November, if not earlier, the stadholder and his managers were actively working to abort the talks. The Holland nobility switched sides from the peace to the war camp.<sup>4</sup> In the States of Utrecht where, in the spring, the still strongly Counter-Remonstrant and pro-war city had been repeatedly outvoted by the nobles and clergy, Ploos engineered an abrupt switch which brought the States of Utrecht over to the war camp.<sup>5</sup> The prince's managers were similarly active in Gelderland and Overijssel. The States of Zeeland was now free of the pressure to which it had formerly been subjected. Frederick Henry's

1. ARH SG 12, 548, secret res. of SG, 11 June 1633.

2. GA Haarlem, vroed. res. 4 Aug. 1633; GA Rotterdam, vroedschap res. 10 Aug. 1633; GA Leiden Sec. Arch 449, fos. 49<sup>v</sup>-50; de Boer, p. 121; Jean de Pange, *Charnacé et l'alliance Franco-Hollandaise (1633-1637)* (Paris, 1905), pp. 75-76.

3. *Archives*, iii. 38-41.

4. Poelhekke, *Frederik Hendrik*, p. 404.

5. Utrecht vroedschap to SG, 27 May 1633, ARH SG 12, 548; de Pange, p. 62.

next step was to force through the projected new treaty of alliance with France which would assure increased and regular French subsidies, but which also stipulated that should Louis XIII break openly with the Habsburgs, neither the Republic nor France should negotiate peace or a truce with Spain '*que conjointement et d'un commun consentement*'. The deliberations over this treaty developed into a long and bitter battle in which Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Delft and Dordrecht fought with every means at their disposal to prevent Frederick Henry and the war party from having their way. At the heart of the struggle was the contest for control of the States of Holland. The prince, according to Charnacé, admonished Pauw that the Holland peace party

n'estoient que quatre ou cinq aveuglés de leur interest privé qui n'estoient pas raisonnables, et qu'il n'estoit pas juste qu'ils gagnassent au prejudice du public; Pau répliqua que c'estoit toute la province; sur ce contraste Orange dit qu'il feroit voir à Pau que non, et que pour cet effet il falloit assembler les Estats de la Province.<sup>1</sup>

And so it proved. Though Frederick Henry lost Pauw with whom he had clashed fiercely in December 1633, he nevertheless managed, through Noordwijck who changed sides as promptly in 1633 as he had in 1625, and through the influential François van Aerssen who was now restored to favour, to force the treaty through the States of Holland despite everything that Amsterdam could do to prevent it.<sup>2</sup> His managers worked relying on Haarlem, Leiden and Gouda as the spearhead of the stadholder's new faction. Meanwhile, the States of Utrecht was disposed in favour of the French alliance by the dexterity of Ploos and the States of Overijssel, as usual, by Haersolte.<sup>3</sup> The fight was difficult, but resulted in the end in a decisive victory for the prince. Aerssen confided to a correspondant at Paris that

... de fait il ne s'est guères veu que d'Arminiens qui se soient opposez aux propositions de la France, laquelle ils taschoient de nous figurer plus dangereuse à cet Estat que l'Espagne mesme, tant ont-ilz dégénéré de nostre ancienne probité. Monseigneur le Prince d'Orange a puissamment aydé à faire accepter ceste alliance et, sans son intervention et sages persuasions nous fussions tousjours restez en irrésolutions, espérans qu'il fust venu quelque nouvelle ouverture d'Espagne, ce qui cessera désormais au moyen de ce traité, auquel Mr de Charnacé s'est employé avec grande dextérité et patience. J'avoue que j'ay parfois désespéré du succez de ceste affaire et m'estonne de ce que l'Espagnol a esté sy imprudent de ne nous avoir fait parler de trêve en aucune sorte, puis qu'il est assez bien informé de nostre constitution; car, s'il en eust autrement usé, il nous jectoît sans doute en partialité, qui nous devoit rendre inutiles à toutes actions dehors et dedans.<sup>4</sup>

1. Archives, iii. 47.

2. Aerssen to Richelieu, The Hague, 2 Apr. 1634, Archives, iii. 56.

3. De Pange, p. 62; A. Waddington, *La République des Provinces Unies, La France et les Pays-Bas Espagnols, 1630-1650* (2 vols. Paris, 1895), p. 221.

4. Archives, iii. 54.

Even so, the relative narrowness of the prince's victory was an ominous indication of the underlying weakness of his new position. The old problem of how, successfully, to manage the provincial assemblies and *vroedschappen* was as acute as ever, if not more so. But while the stadholder's policies had switched and he now depended on a different faction for support, by and large his intimate circle of managers remained as before. The main change, apart from the re-emergence of Aerssen as a central figure, was the disappearance of Beaumont who was evidently too closely linked with the old policies and, presumably, under too much of a cloud in Zeeland to continue in his former capacity. Having lost the prince's favour, he also lost his offices at Middelburg and ended up, ironically, in Grotius' old position as pensionary of Rotterdam.<sup>1</sup> Haersolte remained the dominant personality in the States of Overijssel until his death in 1643; on several occasions after 1633, he was again Overijssel's 'deputy in the field' and, in the year of his death, he was nominated Overijssel's plenipotentiary at the projected Münster peace congress.<sup>2</sup> Increasingly, he was seconded in his activities by Willem Ripperda,<sup>3</sup> an Overijssel noble who had married Alida van den Bouckhorst, Noordwijck's daughter, and who, in 1644, was appointed to succeed Haersolte as the province's representative at Münster. Vosbergen continued to figure prominently in the States of Zeeland and was several times the province's 'deputy in the field'; Schaffer stayed at the helm in Groningen, and Culemborch in Gelderland, while Cats remained instrumental in organizing the States of Holland. Ploos continued for some years to dominate Utrecht but was increasingly seconded by Godard van Reede,<sup>4</sup> who was Utrecht's 'deputy in the field' in 1634, 1637, 1638, 1641, 1642 and other years.

All of these men, together with Cornelis Musch, secretary of the States General, who during the early 1630s became one of the prince's closest advisers, naturally came to be well-known, at least by reputation, to Europe's statesman and particularly to Richelieu. As they were the managers of the provinces, it was always they who took charge of negotiating secret matters of state and especially anything concerning Franco-Dutch relations. In March and April 1634, the secret States General committee deputed to draw up the new treaty

1. Meertens, *Letterkundig leven*, p. 301.

2. *Kroniek van het Historisch Genootschap* 5th ser. no. 3 (1867), p. 657, 5th ser. vol. 5 (1869), p. 744.

3. Willem Ripperda, heer van Hengeloo (1600-1669), entered the States General for Overijssel in 1631; according to the Swedish envoy at Munster, 'il passe pour tres avare, flatteur, affectionné tant a la France qu'a l'Espagne selon le profit qu'il peut tirer de l'une ou de l'autre, mais pourtant toujours dévoué au Prince d'Orange'; NNBW vi. 1193.

4. Godard van Reede van Amerongen (1593-1641), heer van Nederhorst, despite his marriage into a Catholic family, pursued a stridently anti-Spanish policy during the 1646-8 deliberations over the proposed peace with Spain; NNBW iii. 1006-7.

with France consisted of Noordwijck, Culemborch, Pauw, Knuyt, Ploos, Ripperda and Coenders de Helpen.<sup>1</sup> In the States of Holland, it was Noordwijck in particular who continued to be regularly chosen to represent the province in secret deliberations concerning France.<sup>2</sup> During the winter of 1635–6 when, to the annoyance of the French, Frederick Henry entered into secret talks with representatives of the Cardinal-Infante, governor of the Spanish Netherlands, it was Noordwijck and Musch who were delegated by the States General to explain away this highly sensitive matter to the French ambassador.<sup>3</sup> When the Franco-Dutch alliance was renewed in September 1636, the secret committee which negotiated with the French consisted of Noordwijck, Culemborch, Cats, Knuyt, Ploos, Haersolte, Schaffer and Oetgens besides one other representing Friesland.<sup>4</sup> Shortly afterwards, Louis XIII, who had promised handsome gifts to those with the power and inclination to influence the proceedings according to his wishes, distributed, through Charnacé, 20,000 *livres* to Musch, 10,000 each to Noordwijck and Ploos, 6,000 to Cats and 5,000 to Knuyt. Of those approached, only Haersolte and Vosbergen, apparently, refused the French cash.<sup>5</sup>

In his later years, Frederick Henry continued to pack the States General's and the States of Holland's secret committees with his trusted confidants and managers in the same way as he had always done. The real continuity throughout his time as stadholder thus lies not in his policies, which changed radically, but in his unchanging method and choice of personnel for managing the assemblies. Be they former Remonstrants or Counter-Remonstrants, associated with or opposed to the former truce moves, the same familiar names constantly recur. The States General kept on appointing new secret committees with the accustomed frequency, but Frederick Henry ensured that the same key personages were regularly renominated. In 1640, the States General's freshly reconstituted secret committee to decide campaign strategy together with the stadholder consisted of Randwijck, Noordwijck, Teresteyn, Cats, Vosbergen, Rijnsoude, Haersolte, Loo, Aldringa, and Musch. The stadholder himself nominated the secret committee that he wanted from the States of Holland; and in 1640 these were Cats (*Raadpensionaris*), Noordwijck (nobility), Teresteyn (Dordrecht), Broekhoven (Leiden), Beaumont (Rotterdam) and three others, without one representative from Amsterdam.<sup>6</sup> He steadfastly persevered with his pro-French policy for many years until he changed once again, in 1646, and switched

1. Aitzema, *Verbael* i. 297. 2. See, for instance, Res. Holl. 19 Sept. 1634.

3. Aitzema, *Verbael*, i. 325. 4. *Ibid.* i. 349. 5. Waddington, *La République*, p. 283.

6. ARH, Collectie Sypestein, no. 48, fo. 125 (I am indebted for this reference to Professor K. W. Swart); regarding his choice from the States of Holland, the Prince used the following words: 'Uyt de regeeringe van Hollandt hebb ick bij mij geassumeert om te delibereeren en resolveeren op de saecken van Oorlogh De Heeren Noordwijck, Teresteyn,' etc.

back to an active search for peace with Spain. He was thus committed by secret understandings with France, throughout the years 1634 to 1646, to partition of the South Netherlands between France and the Republic. But he was much less effective in his campaigns against the Spaniards from 1634 onwards than he had been during the period 1626 to 1633, and this despite the fact that from 1635, Spain was at war with France as well as with the Republic. Furthermore, whilst he had not intended or attempted the conquest of the South Netherlands during the years of steady gains, he must have known, when he changed his policies in 1633, that the strength of his army would be reduced and thus that prospects for capturing more territory were diminished. During the winter of 1634-5, the prince for the first time encountered determined opposition from Amsterdam over troop levels and army funds, and from then on the Republic's military strength was slowly but inexorably reduced.<sup>1</sup> The paradox is that in the very years that Frederick Henry's prestige reached its zenith at Paris and London, his effectiveness as a military leader was sharply curtailed. If the stadholder was ever really eager to go through with a partition of the South Netherlands which is by no means evident from his campaign strategy after 1635, then he was certainly content that this should be achieved by France rather than by himself.

The essential weakness of the prince's position after 1633 was that in the long run the faction headed by Haarlem, Leiden and Gouda was simply not powerful enough to dominate the States of Holland. Haarlem and Leiden remained staunchly committed to the stadholder's cause throughout his last years<sup>2</sup> – at no stage is it really correct to speak of Holland versus the prince – but not enough towns were able or prepared to confront Amsterdam. The army continued to shrink and Frederick Henry's power to wane. Besides, the Holland war towns, essentially motivated by their own economic interests, were themselves lukewarm when it came to voting funds for the army. Finally, in January 1642, a savage new round of cuts was agreed to almost unanimously by the States of Holland, only the nobility voting against;<sup>3</sup> and despite the prince's efforts in the other provinces, he could not prevent these cuts being adopted by the States General. 'Son autorité se diminue beaucoup', remarked the French ambassador.<sup>4</sup> Undeniably, during the last six or seven years of his life, Frederick Henry's authority did sink far below the level not only of the years of his great victories but even below that of his first uncertain years of 1625 to 1628.

1. Res. Holl. 7, 13, 21 Dec. 1634; 14 Feb., 25 Apr. 1635.

2. See GA Haarlem, vroedschap res. 22 May 1643; GA Leiden, Sec. Arch. 450, fos. 110<sup>r-v</sup>.

3. Res. Holl. 22, 27 Jan. 1642.

4. *Correspondance authentique de Godefroy d'Estrades*, ed. A. de Saint Léger and L. Lemaire (Paris, 1924), 149.

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## THE STATES GENERAL AND THE STRATEGIC REGULATION OF THE DUTCH RIVER TRADE, 1621-1636

Few aspects of the Dutch economic miracle of the seventeenth century were more fundamental to Dutch prosperity or more distinctive to the country than the Republic's flourishing river trade both internally and with the neighbouring Spanish Netherlands and north-west Germany. The Dutch Republic, Europe's leading entrepôt for foodstuffs, notably Baltic grain, fish and herring, salt, wines, sugar, spices and dairy products, possessed a major market for these and other provisions in the densely populated, relatively highly urbanised and industrial belt of territory girdling the United Provinces to the south and south-east. So substantial indeed was this transfer of foodstuffs along the inland waterways of the Low Countries and Westphalia, that from an early stage in the Dutch revolt against Spain, the *binnenstromen* came to be seen as a formidable strategic instrument. During the years 1621-1636, the States General repeatedly closed the waterways for limited periods, in most cases, but not all, only to the passage of foodstuffs and certain materials beyond Dutch territory. The purpose of engaging in such action was in the main strategic, particularly that of inconveniencing as far as possible one or more Spanish or Imperial armies in the field. Due to the complex, decentralised character of the Dutch political system, however, it often proved difficult to implement these temporary blockades in a consistent manner. Especially revealing about Dutch political life at the time is the way conflicting economic interests within the Republic were able at different times to influence both the form and duration of these blockades. Undoubtedly, the major tension in this respect was between the interests of the inland towns on the one hand and those of the maritime towns of Holland and Zeeland on the other.

The history of Dutch regulation of the river traffic before 1609, admirably described by J. H. Kernkamp<sup>1</sup>, shows that the practice then took several forms, that its effects varied greatly in different parts of the Republic and that on

\* For his most helpful advice with this article, I should like to thank Professor K. W. Swart.

1. J. H. Kernkamp, *De handel op den vijand, 1572-1609* (2 vols.; Utrecht, 1931-1934).



occasion these consequences were drastic. As early as the summer of 1572, with most of Holland in rebel hands and the States of that province then gathered at Dordrecht, steps were taken to prevent water-borne traffic reaching Delft which was slower than the others in breaking with Spain, and Amsterdam which adhered resolutely to the Spanish cause until 1578<sup>2</sup>. Following the collapse of Spanish power in most of the Netherlands during the later 1570s and the subsequent parting of ways between the rebellious majority and the Walloon provinces which reverted to Philip II, the States General in Brussels endeavoured intermittently to halt trade by river, canal and overland with the Walloon towns. The advance of Parma's troops into Flanders and Brabant in 1584, led the Dutch to ban all trade with enemy territory indefinitely and close the Rhine, Waal, Maas and IJssel beyond Arnhem, Nijmegen, Venlo and Deventer while the Eems was barred by States warships, patrolling its estuary. This measure, more comprehensive than its forerunners, spread consternation in Holland and quite soon, at the request of the 'burgomasters and merchants' of Dordrecht, the chief river entrepôt in Holland, was amended to permit entry from enemy territory along the Maas and Rhine of Rhenish wines and timber, coal and iron from Liège and the Ruhr, and Walloon lime, essential imports<sup>3</sup>. While resented at Arnhem and Nijmegen, busy intermediary river towns between Holland and Germany, the ban was supported by the provinces of Utrecht and Zeeland which lost little trade by it and in the latter case was in imminent danger from Parma's advance.

While evasion of the ban was widespread, especially the nocturnal transfer of foodstuffs to the Spaniards overland by wagon, the patrolling of the waterways by naval craft and land routes by cavalry was effective enough to curb the traffic and cause considerable hardship to Parma's troops<sup>4</sup>. Also the retention of large stocks within Holland tended to depress food prices which was undoubtedly popular with the lower classes and was reflected in the attitude of towns such as Utrecht where influence of the guilds was marked. After the fall of Antwerp to the Spaniards in 1585, pressure for re-opening the river trade increased, especially in Holland. Nevertheless, the States General, guided by Queen Elizabeth's representative, the earl of Leicester, maintained its stringent policy. Indeed, by placard of 4 August 1586, the ban was again widened to cover all trade with enemy territory, including French ports east of the Seine estuary (so as to prevent sea-borne supplies reaching Flanders via Calais and Boulogne) and

2. *Ibidem*, I, 20-21.

3. N. Japikse, ed., *Resolutiën der Staten-Generaal, 1576-1609*, IV (RGP, XLIII; The Hague, 1915-) no. 750 (30-8-1584); Kernkamp, *Handel*, I, 162; on Dordrecht's river trade during this period, see J. L. van Dalen, *Geschiedenis van Dordrecht* (2 vols.; Dordrecht, 1931) I, 314, 322 and P. W. Klein, *De Trippen in de 17e eeuw. Een studie over het ondernemersgedrag op de Hollandse stapelmarkt* (Assen, 1965) 66-89.

4. Kernkamp, *Handel*, I, 163, II, 15.

German ports from Bremen westwards. During 1587, the ban was gradually relaxed particularly regarding exports by sea to neutral ports and in November the States warships were withdrawn from the Eems. For some towns indeed, it was not unadvantageous to leave the main river blockade in force while the Eems and sea-routes were open, for this diverted the flow of foodstuffs through the ports of Holland and Zeeland via Calais, Boulogne, Emden and Bremen to the Spanish garrisons strung out along the eastern and southern borders of the Republic. Naturally, this approach was bitterly opposed by Holland's river towns, Dordrecht and Gorkum, by the inland provinces and those chiefly concerned with the strategic purpose of the blockade. The ban in force since the summer of 1584 was finally lifted, following Leicester's resignation, in the spring of 1588.

After the prolonged action of the mid 1580s, closing the rivers was mostly resorted to by the States General for short intervals only so as to inconvenience the Spanish forces during a particular campaign. Often, in an effort to reconcile the conflicting demands of strategy and trade, such measures applied only to a narrow sector of waterways. Thus during the 1590 Dutch offensive in Brabant, transporting provisions into Brabant between the Schelde and Maas was forbidden for some months, but Maurits could obtain closure of the Schelde and Maas themselves only briefly<sup>5</sup>. During the prince's advance upon Zutphen in 1591, only the IJssel beyond Deventer was closed. On the other hand, during 1599 a general prohibition on trading with the enemy was declared in reply to the ban on commerce with the 'rebels' issued in February 1599 by the Archduke Albert. In descending on Grave, in 1602, Maurits was again assisted by the States with a temporary ban as he was again in 1604 with the closing of the canals into Flanders during the siege of Sluis. With Spínola's major counter-offensive on the eastern borders of the Republic in 1606, the Maas, Waal, Rhine and Eems were closed to foodstuffs for several months.

Following the signing of the Twelve Years Truce in 1609, the Spanish army of Flanders was substantially reduced in size<sup>6</sup> which itself reduced demand for Dutch provisions while at the same time, the Dutch naval blockade was withdrawn from the Flemish coast so that foodstuffs that previously could enter only by river, canal or overland could now be shipped by sea to Ostend and Dunkirk. The Brussels régime's policy of improving the Flemish canals during the truce years and particularly the digging of the new Gent-Brugge canal started in 1613 also encouraged diversion of traffic away from the Schelde and other *binnenstromen* to the Flemish coast as did Albert's astute refusal to lower the

5. *Ibidem*, 1.

6. Geoffrey Parker, *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road* (2nd ed.; Cambridge, 1975) 271-272.

*licenten* (import-export duties pertaining to trade between the northern and southern Netherlands) on the South Netherlands side<sup>7</sup>. Yet, despite these negative factors, the river trade did benefit in some respects from the truce. The very cessation of hostilities permitted closer north-south links such as the regular *beurtvaart*<sup>8</sup> (sailing barge) services established at this time connecting Vlissingen, Delft, Rotterdam and other Dutch towns with Antwerp. More important still, was the lowering of the *licenten* on the Dutch side from the comparatively high war-time level as fixed by the States General in 1603 to a much lower truce-time level<sup>9</sup>.

Although difficult to compare owing to the various stoppages before 1606, it appears from the lists of tolls paid at Venlo that on average slightly more shipping plied between the Northern and Southern Netherlands along the most important artery, the Maas, during the truce than in the previous few years<sup>10</sup>. Certainly, imports of Liège coal along the Maas into the Republic rose significantly due to the sizeable reduction in the Dutch import duty. Returns on the *riddertol*, a duty levied on barge traffic docking at Antwerp, likewise rose slightly during the period<sup>11</sup>.

The situation on the *binnenstromen* was again transformed by the expiry of the truce in April 1621. The armies of both sides were considerably expanded, the army of Flanders soon reaching a war-time level of around 60,000 men up from a truce-time level of less than half of this figure<sup>12</sup>. The army of Flanders, like its Dutch counterpart, was essentially a standing army, retained throughout the year, distributed in fortified garrisons located along the borders of the Republic. Among the largest Spanish garrisons were those on the German rivers to the east of Dutch territory, notably Lingen on the Eems and Wesel on the Rhine, each having a fixed garrison of around 2,500 men during the 1620s<sup>13</sup>, and Lipstadt on the Lippe. Other important strongholds to the east of the Republic were Oldenzaal and Grol until the capture of these by Frederik Hendrik in 1626 and

7. See P. Voeten, 'Antwerpse handel over Duinkerken tijdens het twaalfjarig bestand', *Bijdragen tot de geschiedenis inzonderheid van het oud hertogdom Brabant*, XXXIX (1956) 69, 70; *idem*, 'Antwerpse reacties op het twaalfjarig bestand', *ibidem*, XLI (1958) 214, 218.

8. On the *Beurtvaart* services, see Jan de Vries, 'Barges and Capitalism. Passenger Transportation in the Dutch Economy, 1632-1839', *AAG Bijdragen*, XX-XXI (1978) 47-48.

9. See tables I and II below.

10. J. A. van Houtte, 'Le tonlieu de Lith et le commerce sur la Meuse de 1551 à 1701', *Economische geschiedenis van België. Handelingen van het colloquium te Brussel, 17-19 november 1971* (Brussels, 1972) 304.

11. R. Baetens, *De nazomer van Antwerpens welvaart* (2 vols.; Brussels, 1976) I, 321.

12. Parker, *Army of Flanders*, 271-272.

13. See Archivo General de Simancas (hereafter AGS), Estado 2321. Gaspar Ruiz de Pereda to Philip IV, Brussels 20 October 1627 and other similar lists compiled by the paymasters-general of the army of Flanders.

1627, Rheinberg, Geldern, Hamm, Orsoy and Düsseldorf. Similarly, Spanish strongholds were dotted along the Maas, notably at Maastricht where over 1,000 men were stationed, Venlo and Roermond, in and around 's-Hertogenbosch, and on the Schelde in and around Antwerp. Finally, there was a veritable complex of fortresses linked by canals in Flanders at Hulst, Sas van Gent, Damme, Brugge, Gent, Ostend, Nieuwpoort and Aalst. Like the Dutch, the Spanish army in the Netherlands at this time almost never pilfered or scoured the countryside for its provisions. After 1621, mutinies were extremely rare and there was virtually no sacking of towns or villages by the Spanish soldiery. Spanish expenditure on the army of Flanders fluctuated at around four and a half million ducats (some thirteen million guilders) yearly during the 1620s, the bulk being expended on grain, fish, salt, dairy produce, wines, horses, fodder and timber imported along the *binnenstromen* from Dutch territory, Liège and Westphalia.

The river trade also benefited in 1621 from the resumption by the Dutch of their naval blockade of the Flemish coast<sup>14</sup>. This deprived Rotterdam, the Zeeland ports and the Noorderkwartier towns of their truce-time carrying of supplies by sea to Flanders, diverting almost all such traffic via the inland waterways especially the Schelde, a shift which favoured the otherwise stagnant economy of Zeeland. However, the coastal blockade also made possible a return to the high level of *licenten* on the rivers prevailing under the war-list of 1603, the extra money being required to pay the burgeoning cost of the navy. It is extremely important to note in this connection that reversion to the 1603 war-list occurred not, as has sometimes been stated in the past<sup>15</sup>, in July 1625 when the States General republished the list, but, as the States General's instructions to the admiralty colleges make clear<sup>16</sup>, when war was resumed, in April 1621. In the case of essential imports such as iron from Liège and the Ruhr, re-imposition of the war-list involved no extra duty, but in most instances as is shown by tables 1 and 2, the new list involved large increases on imports and exports both to and from enemy and neutral territory.

14. Dutch merchant vessels were being prevented from entering Flemish ports by the Dutch navy from the end of April 1621, see Algemeen Rijksarchief, The Hague (ARA), Staten Generaal (SG), 3180, fo. 187v, Res. 21 April 1621. The Dutch blockade of the Flemish coast was operative in most years from April to October.

15. This is stated in several nineteenth-century works and by Becht, see also J. C. Westerman, 'Statistische gegevens over den handel van Amsterdam in de zeventiende eeuw', *Tijdschrift voor geschiedenis*, LXI (1948) 5, 6.

16. ARA, SG 3180, fos. 168v, 170v, 201, Res. 19, 21 April and 7 May.

*Table 1 'Convoy and Licence' Money on key commodities under the 1609 Truce List<sup>17</sup>*

a) Exports:		To Enemy Territory	
	Dutch butter (per vat) . . . . .	4 guilders	
	Dutch cheese (per 100 pond) . . .	—	15 stuivers
	Wheat (per last) . . . . .	10 guilders	
	Herring (per last) . . . . .	4 guilders	
	Salt (refined, 't hondert) . . . . .	15 guilders	
		From Neutral Lands	From Enemy Lands
b) Imports:	Liège coal (de hondert wagen) .	0 gld – 15 st . . . . .	0 gld – 15 st
	English coal (de hondert wagen) . . . . .	0 gld – 10 st . . . . .	—
	Iron (de duysent ponden) . . . . .	1 gld – 0 st . . . . .	—
	Lime (calck, 't hoedt) . . . . .	—	0 gld – 3 st
	Rhine wine (ses Amen) . . . . .	3 gld – 0 st . . . . .	—

*Table 2: 'Convoy and Licence' Money on key commodities under the 1603 war-list re-introduced for the years 1621-48<sup>18</sup>*

a) Exports: Item		To Enemy Lands	To Neutral Territory via the Maas	To Neutral Lands via Rhine or Waal
	Dutch butter (vat) . . .	16 gld . . . . .	13 gld . . . . .	10 gld
	Dutch cheese (100 lb) . . .	3 gld – 5 st . . . . .	2 gld – 15 st . . . . .	2 gld – 5 st
	Wheat (last) . . . . .	36 gld . . . . .	34 gld . . . . .	27 gld
	Herring (last) . . . . .	12 gld . . . . .	11 gld . . . . .	10 gld
	Salt ('t hondert) . . . . .	100 gld . . . . .	85 gld . . . . .	75 gld
b) Imports:		From Enemy Territory	From Neutral Territory	
	Liège coal (hondert wagen) . . . . .	1 gld – 5 st . . . . .		
	English coal . . . . .	—	1 gld – 0 st	
	Iron (1,000 pond) . . . . .	1 gld – 0 st . . . . .	1 gld – 0 st	
	Lime ('t hoedt) . . . . .	0 gld – 4 st . . . . .	0 gld – 3 st	
	Rhine wine (ses Amen) . . . . .	7 gld – 10 st . . . . .	7 gld – 10 st	

This hefty rise in convoy and licence charges initially spread consternation among the Dordrecht skippers' guilds<sup>19</sup>. The increases tended to divert trade, most dramatically in the case of salt where the rise was steepest, away from the main *binnenstromen* such as Maas and Schelde to a number of minor, indirect routes, notably via Breda and then overland to small towns in Spanish Brabant

17. C. Cau, ed., *Groot plaacet-boeck* (9 vols.; The Hague, 1658-1796) I, columns 2388/2416.

18. *Ibidem*, I, columns 2415/2486.

19. See the petition of Dordrecht's Maas skippers to the Dordrecht *vroedschap* (undated 1621) in ARA, SG 12, 562, no. 14.

whence the salt was distributed to its usual markets. Over the years, however, the net result of the resumption of war was marginally positive rather than negative so far as the river trade was concerned. The combined impact of the increase in military spending and the blockade of the Flemish coast evidently slightly outweighed that of the increases in convoy and licence money and the disruptions of war. In the years 1623-1624, despite months of dislocation of the river trade, slightly more traffic passed between the Northern and Southern Netherlands on the Maas than in 1618-1619, the best years of the truce<sup>20</sup>. Similarly, returns on the *Brabantse watertol* collected on river craft docking at Antwerp were higher for 1623-1624 and for most of the 1630s than they had been during the truce<sup>21</sup>. Of this busy war-time traffic between one quarter and one third plied the Maas, a little less than one fifth sailed on the Rhine and one eighth on the Schelde<sup>22</sup>.

While the volume of river trade slightly increased in the early 1620s, its structure was more markedly altered by the transition to war. Unquestionably, despite the higher duties, demand for foodstuffs in the Southern Netherlands greatly increased. On the other hand, Liège coal entered the Republic in notably smaller quantities in the 1620s than previously, presumably as the higher duty increased the attractiveness to the Dutch consumer of domestic peat supplies<sup>23</sup>. Imports of German wines into the Republic were likewise hit by the higher duties such that there was a marked trend during these years for the proportion of Dutch wine re-exports consisting of French wines to increase, a process particularly damaging to Dordrecht, the Dutch entrepôt for German wines<sup>24</sup>.

Spínola and Maurits took the field in August 1621, the Spaniards advancing north-eastwards from Maastricht with 1,800 supply wagons in their train. The subsequent siege of Jülich by the Spaniards continued for five months until the fall of the town in January 1622. During October, the States General several times debated whether to close the Rhine and Maas to provisions *en route* to the Spanish army. Though Holland proved somewhat reluctant to do so, on 23 October, Holland's deputies consented to the ban provided that herring, fish and salt were exempted and with this proviso the passage of foodstuffs was duly forbidden though along the Rhine only<sup>25</sup>. Maurits himself considered this action unnecessary and even inconvenient to the Dutch forces in the Emmerich area and

20. Van Houtte, 'Le tonlieu de Lith', 304.

21. Baetens, *Nazomer*, I, 396.

22. For further statistics on the river trade see my forthcoming book 'The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World, 1606-1661'.

23. Van Houtte, 'Le tonlieu de Lith', 304.

24. Klein, *De Trippen*, 77; M. Bizière, 'The Baltic Wine Trade, 1563-1657', *Scandinavian Economic History Review*, XX (1972) 121-132.

25. ARA, SG 3180 fos. 501v, 512, 513v, Res. 19, 23 October 1621.

following consultation with the States General's deputies to the army was countermanded after only a few days<sup>26</sup>.

In the next year, the armies took the field in July. While one Spanish army distracted the Dutch in the Cleves area, Spínola occupied Steenberg and descended upon Bergen-op-Zoom. Promptly, the Middelburg admiralty college in whose *repartitie* (customs jurisdiction) Bergen and the Schelde fell, provisionally banned the export by river, canal or overland of food, timber<sup>27</sup> and peat, asking the States General to confirm its action. The latter having already ordered the Rotterdam college to halt food exports into Brabant on the routes of its *repartitie*, promptly did so and instructed the governors of Breda, Geertruidenberg and Heusden to prevent passage of supplies from those towns to the surrounding villages except by certificate and upon payment of cautionary deposits so as to prevent seepage of victuals into Spanish hands overland<sup>28</sup>. Soon after, the governors were further ordered to strip the village windmills of key parts and take these into custody within the garrison towns. In early August, the Rotterdam college complained that while it had halted the exit of all victuals from its *repartitie*, the States of Zeeland were allowing export of (French) wines, Middelburg's chief item of trade, as well as of salt, vital to the refining town of Zierikzee<sup>29</sup>. At once, Zeeland was made to cease this practise. On 6 August, the States General's ban was widened to include hay and other horse feeds.

As the siege of Bergen-op-Zoom continued during August, anxiety in Zeeland, the province most immediately threatened, mounted. One consequence of the ban was a massive diversion of provisions by sea from Zeeland and Rotterdam to the ports of north-east France whence they could be transported, albeit at considerable inconvenience and cost, through Flanders to the besieging army in Brabant. To reduce this flow (the States of Zeeland did not wish to prevent it altogether), the States General was asked to extend the special war-time *licent* charged on exports to Calais, to Boulogne and the other French ports as far west as Dieppe, the surcharge to be re-imbursed upon presentation of testimonials from magistrates in those ports that cargoes had really been unloaded there and not at Calais<sup>30</sup>. Soon after, alarmed by reports of further large consignments passing to the Spaniards via Calais, Zeeland requested a temporary raising of the charges for Calais as high as those pertaining on the Schelde<sup>31</sup>. The States

26. *Ibidem*, fos. 537v, 553.

27. Regarding timber, the aim was to prevent passage of Norwegian *sparren ende deelen* used in the construction of siege works, trenches and for mining under walls.

28. ARA, SG 3181 fos. 329v, 330, 334, Res. 25 and 27 July 1622.

29. *Ibidem*, fos. 350v-351, Res. 4 August 1622.

30. Zeeland to SG, 13 August 1622, *Notulen van de Staten van Zeeland*, 1622, 309; ARA, SG 3181, fo. 377, Res. 17 August 1622.

31. *Notulen Zeeland*, 1622, Res. 15 August 1622; ARA, SG 3181, fos. 391, 393, Res. 24, 25 August 1622.

General, after consulting the three Holland admiralty colleges, not only raised the charges for Calais to the Schelde level and those for French ports beyond Calais as far as the Somme estuary to the prior level for Calais, but banned all trade of any kind temporarily with Spanish Brabant and Flanders. A few days later, Zeeland began pressing for closure of the Maas in line with the waterways further west and for imposition of the Schelde list on all victuals shipped to French ports between Calais and the Seine<sup>32</sup>. The States General closed the Maas on 3 September and though Holland was reluctant to concede Zeeland's second point, the inland provinces insisted, and the Schelde list was duly extended to provisions for French ports up to though excluding the Seine estuary while for French ports from the Seine westwards deposits had to be paid refundable on presentation of testimonials from the relevant French authorities.

The Spanish army finally withdrew in defeat from before Bergen on 4 October 1622. Although the confiscated *spillen* were then speedily restored to the Brabant village windmills under States' control, the *binnenstromen* remained closed at Maurits' recommendation for several more weeks. In the second week of October, the Zeeland authorities, without prior authorization from The Hague, allowed export of wines to Flanders and Antwerp alleging that excessive stocks of wine had accumulated at Middelburg since July. Annoyed, the States General nevertheless removed the ban on wine exports on 17 October and that on foodstuffs generally two days later<sup>33</sup>. Thus the 1622 river blockade was in force for a little under three months altogether. Zeeland's role during that period may be accounted that of a province much alarmed by the Spanish threat and willing to place strategic necessity before commercial interest up to a point, but nevertheless remaining highly sensitive to the commercial needs of its merchants.

During 1623 there took place no Spanish offensive against the Dutch. Even so, the year was one of concern in the Republic, particularly in Overijssel and Gelderland, regarding the build-up of Spanish forces at Lingen, Geldern, Oldenzaal and Grol and the proximity for a time of the army of the German Catholic League under Tilly to the Republic's eastern border. It was widely feared that even without direct co-operation between the two Catholic armies, Spínola could invade from the south with Maurits being compelled to retain a large part of his forces far to the north<sup>34</sup>. During February and March 1623, Overijssel took the lead as had Zeeland the previous year in pressing for action on the rivers, to impede the build-up of enemy forces lest the latter should

32. ARA, SG 3181, fos. 414, 426v, 429, Res. 3, 10 and 12 September 1622; *Notulen Zeeland*, 1622, 15 September 1622.

33. ARA, SG, 3181, fos. 466, 472v, 474v, 478, Res. 8, 15, 17 and 19 October 1622.

34. *Gedenkschriften van jonkheer Alexander van der Capellen* (2 vols.; Utrecht, 1777) I, 95.



attempt to besiege 'eenige vande Overijsselsche steden'<sup>35</sup>. Encountering the reluctance of Holland, Overijssel despatched an extraordinary delegation to The Hague to back the demand. In early April Holland's consent was obtained for a provisional closure for two months of the Maas, Rhine, IJssel (beyond Deventer), Weser and Eems to foodstuffs, munitions and timber, wine to be included but not salt<sup>36</sup>. Shortly after, the States General also closed the Schelde and canals leading into Flanders. Warships were despatched to patrol the Eems and Weser estuaries.

With the Rhine shut to foodstuffs and the troops at Zutphen intercepting supplies passing eastwards beyond Deventer, the States of Gelderland received complaints that no butter, cheese or herring was reaching Doetinchem, Borculo, Bredevoort, Winterswijk and other localities in the county of Zutphen. Gelderland and Overijssel which had a similar problem with regard to districts east of Deventer, then asked the States General to permit passage to rationed consignments on payment of caution money as had long been the practice with outlying villages under States' control in Brabant<sup>37</sup>. In response, the States General, advised by the *Raad van State*, drew up fixed quotas of provisions for the localities concerned, allocating each to a specified distribution point, usually Zutphen, Arnhem or Deventer, from where the rations were to be released. On the expiry of the original ban, on 14 June, the measure was renewed indefinitely and maintained through June and most of July. Protests were registered by Dordrecht concerning the damage to river commerce generally and from the city of Bremen and the Danish crown on behalf of the latter over the blocking of the Weser by States warships<sup>38</sup>.

On 19 July, a Holland delegation conferred with Maurits who agreed that there was now little reason to prolong the blockade which experience showed was damaging Dutch trade. The next day, led by the pensionary of Dordrecht, Holland's delegation to the States General, showing particular concern on behalf of the new herring catch, demanded withdrawal of the ban on the ground that it was ineffective, the enemy being well supplied, and because the admiralty colleges could no longer support the loss of the *licenten*<sup>39</sup>. Initially, the States

35. ARA, SG 3182, fos. 76v, 89v, 90v, 99v, Res. 22 February 4, 6 and 13 March; the entry for 22 February reads: 'Die van Gelderlant ende Overijssel hebben vtoont de seer grote magasinen van vivres ende andere crychsprovisien, die den vyant in die quartieren in syne steden is maeckende, apparentelick omme eenige van deser landen frontieren ten bequaemen saisonne van 't jaar met belegeringe aen te tasten'.

36. *Resolutien Staten van Holland*, 31 March 1623; ARA, SG 3182, fos. 132v, Res. 4 April 1623.

37. *Ibidem*, fo. 173, Res. 4 May 1623.

38. *Resolutien Staten van Holland*, 22 July 1623; ARA, SG 3182, fos. 203v, 226, Res. 30 May and 16 June 1623.

39. *Ibidem*, fo. 276, Res. 20 July 1623; GA Deventer, Republiek I, no. 19, Johan Lulop to Deventer, 26 July 1623.

General considered exempting herring from the ban and re-opening the canals into Flanders and Brabant while keeping the routes to the east closed. However, Friesland and Groningen reacted to Holland's pressure by insisting that if herring and fish were exempted then so should be butter and cheese likewise<sup>40</sup>. The consequent deadlock was broken only several weeks later when, on the prince's advice, the inland provinces and Zeeland gave way to Holland, agreeing to re-open all the rivers from 12 August<sup>41</sup>. But on 6 August, Tilly's forces aided by some Spaniards vanquished the Protestant army of Christian of Brunswick at Stadtlohn, almost within sight of the Gelderland border which province and the Overijssel towns, especially Deventer, thereupon determined to prolong the ban on their waterways, appealing to the States General to suspend its order<sup>42</sup>. Six provinces consented at once to keep the Rhine, Maas, IJssel and Eems closed for the interim while Holland did so reluctantly. Subsequently, the Overijssel and Gelderland deputies in The Hague repeatedly reminded their colleagues that the evidence gleaned from Wesel and elsewhere established beyond doubt that all the Imperialist, Catholic League and Spanish forces in the area were suffering severely from shortage of supplies that both Córdoba's troops at Buerich and Anholt's force close by could be compelled to withdraw within a few weeks by keeping the rivers closed<sup>43</sup>. Thus, the blockade was continued through September despite mounting impatience in Holland. On 26 September, representatives of the *grote visscherij* (herring fishery) of South Holland appealed to the States General that herring sales had suffered severely, asking that this product might now be permitted through to Cologne and neighbouring markets<sup>44</sup>. Finally, on 2 October, after a total of six months stoppage, the Rhine, Maas, IJssel and Eems were re-opened<sup>45</sup>.

During 1624, the chief military development was the commencement of the siege of Breda by the Spaniards; but well before the actual invasion, the preparations were fully evident and the Dutch responded with regulation of the rivers. On 22 July, the Middelburg admiralty college submitted to the States General that owing to the large-scale movement of *sparren ende deelen* through Zeeland to Antwerp for use by the Spanish army, it had provisionally forbidden

40. ARA, SG 3182, fos. 276, 277v, 283v-284, Res. 20, 21, 26 and 28 July; Maurits proposed re-opening some *binnenstromen* but keeping the Rhine and Maas closed which Holland opposed deeming 'dat de Lycenten op d'eene plaets te openen, en op d'andere ghesloten te houden, causeren soude groote diversie van Neeringe', *Resolutien Staten van Holland*, 3 August 1623.

41. ARA, SG 3182, fo. 297, Res. 4 August 1623; GA Deventer, Republiek I, no. 19, Johan Lulop to Deventer, 4 August 1623.

42. *Ibidem*, Gelderland to Deventer, 12 August 1623; ARA, SG 3182, fo. 314, Res. 14 August 1623.

43. *Ibidem*, fo. 357v, Res. 6 September 1623; GA Deventer, Republiek I, no. 19, Johan Lulop to Deventer, 14 August and Gelderland to Deventer, 26 August 1623.

44. ARA, SG 3182, fo. 388v, Res. 26 September 1623.

45. *Ibidem*, fo. 389, Res. 27 September 1623.

export of such timbers<sup>46</sup>. Shortly after, the States instructed the Rotterdam college to stop passage of foodstuffs, including wine, beer and horse fodder, along Maas or Waal or into Brabant 'op dat den vyant die extraordinaris dierte in zijn leger heeft, daarmede nyet en werdt versien'<sup>47</sup>. On 7 August, the States ordered the Middelburg college to shut the Schelde also and, as in previous years, pronounced forfeit all foodstuffs together with the barges and wagons in which they were conveyed intercepted by its ships and troops *en route* to Spínola's army<sup>48</sup>. While the Rhine and IJssel remained open, the Amsterdam and Noorderkwartier colleges were instructed to assist with preventing passage of provisions from those routes southwards. Just before Spínola encircled Breda, on 23 August, Gelderland proposed a general prohibition on passage of foodstuffs by waterway or overland out of the Republic, but with Holland again pre-occupied with the issue of herring exports to Cologne and Westphalia, the Rhine still remained open even though it was well known in The Hague that much of the provisions being conveyed along the Rhine were being unloaded at the Spanish garrison towns of Wesel and Rheinberg and transported overland to Venlo and thence to Spinola's army<sup>49</sup>. While supplies continued to flow eastwards, there was also a major diversion of provisions from Zeeland especially to Calais. Early in November 1624, the States General raised the *licent* on exports to Calais to the Schelde level and to other French ports as far as the Somme estuary to the prior level Calais<sup>50</sup>.

By December 1624, after five months of closure of the Schelde, Maas and the waterways between, pressure had built up from Gelderland, Overijssel, Zeeland and also from the stadholder for closing the Rhine likewise. However, Holland refused to agree to this so long as the sea-route to Calais remained open, knowing that Zeeland would not consent to closure of the latter<sup>51</sup>. As the position of Breda steadily deteriorated, so demands for a tighter river blockade increased. In late January 1625, being advised by the Rotterdam college that so much food was being shipped up the Rhine that even grain was passing by that route, which was previously unheard of, Holland at last gave in and the river was closed<sup>52</sup>. As the months passed, the besieging army was doubtless sustained by the prospect of the eventual fall of Breda, but there is no doubt that the troops suffered severely from lack of supplies and towards the end of the siege the

46. *Ibidem*, SG 3183, fo. 390, Res. 25 July 1624.

47. *Ibidem*, fo. 399, Res. 29 July 1624.

48. *Ibidem*, fos. 420v, 421v, Res. 7 August 1624.

49. *Ibidem*, fos. 625v, 665, 745v.

50. *Ibidem*, fo. 645.

51. *Ibidem*, fos. 733v-734, 745v, 737v-738, Res. 20, 21 and 28 December 1624.

52. *Ibidem*, SG 3184, fos. 29, 31, Res. 20, 21 January 1625.

besiegers were in fact reduced to a far worse state of distress than the defenders<sup>53</sup>. In part, this was due to lack of pay, but it does seem that the Dutch blockade contributed also. When Breda finally fell, the admiralty colleges desperately short of funds for the navy, at once pressed the States General to restore the *licenten*<sup>54</sup>. Shortly after, on 12 June, a group of Amsterdam merchants who exported herring and fish to Westphalia, backed by the Amsterdam burgomasters, petitioned the States General for the re-opening of the rivers. Fish exports were promptly exempted from the ban. After consulting Frederik Hendrik, the new stadholder, the States finally opened all the *binnenstromen* to provisions and the other prohibited merchandise from 30 June 1625, except for the routes to Breda and 's-Hertogenbosch which remained blockaded<sup>55</sup>. Export of horses was allowed a few days earlier to enable Dutch dealers to participate in the Besançon horse fair. The Maas and Schelde had been closed to foodstuffs and munitions for little short of a year.

The re-opening of the waterways, however, proved to be brief. July indeed was the only month in 1625 when river traffic was unimpeded as is reflected in the high return on the *Brabantse watertol* at Antwerp for that month<sup>56</sup>. Then, on 29 July, the Brussels regime, finally complying with pressure emanating from Madrid for some time, forbade trade of any kind with the 'rebels', suspended indefinitely the *licenten* on the Spanish side on all water and land routes between Spanish and Dutch-occupied territory and closed the Rhine to the Dutch at Wesel and the Eems at Lingen<sup>57</sup>. Fleets of Dutch barges were turned back by Spanish troops and officials on the Maas, Rhine, Schelde and other waterways. Unquestionably, the measure struck hard at both sides: Dutch river commerce was all but paralysed but in the Southern Netherlands prices of grain, herring, butter, cheese, salt and sugar rose steeply<sup>58</sup>. Spanish cavalry operating on the fringes of Gelderland and Overijssel began to disrupt the flow of supplies overland to Zutphen, Doesburg, Emmerich and other Dutch garrison towns, a practice which they had previously scrupulously avoided for fear of retaliation in

53. Algemeen Rijksarchief (ARA) Brussels, SEG 193, fo. 23, Isabella to Philip, Brussels, 1 May 1625.

54. ARA, SG 3184, fos. 224, 232, 243v, Res. 7, 12 June 1625.

55. *Ibidem*, fo. 248v, Res. 23 June 1625.

56. Baetens, *Nazomer*, I, 322.

57. AGS Estado 2039, consulta 28 September 1625; *Ordinantie ons Heeren des Coninx in houdende verbodt vanden coophandel mette gherelleerde provintien* (Knuttel 3584; Brussels, 29 July 1625); J. I. Israel, 'A Conflict of Empires. Spain and the Netherlands, 1618-1648', *Past and Present*, LXXVI (1977) 56; see above, 23.

58. *Ibidem*; Van der Capellen, *Gedenkschriften*, I, 454. On the collapse of sugar imports from Holland to Antwerp in 1625-1629 see H. Pohl, 'Die Zuckereinfuhr nach Antwerpen durch portugiesische Kauffleute während des 80 jährigen Krieges', *Jahrbuch für Geschichte von Staat, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Lateinamerikas*, IV (1967) 356-357.

kind. The States General were slow to respond, first deliberating what to do in answer to the Spanish edict on 12 and then 19 August, but as yet were unable to agree on any action. There then ensued a period of intensive debate on this question among the Dutch provinces, city councils, admiralty colleges and other administrative bodies<sup>59</sup>.

In all, formulating a response to the Infanta's *verbodt* took some two and a half months. The Dordrecht *vroedschap* pondered at length and consulted various local merchants before concluding, almost unanimously, that the most effective reply to the Spanish action would be to retaliate in kind banning all trade not only with enemy territory but with neighbouring neutral lands as well, with a view to forcing Isabella to retract her prohibition quickly<sup>60</sup>. Likewise Amsterdam judged it best to proceed 'volgende 't exempel vande vijand'<sup>61</sup>. Zeeland once again was keen to proceed with stringent action on the rivers. Finally, on 16 October 1625, the States General issued a sweeping counter-prohibition, known as the *placaet van retorsie*, forbidding trade by inland waterway or overland with either enemy, neutral lands or villages and districts under contribution to the States but lying beyond the frontier garrison towns – Arnhem, Nijmegen, Zutphen, Grave, Heusden, Geertruidenberg and Bergen-op-Zoom<sup>62</sup>. As adjuncts to the edict, merchandise shipped westwards to French ports from Calais to the Somme were, for the duration, to pay the Schelde *licent* while exports to the Zevenbergen and Prinsenland districts lying between Spanish-occupied Breda and Tholen had to pay the still higher *Bosch* licent. Applications for exemption of consignments arranged before 16 October, including one from Louis de Geer who found himself unable to receive a delivery of pistol locks and bandeliers along the Maas from Sittard, were rejected. Meanwhile, fearing Dutch cavalry retaliation in Brabant and Flanders against the supplying of Spanish garrisons from local villages, the Spanish governors in the region made it known to their Dutch counterparts that the Brussels edict would not involve Spanish attempts to disrupt movements of provisions from border villages into Dutch garrisons, though for some months the dislocation continued on the eastern frontier<sup>63</sup>.

The effects of the 1625 river blockade were undoubtedly drastic. The Dutch action increased further the diversion of trade from the *binnenstroom* which had commenced at the end of July with the Brussels edict. A massive flow of

59. ARA, SG 3184, fo. 320v, Res. 12 August 1625; *Resolutien Staten van Holland*, 23 September, 2, 3 October 1625.

60. Gemeente Archief (GA) Dordrecht, section 3, vol. 46, fo. 23, vroedschapsresolutie, 27 September 1625.

61. GA Amsterdam, vroedschapsresoluties XIV, fo. 123, Res. 22 September 1625.

62. ARA, SG 3184, fo. 405v, 408v, Res. 16, 18 October 1625; for instance, trade relations between Grave and the Cuyk region were completely severed much to the distress of the Grave *vroedschap*, see ARA, SG 4947, II, Burgomaster of Grave to SG, 1 December 1625.

63. *Ibidem*, 3184, fos. 383, 396v, 494.

provisions, materials and manufactures which normally had passed along the rivers now passed via Amsterdam and the Noorderkwartier ports to Bremen and Hamburg whence they were shipped up the Weser and Elbe and then overland to the Eems and Rhine vallies<sup>64</sup>. If Bremen had previously suffered from Dutch river regulation, on this occasion the city profited. Revealingly, while the Middelburg, Rotterdam and Noorderkwartier admiralty colleges advised the States General to impose the Schelde *licent* for exports to Bremen and Hamburg, Amsterdam argued against and the matter was shelved<sup>65</sup>. Despite the raised tariffs on goods for the north-east French ports, there took place a simultaneous diversion of trade via Rotterdam and the Zeeland ports to Calais and Boulogne.

During the autumn of 1625, many requests reached the States General from villages under contribution but beyond the border *comptoirs*, asking for special arrangements for their supplies. At the States' bidding, the *Raad van State* drew up lists of approved provisions based on numbers of inhabitants and assigned each village to a depot – Dordrecht, Gorkum, Bergen-op-Zoom, Heusden, Grave, Arnhem, Nijmegen or Deventer – whence these were to be obtained. Oudenbosch, for example, a village of 344 inhabitants, located between Breda and Bergen, was allocated weekly at Dordrecht only, fixed rations of rye and oats, one hundred pounds of cheese, half a sack of salt, four barrels of beer, fifty pounds of soap and four stoops of wine 'for sick women' as well as measures of herring, other fish, cooking oil and timber for the upkeep of their houses<sup>66</sup>. The same rations were assigned to other villages in proportion to population, the nearby twin villages of Oud and Nieuw Gastel, for instance, with 663 inhabitants, were allocated at Dordrecht two hundred pounds of cheese weekly, twice the provision of herring and fish and fifty percent more beer and wine than Oudenbosch<sup>67</sup>. The lists testify to the wide variety of needs and particularly the large amount of herring consumed by the Brabant peasantry. Cheese was allocated on the basis of over a quarter of a Dutch pound per week for every adult and child in the villages. Inevitably, the system prompted rivalries between the depot towns for possession of these captive markets. Gorkum and Heusden quarreled, for example, over the provisioning of various villages in their vicinity while Rotterdam objected that the Prinsenland was assigned to Dordrecht, for previously much of the area's grain and fish had been procured from Rotterdam<sup>68</sup>.

64. Despite heavy diplomatic pressure, Spain was unable to secure the closing of the Weser to the Dutch by the neighbouring German princes, see AGS Estado 2040, consulta, 3 December 1626.

65. ARA, SG 3185, fo. 52v, Res. 5 January, 12 February 1626.

66. *Ibidem*, fos. 59-60, Res. 27 February 1626.

67. *Ibidem*, fos. 51v, 60, 61v, Res. 12, 17, 18 February 1626.

68. *Ibidem*, fos. 64, 75v, Res. 21 February, 6 March 1626.

Among the repercussions of the blockades there was a sudden dislocation of commerce in neighbouring neutral lands. Liège for instance was entirely cut off from its Dutch market. While the Liège city council secured permission from Brussels for the passage through Spanish territory to the city of grain purchased from the Dutch, the States General refused to allow consignments for Liège through its *comptoirs*<sup>69</sup>. Applications from Goch, Calcar, Cleves and other neutral localities on the Rhine to be allowed provisions from the Republic were held up for months in the States while the provinces considered what was to be done<sup>70</sup>.

Pressure for some relaxation of the blockade was perceptibly mounting by the spring of 1626. In May, while rejecting petitions from the skippers of Nijmegen, Arnhem, Tiel and Culemborg for permission to convey fish and other perishable merchandise to neutral lands and from Dordrecht *vroedschap* to allow in a consignment of Liège iron and coal, the States General, prompted by Overijssel and Gelderland which were suffering most from the action, delegated a committee to deliberate the feasibility of restoring trade with neutrals on the basis of a higher than normal *licent*<sup>71</sup>. There were powerful groups however, including stadholder, *Raad van State*, and several city councils, who continued to insist that the *placcaet van retorsie* should not be altered but strictly maintained. Indeed, the States of Holland agreed on resisting the pressure from the inland provinces and persevering with the ban as it stood, disagreeing only over the issue of Calais, some towns, doubtless including Dordrecht and other inland centres, wishing to raise the *licent* or close the route altogether, while the maritime towns preferred to maintain the *status quo*<sup>72</sup>. Amsterdam persisted throughout 1626 in wanting the blockade to remain unaltered<sup>73</sup>. The *Raad van State*, as always, was highly critical of this latter attitude, advising the States General that the

licenten alnoch behooren verhoogt te worden [to Calais and Boulogne], niet alleen voor desen tegenwoordigen tydt maer oock altydt duerende de oorlog, ende dat tselve streecken soude tot grooten dienst van tlandt ende ongerieff vande vyandt<sup>74</sup>.

That strategic reasoning was actually less important than commercial calculation in formulating Dutch policy over the *placcaet van retorsie* is demonstrated by the

69. *Ibidem*, fo. 64, Res. 21 February 1626.

70. *Ibidem*, fo. 191, Res. 30 May 1626.

71. *Ibidem*, fo. 165v, Res. 15 May 1626.

72. *Resolutien Staten van Holland*, 13, 19, 25 June 1626.

73. GA Amsterdam, vroedschapsresoluties XIV, fos. 159v, 182v, Res. 9 July and 17 November 1626, declaring in the latter 'in 't openen vande licenten op de neutrale Landen niet te consenteren voor ende aleer den vyand van syne syde daer inne geconsenteerd sal hebben'.

74. Advys of Raad van State to SG, 24 July 1626, ARA, SG 5494, I.

fact that the *Raad van State* changed its stance at the end of September 1626 and switched to favouring re-opening the *licenten* for neutral territory, as the ban was being extensively evaded due to disobedience and corruption among the naval crews and troops patrolling the rivers and routes who frequently extorted money for condoning prohibited traffic and on account of the now desperate shortage of naval funds<sup>75</sup>; yet despite this, the *placcaet* remained unmodified. While Utrecht, Friesland and Groningen were willing to alter the ban, Gelderland and Overijssel, denuded of their German trade, called more and more stridently for relaxation, first intimating that they would be unable to meet their annual quotas towards the States General's budget if this were not done and, by January 1627, actually threatening to re-open the *licenten* on their rivers unilaterally.

Holland, in the face of this pressure, while still preferring complete closure, was willing by January 1627 to consider modification. However, the solution acceptable to the majority of the province, restoring the *licenten* for neutral territory only on the basis of the Bosch *licent*, was entirely unacceptable to the inland provinces<sup>76</sup>. The latter were only willing to raise the *licenten* for neutrals on Maas and Rhine if those for the sea-routes to the Eems, Weser and Elbe estuaries, as the *Raad van State* advised, were increased *pari passu*; otherwise they insisted on restoration of trade with neutrals on the regular war-time basis. For a time, Holland inclined towards a compromise whereby river commerce with neutrals would pay the regular war-time *licent* on trade with enemy territory, but this too proved unacceptable to Overijssel and Gelderland<sup>77</sup>. It is not entirely clear whether the opposition of Dordrecht to the Holland majority over this proposed compromise was chiefly due to Dordrecht's dislike of seeing the gap in *licenten* charged on river as distinct from maritime traffic widened further, or to a belief that such modification of the *placcaet* would remove pressure from the enemy to lift his blockade by enabling the Spaniards to procure their provisions indirectly via neutrals. Proposals to placate the inland provinces and Dordrecht by increasing the *licent* on the sea-routes at least to the Eems and Weser estuaries to the level normally applying on the Rhine and Maas to trade with neutrals, though supported by most Holland towns was firmly blocked by Amsterdam and for a time by Rotterdam<sup>78</sup>. Significantly the softening in Holland's approach early in 1627, caused dismay in Zeeland because re-opening

75. ARA, SG 3185, fos. 398v, 401, Res. 3 and 6 October 1626; *ibidem*, SG 5494, II, Advys Raad van State to SG, 29 September 1629; ARA, Raad van State, 44, Res. 29 September and 24 December 1626.

76. *Ibidem*, SG 3186, fo. 20v, Res. 15 January 1627; *Resolutien Staten van Holland*, II, 14 and 18 January 1627.

77. *Resolutien Staten van Holland*, 18, 19 January 1627.

78. *Ibidem*.



to neutrals but not to the enemy meant in effect the resumption of some activity on the Rhine and Maas while the Schelde and Ghent canal remained completely closed such that Brabant and Flanders would be supplied indirectly from neutral localities on the Rhine and Maas<sup>79</sup>, while Zeeland's trade with Calais contracted.

One notable difference between the 1625-1627 blockade and the less prolonged interruptions of river trade during the 1620s was that while the latter involved only provisions and certain materials, the 1625-1627 action applied to all merchandise, shutting out foreign manufactures in the process. For this reason, the 1625-1627 ban proved to be of greater concern than the others to the Holland industrial as well as commercial towns. While the work-force of Leiden, Haarlem, Delft and Gouda undeniably benefitted in all the blockades from the cheaper foodstuffs and therefore lower cost of living that resulted<sup>80</sup>, exclusion of South Netherlands, Westphalian and Liège manufactures especially appealed to *vroedschappen* which, prompted by the textile guilds, were in highly protectionist mood during the 1620s<sup>81</sup>. Thus coupled with the resistance of Amsterdam and other maritime towns to the demands of the eastern provinces and Holland river towns was that of Leiden and the manufacturing interest. After considering the representations of the inland provinces in June 1626, the Leiden *vroedschap* had instructed its deputies in the Hague to

serieuselick helpen arbeeyden dat de licenten op de neutrale landen gesloten blyven ende dat de sluyten naer den viant, met goede wachten beset ende bewaert mogen werden<sup>82</sup>

Middelburg, which consistently strove through 1627 to stiffen the resistance in Holland to re-opening the rivers discerningly made a point of stressing that by shutting out Flemish manufactures the river blockade was significantly damaging industrial life across the border.

Undeniably though, the staunchest support for the blockade stemmed from those towns which profited from the diversion of river commerce to the sea-routes. Frequently, this expanded trade with north-east France and north-west Germany was indirect. Herring and salt-fish, for instance, was shipped in abundance from Rotterdam and Zeeland first to Dover and then to Calais so as to avoid the higher *licenten* payable on the direct route to Calais<sup>83</sup>. The

79. *Notulen Zeeland*, 1627, Gecommitteerde Raden to Zeeland towns, Middelburg, 22 January 1627.

80. Van der Capellen, *Gedenkschriften*, I, 454; Israel, 'A Conflict', 56-57; see above, 23-24.

81. J. I. Israel, 'The Holland Towns and the Dutch-Spanish conflict', *Bijdragen en mededelingen betreffende de geschiedenis der Nederlanden*, XCIV (1979) 65-68; see above, 67-70.

82. GA Leiden, Secretariearchief 447, fo. 303, Res. 23 June 1626, see also *ibidem*, fo. 332, Res. 18 November 1626.

83. *Notulen Zeeland*, Res. 18 March 1626.

fundamental motivation for Zeeland's persistent opposition to restoring the *licenten* on the rivers is revealed by its reaction to the demands from Overijssel, Gelderland and the *Raad van State* that the charges for Calais should be increased in order to reduce the diversion by that route. The inland provinces were naturally bitter that others should profit from the cessation of their own trade while the *Raad* judged that the great scale of the diversion was in effect nullifying the intended strategic impact of the *placcaet*. In November 1626, Zeeland instructed its deputies in The Hague that they

zullen devoir doen dat dese openinge van licenten op Neutralen geen voortganch en gewinne, maer de zaecken laten verblyven by den teneur van het placcaet van retorsie... ende sonderlinge niet mede de meerder verswaringe van het Port en de Haven van Calis, op dat den cours van den Handel niet en werde gediverteert<sup>84</sup>.

The Middelburg *vroedschap* was the most anxious of any in the United Provinces to retain the blockades as it stood and in its drive to hold the line in Zeeland and Holland, elaborately set out its arguments<sup>85</sup>. Replying to claims that the *placcaet* was not in fact denying provisions to the enemy but merely denuding the admiralty colleges of sorely needed funds, Middelburg judged that in reality great damage was being dealt to the Southern Netherlands through the blockade. If supplies were entering via Calais and other French ports, these were costly due to the high *licenten*, a factor which also compensated the admiralty colleges in part, because the French taxes had to be paid before such victuals entered Spanish territory, and owing to the heavy cost of transportation by canal and overland to the Spanish forces. In consequence, the Spanish Netherlands had suffered a punishing rise in food prices. Salt was then selling at Liège, according to the Middelburg *vroedschap*, at five times its price in Holland and Zeeland. Rye, a cheap grain, was then selling at Ghent for over twenty five per cent more per last than was wheat at Middelburg. Restoring river trade with neutrals, it was argued, would not only harm the commerce of Holland and Zeeland but provide both the Spanish army and the Emperor with all the supplies they needed thereby undermining the strategic interests not only of the Republic but also of its protestant allies in Germany and of the Danish king<sup>86</sup>. At the same time, Middelburg maintained that the *licenten* for Calais should not be raised lest sea-borne commerce should suffer.

84. *Ibidem*, Res. 24 November 1626.

85. See Rijksarchief in Zeeland, Middelburg, archive of the States of Zeeland, vol. 933: 'Considerationen van d'Heeren borgemrs schepenen ende Raet deser stad Middelburg over het openen vande licenten oft uytganck vande goederen op ende vande neutralen Landen steden ende dorpen op contributie zittende', 5 February 1627.

86. *Ibidem*, 9-13.

During February and March 1627, while the States of Zeeland, specially summoned on account of this issue, unanimously re-affirmed support for the existing placcaet, and while Holland remained divided, Overijssel and Gelderland intensified their pressure 'met affirmatie dat zonder dese openinge niet een stuyver tot subsidie van de Admiraliteyten is te verwaghten'<sup>87</sup>. To back its claims, Overijssel put to the States General a missive from the Deventer *vroedschap* maintaining that owing to continued closure of the rivers, Deventer's former German trade (chiefly with the towns of north-central Germany via Münster and Osnabrück) had been wholly diverted via Holland, Bremen and the Weser route<sup>88</sup>. Confronted by such pressure and that of groups within Holland who claimed that imports such as lime, iron and *molensteenen* were urgently needed for agriculture and the windmills<sup>89</sup>, the States of Holland equivocated during February and the States General provisionally resolved by majority vote to restore river trade with neutrals as from 13 February 1627<sup>90</sup>. Shortly after, even Rotterdam, one of the Holland towns that gained most from the blockade, consented to restoring river commerce with neutrals provided that this was on the basis of the war-time *licent* on trade with enemy territory, hoping in this way to retain a substantial gap between the cost of river-borne as distinct from sea-borne commerce<sup>91</sup>. Yet the dispute was far from over and the scheduled re-opening failed to take place. Several Holland towns continued to insist on the 'enemy' *licent* on trade with neutrals while the *Raad van State* still pressed for the Bosch *licent* both on exports by river and by sea to Calais and Bremen and Zeeland flatly refused to accept the majority vote in favour of re-opening<sup>92</sup>.

During March, the inland provinces continued to insist that they would only accept further closure of the rivers if the diversionary sea-routes were closed likewise, and warships employed to block the entrances of Emden, Bremen, Calais, Boulogne and the Somme estuary as in 1599<sup>93</sup>. When Holland objected that this would be costly and would annoy the foreign states affected, asking whether simply raising the *licenten* on the sea-routes would not suffice, the inland provinces replied that it would not but that they would accept restoring the river trade to neutrals on the basis of the same increased *licent* as would be applied to the sea-routes. This prompted a *groote dispariteyt* among the Holland towns<sup>94</sup>. A majority of the province comprising manufacturing, river and other

87. *Notulen Zeeland*, 1627, 122.

88. ARA, SG 3186, fo. 46, Res. 30 January 1627.

89. *Notulen Zeeland*, 1627, 108.

90. ARA, SG 3186, fo. 53v, Res. 4 February 1627.

91. GA Rotterdam, Oud Archief XX, vroedschapsresoluties, 24 February 1627.

92. ARA, SG 3186, fo. 65, Res. 13 February 1627.

93. *Ibidem*, fo. 104, Res. 13 March 1627.

94. *Resolutien Staten van Holland*, 10 March 1627.

inland towns now brought heavy pressure to bear on Amsterdam, Rotterdam and the Noorderkwartier ports to concede a *generale sluytinge* which would include the disputed sea-routes. On 20 March, a majority of the States of Holland voted for a general closure

sonder dat die van Amsterdam te bewegen waren tot het sluyten van de Havenen van Calis, Boulogne ende de Somme met de Eems ende Weser, ofte de convoyen van dien te verhoogen, omme niet alle de neringen uyt den Lande te diverteren<sup>95</sup>.

Nevertheless, on 26 March, Holland consented in the States General to deliberate a *generale sluytinge*, agreeing to closure of the Eems and Weser by Dutch warships and that Louis XIII should be asked to forbear the closing of Calais to Dutch merchant vessels<sup>96</sup>. Soon after, Rotterdam gave way to the clamour for a general closure<sup>97</sup>. However, when it emerged subsequently that at Amsterdam's insistence Holland would concede shutting the Eems and Weser to foodstuffs and munitions only and not to other merchandise, the five non-maritime provinces retorted that if Holland refused to proceed with a general closure such as had been envisaged, that they would then insist on implementing the resolution of 4 February and re-open the rivers to trade with neutrals<sup>98</sup>. To this Holland and Zeeland replied that they would not accept a majority vote by the five inland provinces on an issue concerning convoy and licence money.

The deadlock continued unchanged for a further two months. During June, however, discussion resumed on the basis of a fresh approach whereby exports by river and overland to neutrals would be allowed except for foodstuffs and munitions, the Eems and Weser would be closed but likewise to foodstuffs and munitions only and all imports from neutral territory admitted by river 'uytgesondert manufacturen in vyanden steden ende landen gemaect'<sup>99</sup>. Deftly though this formula accommodated most of the conflicting interests involved, it failed to clinch the matter. Zeeland proved willing to concede admission of timber, iron, lime, *molensteenen* and other key imports for which there was mounting demand in Holland, though Vlissingen at first resisted the addition of iron to the list alleging that sufficient iron was arriving by sea. In other respects though,

95. *Ibidem*, 20 March 1627.

96. ARA, SG 3186, fos. 118, 156, Res. 24 March, 17 April 1627; *Resolutien Staten van Holland*, 2 April 1627; *Notulen Zeeland*, 1627, 107-108, reports from The Hague dated 3, 14 and 20 April; in the first of these it is stated that 'die van Hollant niet wel langer kunnen derven kalck, yser en Molensteenen, die sy nodigh hebben tot hare Lantwercken, molens en sluysen'.

97. GA Rotterdam, Oud Archief XX, 18, Res. 29 March 1627.

98. ARA, SG 3186, fo. 156, Res. 17 April 1627; *Notulen Zeeland*, 1627, 109.

99. ARA, SG 3186, fos 243v-244, Res. 12 June 1627; *Notulen Zeeland*, 11 June 1627; *Resolutien Staten van Holland*, 30 June 1627.

Zeeland was less placatory insisting that traffic carrying goods from neutral lands to the Republic should return empty. In Holland also the proposal was eventually rejected because Frederik Hendrik and the army were then about to take the field and it was thought best to keep the blockade as it stood. Even so, on 17 July, hard pressed to admit imports of materials, the States General finally agreed to allow in goods from neutral territory on the regular war-time basis, excepting only manufactures from enemy territory<sup>100</sup>. Immediately, permission was granted to a merchant of Hasselt to convey down the Maas 10,000 lb of iron and large consignments of Liège coal and lime.

After the campaigning season, the inland provinces resumed their drive to secure either a full resumption of river trade with neutrals or else a total lifting of the river blockade. The financial predicament of the admiralty colleges was now such that an immediate subsidy of 800,000 guilders from the States General was considered essential. The five provinces used this as a lever to force Holland into compliance, refusing to vote the subsidy until the river ban was further relaxed<sup>101</sup>. By majority vote, the States General, on 9 October, provisionally agreed to re-open the rivers shortly on the basis applying before October 1625<sup>102</sup>. In Holland, a majority including Amsterdam and Rotterdam were now willing to terminate the blockade completely but Haarlem, Schiedam and Hoorn still preferred the relaxation to be on the basis of trade with neutrals only while Enkhuizen and Schoonhoven steadfastly opposed any change<sup>103</sup>. Dordrecht consented to the re-opening on 11 October. Zeeland, however, remained reluctant, proposing that if Spain did not promptly respond by lifting its own ban, the States General should then re-impose its blockade with both enemy and neutral territory and that in any case exports should be on the basis of the *Bosch licent*<sup>104</sup>. Despite the reservations of some Zeeland and Holland towns, the *licenten* on river, canal and overland commerce were at last restored two years and four days after the original declaration of the blockade on 20 October 1627.

The rivers remained fully open on the Dutch side (the Spanish ban remained in effect) for a mere three months before the Dutch again sought to regulate them for strategic purposes. In January 1628, following the recent arrival of Catholic League troops under Tilly and Imperialist detachments in East-Friesland, some of these forces encamping within view of the Dutch garrison at Leerort on the Eems, the States General decided to try to compel these units to withdraw by

100. ARA, SG 3186, fo. 312v, Res. 17 July 1627.

101. *Resolutien Staten van Holland*, 9 October 1627.

102. ARA, SG 3186, fo. 426, Res. 9 October 1627.

103. *Resolutien Staten van Holland*, 9 October 1627; GA Dordrecht, section 3, vol. 46, fo. 109, Res. 11 October 1627.

104. ARA, SG 3186, fo. 437v, Res. 18 October 1627.

halting exports of food up the Eems and overland from the Dutch border. A frigid neutrality persisted between Dutch and Imperialists, 'hoewel', as Aitzema put it, 'het Hart ende gemoedt wedersijts hostijl genoech was'<sup>105</sup>. As the pretext for its action, the States General gave out that owing to the wars in Poland and East Prussia supplies were very short in the Republic. It was decided in The Hague to refrain from preventing passage of foodstuffs from the bishopric of Munster and overland from Hamburg to East-Friesland 'de wijl 't selve al te seer soude smaken na rupture vande Neutraliteyt', but the admiralty colleges of Dokkum and Amsterdam were ordered to despatch warships to the Eems and East Frisian coast and allow no sea-borne provisions to enter Griet or Norden or beyond Emden while the Dutch governors of Leerort, Bellingwolde and Bourtange were to allow no supplies through from the province of Groningen. When Tilly protested at such conduct, the States General again alleged shortages on account of the occurrences in Poland. The ban seems to have had only a very limited effect, however, due to the Elbe and Rhine remaining open and following a petition from the city of Emden pointing out that the Imperialists were receiving most of what they needed from Münster, Cologne and Hamburg, the ban was lifted after eight months duration during August<sup>106</sup>.

The next occasion when the States General suspended the river trade was during the major Dutch offensive that began in May 1629. The long Spanish prohibition on trade with the 'rebels', operative since July 1625, was finally called off in April 1629 after urgent pleas from Brussels had secured the consent of Philip and his ministers in Madrid<sup>107</sup>. At this point, the condition of the Spanish troops, starved of supplies and in some cases having received no pay for as long as four months, was, as Frederik Hendrik was well aware, more wretched than at any stage since 1621. The Dutch descent upon 's-Hertogenbosch being intended as a surprise, the States General waited until the army was well entrenched around the great fortress town when the Brussels regime was endeavouring with much difficulty to muster an army of relief before imposing the new blockade. The moment was undeniably well chosen as the shortage of all foodstuffs and military supplies in the Southern Netherlands was then acute. In the second week of May, the *Raad van State* proposed an immediate ban on exports of provisions and munitions along the rivers and canals. Holland, except for Dordrecht which briefly resisted<sup>108</sup>, acquiesced and, on 17 May, the States General introduced the

105. Lieve van Aitzema, *Historie of verhael van saken van staet en oorlogh in ende omtrent de Vereenigde Nederlanden* (14 vols.; The Hague, 1667-1671) II, 431; see also Bernard Hagedorn, *Ostfrieslands Handel und Schiffahrt des 16. Jahrhunderts bis zum Westfälischen Frieden (1580-1648)* (Berlin, 1912) 506-507.

106. Aitzema, *Historie*, II, 438-441.

107. See above, 24.

108. GA Dordrecht, section 3, vol. 46, Res. 13 May 1629.

ban exempting only wine at Zeeland's request. The stoppage applied to the Schelde, Maas and waterways into Flanders and Brabant only, leaving the Rhine, Eems and Weser open<sup>109</sup>. As before, special arrangements were made for various localities in Dutch Brabant to receive rationed supplies.

At the end of May, the States General debated whether to extend the ban also to the Rhine, IJssel and Eems for which there was good strategic reason but put off its decision owing to the reluctance of Holland, or at least of Amsterdam and other commercial towns<sup>110</sup>. Through June and early July, discussion among the provinces focussed on the Rhine, Eems and sea-lanes to Calais, Boulogne, Emden and Bremen. Predictably, Zeeland wished to keep the sea-routes open but to close the Rhine 'alzoo anders de Neringe derwaerts wert gediverteert, tot groote prejuditie van de inwoonderen van Zeelant'<sup>111</sup>. While most Holland towns desired closure of both the sea-lanes and the Rhine, Amsterdam insisted that both should remain open<sup>112</sup>. Amsterdam thus clashed with Middelburg on the question of the Rhine as well as on that of wine which Amsterdam wished to be included in the ban. At length, Amsterdam gave in on the former and Middelburg on the latter point, the States General closing the Rhine and encompassing wines within the blockade on 7 July<sup>113</sup>, thereby evoking considerable displeasure in Zeeland where merchants evidently had large stocks of wine in hand awaiting shipment to Antwerp and Ghent<sup>114</sup>. Zierikzee was much aroused that the prohibition applied also to salt.

During July, as it became clear that the Republic faced a full-scale strategic emergency, the inland provinces and some Holland towns repeatedly demanded that the river blockade be extended further. Attempting to save 's-Hertogenbosch by means of diversion, the Spanish forces advanced north-eastwards, crossing the Rhine at Wesel and, on 22 July, seizing a vital crossing on the IJssel at Westervoort. Also, it seemed increasingly probable that Imperial troops, then triumphant in North Germany, would, as indeed they soon did, move to assist the Spaniards. In response, the States General firstly closed the Eems above Leerort

109. ARA, SG 3188, fos. 286v, 287v, Res. 13, 14 May 1629; ARA, Admiraliteiten 2456, Res. Coll. Middelburg, 13, 16 May 1629.

110. ARA, SG 3188, fo. 324, Res. 30 May 1629; GA Amsterdam, vroedschapsresoluties XV, fo. 93v, Res. 6 July 1629; the Amsterdam *vroedschap* noted that previously such action had not seriously hindered the enemy 'door dien hij niettegenstaende 't sluyten, evenwel toevoer van alles ghekreghen heeft door de ingesetenen van eenighe particuliere steden, als Deventer ende andere plaetsen opde frontieren ghelegen, oock Dordrecht, sonder dat het Land zyn gerechtigheyt daer van gekregen heeft. Te meer alsoo door't selve sluyten den vyand tegenwoordigh nieuwe oorsaecke gegheven souden worden, om tot groot nadeel van dese Landen, van syne syde de licenten generalick mede te sluyten'.

111. *Notulen Zeeland*, Res. 11 July 1629.

112. *Resolutien Staten van Holland*, 7 July 1629.

113. ARA, SG 3188, fo. 393, Res. 7 July 1629.

114. *Notulen Zeeland*, Res. 11, 12, 19 July 1629.

on 19 July<sup>115</sup>. The five provinces and most Holland towns also pressed Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Middelburg to consent to closure of the sea-lanes to north-east France and north-west Germany but without success. In early August, combined Spanish and Imperial forces thrust into the heart of the Republic, the town of Amersfoort capitulating to the Imperialist general Montecuculi on 13 August. Soon after, the States General shut the rivers Weser and Jade to prevent passage of supplies to the enemy via Bremen and Munster<sup>116</sup>. Two warships were assigned to block the Weser estuary and two that of the Jade.

Through September 1629, with the Spanish occupation of the Veluwe continuing, the Dutch maintained their river blockade. Undoubtedly, the dangerous military situation did much to unify Dutch opinion over the closure of the rivers except that there was some friction between Zeeland and the other provinces over the inclusion of wine and salt in the ban<sup>117</sup>. The consensus dissolved, however, as soon as the emergency passed with the withdrawal of enemy troops from the Veluwe and IJssel in mid October. After some discussion, the blockade was finally lifted, after five and a half months in operation, on 1 November, except in the case of grain which was then in short supply in the Republic and export of which was forbidden indefinitely<sup>118</sup>.

After the dramatic campaigns of 1629, for two years (1630-1631) there was no major advance by either side in the Low Countries and there was no significant interruption of river traffic other than the continuing Spanish ban on the passage of timber down the Rhine and Maas to Dutch territory and the Dutch ban on grain exports which was renewed in May 1630 and maintained until August 1631<sup>119</sup>. The massing of Spanish forces around Antwerp in August 1631 preceding Jan van Nassau's ill-fated venture into Zeeland elicited merely a temporary Dutch ban on exports of certain timbers (*sparren, deelen ende andere noordsche waeren*) to the Spanish Netherlands<sup>120</sup>. Nor during Frederik Hendrik's great break-through along the Maas valley in 1632, did the States General seek to regulate river traffic as part of its strategy. Soon after the siege of Maastricht began, in June 1632, the States of Zeeland, in view of the shortage evident at

115. ARA, SG 3188, fos. 414, Res. 19 July 1629; GA Amsterdam, vroedschapsresoluties XV, fo. 99v, Res. 19 July 1629.

116. ARA, SG 3188, fos. 486v, 503, Res. 25 August, 1 September 1629; ARA, Admiraliteiten 2457, Res. Coll. Middelburg, 1 September 1629.

117. ARA, SG 3188, fos. 533v, 548v, Res. 22 September, 8 October 1629; *Notulen Zeeland*, Res. 7 September 1629.

118. ARA, SG 3188, fo. 570, Res. 24 October 1629.

119. See above, ch. 1, p. 24; on the importance to the Dutch of timber imports down the Rhine from the Black Forest, Odenwald, Saarland and elsewhere, see H. C. Diferec, *De geschiedenis van den Nederlandschen handel tot den val der Republiek* (Amsterdam, 1908) 218-219; for the ban on grain exports, see ARA, Admiraliteiten, verzameling Bisdorn, vol. 58, fos. 136, 226.

120. *Ibidem*, fo. 243v.



Zandvliet and other Spanish forts around Antwerp, provisionally banned the export of foodstuffs along the waterways of its *repartitie* into Flanders and Brabant, but both the States General and the *Raad van State* reacted negatively, deeming that such action should not have been taken without proper authorization, and the ban was soon lifted<sup>121</sup>. This and the subsequent lack of debate over the matter seems to suggest that the decision not to regulate the rivers during the Maas offensive arose from strategic considerations. Presumably, the fact that the Dutch army operated over a long stretch of the Maas valley beyond the *comptoiren* meant that there was little sense in closing the Maas to Dutch traffic and with the Spanish and Imperialist armies of relief drawn into the same area, neither was there any sense in closing the other rivers. During 1633-1634, there was again no action on the rivers except that in 1634 whilst the marqués de Aytona sought to cut off the Dutch garrison at Maastricht by establishing fortifications blocking the Maas in and around Stevensweert, the States General forbade transportation by water or overland of supplies to the Stevensweert area and imposed a general ban on the passage of Scandinavian timbers to the enemy.

The last occasion when the States General imposed a full-scale river blockade for strategic purposes took place in 1635-1636 following the Spanish and Imperialist offensive on the eastern frontier of the Republic during the autumn of 1635. After the failure of the combined Franco-Dutch invasion of the Southern Netherlands in June 1635, the Spaniards succeeded in surprising the strategic Dutch fortress of Schenkenschans on the Rhine between Nijmegen and Emmerich just beyond the Dutch border, a fortress which commanded an easy entrance into Gelderland north of the great rivers. The Cardinal-Infante had swiftly followed up this break-through, building a linking fortress, Fort Ferdinandus, between Schenkenschans and Cleves and connecting this new enclave with the main Spanish territory by seizing and fortifying Gennep. This advance represented the most dangerous threat to the Republic since 1629, especially as Imperialist troops moved to assist the Spaniards in holding the Cleves enclave. In early August, the States General imposed and strictly enforced a ban on the passage of foodstuffs along the Rhine and Maas beyond Dutch territory<sup>122</sup>. When, however, some days later, the *Raad van State* proposed that the blockade should be extended to encompass the Schelde and other routes into Brabant and Flanders as well as the Eems and Weser, while the inland provinces,

121. ARA, SG 3191, fo. 295v, Res. 22 June 1632.

122. ARA, SG 5515, I, SG (minute) to Coll. Rotterdam, 6 August 1635; *ibidem*, SG 3194, fo. 410v, Res. 18 August 1635; *ibidem*, SG 5494, II, Coll. Rotterdam to SG, 17 and 22 August 1635; in November 1635, the Rotterdam college reported that it had twenty five armed vessels with average crew size of thirty on the rivers of its *repartitie*, ARA, SG 5515, II, Coll. Rotterdam to SG, 22 November 1635.

being those most immediately threatened, agreed, Holland and especially Amsterdam and Dordrecht, and Zeeland, the latter now having discarded its earlier zeal for such action, refused<sup>123</sup>.

On 30 August, the States General peremptorily instructed the Middelburg admiralty college to stop exports of provisions from its *repartitie* indefinitely, without the States of Zeeland having consented to this<sup>124</sup>. The order was not implemented and the college and States of Zeeland endeavoured to persuade the other provinces and the stadholder that in the interests of the Republic as a whole, the Schelde should not in fact be closed. While Zeeland was unable to sway the prince who in fact had clear evidence that the enemy troops on the eastern frontier were suffering from severe shortage of supplies which could readily be made more acute by widening the blockade<sup>125</sup>, Zeeland's arguments proved more effective in Holland and especially with the Amsterdam *vroedschap*<sup>126</sup>. Consequently, all further moves towards widening the ban were blocked for the time being. Indeed Holland, at the prompting of Dordrecht, advised Frederik Hendrik on 6 December that it now favoured re-opening the Maas and Rhine and pressed him for his reasons why this should not be done<sup>127</sup>. The prince insisted that the countryside around Cleves was derelict and uncultivated, that the enemy was hampered by lack of victuals and that therefore for strategic reasons the rivers should remain closed.

During January 1636, delegates from Holland and Zeeland as well as from the States General conferred several times with the stadholder over the question of the blockade. The prince and inland provinces continued to demand closure of the Schelde, Eems and Weser and a suspension of *licenten* on provisions for neutral as well as enemy territory. Holland and Zeeland objected that were this to be done, the Spaniards would receive Dutch foodstuffs by sea indirectly via the ports of south-east England and that once this commerce was diverted to Dover and elsewhere it would be difficult to retrieve it. The stadholder answered that the blockade would be for a short period only and that if supplies reached Flanders from England, it would be laborious and costly for the enemy to transfer such victuals to its forces in the Rhine valley<sup>128</sup>. The issue of whether to halt passage of supplies overland from Grave, 's-Hertogenbosch, Geertruiden-

123. ARA, SG 3194, fo. 425, Res. 25 August 1635.

124. *Ibidem*, fo. 432v, Res. 30 August 1635; *Notulen Zeeland*, Res. 15 September 1635.

125. *Resolutien Staten van Holland*, 11 September and 12 October 1635; for confirmation of the prince's information, see ARA Brussels, SEG 213, fo. 89, Cardinal-infante to Philip IV, 20 August 1635.

126. GA Amsterdam, vroedschapsresoluties XVI, fos. 97, 97v, Res. 15 and 23 October 1635.

127. *Resolutien Staten van Holland*, 6, 11 December 1635.

128. ARA, SG 3195, fos. 57v-58, 66v-67, Res. 19, 21, 23 January 1636; *Resolutien Staten van Holland*, Res. 24 January 1636.

berg and Bergen-op-Zoom to neutral territory and villages under contribution was held up in the States-General, against the advice of stadholder and *Raad van State*, for several weeks. Finally, in late January 1636, the Amsterdam *vroedschap* reluctantly changed its stance, consenting to a general blockade<sup>129</sup>, and the opposition in Holland to the demands of stadholder, inland provinces and *Raad van State* collapsed. On 1 February 1636, the States General suspended the *licenten* on all exports of foodstuffs via *binnenstromen* or overland, closing the Rhine, Maas, Waal, Schelde, Zwijs, Eems and Weser<sup>130</sup>. The question as to whether to close the Elbe also was kept back for further consideration by Holland and firmly blocked by Amsterdam.

Zeeland accepted the ban only with great reluctance<sup>131</sup>. A request for exemption of fish and salt put to the States General on behalf of Zierikzee was rejected. As in the past, troops as well as considerable naval forces were used to enforce the blockade and confiscate goods and barges, horses and wagons employed to circumvent it. Requests from Dordrecht merchants for permission to despatch provisions *onder cautie* through the Spanish-controlled sections of the Maas to Venlo, Roermond and Maastricht were rejected<sup>132</sup>. On seeking clarification regarding marginal commodities, the admiralty colleges were instructed to include in the ban besides *sparren ende deelen*, sugar, spices, soap, olives, caviar and tobacco<sup>133</sup>. In March, protests were submitted in The Hague by the city of Bremen, indignant at the closing of the Weser and the Count of East Friesland and city of Emden, aroused by the closing of the Eems. These were disregarded except that the States General permitted resumption of export of spices and drugs to Bremen<sup>134</sup>. Bremen also appealed directly to the Amsterdam *vroedschap*, claiming that the States General's measure would surely fail in its strategic purpose while having the adverse strategic effect of depriving the Swedish army and other Protestant forces in North Germany of their supplies (much of which came from Holland via Bremen) to the advantage of the Emperor.

As always, the blockade caused huge temporary diversions in the trade in foodstuffs and before long attention in the Republic was centering on the question of extending the ban further. Although the Amsterdam admiralty

129. GA Amsterdam, vroedschapsresoluties XVI, fo. 114, Res. 28 January 1636.

130. ARA, SG 3195, fo. 87v, Res. 1 February 1636; *Resolutien Staten van Holland*, 1 February 1636.

131. *Notulen Zeeland*, 11 February 1636; ARA, SG 3195, fo. 115v, Res. 15 February 1636.

132. *Ibidem*, fos. 120v-121, 125, 133v.

133. *Ibidem*, fo. 100, Res. 7 February 1636; in late April 1636, Amsterdam pressed for exemption of sugar and spices from the ban 'als niet anders zynde als delicatessen waer door den vyandt niet en kan werden gespijst', *Resolutien Staten van Holland*, 22 April 1636.

134. Aitzema, *Historie*, IV, i, 337; Ludwig Beutin, *Quellen und Forschungen zur Bremischen Handelsgeschichte*, II, *Bremen und die Niederlande* (Weimar, 1939) 9-10, 36-37.

college confirmed in mid February, that supplies were being shipped in large quantities to the enemy from Holland via Hamburg and the Elbe and through Dover and Dunkirk, Holland opposed broadening the blockade to encompass the Elbe and Dover at the insistence of Amsterdam<sup>135</sup>. Even so, there was growing fear in Holland of the consequences of leaving the Dover route open and nowhere more so than at Rotterdam. Rotterdam complained in the States of Holland on 29 February that Englishmen were buying up salt fish in quantity, intending to ship it to Flanders via England<sup>136</sup>. The *gecommitteerde raden* of Zeeland wrote to The Hague shortly after complaining that provisions were being shipped daily from Zeeland to England for trans-shipment to Dunkirk and transfer to the Rhine, urging the States General to bring forward its schedule for blockading the Flemish coast<sup>137</sup>. While in most years, the States General's fleet blocked the Flemish coast from April onwards, the programme was so delayed in 1636 that no naval action was taken to check the flow of supplies either in April or May, causing consternation not only in Middelburg and Vlissingen but in Rotterdam which wanted either a wider ban, to encompass England, or else a total lifting of the blockade<sup>138</sup>.

Schenkenschans fell to the Dutch on the last day of April, but despite this the ban was kept in force for some months longer at the insistence of stadholder, *Raad van State* and inland provinces in order to weaken the remaining Spanish and Imperialist forces in the Cleves and Gennep areas. During May, pressure in Zeeland for re-opening the rivers steadily mounted until, on 28 May, the States agreed that the blockade could simply not be suffered by the inhabitants of Zeeland any longer such that if the States General would not immediately lift it, as would be preferred, then Zeeland would break with accepted procedure and re-open its waterways unilaterally from the end of May<sup>139</sup>. The States, *licentmeesters* and military governors in Zeeland were warned not to act without States General authorization, but Zeeland went ahead nevertheless and officials on the Schelde followed their province rather than the orders from The Hague<sup>140</sup>. The States General, States of Holland and stadholder reacted with great indignation, summoning several officials of the Middelburg admiralty college to be disciplined in The Hague and sending in Holland warships to patrol Zeeland's waterways. In this way Zeeland was quickly forced to retract and re-impose the blockade on the Schelde for the final few weeks of the action<sup>141</sup>. Finally, on 25

135. *Resolutien Staten van Holland*, 20 February 1636.

136. *Ibidem*, 29 February 1636.

137. *Ibidem*, 26 April 1636.

138. GA Rotterdam, Oud Archief, no. 21, 101, vroedschapsresoluties, 19 May 1636; ARA, SG 3195, fos. 200v, 216v, 232v-233, 29 March, 7, 14 April 1636.

139. *Notulen Zeeland*, 28 May 1636.

140. ARA, SG 3195, fos. 349, 366v-377, Res. 30 May, 5, 6 June 1636.

141. *Notulen Zeeland*, 8, 13 and 20 June 1636.

June, the States General did restore the *licenten*, this being the very last occasion that this occurred. As Aitzema expressed it

't gheheel werck tegen Zeelandt wiert ghelaten in ruste; ende den vijf en twintichsten Junii wierden de licenten generalijck geopent; tot sluytinge vande welcke men noyt daer na heeft willen verstaen<sup>142</sup>.

Compared with the earlier river blockades, the last, that of 1635-1636, shows some significant points of divergence. Perhaps most striking is the totally different role played by Zeeland in 1636-1636 than previously, though the explanation is clear enough. The outbreak of war between France and Spain in May 1635 entirely transformed Zeeland's position vis-à-vis strategic regulation of the Dutch waterways. In the past, closing Schelde and Zwiijn had simply meant swelling Zeeland's commerce with Calais, Boulogne and Dieppe. After May 1635, however, with the border between France and the Spanish Netherlands shut, suspending Dutch river traffic merely meant transferring lucrative business to the English such that, as Aitzema observed of the 1635-1636 blockade, Zeeland suffered more than any other province. The enormous growth of the entrepôt trade at Dover, briefly, during the mid 1630s, was entirely due to two factors – the outbreak of the Franco-Spanish war and the last Dutch river blockade and there can be no doubt that the latter was of great importance in shaping this short phase in Dover's history. Whereas no French wines were re-exported from the Dover entrepôt in 1634 or until December 1635, from the latter month until November 1636, no less than 3,666 tuns were re-exported, almost all to Dunkirk<sup>143</sup>. The rise of Dover was also looked upon with evident anxiety at Amsterdam and still more at Rotterdam. Before, 1635, with the Calais-Dunkirk connection viable, Zeeland had generally been the most eager of the provinces to engage in river regulation. While the clearest evidence relates to the years 1625-1629 when England was also at war with Spain, that is to years when re-exports from Dover to Dunkirk were forbidden by the English crown<sup>144</sup>, and to 1622 when Zeeland was directly threatened by Spinola's operations, during the 1623-1624 blockades Zeeland had also readily participated. Despite England then being at peace with Spain, the Dutch naval blockade of the Flemish coast had curtailed English exports to Flanders and Zeeland's trade by sea with north-east France had much expanded.

After 1636, there was only one major Spanish offensive by land against the

142. Aitzema, *Historie*, IV, i, 301.

143. See J. S. Kepler, *The Exchange of Christendom. The International Entrepôt at Dover, 1622-1641* (Leicester, 1976) 55.

144. *Ibidem*, 34-35.

Dutch, in 1637, and after the recapture of Breda by the Dutch in the same year, there occurred only several fairly minor advances by the Dutch, the most important being the campaigns culminating in the capture of Sas van Gent and Hulst (1644, 1645) in Flanders. Thus it might be said that from a strategic point of view, the Dutch had little real reason to resort again to river regulation after 1636. Yet the 1637 campaign was a major one and during the sieges of Gennep (1641), Sas van Gent and Hulst there was in fact reason to impose river blockades at least in certain specific sectors. The fact that this was not attempted does suggest that the new-found fear of the consequences of shutting the rivers evident at Middelburg, Rotterdam and Amsterdam in 1635-1636 owing to the burgeoning of the Dover entrepôt acted at least to some extent as a deterrent.

In conclusion, it may be said that while those who opposed regulation of the waterways habitually claimed that such action was ineffective in denying provisions to the enemy and while evidence of contraband trade and collusion with contrabandists by the very officials and troops assigned to prevent it abounds, it does seem that considerable inconvenience was in fact caused both to the Spanish and Imperialist forces. Spanish documentation confirms that during at least four major campaigns, those of 1622, 1624-1625, 1629 and 1635-1636, the army of Flanders was severely impeded by lack of provisions. The fact that supplies were brought in great quantities from Holland to Spanish forces at Bergen-op-Zoom, Breda and in the Rhine valley via Calais and Dunkirk or through Bremen and Emden surely proves conclusively that the Spaniards were forced to procure victuals with great difficulty and at great cost. Furthermore, the tendency of the Dutch provinces to be sharply at variance as to when and how to blockade the rivers demonstrates that the effects of such action were both widespread and profound. Over this issue, the interests of the inland towns diverged sharply from those of the maritime towns and the blockades were seen to cause major if temporary shifts in patterns of trade. The economic repercussions were therefore very diverse, some localities reaping handsome profits from the misfortunes of others, and could, as several references in the Dordrecht city council records indicate, influence for prolonged periods the entire tone of life of major towns<sup>145</sup>.

145. See, for instance, GA Dordrecht, section 3, vol. 46, fos. 31v-32, 128, Res. 29 November 1625, 22 August 1628.

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## THE PHASES OF THE DUTCH *STRAATVAART*, 1590-1713: A CHAPTER IN THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE MEDITERRANEAN

It is probable that no other single country, with the possible exception of Britain in the nineteenth century, has ever exerted so great a preponderance over the world economy as a whole, and for so long a period, as did the Dutch Republic from the end of the sixteenth down to the middle of the eighteenth century. For over a century and a half, Amsterdam was universally acknowledged to be the hub of world trade, shipping and finance. Yet this unprecedented degree of economic influence exerted by the Dutch was by no means evenly spread. Amounting to overwhelming control in some sectors such as northern Russia or large parts of the East Indies, the Dutch ascendancy was less pronounced and possibly absent in some others. One region where the Dutch role was less predominant than elsewhere as has been pointed out by a good many historians, and among them J.G. van Dillen,<sup>1</sup> was the Mediterranean. The Dutch did, from 1590 onwards, loom large in the life of the Mediterranean. Dutch merchants and manufacturers showed a keen interest in all parts of the region from Spain to Turkey and their impact throughout its length and breadth was both profound and enduring. Yet it seems clear that they achieved a pre-eminent position in Mediterranean commerce during at most two relatively short periods. For the larger part of the period of Holland's world commercial supremacy, the Dutch were forced to accept second or third place among the dominant trading nations of the Mediterranean and had at all times to share control with their main rivals—the English, French and Venetians.

This in itself raises interesting questions. Taking the period as a whole, how and why did the Dutch fail to achieve a position of unrivalled preponderance in Mediterranean trade? But this question at once leads on to others. For even a most fleeting acquaintance with the changing pattern of international rivalry in the Mediterranean in early modern times reveals that the Dutch role in the Mediterranean from 1590 down to the early eighteenth century underwent a whole series of dramatic shifts in form, organization and volume each of which radically transformed the competitive position of the Dutch in relation to their rivals. Thus anything which purports to be an adequate account of Dutch trade with the Mediterranean in this period has not only to delineate its essential strengths and weaknesses but must attempt to identify, define and explain its major phases. Van Dillen, practically alone amongst Dutch historians, made a tentative start at this.<sup>2</sup> He identified a vigorous early phase from 1590 down to around 1620 followed by a lower level of activity down to 1645. In that year the outbreak of the Venetian-Turkish war of

<sup>1</sup> J.G. van Dillen, *Van rijkdom en regenten. Handboek tot de economische en sociale geschiedenis van Nederland tijdens de Republiek* (The Hague 1970) 71-72, 87, 502.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibidem*, 77, 87, 357, 502, 569.



1645-'69 which largely paralysed Venice's trade with the Levant combined with the effects of the civil war in England which Van Dillen (following A.C. Wood and Ralph Davis) supposed temporarily weakened the English position in the Mediterranean, gave rise to a period of Dutch predominance which lasted down to the early 1660s. In Van Dillen's fourth phase, after 1672, the Dutch *straatvaart*, or traffic through the Straits of Gibraltar, steadily declined.

But how valid is this schematization? The problem of the form, volume and phases of the Dutch *straatvaart*, I would suggest, needs to be looked at again for two principal reasons. In the first place while it remains true that reliable statistics for Dutch Mediterranean trade in the seventeenth century are fairly scarce, a certain amount of new material has come to light in recent years which makes it possible to modify and perhaps refine Van Dillen's framework in a number of respects. In the second place, Van Dillen's brief analysis, helpful though it is, has failed to have much impact outside the Netherlands on historians' perceptions of the Dutch role in the Mediterranean. Far more influential in the general historiography are the very different (and in my view altogether unsatisfactory) judgments of English historians such as Ralph Davis and the French *grand maître* Fernand Braudel. There is, I propose, a pressing need to modify Van Dillen and to see off the views of Davis and Braudel.

In general, British historians have tended to seriously underestimate Dutch involvement in the Mediterranean from the late sixteenth to the early eighteenth century, maintaining that the English role was incomparably more important. A.C. Wood, for instance, the historian of the English Levant Company, judged that Dutch activity in the eastern Mediterranean hardly amounted to 'serious competition' to that of the English which he thought unsurprising given that 'with the small natural resources of their country they could not hope to compete with the output of England'<sup>3</sup>, a curious remark in view of Dutch superiority over the English in most areas of world trade during the seventeenth century. Ralph Davis was of the view that the Dutch came nowhere near the English in volume of traffic either in the Levant or in the Mediterranean as a whole. As he saw it, it was the English who took over the former trade of the Venetians and French with the Ottoman Empire, attaining by the middle of the seventeenth century a position of unprecedented superiority over all rivals. At a conference in Venice, he urged his continental colleagues that 'les Anglais firent plus que de s'emparer du commerce venitien ou français, ils vendirent en Turquie plus de marchandises que les marchands de ces deux nations n'en avaient jamais vendu'.<sup>4</sup> Meanwhile, the Dutch, in his opinion, were, in the Levant, an entirely marginal factor.

This tendency to minimize the role of the Dutch in the English historiography is especially striking when it is noted that historians other than British and Dutch have tended to assume that the Dutch and not the English were the dominant tra-

<sup>3</sup> A.C. Wood, *A History of the Levant Company* (2nd edn.; London 1964) 54-55, 99-100.

<sup>4</sup> Ralph Davis, 'Influences de l'Angleterre sur le déclin de Venise au XVII<sup>e</sup> siècle' in: *Aspetti e cause della decadenza economica veneziana nel secolo XVII* (Venice and Rome, 1961) 210, 219, 229; see also Ralph Davis, 'English Imports from the Middle East, 1580-1780' in: M.A. Cook ed., *Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East* (London 1970) 203; Van Dillen has already pointed out that 'Ralph Davis underrates the importance of the Dutch Mediterranean trade', see J.G. van Dillen, 'Amsterdam's Role in Seventeenth-Century Dutch Politics and its Economic Background' in: J.S. Bromley and E.H. Kossmann ed., *Britain and the Netherlands II, Papers delivered to the Anglo-Dutch Historical Conference (1962)* (Groningen 1964) 136.

ding power in the Mediterranean at least from 1590 when Baltic grain was first shipped to Italy on a large scale, down to the middle of the seventeenth century. This was the view of the German economic historian Ludwig Beutin<sup>5</sup> and more recently of Fernand Braudel. Braudel asserts in his famous study of the Mediterranean in the sixteenth century that while the English were the first 'nordics' to ply a regular seaborne commerce with the Mediterranean, which they did from the 1570s onwards, they had lost their lead by 1590 being unable to compete with Dutch superiority in shipping and Dutch access to Spanish silver, a crucial ingredient in the Levant trade.<sup>6</sup> Practically the only non-Dutch historian who presents a picture of rough equivalence as between the Dutch and English for much of the seventeenth century was the late nineteenth-century French historian Paul Masson.<sup>7</sup>

Regarding the main phases in the development of Dutch Mediterranean commerce, Van Dillen's framework stands completely at variance with that of Braudel. Van Dillen believed that war and political factors could be decisive in shaping patterns of trade and that the Dutch role in the Mediterranean entered its most flourishing period only after 1645 in which, as I hope to show, he was entirely correct. Braudel, by contrast, de-emphasizing political factors in favour of what he argues was the 'secular trend', explains the Dutch role in the Mediterranean in terms of a rise and fall rhythm which fits in with his wider conceptions of the Mediterranean's economic evolution. He argues that trade in bulky goods, especially grain, was the decisive factor in determining the balance of commercial power in the Mediterranean and that the Dutch predominated—at first jointly with the Hanseatics—for as long as they maintained a high level of grain shipments which (he alleges) continued down to 1650 or thereabouts.<sup>8</sup> After 1650, according to Braudel, Dutch Mediterranean commerce declined along with demand for, and shipment of, Baltic grain.

For Braudel the preponderance of northern Europeans in the economic life of the Mediterranean begins with the massive upsurge in grain shipments to Italy that began in 1590.<sup>9</sup> For the first time, drawn by rocketing prices for grain on the Italian market, whole fleets of 'nordic' ships sailed through the Straits of Gibraltar. But, even while insisting on the centrality of the grain trade, Braudel failed to grasp the scale of the Dutch incursion. He supposed that only some dozens of Dutch ships were arriving in Italy each year in the 1590s and that these were matched by a roughly comparable number of Hanseatic vessels.<sup>10</sup> While he was right that the English played a negligible role in shipping this grain, it is clear that he vastly underrated the part played by the Dutch and exaggerated that of the North Germans. He even thought that in one or two years, notably 1593, the Hanseatic grain trade to

<sup>5</sup> Ludwig Beutin, 'La décadence économique de Venise considérée du point de vue nord-européen', *Aspetti e cause della decadenza economica veneziana*, 93-94; see also Ludwig Beutin, 'Der wirtschaftliche Niedergang Venedigs im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert', *Hansische Geschichtsblätter* 76 (1958) 49-50.

<sup>6</sup> Fernand Braudel, *La Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen à l'époque de Philippe II*. 2 vols. (Paris 1966) I, 544-75.

<sup>7</sup> Paul Masson, *Histoire du commerce français dans le Levant au XVII<sup>e</sup> siècle* (Paris 1896) 119, 123, 126-127.

<sup>8</sup> Braudel, *La Méditerranée* I, 545, 567-569, 572-573; much of Braudel's analysis of this topic is drawn from the following works: Hermann Wätjen, *Die Niederländer im Mittelmeergebiet zur Zeit ihrer höchsten Machtstellung* (Berlin, 1909) see especially pp. 114-116 and Ludwig Beutin, *Der deutsche Seehandel im Mittelmeergebiet bis zu den Napoleonischen Kriegen* (Neumünster 1933) 11-15.

<sup>9</sup> Fernand Braudel and Ruggiero Romano, *Navires et marchandises à l'entrée du Port de Livourne (1547-1611)* (Paris 1951) 51; Braudel, *La Méditerranée* I, 568-569.

<sup>10</sup> Ibidem.

Italy outstripped that of the Dutch. But this is hardly tenable. If in 1593 thirty-four ostensibly Hanseatic vessels reached Livorno as against only twelve classified as 'Dutch', no less than twenty-eight of these ships loaded their grain in Amsterdam rather than German ports which shows the centrality of Holland in the trade. In view of the political situation which Braudel (characteristically) ignores, it seems likely that many of the ships claiming to be 'Hanseatic' were in fact Dutch. The Spaniards were then seizing large numbers of Dutch vessels in the Mediterranean – 26 in 1591 alone – so that Dutch vessels sailing there were often supplied with false papers and flags. But in any case it is inherently improbable that Hanseatic commerce with Italy ever remotely approached the level of Dutch trade, since the Hanseatic towns together possessed only about a quarter as many vessels capable of sailing with grain to the Mediterranean as the Dutch.<sup>11</sup> But what matters most of all is that the Livorno data used by Braudel give a wholly unrealistic notion of the scale of Dutch trade with Italy in the 1590s. Dutch notarial deeds show that very much larger numbers of Dutch ships were involved than Braudel supposed. In 1591, for instance, from fifty to one hundred Dutch ships sailed from Amsterdam alone and we know that large contingents sailed also from Hoorn and Enkhuizen and smaller numbers from Rotterdam and Middelburg.<sup>12</sup> There is no question that the total exceeded one hundred. But the real number was probably much higher. It seems unlikely that the Spaniards can have captured or sank a quarter of the total volume of Dutch shipping sailing to the Mediterranean in 1591, yet we know that they did in that year alone successfully intercept twenty-six Dutch vessels off the coasts of Spain and Italy.<sup>13</sup> According to Velius, the seventeenth-century chronicler of Hoorn, with wheat selling for 600 guilders per last in Italy in 1591 and only one third of this amount in Holland, no less than 400 'large ships' sailed from Holland to Italy that year.<sup>14</sup> This may be an exaggeration but it is certainly more realistic than the notion of just a few dozen 'nordic' ships each year. In 1592, over one hundred Dutch vessels entered the port of Genoa alone and the level of grain shipments from Holland to Italy remained at a similarly high level through 1593-4.<sup>15</sup>

Having followed Beutin in postulating a rough balance between Dutch and Hanseatic shipping to the Mediterranean in the 1590s, Braudel goes on to assert that after 1600 Hanseatic competition collapsed almost totally, never to revive. 'Au début de XVII<sup>e</sup> siècle,' he asserts, 'les Hanséates étaient éliminés et leurs navires ne dépassaient plus guère l'escale de Málaga.'<sup>16</sup> This is a remarkable assertion and a particularly clear illustration of the dogmatic tendency in Braudel for the very authorities whom he cites, Beutin and Wätjen, show that the collapse was only tempo-

<sup>11</sup> Pierre Jeannin, 'Entreprises hanséates et commerce méditerranéen à la fin du XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle' in: *Mélanges en l'honneur de Fernand Braudel* (Toulouse 1973) 263-264, 266, 269.

<sup>12</sup> Simon Hart, 'Die Amsterdamer Italienfahrt, 1590-1620' in: *Wirtschaftskräfte und Wirtschaftswege. Festschrift für Hermann Kellenbenz*. 5 vols. (Nuremberg 1978-1981) II, 147-149.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibidem*, 146.

<sup>14</sup> Theodorus Velius, *Chronyk van Hoorn, daar in het begin, aanwasch en tegenwoordige staat dier stad verhaalt worden*. Annotated by S. Centen (4th edn.; Hoorn 1740) 490.

<sup>15</sup> Edoardo Grendi, 'I Nordici e il traffico del porto di Genova, 1590-1666', *Rivista Storica Italiana* 83 (1971) 67.

<sup>16</sup> Braudel, *La Méditerranée* I, 568-69; this and other strands of Braudel's analysis have already been criticised by Baetens, see Roland Baetens, *De Nazomer van Antwerpens welvaart. De diaspora en het handelshuis De Groote tijdens de eerste helft der 17<sup>e</sup> eeuw*. 2 vols. (Brussels 1976) I, 50, 70, 72.

rary and due to political factors.<sup>17</sup> Hanseatic activity in the Mediterranean in the early years of the new century fell off sharply owing to the Dutch-Spanish cease-fire in 1607 and subsequent Twelve Years' Truce which removed one of the main hindrances to the progress of the Dutch in the Mediterranean. With Dutch shipping secure from the Spaniards, Dutch freight and insurance rates to the Mediterranean fell sharply and the Hanseatics, for the time being, could no longer compete. But no sooner had Spain re-imposed its embargoes on Dutch ships and goods, in April 1621, a ban which was to remain in force until 1647, than there was a significant revival in North German traffic not only to Málaga, Alicante and other Spanish Mediterranean ports but also to Marseille, Genoa and Livorno.<sup>18</sup>

But were the Dutch and Hanseatics preponderant in Mediterranean commerce in the 1590s in the sense that Braudel assumes? In fact there is good reason to question the view that grain shipments were the key to trade supremacy in the area and that Dutch primacy in bulk shipping and the grain trade automatically assigned the Dutch first place among the northern nations involved. To begin with, in the early years, as is well known, Dutch trade to Italy was to a considerable extent merely a shipping service for merchants based outside the Netherlands. Dutch shipping in the Mediterranean was present in great volume from 1590 onwards but was not yet a symptom of commercial control. The grain was often bought in Amsterdam by leading Genoese, Venetian and Tuscan merchants through local factors several of whom, notably Jasper Quingetti and Jan and Filippo Calandrini, were themselves Italians.<sup>19</sup> This was especially true in the 1590s when the leading purchaser for the Tuscan market was none other than the Grand Duke himself, but remained so in some measure at least down to the early 1640s.<sup>20</sup> Furthermore, the shipping of Baltic grain to Italy using cheap, unarmed and lightly manned *fluits* had very little to do with what were known to the English as the 'rich trades' of the Mediterranean and it was these last which were always the chief focus of international rivalry. In trade with Italy, the tussle for control and the main profits revolved around the exchange of textiles, spices and silver for Italian silks and other luxury goods. In the Levant, Baltic grain played practically no role at all.

To regard Dutch primacy in the shipping in of Baltic grain to the Mediterranean as conferring a general trade hegemony in the area down to 1650 is thus a major distortion. In reality, apart from supplying northern grain to Italy, the Dutch succeeded in capturing hardly any Mediterranean commerce in what I propose to call the first phase, that is from 1590 down to 1607. Their path was blocked by major obstacles. The Dutch were stripped of their trade with Spain, following Philip III's general embargo on 'his rebels', in 1598, and this, in turn, had a much wider impact, preventing the Dutch from participating in the crucially important carrying trade between the Iberian Peninsula and Italy. Braudel, in line with his general approach, insists that these Spanish measures were ineffective and had no significant impact;

<sup>17</sup> See for instance Beutin, *Der deutsche Seehandel*, 29, 35, 45.

<sup>18</sup> Algemeen Rijksarchief, The Hague (ARH), Archive of the States General (SG) vol. 6906. Albert Muilman to States General, Genoa, 15 August 1648; Grendi, 'I Nordici', 56; Jonathan I. Israel, *The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World, 1606-1661* (Oxford 1982) 210, 342.

<sup>19</sup> G.G. Guarnieri, *Il Movimento delle navi da guerra e mercantili nel porto di Livorno al tempo del terzo granduca di Toscana (1587-1609)* (Livorno 1911) 16; Hart, 'Amsterdamer Italienfahrt', 163-66.

<sup>20</sup> Of twenty-three Dutch grain ships which arrived at Genoa in April 1648, nine or ten at least had been chartered by the Genoese Senate, ARH SG 6906. Albert Muilman to SG, Genoa, 11 April 1648.

and it is true that quite a number of historians have tried to back him up.<sup>21</sup> The myth of the ineffectiveness of the Spanish embargoes against the Dutch has remained so appealing to some historians precisely because Braudel's grand concept can not survive without it. But the data we have scarcely leave room for doubt. Dutch trade with Spain and Portugal was already at a low ebb in the early 1590s.<sup>22</sup> It expanded considerably in the middle years of the decade, especially with Portugal, but was then dramatically cut back by Spanish government action in the years 1598-1607. The evidence of the freight contracts which have survived in the Amsterdam notarial archives shows, as we see from Table 3, that something like seventy or eighty per cent of Dutch sea-borne trade with Spain was eliminated.

Table 3 *The collapse of Dutch trade with Spain (1597-1602)*<sup>23</sup>

Year	Total Number of voyages from Amsterdam to the Iberian Peninsula	To Castile	To Valencia- Mallorca	To Portugal	In North German ships
1597	192	65	10	117	1
1598	201	44	8	149	4
1599	15	1	2	12	8
1600	57	4	4	49	10
1601	62	8	2	52	10
1602	34	5	4	25	9

Moreover, a large slice of such trade between Amsterdam and the Iberian Peninsula as survived was now being carried in North German ships and this time, it would appear from the details about the skippers given in the freight contracts, ships sailing from Amsterdam classified as 'Hanseatic' really were Hanseatic.

Denied access to Spain, excluded from the carrying trade between the Peninsula and Italy, and sharing extensively in none of the 'rich trades' except for the supply of costly Russian leather and caviare to Genoa and Livorno, the Dutch were in a generally weak position in the Mediterranean during phase one, despite the huge numbers of Dutch ships in evidence. As a consequence of its basic weakness and narrowness, in those years when Italian harvests were abundant, such as in the late 1590s, the entire Dutch *straatvaart* slumped dramatically.<sup>24</sup> For Braudel there was just one fundamental pattern to Dutch Mediterranean trade down to 1650 and this,

<sup>21</sup> Fernand Braudel, *Civilisation matérielle, économie et capitalisme, XVe-XVIIIe siècle*. 3 vols. (Paris 1979) III, 175; see the arguments put forward as to the ineffectiveness of the second Spanish embargo in the 1620s in José Alcalá-Zamora, *España, Flandes y el Mar del Norte (1618-1639)* (Barcelona 1975) 182-184; similar arguments have been put forward by Henry Kamen and James Casey.

<sup>22</sup> J.W. IJzerman, 'Amsterdamsche bevrachtingscontracten, 1591-1602. I: De vaart op Spanje en Portugal' in: *Economisch Historisch Jaarboek* 17 (1931) 164.

<sup>23</sup> This table is assembled from the freight contract data listed by IJzerman in loc. cit. lists for the years 1597-1602.

<sup>24</sup> Grendi, 'I Nordici', 67; Hart, 'Amsterdamer Italienfahrt', 149.

he believes, was established in the 1590s. But the *longue durée*, a deep-seated shift occurring over a long period and shaped by basic 'material' needs, factors and forces, can not be accepted if it fails to fit the facts. With the next major upsurge in Dutch traffic to the Mediterranean, in the years 1606-9, the 'structure' of the Dutch *straatvaart* in fact changed fundamentally. Its entire character, form and organisation were transformed. The Dutch-Spanish cease-fire of April 1607 and subsequent lifting of the embargoes made it much safer for the Dutch to sail to the Mediterranean, re-admitted them to the ports of Spain and Portugal and enabled the Dutch for the first time to engage on a large scale in the carrying trade between the Peninsula and Italy, the key carrying trade of the western Mediterranean. At the same time, the Dutch were now able to enter on a large scale into the carrying of oil, grain and salt from the agriculturally rich areas of Spanish southern Italy-especially Puglia and Sicily-to the north Italian states.<sup>25</sup> Throughout what I propose to call the second phase, from 1607 to 1621 (but not in one year before or one year after, until 1647), the Dutch were the principal carriers of Castilian wool, Valencian salt and Portuguese sugar to Genoa, Livorno and Venice and similarly also of Puglian oil, Puglian and Sicilian grain and Sicilian salt.<sup>26</sup> The Hanseatics were for the time being eliminated from the sea-lanes between Spain and Italy while the English played no more than a marginal role in the carrying of either Iberian products to North Italy or of south Italian products to North Italy. In the carrying trades, the Dutch role was now much more diverse and strongly based than before; but still a large part of this expanded activity was in the service of Genoese, Livornese and Venetian merchants, and however important, can not be said to have amounted in itself to a Dutch hegemony over Mediterranean commerce.

If we now ask how much progress did the Dutch make during this early period in the carrying of valuable goods in the Mediterranean, it seems to me, once again, that what must be chiefly stressed is the change in the 'structure' of the *straatvaart* in the years 1607-9. Before 1607, a few leading Amsterdam merchants, such as Isaac le Maire, Gaspar van Ceulen, and Guillermo Bartolotti, were shipping costly merchandise to Italy, especially Russian leather, furs, and caviare to Livorno.<sup>27</sup> Throughout the seventeenth century, Italy was much the most important market for Russian caviare and this traffic was controlled by the Dutch as early as 1600, or earlier, to judge from the fact that by then several Dutch vessels were sailing each year direct from Archangel to Livorno.<sup>28</sup> But as yet the Dutch brought no spices to Italy or Spain and there was practically no direct contact between Holland and the Levant. It is true that significant quantities of cottons and other Levant goods were reaching Amsterdam, and often in Dutch ships; but most of this merchandise

<sup>25</sup> Israel, *The Dutch Republic*, 44-46.

<sup>26</sup> Ibidem, 140; Wäjen, *Niederländer im Mittelmeergebiet*, 122; in the same way, but not before or after (until 1647), the Dutch dominated the carrying of grain to eastern Spain from Sicily and Sardinia, see Alvaro Castillo Pintado, *Tráfico marítimo y comercio de importación en Valencia comienzos del siglo XVII* (Madrid 1967) 78, 168-177.

<sup>27</sup> Simon Hart, 'Amsterdamse scheepvaart en handel op Noord-Rusland in de zeventiende eeuw' in: Simon Hart, *Geschrift en getal. Een keuze uit de demografisch-, economisch- en sociaal-historische studiën op grond van Amsterdamse en Zaanse archivalia, 1600-1800* (Dordrecht 1976) 288-291.

<sup>28</sup> Ibidem; in a paper on the caviare trade, the English diplomat Sir John Finch reported from Tuscany in 1667 that 'Italy consumes 39 parts of 40 of that commodity', see Public Record Office, London (PRO) SP 98/8. Finch to Arlington, Livorno, 7 March 1667.

arrived via Venice and was remitted by Venetian merchants.<sup>29</sup> Thus, a Dutch ship *en route* to Amsterdam which sank in a storm off Sicily in 1595 was carrying Zante currants, cummin, and other costly goods but this cargo was loaded at Venice on the initiative of Venetian merchants. A Dutch ship captured by the Spaniards off Gibraltar the following year was carrying Turkish cottons, currants, and a range of Near Eastern drugs but again was sailing from Venice and for Venetians. The début of the Dutch themselves at Aleppo occurred in 1599 when a Dutch ship arrived on the Syrian coast carrying 100,000 ducats in silver with which to purchase silks, spices, and cottons. According to the Venetian consul, the arrival of this vessel proved quite a shock for the resident Venetians, French and English alike.<sup>30</sup> In March 1600, Henry Lello, the English envoy at Constantinople, wrote to Sir Robert Cecil, that the 'Fflemings merchants doe beginne to trade into these countryes which will cleane subvert ours, although it be now butt little worth'.<sup>31</sup> But, as yet, Dutch participation in the Levant trade, if enough to worry the dominant commercial powers of the region, was still essentially marginal. According to the Portuguese traveller Pedro Teixeira, Dutch remittances to Aleppo in 1604 were running at only half the rate of those of the English and were of little account compared with the investments of the Venetians and French. (See Table 4)\

Table 4 | *Western remittances in cash and goods to Aleppo in 1604 and 1614 (valued in Venetian ducats)*<sup>32</sup>

Trading Nation	1604 (Teixeira)	1613 (Morosini)
Venetians	1,250,000	850,000
French	800,000	1,750,000
Dutch	150,000	500,000
English	300,000	250,000

But, over the next decade, the picture changed dramatically as is confirmed by several independent contemporary reports as well as the figures compiled in 1614 by the then Venetian consul at Aleppo, Girolamo Morosini. By 1613, Dutch trade at Aleppo was estimated to be around twice as important as that of the English and, what is just as striking, the Dutch role was expanding rapidly whereas English trade

<sup>29</sup> Alberto Tenenti, *Naufrages, corsaires et assurances maritimes à Venise, 1592-1609* (Paris 1959) 184-185, 219, 233, 275, 307 *et seq.*

<sup>30</sup> 'Gli olandesi', reported the consul, Giorgio Emo, 'sono di danno comune', see the 'relazione' of Gioio Emo dated 12 Dec. 1599 in: Guglielmo Berchet, *Relazioni dei consoli veneti nella Siria* (Turin 1866) 102-103.

<sup>31</sup> *Bronnen tot de geschiedenis van den Levantschen handel*. K. Heeringa ed. 2 vols. in three parts (The Hague, 1910-1917) I, 169; A.L. Horniker, 'Anglo-French Rivalry in the Levant from 1583 to 1612', *Journal of Modern History* 18 (1946) 298.

<sup>32</sup> The two sets of figures for 1604 and 1613 are taken respectively from the *Relaciones de Pedro Teixeira d'El origen, descendencia y svccession de los reyes de Persia, y de Hormuz, y de vn viage hecho por el mismo avtor desde la India oriental hasta Italia por tierra* (Antwerp 1610) 181-183 and the 'relazione' of Girolamo Morosini of 9 Feb. 1614 in Berchet, *Relazioni*, 158-159; 'la nazione fiamminga', reports Morosini, 'negozia un milione di reali la maggior parte contadi ed alcune poche merci di Alemagna, ambre, argenti vivi, cinabri, fil fi rame, ottone e ferro; by contrast 'la nazione inglese negoia un mezzo milione, lo sfarzo principale e in carisce (ie. kerseys), londre, stagni ed alcuni pochi contadi'; see also Guglielmo Berchet, *La Repubblica di Venezia e la Persia* (Turin 1865) 75.

with Aleppo seemingly declined steadily from the moment the Dutch appeared on the scene, in 1599, down to 1621.<sup>33</sup> How is one to account for the obvious superiority at this stage of the Dutch over the English? According to Morosini's predecessor as Venetian consul at Aleppo, Gio Francesco Sagredo, Dutch commerce in the Near East had gained real impetus 'seguito la tregua col re cattolico', that is since the signing of the Twelve Years' Truce in 1609 and that in the two years since the signing of the Dutch-Spanish truce 'many houses' of Dutch merchants had come to Aleppo.<sup>34</sup> And this was indeed the crux of the matter. Just as the resumption of traffic between Holland and Spanish territory enabled the Dutch to take over much of the bulk carrying trade between Spain and Italy in the years 1607-21, so access to Spanish silver enabled the Dutch to step up their bullion remittances to Ottoman territory lending their traffic east of Sicily an entirely new impetus.<sup>35</sup> The Spanish truce, in other words, freed the Dutch from what hitherto had been the chief obstacle to their progress in the 'rich trades' of the Mediterranean, namely their lack of manufactures of their own which they could sell in Italy and Turkey.<sup>36</sup> But, in addition to Spanish silver, there was also another factor of great significance which also came into play in the years around 1609. Since 1598 Dutch merchants had been importing large quantities of pepper and East India spices into northern Europe. After a major effort in the Moluccas in 1605, the Dutch finally gained control over the trade in nutmegs, mace and cloves. But it still took several years until the Dutch began to ship significant quantities of pepper and spices to the Mediterranean. What was possibly the first consignment of pepper to reach Italy from Holland arrived at Livorno in December 1605.<sup>37</sup> But as late as 1607 practically the whole of the Mediterranean's provision of pepper and spices came either via Lisbon or else overland from the Far East via Aleppo and Alexandria. A regular stream of Dutch pepper and spices began arriving in Livorno only from 1609 and in Venice from around 1612.<sup>38</sup> By 1620, no more spices were arriving at Aleppo and the entire Mediterranean market was being supplied principally from Holland and to a (much) lesser extent from England and Portugal.

Equipped with silver and spices, the Dutch were a force to be reckoned with in the trade to Italy and Turkey in the years 1607-21 in a way that they had not been during phase one of their *straatvaart*. At this point, the Dutch state began to take an eager interest in Mediterranean trade. In 1609, a convoy of ten large ships sailed from Holland for 'Cyprus, Syria, Palestine, and Egypt' provided with extra men and guns by the States General. In 1610, the States General resolved to promote

<sup>33</sup> According to Emo, the English were shipping 500,000 ducats worth of goods to Aleppo in 1599; and while the English in the years around 1600 were the first to challenge Venice's grip on the cotton exports of Cyprus and Smyrna, by 1611, the Dutch, who were better placed to supply cotton to Germany, had replaced the English as the chief challengers to Venetian control.

<sup>34</sup> see the 'relazione' of Gio Francesco Sagredo of 4 July 1611 in: Berchet, *Relazioni*, 151: 'la nazione fiamminga ha ingrossato grandemente il negozio seguito la tregua col re cattolico, ed ha posto nuovamente in Aleppo molte case'.

<sup>35</sup> The States General in September 1609 authorized the minting of 100,000 silver *Leeuwendaalders* expressly to 'advance our trade with Syria', see *Resolutiën der Staten-Generaal van 1576 tot 1609 XIV*, (1607-1609). H.H.R. Rijperman ed. (The Hague 1970) 900.

<sup>36</sup> Van Dillen, *Van rijkdom en regenten*, 76.

<sup>37</sup> Braudel and Romano, *Navires et marchandises*, 57.

<sup>38</sup> *Bronnen tot de geschiedenis van den Levantschen handel I*, 15-16, 98, 105; though initially, at Venice, the English brought more than the Dutch, see Domenico Sella, *Commerci e industrie a Venezia nel secolo XVII* (Venice and Rome 1961) 73-74.



Dutch trade in the Levant by seeking a commercial treaty with the Ottoman Sultan and, despite French and English obstruction this was quickly accomplished.<sup>39</sup> In 1611, business suddenly booming, the Amsterdam Levant merchants summed up their views on the fast developing situation in a petition to the States General.<sup>40</sup> While conceding that the Near East's role in the world spice trade was now rapidly being eliminated by VOC activity in the Far East, the merchants confidently claimed that the Levant trade was now one of the most valuable and important in which the Dutch were engaged and perhaps even more vital to the United Provinces than its flourishing trade with the East Indies. This bold assertion they grounded on the fact that from the Near East came a range of costly raw materials—cottons, mohairs, silks and gallnuts—required by the textile industries of the west. If the Dutch could dominate the Levant trade, as they had that of the Baltic and Far East, then the industrial potential of Holland's textile towns, Leiden and Haarlem, would be greatly enhanced and the German textile towns would be made dependent for their supplies on the Dutch entrepôt. The Amsterdam Levant merchants judged that they now already controlled the trade in cotton from Cyprus and Egypt and were the chief suppliers of cotton to Germany and the South Netherlands.<sup>41</sup> But they had, they declared, made less progress in the traffic in Persian raw silk, sold to the west through Aleppo, and it was this, the most valuable strand of the Levant trade which they now proposed to wrest from the hands of the Venetians and French. They estimated the then value of Dutch trade with the Ottoman Empire including Cyprus at around four million guilders yearly, or some £ 400,000, which would seem to confirm that Dutch commerce with the Near East now substantially surpassed that of the English.<sup>42</sup> Yet, as Venetian sources confirm,<sup>43</sup> the Dutch were only now beginning to buy up raw silk in any quantity and while the Dutch heavily dominated the trade in cottons, English silk purchases at Aleppo probably remained larger than those of the Dutch for some years after 1611. Indeed, down to 1621 the Dutch conspicuously failed to gain the same momentum in the silk trade as in other spheres of Near Eastern Trade. There were several reasons for this, as we shall see further on, but one reason was the relatively low level of demand for raw silk in the Low Countries themselves at this time.<sup>44</sup> For as long as most Persian raw silk continued to reach the west through Turkey, the French and Venetians were bound to retain their primacy in this traffic; for France and Italy were then much the largest consumers and considerably nearer to Aleppo than Holland or Eng-

<sup>39</sup> A.H. de Groot, *The Ottoman Empire and the Dutch Republic. A History of the Earliest Diplomatic Relations, 1610-1630* (Leiden and Istanbul 1978) 90.

<sup>40</sup> see the 'Memorie betreffende den Levantschen handel' (1611) in: *Bronnen tot de geschiedenis van den Levantschen handel* I, 429-431.

<sup>41</sup> Dutch primacy in trade with Cyprus was achieved between 1605 and 1611, in the former year the Venetians being still in first place and the English en French still as active as the Dutch, see the *Relaciones de Pedro Teixeira*, 198 and Sella, *Commercio e industrie*, 27-28.

<sup>42</sup> The 4% consular dues paid by the Dutch on their exports from Ottoman territory then amounted to 160,000 guilders yearly, see *Bronnen tot de geschiedenis van den Levantschen handel* I, 430.

<sup>43</sup> Archivio di Stato di Venezia (ASV), Cinque Savii alla Mercanzia (CSM) 1st series vol. 153, fo. 48 res. 4 August 1611; in his 'relazione' of 24 September 1610, Tomaso Contarini, reporting from Holland, states that fifteen Dutch ships sailed that year to 'Cypro et Soria...per levar...gottoni et filadi, ma gottoni il piu, poiche sede et speciarie le hanno con piu vantaggio dall' Indie' in: *Relazione veneziane. Venetiaanse berichten over de Vereenigde Nederlanden van 1600-1795*. P.J. Blok ed. (The Hague 1909) 37.

<sup>44</sup> On the Amsterdam and Antwerp silk industries in the early seventeenth century, see L. van Nierop, 'De zijdenijverheid van Amsterdam historisch geschilderd', *Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis* 45 (1930) 33, 152-153, 169.

land.<sup>45</sup> In other words, the Dutch Levant trade undoubtedly surpassed that of the English during phase two but structural factors prevented either nation toppling the French and Venetians from first and second place. Taking the Dutch lead over the English in the Levant trade, together with their preponderance in the carrying trades to, and between, Spain and Italy, it would seem that the Dutch in the Mediterranean were now in an uniquely strong overall position. Since 1607-9, the *straatvaart* had become much more complex and diverse in structure so that the shipping in of Baltic grain, though still very significant, was no longer anything like the sole driving force it had formerly been. In years when there was little demand for Baltic grain in the Mediterranean, as in 1615-1616, Dutch predominance in the Mediterranean carrying trades now clearly continued despite the lack of consignments of grain from Holland. Apart from the silks from Aleppo, and the trade in currants from Zante and Cephalonica (which was in English hands), practically everything else was dominated by the Dutch. In the period from September 1615 to April 1616, forty-three Dutch ships entered the port of Venice while another forty-two arrived during the rest of 1616.<sup>46</sup> This made a total of eighty-five Dutch ships reaching Venice in just sixteen months. We have a list of the cargoes brought by the first forty-three ships, down to April 1616, drawn up by the Dutch consul in Venice. The most striking thing about the list is that not a single one of these Dutch vessels carried Baltic grain. Seven of the ships had sailed in convoy from Seville loaded with Spanish wool for Venice's woollen cloth industry. Five had sailed in convoy from Alicante carrying Castilian wool and Valencian salt. Another five had sailed from Crete and other Venetian islands with wine and currants and two from Cyprus with cotton yarn. Six ships had sailed from the Spanish vicerealties of Naples and Sicily with grain, two from Constantinople with Turkish wools, two from Tunisia with hides, wool, and amber, one from Lisbon with sugar, another from Zante with raw silk and the rest from Holland with fish, lead, spices, and naval stores, especially tar. No less than nineteen of the forty-three Dutch ships in question had loaded in harbours under Spanish control.

Dutch ships carried some Cyprus cotton to Venice but the bulk of the island's cotton exports they were now bringing back to Amsterdam for distribution in the Low Countries and Germany. According to the first Dutch ambassador in Constantinople, Cornelis Haga, in a letter to the States General of May 1615, neither the French nor the English any longer handled more than a small fraction of Cyprus' exports.<sup>47</sup> In 1614, we learn, no less than ten Dutch ships loaded cottons in the ports of Cyprus and these must indeed have accounted for the bulk of the few thousand bales of cotton produced in Cyprus each year. The Dutch dominated also in Egypt. But in Crete and other Venetian islands, the position was different. Dutch merchants showed interest in the trade in currants and Cretan wine and, in 1618, at their

<sup>45</sup> The directors of the English and Dutch East India Companies calculated in 1620 that roughly 6,000 bales of Persian raw silk were being exported to the west each year through Aleppo; of these, no less than 3,000 bales were destined for the French market, via Marseille, 1,500 bales for Venice, 400 bales for other parts of Italy, 600 bales for England and a mere 500 bales for the Low Countries, see the *Bronnen tot de geschiedenis der Oostindische in Perzië I (1611-1638)*. H. Dunlop ed. (The Hague 1930) 11.

<sup>46</sup> ASV CSM new series vol. 24 'Nota delli vascelli dei paesi et stati bassi venuti a Venetia' (September 1615 to April 1616); for an abridged version of this document, see *Bronnen tot de geschiedenis van den Levantschen handel I*, 61-62.

<sup>47</sup> Haga to SG, 30 May and 28 November 1615 in *Bronnen tot de geschiedenis van den Levantschen handel I*, 463, 481.

request, the States General appointed a consul to reside on Zante.<sup>48</sup> But here the English remained pre-eminent even though the Venetian government would not allow the sale of English cloth in the Venetian colonies. Sir Thomas Roe, England's ambassador at Constantinople in the 1620s, estimated that the English nation were then spending £ 53,000 yearly in cash on Zante currants, providing Venice with a windfall, being 'so inamored with plumporridge, cakes, and pies, as they will with currants swallow anything.'<sup>49</sup>

If phase two (1607-1621) was one of vigorous expansion and rapid diversification, the third phase, that of 1621-45 corresponding to the period which Braudel saw as the high-point of Dutch Mediterranean trade,<sup>50</sup> was in fact one of disastrous slump and contraction. Philip IV's edicts of April 1621, banning Dutch ships and cargoes from Spain, Portugal, and his Italian viceroyalties, paralysed the Dutch carrying trade between Spain and Italy, stopped the Dutch obtaining silver in Spain, and prevented them from carrying grain, salt and olive oil from Sicily, Puglia and Sardinia to northern Italy. Moreover, the impact of the Spanish embargoes was not just immediate and drastic but also lasting. Amsterdam merchants, such as Jacques Thierry and Jeremias van Ceulen, were later able to obtain passes from the viceroys of Naples and Sicily for trade with southern Italy.<sup>51</sup> But in the case of Spain itself the embargoes were still effective as late as 1646, the last full year of the Spanish drive against Dutch commerce.<sup>52</sup> The books of the 'directors' of the Dutch Levant trade for 1646-7 reveal that even in the last full year of the Spanish embargoes practically all merchandise shipped from Spanish Mediterranean ports to Dutch territory, was loaded onto Hanseatic ships, ships which, from the details given, do seem to have been genuinely Hanseatic and manned by German crews.<sup>53</sup>

The evidence also shows, despite what has been said to the contrary, that the Dutch were shut out of the viceroyalties of Valencia and Mallorca as well as from Castile.<sup>54</sup> Shipments of salt from the salt-pans of Valencia to Genoa and Livorno all but ceased in the early 1620s owing to lack of Dutch shipping.<sup>55</sup> There was a ruinous

<sup>48</sup> Ibidem, I, 66.

<sup>49</sup> *The Negotiations of Sir Thomas Roe, in His Embassy to the Ottoman Porte, from the Year 1621 to 1628 Inclusive* (London 1740) 10, 626.

<sup>50</sup> Braudel, *La Méditerranée* I, 572; although their views have been criticised by some other Dutch scholars, A.M. van der Woude and other Dutch 'Braudelians' have laid it down as something of a dogma that Dutch overseas trade in general, including Mediterranean trade, expanded vigorously in the first half of the seventeenth century and then stagnated after 1650, see A.M. van der Woude, 'De "Nieuwe Geschiedenis" in een nieuwe gedaante', *Algemene Geschiedenis der Nederlanden* V (Haarlem 1980) 19-20.

<sup>51</sup> Amsterdam City Archives (GAA), Notarial Archive (NA) vol. 694B, doc. 60, vol. 664, pack 17, fos. 70-2, and vol. 675, fos. 69v-70.

<sup>52</sup> Israel, *The Dutch Republic*, 205-217, 337-345.

<sup>53</sup> Of thirty-nine ships which returned from the Mediterranean to Amsterdam between May 1646 and April 1647, fourteen had loaded part of their return cargoes in Spanish ports; of these fourteen carrying Spanish goods no less than twelve are listed as Hanseatic and had German skippers, see ARH *Levantse Handel* 264, fos. 21, 88, 194v and Wätjen, *Niederländer im Mittelmeergebiet*, 221-226.

<sup>54</sup> Israel, *The Dutch Republic*, 140-141; for Casey's disagreement with my arguments on this point, see James Casey, *The Kingdom of Valencia in the Seventeenth Century* (Cambridge 1979) 97-98.

<sup>55</sup> On 11 February 1623, the viceroy of Valencia reported to Madrid that exports of salt from the great salt-pan of La Mata, in the viceroyalty of Valencia, had completely ceased owing to the outbreak of war between Spain and the Dutch, the Dutch by 1621 having become virtually the sole carriers of Valencian salt to Italy, Archivo de la Corona de Aragón, Consejo de Aragón vol. 603, doc. 6. Viceroy of Valencia to Philip IV, Valencia, 11 Feb. 1623.

shortage of Spanish wool at Venice in the early 1620s, adequate supplies being restored only from 1625 when more non-Dutch shipping became available;<sup>56</sup> and this could not have occurred had the exclusion of the Dutch failed to take effect in the realm of Valencia as well as in Castile. The armada which the Spaniards established at Gibraltar failed to disrupt Dutch shipping. The States General neutralized the threat posed by Spanish naval power by forming the *straatvaart* into large, heavily armed convoys which were escorted as far as Genoa, Marseille and Livorno by units of the Dutch navy. But the cost of the extra men and guns, as well as the increasing threat of the privateers based at Dunkirk, dramatically forced up Dutch freight and insurance rates for voyages to the Mediterranean. In the years 1617-20, Dutch freight charges for shipping grain from the Baltic to Italy were running at levels from nine to eleven ducats per last.<sup>57</sup> In 1621, these freight rates shot up to nineteen and twenty ducats per last, practically double the level of a few months before. Whereas during phase two the Dutch had enjoyed a clear advantage over the English in respect of shipping costs, phase three began with a complete reversal in the balance of freight and insurance charges with a decisive shift in favour of the English.<sup>58</sup> Eight years later, Amsterdam merchants pin-pointed this factor as one of the main reasons for the sharp overall contraction of Dutch Mediterranean trade as from 1621. In fact, shipping grain direct from the Baltic to the Mediterranean in Dutch ships virtually ceased after 1621.

It was soon well known to Dutch merchants and the Dutch public alike that the recently flourishing *straatvaart* was now in a bad way. Pamphleteers advocating support for the newly set up West India Company uninhibitedly cited the misfortunes of the *straatvaart* when urging investors to switch their funds to the coffers of the new company.<sup>59</sup> Amsterdam merchants repeatedly stated that it was not just trade to Spain which was affected but that there was a profound slump also in Dutch commerce with Italy.<sup>60</sup> As for Dutch trade to the Near East, it was in a state of virtual collapse. There the impact took the form not just of a contraction in the volume of Dutch activity but of a drastic narrowing in its scope. As Haga reported to The Hague in November 1623, the subsidiary branches of the Dutch Levant trade now withered away, what was left being concentrated more and more on Aleppo and Cyprus, Dutch commerce with 'Alexandria, Cairo, Smyrna and Constantinople being completely ruined'.<sup>61</sup> In 1625, the Levant merchants requested help from the States General. 'In the last few years', they declared, 'partly owing to the wars this land wages against the king of Spain and partly owing to the charters awarded to the East and West India Companies,' they found themselves 'stripped and denuded of all their commerce and traffic (with the Ottoman Empire) except

<sup>56</sup> ASV CSM 1st series vol. 146, fo. 158, res. 2 March 1625.

<sup>57</sup> *Bronnen voor de geschiedenis van de Nederlandse Oostzeehandel in de zeventiende eeuw VI, (1617-1625)*. P.H. Winkelmann ed. (The Hague 1983) 81, 191, 197, 281, 421, 440, 446, 449-450.

<sup>58</sup> 'Koopmansadviezen aangaande het plan tot oprichting eener compagnie van assurantie (1629-35)'. P.J. Blok ed. in: *Bijdragen en Mededeelingen van het Historisch Genootschap* 21 (1900) 51-52.

<sup>59</sup> According to the *Korte Onderrichtinge ende vermaeninge aen alle liefhebbers des Vaderlands* (Knuttel no. 3363) (Leiden 1622) the *straatvaart* had now become 'very dangerous and virtually fruitless'.

<sup>60</sup> 'De negotie op Italien is naest eenige jaren seer vermindert, werdende de fijne waren ten deele over landt gesonden ende de grove waren met diere vrachten ende premien beswaert', 'Koopmansadviezen', 64; as for trade to North Africa and the Levant these were stated in 1629 to be 'nu bijnae geheel vervallen', *ibidem*, 67.

<sup>61</sup> Haga to SG, Constantinople, 25 November 1623 in: *Bronnen tot de geschiedenis van den Levantischen handel I*, 497-498.

for a few places and islands in the Mediterranean' and that 'as a result, the trade to Italy has also become very bad'.<sup>62</sup> It was in response to this that the States of Holland and States General agreed, in June 1621, to set up an umbrella organisation to supervise and generally assist Dutch trade with the Mediterranean. This organisation, called the college of 'Directeuren van den Levantschen handel en navigatie in de Middellandsche Zee' (Directors of the Levant Trade and Navigation in the Mediterranean Sea), at first having only one chamber, meeting at Amsterdam, was not a joint stock company on the model of the East and West India Companies, or of the English Levant Company.<sup>63</sup> It did not itself engage in commerce at all. Its purpose was to represent the interests of Dutch merchants trading to the Mediterranean in dealings with the Dutch state and with the admiralty authorities, to regulate the convoy system and shipping practices, and to collect certain charges on the trade on behalf of the government which were used in part to fund the network of Dutch consuls in Italy and the Near East which was set up during the flourishing Twelve Years' Truce period but which was now being maintained with increasing difficulty.

Beside the impact of the 1621 Spanish embargo on Dutch trade, the other major factor depressing the Dutch Levant trade during phase three was the Dutch East India Company's growing success, beginning in the 1620s, in shipping sizeable quantities of Persian silk from source, in the Persian Gulf, and from Surat, round Africa to Holland by-passing the Mediterranean. By the late 1620s, shipments of raw silk by the VOC from Persia and Surat were exceeding the combined total of raw silk being shipped to Holland from the Mediterranean and Archangel—to where further significant quantities were being transported overland from Persia via Moscow. According to a memorandum compiled for the admiralty authorities by the Sephardi merchant Sebastian Pimentel, in January 1630, some 1,500 bales of raw silk were then reaching Holland yearly.<sup>64</sup> Of this, more than half, some 800 bales yearly, was now being shipped by the VOC round Africa, while another 400 bales yearly was reaching Amsterdam via Moscow and Archangel, with only some 300 bales yearly being shipped to Holland from Turkey and Italy combined. Then, in the mid 1630s, the VOC stepped up its drive and tried to divert the bulk of all Persia's silk exports round Africa to Holland, thereby stripping the English, French and Venetians of the large quantities they were accustomed to purchase at Aleppo. This was a grandiose project and one which proved impossible to attain. But for a decade or so this initiative did have an immense impact on the silk trade and, at its height, in the late 1630s, appears to have accounted for something like half of Persia's total silk exports.<sup>65</sup> This was not enough to put an end to Aleppo's role as a silk emporium for the English, French and Venetians but so much silk was now

<sup>62</sup> Ibidem, I, 505-506.

<sup>63</sup> A.H. de Groot, 'The Organisation of Western European Trade in the Levant, 1500-1800' in: L. Blussé and F. Gastra ed., *Companies and Trade* (Leiden 1981) 234-235.

<sup>64</sup> Sebastian Pimentel, 'Memorij van de rau zijde dij jaerlicks indese Landen comt' fo. 1 in: ARH SG (Admiraliteiten) 5501/1.

<sup>65</sup> While the principal Dutch buyer in Persia reported that he bought up, on behalf of the VOC, 743 out of a reduced total of only 1,073 bales exported from Persia in 1635, and 1,000 out of an estimated total of 1,473 bales, in 1636, it is evident that he somewhat underestimated the continued seepage through to Aleppo, *Bronnen tot de geschiedenis der Oostindische Compagnie in Perzië* I, 598-599, 612, 654; N. Steensgaard, *Carracks, Caravans and Companies: The Structural Crisis in European-Asian Trade in the Early Seventeenth Century* (Copenhagen 1973) 374-376, 390-396.

reaching Holland on VOC ships from the Far East that the importing of silk to the Netherlands from the Mediterranean was depressed to very low levels indeed. Much the same happened also with certain other Asian products. Rhubarb, for instance, previously obtained by the Dutch and their rivals alike in Aleppo, was now also largely re-routed via the Persian Gulf and the Cape.<sup>66</sup> All this reduced the Dutch Levant trade to such a point, that Amsterdam merchants in the 1630s were in the habit of saying that it was completely lost.<sup>67</sup> Lewes Roberts was being perfectly accurate when he wrote in his *Marchant's Mapp of Commerce*, of 1638, that the English, French and Venetians were the 'onely three Christian nations that have any trade of moment' at Aleppo, the 'trade driven here by the Dutch (being) not worthy of consideration'.<sup>68</sup> But Ralph Davis referred to this assertion in support of his contention that the English far outstripped the Dutch in the Levant trade during the seventeenth century without realising that this applies only to one specific phase in a sequence of vast structural shifts. By the mid 1640s, the VOC's purchases of silk in Persia had fallen off sharply, due to a variety of factors, and before long the bulk of the supply was again reaching the west via Aleppo and Smyrna. But the point remains, until around 1645 there was little incentive for Dutch merchants to buy silk in the Levant.

If the Dutch *staatvaart* slumped from 1621 down to the close of the Thirty Years' War, the English share of the Levant trade, previously shrinking during phase two, now surged vigorously ahead. But contrary to Ralph Davis' views, there was nothing especially remarkable about the impetus or volume of England's growing trade with Turkey. Nor did English commerce manifest any inherent superiority over that of England's rivals. Roberts estimated that in the late 1630s, when the Dutch Levant trade was at its nadir, England was shipping some 6,000 cloths and 100,000 rix-dollars in silver to Aleppo yearly. This was in fact only a modest quantity of silver and the same is true of the cloth. In 1605, according to Teixeira, the Venetians had been exporting five to six thousand cloths to Aleppo not to mention a like quantity of finished silks and brocades, and the Venetian woollens were some thirty per cent longer.<sup>69</sup> Nor was it by any means the English alone who strengthened their position in the Levant at this time. While the French Levant trade declined steadily during the Thirty Years' War, especially after the outbreak of the 1635-59 Franco-Spanish war cut Marseille merchants off from their sources of silver,<sup>70</sup> the Venetians, as from 1621, staged a remarkable recovery which lasted down to the outbreak of the 1645-69 Venetian-Turkish war. This late revival is especially notable in view of the conflict in Germany, which, as has often been observed,<sup>71</sup> disrupted the trade and communications of Venice's principal remaining western market. Yet despite the fighting north of the Alps, the re-export of Levant goods overland from Venice to Germany and the Netherlands remained

<sup>66</sup> *Bronnen tot de geschiedenis der Oostindische Compagnie in Perzië* I, 587, 656.

<sup>67</sup> 'Koopmansadviezen', 65, 67, 85, 88.

<sup>68</sup> Lewes Roberts, *The Marchants Mapp of Commerce* (London 1638) 139.

<sup>69</sup> Ibidem; Sella, *Commerci e industrie*, 13-14, 27, 119.

<sup>70</sup> Masson, *Histoire du commerce français dans le Levant au XVIIe siècle*, 118; Gérard Tongas, *Les relations de la France avec l'Empire Ottoman durant la première moitié du XVIIe siècle* (Toulouse 1942) 209.

<sup>71</sup> Sella, *Commerci e industrie*, 52; B. McGowan, *Economic Life in Ottoman Europe. Taxation, Trade and the Struggle for Land, 1600-1800* (Cambridge 1981) 19.

surprisingly buoyant and this trade was effectively controlled by Venice.<sup>72</sup> Thus Venice's role was bolstered by the collapse of the Dutch *straatvaart* and, in the years 1625-9, when the river trade between the Netherlands and Germany was halted,<sup>73</sup> the Serenissima again enjoyed an undisputed sway over the distribution of Levant goods to the German textile towns. Having since the 1590s, established a firm grip over the overland routes linking Constantinople and Salonika with the Dalmatian ports of Split and Valona, a trading network based on a close collaboration between Venice and Balkan Sephardi Jewry which effectively prevented Venice's rivals from developing any significant seaborne trade with the Ottoman capital,<sup>74</sup> the Venetians now moved back vigorously into the trade with Cyprus and Egypt where the English strikingly failed to step into the shoes of the Dutch. In these areas it was the Venetians, not the English, who profited from the collapse of the Dutch traffic. In 1626, a Venetian convoy swept up virtually the whole of Cyprus' cotton crop, leaving nothing at all for the English or Dutch.<sup>75</sup> In the 1630s, when the strife between Dutch and Portuguese in Brazil temporarily devastated the sugar plantations there, the Venetians were able to revive their former sugar trade with Cyprus and Egypt.<sup>76</sup> The Venetians were now back in second place to the English at Aleppo and had recovered their former primacy in Cyprus and Egypt as well as in all the lesser ports of Syria, Palestine and Turkey where the local Venetian colonies briefly recaptured some of their former vigour.<sup>77</sup>

But just as abruptly as the Dutch *straatvaart* collapsed in the early 1620s, so it arose anew in the years 1645-7 with the outbreak of the war between Venice and Turkey over Crete, in 1645, and the final lifting of the Spanish embargoes in 1647. The Venetian-Turkish war of 1645-69 at once paralysed sales of Venetian woollen cloth throughout the Ottoman Empire.<sup>78</sup> With the removal of the threat of the Dunkirk privateers and peace with Spain, Dutch freight and insurance rates to the Mediterranean, fell as spectacularly in 1647 as they had risen in 1621. By 1648-9, freight charges quoted in Amsterdam for voyages to the Mediterranean were often less than half those applying during the early 1640s.<sup>79</sup> Indeed the turn-about in 1645-7 was extraordinarily abrupt and every bit as dramatic as the collapse in 1621. In 1644, the Dutch were still saying that they had completely lost their former Levant trade 'so that in many years we have had no ships sailing to, or returning from there, the English having wholly taken over that trade.'<sup>80</sup> But by Feb-

<sup>72</sup> 'Koopmansadviezen', 13, 64-65, 85.

<sup>73</sup> On the four-year stoppage of the river trade between Dutch territory and Germany, see Israel, *The Dutch Republic*, 217-223; on the effects of this on the distribution of Turkish products in Europe, see *Bronnen tot de geschiedenis van den Levantschen handel* I, 557-559 and 'Koopmansadviezen', 65: 'Wat de Levantsche negotie belanght, die vervalt van sich selfs, doordat de Persische ende Suratse waren, die daerover plachten te comen, ons van anderen wegen worden toegevoert doch de grove waren, van daer comende, sijn hier nu als in eenen sack, vermits de licenten gesloten ende betercoop over Italien in Duytslandt en elders daer se getrocken worden, connen gebracht worden.'

<sup>74</sup> Renzo Paci, *La 'Scala' di Spalato e il commercio veneziano nei Balcani fra cinque e seicento* (Venice 1971) 106-111; Venetian trade with Constantinople and Salonika through the Dalmatian ports was at its height in the 1620s and 1630s.

<sup>75</sup> *Bronnen tot de geschiedenis van den Levantschen handel* I, 533, 559-560.

<sup>76</sup> Simone Luzzato, *Discorso circa il stato de gl'hebrei et in particular dimoranti nell' inclita città di Venetia* (Venice 1638) fo. 17; Sella, *Commerci e industrie*, 53-54.

<sup>77</sup> Roberts, *Marchants Mapp*, 128-129, 139, 141.

<sup>78</sup> British Library MS. Add. 10130, fo. 79v ('Relazione della città e Republica di Venezia').

<sup>79</sup> GAA NA 1532, fos. 35, 74, 169 e.v.

<sup>80</sup> *Bronnen tot de geschiedenis van den Levantschen handel* I, 1075.

ruary 1649, the English Levant Company was so alarmed by the sudden upsurge in Dutch activity, so conscious that the Dutch now enjoyed lower costs and readier access to Spanish silver than the English, that its directors feared that the entire English position in the Near East was in danger of imminent collapse.<sup>81</sup> A further unmistakable symptom of the radical turn-about which took place in 1645-7 was the resumption (as had happened previously only before 1621) in the shipping of commercial quantities of Turkish products from Holland to England.<sup>82</sup> And simultaneously with the revival in Dutch sea-borne trade with the Levant, there was a marked expansion in Dutch overland trade with Italy via Frankfurt and Augsburg.<sup>83</sup> Greatly increased quantities of Dutch and Dutch East Indies products were now reaching Italy by land, stimulated by the end of the Thirty Years' War in Germany as well as by the blocking of Venetian exports to the Balkans. And this tremendous recovery in Dutch trade with Italy and the Levant by sea and land was to be sustained. This was the beginning of the most flourishing period in the history of Dutch Mediterranean trade and it was to last down to the late 1680s. 'Avec le milieu du XVIIe siècle', asserted Braudel about the changing balance of commercial power in the Mediterranean, 'la roue du sort va tourner contre la Hollande'.<sup>84</sup> He could not have been more wrong.

The vigorous expansion of Dutch Mediterranean trade in the post-1645 period offers a number of parallels with the earlier expansion of the Twelve Years' Truce. As before, large numbers of Dutch ships began to frequent the ports of southern and eastern Spain.<sup>85</sup> As before, it became customary for Dutch vessels to collect large quantities of silver bullion at Cadiz, San Lúcar, Málaga and Alicante which they then carried on to Genoa, Livorno, Venice and Smyrna where what was to be the main Dutch merchant colony in Turkey was established at this time. With this silver the Dutch were able to pay for part of their purchases of silks, mohairs and cottons. Similarly, where the Dutch had been the chief carriers of Baltic, Sicilian and Puglian grain to Valencia and other parts of eastern Spain during phase two, they now resumed that role in phase four (1645-88).<sup>86</sup> But it would be wrong to see the fourth and most successful phase in the evolution of the Dutch *straatvaart* as essentially a repetition of phase two. There were in fact major differences in the structure, that is the form, pattern and organization, of Dutch Mediterranean trade in the two periods. During the second phase, Dutch enterprise in the Mediterranean had shown great vigour but also grave limitations. Most notably the Dutch had proved unable to sell their manufactures in any quantity and (except for cotton) had not been major consumers of raw materials from the Mediterranean area. Dutch merchants had exported some linen and Leiden says to Italy and bought some Venetian cloth to sell in Turkey. But basically the Dutch had relied on Spanish

<sup>81</sup> *Calendar of State Papers. Domestic 1649-50*, 12.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>83</sup> Friedrich Blendinger, 'Augsburger Handel im Dreissigjährigen Krieg', in: *Wirtschaftskräfte und Wirtschaftswege* II, 304, 308.

<sup>84</sup> Braudel, *La Méditerranée* I, 572-573.

<sup>85</sup> Israel, *The Dutch Republic*, 416-423.

<sup>86</sup> Of twenty-nine Dutch ships captured by Barbary corsairs in the western Mediterranean between September 1662 and December 1663, eight were carrying grain from Sardinia, Sicily or Puglia to Spain, see H. Brugmans ed. 'De notulen en monumenten van het College van Commerciet te Amsterdam. 1663-1665', *Bijdragen en Mededelingen van het Historisch Genootschap* 18 (1897) 307-310.



silver to settle their purchases in the Levant.<sup>87</sup>

All this now changed. After 1645, the Dutch Republic emerged much more strongly in the international arena as a producer of industrial goods than before.<sup>88</sup> It was in the second half of the seventeenth century that the Dutch reached the peak of their success in early modern times as an industrial power and while this also changed the character of Dutch trade with many parts of northern Europe, nowhere is this more evident than in the Republic's relationship to the Mediterranean world. Peace with the Spanish Netherlands meant that more Flemish linen could now be bleached at Haarlem and shipped from Holland to Italy; and there is no doubt that linens now rivalled 'says' as the most important Dutch manufactured product exported to Italy.<sup>89</sup> With the Venetian camlet industry in a state of collapse, Leiden now began to produce large quantities of fine camlets (greinen) woven from Turkish mohair.<sup>90</sup> Most important of all, the Dutch now succeeded in ousting the English almost completely from the buying up and shipping of Spanish wools.<sup>91</sup> This assured Holland effective control over southern Europe's most valuable raw material. From 1645—building on the collapse of Venice's cloth exports to Turkey—Leiden emerged as Europe's leading producer of fine woollen cloth (*lakens*) and this proved to be the key to a greatly expanded role in the Levant. Leiden's output of fine woollens rose sharply in the late 1640s and rarely dipped below 17,000 pieces yearly during the rest of the century.<sup>92</sup> And a high proportion of Leiden's total output, in some years as much as a third, was destined for the Levant. After 1650, Leiden's burgomasters were always acutely aware that Turkey was of paramount importance to the prosperity and well-being of their city.<sup>93</sup> Just as high-quality woollen cloth, made from Spanish wool, had been the basis of Venetian pre-eminence in the Levant trade in the sixteenth century, and at the beginning of the seventeenth, so it became the basis of the new Dutch bid for preponderance in the Levant in the years 1647-88 when Holland's Mediterranean trade was at its height.

But English cloth exports also benefited from the collapse of Venice's textile industries during the 1645-69 Turkish war. From 6,000 long and shortcloths yearly in the 1630s, the total rose to ten to twelve thousand in the 1660s.<sup>94</sup> In 1669, admittedly an exceptional year for the English Levant trade, 13,980 pieces were exported to Turkey, mainly to Smyrna and Aleppo.<sup>95</sup> In 1663, 12,190 long and shortcloths

<sup>87</sup> ACV CSM 1st series vol. 143, fo. 48; Berchet, *Relazioni*, 158-159; Van Dillen, *Van Rijkdom en regenten*, 76.

<sup>88</sup> Even those scholars who maintain that the Dutch economy in general was stagnating by 1650 accept that key sectors of industry expanded for some decades after that date, see, for instance, P.W. Klein, 'De zeventiende eeuw, 1585-1700' in: J.H. van Stuijvenberg ed., *De economische geschiedenis van Nederland* (Groningen 1977) 97-100, 108.

<sup>89</sup> Wäjen, *Niederländer im Mittelmeergebiet*, 355-359 et seq; Blendinger, 'Augsburger Handel', 304-308.

<sup>90</sup> N.W. Posthumus, *De geschiedenis van de Leidsche lakenindustrie*. 3 vols. (The Hague 1908-1939) III, 272-279.

<sup>91</sup> Aggrieved English merchants complained that within a year or two of the Dutch-Spanish Peace (1648), the Dutch were shipping four times as much Spanish wool as the English, the English having controlled the trade since 1630 down to 1647, see *A Brief Narration of the Present State of the Bilbao Trade* (London 1650) 1-2, 9; Israel, *The Dutch Republic*, 412, 420.

<sup>92</sup> Posthumus, *Geschiedenis van de Leidsche lakenindustrie* II, 930, 932.

<sup>93</sup> See, for instance, the resolution of the Leiden burgomasters and vroedschap of 18 December 1668 in *Bronnen tot de geschiedenis van den Levantschen handel* II, 69.

<sup>94</sup> British Library MS Add. 36785, fo. 33; Roberts, *Marchants Mapp*, 139.

<sup>95</sup> British Library MS Add. 36785, fos. 6, 33.

accounted for £ 163,610 out of £ 167,661 worth of English manufactures exported to Turkey. But the marked strengthening of the English Levant trade during the middle decades of the seventeenth century was achieved wholly at the expense of Venice and France. Ralph Davis was mistaken in supposing that England was gaining also on the Dutch. During the third quarter of the century, exports of Leiden *lakens* to Smyrna, where the Dutch re-established their factory in 1651,<sup>96</sup> and to Aleppo (which, however, now increasingly took second place to Smyrna) rose to around six thousand pieces yearly, these so-called *halve lakens* being nearly as long as the English long cloths.<sup>97</sup> This in itself represents nearly half the quantity of England's cloth exports to the Ottoman territory. But then we must remember that the Dutch product was a finer cloth, manufactured from costlier wools, and fetching a higher price.<sup>98</sup> From 1645 down to the 1690s, it was a fact of commercial life in the Levant that Dutch and not English cloth was the western product most highly esteemed by the Turks.<sup>99</sup> Leiden *lakens* cornered the upper end of the Ottoman market. And if Dutch cloth exports to Turkey by sea fell off more sharply than the English during the second, and especially the third Anglo-Dutch War (1672-74), the Dutch partially countered this by stock-piling at Livorno and Smyrna and by circumventing Venice's ban on the passage of foreign woollens overland through her territories.<sup>100</sup>

During the most successful phase of the Dutch *straatvaart*, from 1645 to 1688 the value of Dutch woollen cloth exported to Turkey, we can assert with some confidence, was equivalent to between half and two-thirds of the value of English cloth exports. It might seem that this still left the English with the upper hand. But if relatively few *lakens* percolated by the overland route, through Venice and Ancona, into the Turkish Balkans, and to Constantinople, there was no such ban on the passage of Dutch linens and we know that substantial quantities were passing overland via Italy into the Balkans.<sup>101</sup> And then on top of this the Dutch had a much

<sup>96</sup> On the re-establishment of the Dutch merchant colony at Smyrna, see *Calendar of State Papers. Domestic, 1651*, 290-291; and also Jan Willem Samberg, *De hollandsche gereformeerde gemeente te Smyrna. De geschiedenis eener handelskerk* (Leiden 1928) 28, 31.

<sup>97</sup> Van Dillen was certainly mistaken in accepting Savary's estimate that around 1670 the Dutch were supplying only around 2,000 or 2,500 *lakens* to the Levant yearly, Van Dillen, *Van Rijkdom en regenten*, 78; contemporary Dutch and English sources establish that the main Dutch Smyrna convoy in the 1660s usually carried four to five thousand *lakens*. *Bronnen tot de geschiedenis van den Levantschen handel* II, 98-98, 303; an English report tells us that the outward-bound Dutch Smyrna convoy which reached Livorno in January 1669 carried 4,589 *lakens* besides some camlets, see PRO SP 98/10, fo. 26; on the second annual convoy, I assume that there were at least another 1,000 *lakens*; thus, I agree with Masson's statement about the Dutch at the height of their Levant trade: 'les Hollandais portaient dans le Levant quantité d'épicerie mais surtout 6,000 ou 7,500 pièces de leurs draps', Masson, *Histoire du commerce français dans le Levant au XVII<sup>e</sup> siècle*, 126; on the lengths of the English and Dutch pieces, see Posthumus, op. cit. ii, 940, note 4 and B.E. Supple, *Commercial Crisis and Change in England, 1600-1642* (Cambridge 1964) 257-258.

<sup>98</sup> Posthumus values Leidens *halve lakens* in the 1640s at 190 guilders each where the average value of English cloths in the 1660s was 150 guilders; on this basis, the 6,000 *lakens* shipped yearly to Turkey in this period were worth some 1,150,000 guilders or £ 105,000, Posthumus, *Geschiedenis van de Leidsche lakenindustrie* II, 940-941.

<sup>99</sup> Sella, *Commerci e industrie*, 64.

<sup>100</sup> In a matter of months before the outbreak of war with France and England in 1672, Dutch merchants shipped to Smyrna on two convoys some 14,000 *lakens* which in English terms were worth nearly a quarter of a million pounds, see PRO SP 99/51, fo. 158. Doddington to Williamson, Venice, 8 April 1672.

<sup>101</sup> Paci, 'Scala' di Spalato, 117-118; see also J.G. van Bel, *De linnenhandel van Amsterdam in de XVIII<sup>e</sup> eeuw* (Amsterdam 1940) 69-70.

larger share of the trade in pepper and spices to both Italy and Turkey, and in the flow of Spanish silver. The English did export some silver to Turkey to boost their purchases of levant goods; but it is striking that such silver partly, or perhaps even mostly, consisted of Dutch *leeuwendaalders*—a silver coin minted in Holland specially for the Near East—which had first to be specially imported into England from Holland.<sup>102</sup> All considered, the Dutch having a lively transit trade through Venice and Ancona which the English did not,<sup>103</sup> there would seem to be no grounds for supposing that in this period the English Levant trade surpassed that of the Dutch, let alone for accepting Ralph Davis' claim that 'England was... for several decades in the middle of the seventeenth century... much the largest western trader with Turkey'.<sup>104</sup> As for his assertions that the Dutch Levant trade 'declined rapidly after 1660' and that 'France was the only country whose seaborne trade with the Levant rivalled England's in the seventeenth and most of the eighteenth century', these would seem to be totally at variance with the evidence. Far more realistic are the contemporary French assessments of the position which include a valuable statistical survey of exports from Smyrna to the west in the year 1687.<sup>105</sup> This confirms that in the 1680s the Dutch were the only serious rivals to the English and that the French still then lagged far behind.

Table 5 *The value of goods shipped from Smyrna to the West in 1687 (in piastres)*

<i>Destination</i>	<i>Value</i>
England	1,300,000
Holland	1,100,000
France	254,450
Venice	79,860

If during phase four (1647-1688) the English seaborne trade to Turkey exceeded the Dutch by something like a ratio of around five to four<sup>106</sup> which was offset by the

<sup>102</sup> G.F. Abbott, *Under the Turk in Constantinople. A Record of Sir John Finch's Embassy, 1674-1681* (London 1920) 237-238; Arthur Attman, *Dutch Enterprise in the World Bullion Trade, 1550-1800* (Göteborg 1983) 38-39.

<sup>103</sup> Even Sir John Finch who liked to boast that the English Levant trade was 'ten times as great as that of Holland' admitted that 'at Venice almost all English business is either in Italian or Dutch hands', PRO SP 98/5. Finch to Arlington, Florence, 13 June 1665 and SP 98/9, fos. 230, 277. Finch to Arlington, Florence, 3 July and 19 August 1668.

<sup>104</sup> Davis, 'English Imports from the Middle East', 203.

<sup>105</sup> F. Braudel, P. Jeannin, J. Meuvret and R. Romano, 'Le déclin de Venise au XVII<sup>e</sup> siècle', in: *Aspetti e cause della decadenza economica veneziana*, 59-61; Colbert, for his part, clearly believed that the Dutch Levant trade far surpassed that of the English, a judgment he based on data obtained for him by the French ambassador in Holland, see *Correspondance administrative sous le règne de Louis XIV.* G.B. Depping ed. 4 vols. (Paris 1850-1855) III, 348-349; Simon Elzinga, *Het voorspel van den oorlog van 1672. De economisch-politieke betrekkingen tusschen Frankrijk en Nederland in de jaren 1666-1672* (Haarlem 1926) 119-120; the French envoy sent to Constantinople in 1670 was told in his instructions that altogether the western trading nations were then shipping out 20 million livres worth of goods from Ottoman territory yearly, of which the Dutch were considered to be taking more than half, ten or eleven millions worth, the English a mere one third of this, and the Venetians most of the rest, but these figures certainly give an exaggerated picture of the Dutch role, see *Recueil des Instructions données aux ambassadeurs et ministres de France depuis les traités de Westphalie jusqu'à la Revolution Française* 29, Turquie. Pierre Duparc ed. (Paris 1969) 71.

<sup>106</sup> See again Table 5 and also the figures in Tongas, *Les relations de la France avec l'Empire Ottoman*, 208-209.

Dutch share in the overland trade, via Venice, Ancona, Ragusa and Split, to Constantinople and Salonika, this does still mean that Dutch trade with the Levant was relatively weak, weaker than in most other major sectors of world commerce. This is especially noteworthy in that the Levant trade can in some respects be said to have been more vital to the Dutch Republic than to England. Turkey was probably the single largest market for Leiden *lakens*. The Levant was the only source of the mohair yarns, spun from the hair of the Angora goat in the villages of western Anatolia, which were the indispensable raw material for what was the second most important textile branch at Leiden from the 1640s down to the mid eighteenth century.<sup>107</sup> In the 1650s, there were some 9,000 men and women engaged in the manufacture of camlets at Leiden, compared with 14,000 in the *laken*-industry and 7,000 producing says. As late as the 1690s, by which time the Leiden camlet industry was past its prime, it was reckoned that Holland consumed some two-thirds of all the mohair yarn exported from Turkey, mostly at Leiden but also at Haarlem and Amsterdam.<sup>108</sup> And then it is also clear that the Dutch silk industry, based at Haarlem and Amsterdam, grew faster than the English from the 1650s onwards when Holland began to draw off a large proportion of the skilled work-force engaged in silk manufacture at Antwerp.<sup>109</sup> By the end of the century, surprisingly large quantities of Dutch finished as well as 'thrown' silk were being exported from Holland to England as well as to other European markets.<sup>110</sup>

The explanation for the relative weakness of the Dutch Levant trade would certainly seem to lie in the fact that through the later seventeenth century (as well as earlier) the Dutch East India Company, unlike its English rival, imported large quantities of Asian raw silk round the Cape. Besides Chinese and, later on, also Bengali silk, the VOC continued to ship sizeable quantities of Persian silk albeit not in such massive amounts as during the decade 1635-45.<sup>111</sup> Added to this, there was throughout a substantial flow of Persian and Armenian silks across the Caspian sea to Moscow, from where Dutch merchants sent them, via Archangel, to Amsterdam.<sup>112</sup> While little or no silk reached England from Russia, silks shipped from Archangel were constantly influencing supply and demand for silk in Holland. Thus, structurally, there were major differences between the Dutch and English Levant trades. The importing of silks from Smyrna and Aleppo by the Dutch was essentially a marginal activity designed to supplement stocks pouring in from Asia and Russia. The main Dutch Smyrna convoy sailed late in the year and could not sail until it was known how much silk was arriving on the VOC ships and the returning Russia convoy.<sup>113</sup> The 'directors' of the Dutch Levant Trade resolved in September 1686, for example, that the date for the sailing of the November

<sup>107</sup> Posthumus, *Geschiedenis van de Leidsche lakenindustrie* II, 937, 939, 941; in 1665, the value of Leiden's total camlet output, in that year at a peak of just over 3 million guilders, even slightly exceeded that of her *lakens*.

<sup>108</sup> See the 'Memorie' written in the year 1700 in *Bronnen tot de geschiedenis van den Levantschen handel* II, 305-306; total annual exports of Turkish mohair were then estimated at 600,000 pounds in weight worth £ 141,000.

<sup>109</sup> A.K.L. Thijs, *De zijdenijverheid te Antwerpen in de zeventiende eeuw* (Brussels 1969) 100-101.

<sup>110</sup> Otto Pringsheim, *Beiträge zur wirtschaftlichen Entwicklungsgeschichte der vereinigten Niederlande im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert* (Leipzig 1890) 33.

<sup>111</sup> Kristof Glamann, *Dutch-Asiatic Trade, 1620-1740* (Copenhagen and The Hague 1958) 127-128.

<sup>112</sup> ARH *Levantse Handel* vol. 1, 256, res. 18 October 1662 and vol. 6, res. 24 January 1685.

<sup>113</sup> *Ibidem*; *Bronnen tot de geschiedenis der Oostindische Compagnie in Perzië* I, 528, 564, 612.

convoy for Smyrna would be fixed, and announced at the Amsterdam Bourse, 'as soon as the date of the auction of the East India Company's goods is announced'.<sup>114</sup> If the importing of silks from Turkey was at bottom marginal, the essence of the Dutch Levant trade was the exchange of *lakens* for mohair yarns.<sup>115</sup> Meanwhile the essence of the English trade was the exchange of cloth for Persian raw silks. While both the Dutch and the English focused more and more on Smyrna rather than Aleppo, after 1651, and while both continued to ply some trade with Aleppo, through Iskanderun, it does seem that the Dutch trade was even more concentrated on Smyrna than the English which is perhaps attributable to the greater role of Anatolian yarns in their commerce.<sup>116</sup>

According to French estimates, reported by Masson, Dutch purchases of Turkish mohair yarns in the later seventeenth century were frequently as high as 300,000 lb or 1,500 bales yearly.<sup>117</sup> Dutch figures for the 1690s show us that at that time their purchases were sometimes far higher. In September 1699, for instance there were reportedly 4,000 bales of mohair yarn stockpiled in Amsterdam of which 2,760 bales had arrived on Dutch ships from Smyrna and Livorno in the previous nine months.<sup>118</sup> It is true that earlier on, notably in the 1660s, the English seem to have had a much larger share of the trade in mohair yarns. But the relatively high figure of 267,487 lb, or 1,340 bales, reportedly imported to London in 1663 does seem to have been wholly exceptional.<sup>119</sup> At any rate the corresponding figure for 1669, which we know to have been an unusually good one for the English Levant trade, was down to 186,372 lb of 930 bales.<sup>120</sup> The low figure of only 126,469 lb of mohair yarn imported to Amsterdam in 1668 can not be considered representative as this we know to have been an exceptionally poor year for the Dutch.<sup>121</sup>

The Dutch Levant trade diverged structurally from the English also in being much more closely linked to Spain and Italy. The English Levant Company's sphere of activity was legally confined to the Levant proper. But the Dutch Levant trade was so closely connected to the 'rich trades' of Spain and Italy, that there was no way of separating the different sections of Dutch Mediterranean trade administratively. The directors of the Dutch Levant Trade were responsible for, and collected a toll known as *lastgeld*, from all Dutch shipping entering the Mediterranean. It is sometimes argued that because the Dutch were forced to use larger, more heavily armed ships in the Mediterranean than was their wont on their other trade

<sup>114</sup> ARH Levantse Handel vol. 6, res. 11 September 1686.

<sup>115</sup> *Bronnen tot de geschiedenis van den Levantischen handel* II, 306: '...sijnde buyten alle twijffel de verhandelinge van de Hollandsche lakenen tegens de Turxsche garens het voornaamste van de Nederlandschen handel op dese plaetse van Smyrna.'

<sup>116</sup> Even so, as late as the 1680s, sections of the Dutch Smyrna convoys did regularly call at Iskanderun, or 'Scanderoon' as the English called it, see, for instance, ARH Levantse Handel 6, res. 9 April 1687; in collecting a forced loan on western merchants, in 1685, the Turkish government estimated that seven tenths of western commerce was concentrated at Smyrna, one tenth at Constantinople, and one fifth at Aleppo-Iskanderun.

<sup>117</sup> Masson, *Histoire du commerce français dans le Levant au XVIIe siècle*, 126.

<sup>118</sup> *Bronnen tot de geschiedenis van den Levantischen handel* II, 102-103.

<sup>119</sup> British Library MS.Add. 36785, fo. 21.

<sup>120</sup> Ibidem, fo. 47; PRO SP 98/10, fo. 177. Dethick to Williamson, Livorno, 16 May 1669.

<sup>121</sup> We also know that in 1668, Dutch merchants had, through special circumstances, to ship a large part of their Levant goods back on English ships, PRO SP 98/10. Finch to Arlington, Livorno, 14 January 1669; see H. Brugmans, 'Statistiek van den in- en uitvoer van Amsterdam, 1 October 1667 - 30 September 1668', *Bijdragen en Mededelingen van het Historisch Genootschap* 19 (1898) 141.

routes they thereby lost their usual advantage of cheap shipping.<sup>122</sup> But this is certainly wrong as far as the most successful phase of the Dutch Mediterranean trade is concerned. Pieter de la Court ascribed what he saw as Dutch supremacy in the Mediterranean specifically to the greater size and security of the Dutch ships and their naval escorts.<sup>123</sup> It was the size and reliability of the Dutch ships, he believed, which attracted the custom of the Genoese, Livornese, Armenian, and Jewish middlemen of the Mediterranean. The English had replaced the Dutch as the main carriers between Spain and Italy during the Thirty Years' War.<sup>124</sup> But even Sir John Finch never one to praise Dutch methods if he could help it had to admit that it had not taken the Dutch long to regain control of the traffic after 1647. 'The reason is', as he put it

'the Dutch, observing that all forraigners gave greater freights to our ships than theirs, by reason of the goodnesse of our vessels, they, partly for their own security, against the Barbary Coast, partly to invite forraigners to load on their vessels, send out a yearly convoy to protect theyr ships which takes up all the Spanish mony and fine goods from Spayn for Italy, from Italy for the Levant and agayn from the Levant for Italy and from Italy for Spayne and in this trade they employ theyr men of warr.'<sup>125</sup>

In fact, during the successful fourth phase of Holland's Mediterranean trade there were usually two of these heavily armed and escorted convoys each year, a larger autumn convoy which sailed after the arrival of the returning VOC and Russia convoys and a smaller spring fleet. In peace time, these were both usually escorted by two warships. In 1662, for example, the smaller convoy—two 'great ships' and two warships—arrived at Smyrna on 12 June and the larger—five 'great ships' and two warships on 10 November; in addition, ten other Dutch vessels arrived singly that year at Smyrna from Livorno and Venice.<sup>126</sup> Clearly by no means all the valuable goods transported across the Mediterranean by the Dutch went in convoy and, despite the convoys, there were some spectacular losses. One of the Dutch vessels captured by Barbary pirates in 1662, sailing from Cadiz to Genoa, was carrying 140 bales of Spanish wool, 50,000 silver pieces of eight, and other merchandise the whole cargo being worth 195,000 guilders.<sup>127</sup> As time went on, these Dutch 'great ships' as well as the warships were more and more heavily armed. The main convoy which returned from Smyrna to Amsterdam in the summer of 1665 consisted of seven vessels with from twenty to twenty-eight guns apiece, escorted by two warships.<sup>128</sup> The spring convoy of 1685 consisted of four 'great ships' of forty guns apiece.<sup>129</sup> Three 'great ships' sailing from Amsterdam to Livorno in May 1690 carried fifty-four, forty, and thirty-four guns respectively and together were manned by about 250 men.<sup>130</sup>

<sup>122</sup> Davis, 'Influences de l'Angleterre', 216, 219; Ralph Davis, *The Rise of the Atlantic Economies* (Ithaca and New York 1973) 183.

<sup>123</sup> Pieter de la Court, *Interest van Holland ofte Gronden van Hollands Welvaren* (Amsterdam 1662) 62.

<sup>124</sup> 'Koopmansadviezen', 51, 65.

<sup>125</sup> PRO SP 98/8. Finch to Arlington, Florence, 13 June 1667.

<sup>126</sup> ARH *Levantse Handel* vol. 122: 'Notitie van schepen in Smirna gearriveert en vertrocken anno 1662'.

<sup>127</sup> Brugmans, 'Notulen en monumenten', 308.

<sup>128</sup> PRO SP 94/49, fos. 22, 69.

<sup>129</sup> ARH *Levantse Handel* vol. 6, res. 14 February 1685.

<sup>130</sup> ARH *Levantse Handel* vol. 7, res. 2 May 1690.

In the years after 1670, when the third of the Dutch Levant Trade chambers was set up at Rotterdam, some of the smaller convoys were referred to as 'Rotterdam' convoys and some sort of division of labour between Amsterdam and Rotterdam does seem to have evolved.<sup>131</sup> Certainly Rotterdam came to play an increasingly significant part in the Dutch Levant trade in the last third of the century whilst the second chamber, that of the North Holland ports, lodged at Hoorn, with representatives from Hoorn, Enkhuizen and Medemblick, steadily waned in importance.<sup>132</sup> The fortunes of Hoorn's *straatvaart* diverged markedly from those of Amsterdam and Rotterdam because it consisted almost entirely of shipping Baltic grain to Italy, an activity which became less and less important from the late 1650s onwards. Meanwhile, there was also an up-and-coming involvement, at least in the western Mediterranean, on the part of Zeeland merchants and eventually, in 1690, it was decided to set up a fourth Levant Trade Chamber, at Middelburg.<sup>133</sup>

If the Dutch and English Levant trades of the seventeenth century reveal profound differences of structure, the same is true of these nations' traffic to Italy and the Venetian *stato del mar*. Here again, raw silks played a crucial role. England imported somewhat less silk from Italy than from Turkey; nevertheless, silks formed nearly half the total value of England's imports from Italy and provided the basis of her Italian trade. In the 1660s, for example, London merchants imported roughly half the quantity of silk (130,000lb) from Italy that they shipped from Turkey and practically nothing direct from Persia or the Far East, giving a grand total of some 400,000 lb yearly.<sup>134</sup> The Dutch by contrast were shipping in over 200,000 lb yearly from Persia, China, and Bengal on their East India ships and a substantial quantity, certainly not less than 50,000 lb yearly, from Archangel. On top of this, Amsterdam continued to receive sizeable amounts of silk from northern Italy overland, via Augsburg and Frankfurt, while the government in Brussels encouraged the Antwerp silk industry to import its raw silk overland from Italy rather than by sea, in Dutch ships, by offering special fiscal concessions.<sup>135</sup> All considered, therefore, it is not surprising that Holland's imports of raw silk from Italy by sea tended to be much smaller than England's.<sup>136</sup>

There were indeed also other strands of Italian trade heavily dominated by the English even while Holland's Mediterranean trade was at its height. Partly this was a matter of patterns of consumption in the home market and partly of division of labour with the Dutch. While Rotterdam and Amsterdam largely controlled the

<sup>131</sup> See, for instance, PRO SP 98/13, fo. 90. Dethick to Williamson, Livorno, 21 June 1671; on the establishing of the Rotterdam chamber which included representatives from Leiden and Dordrecht, see ARH Levantse Handel vol. 292, I; and D.W. Canneman, *Dissertatio historico-oeconomico-politica inauguralis de Batavorum mercatura Levantica* (The Hague 1839) 59-60; officially the Rotterdam directors were styled 'Directeuren van den Levantschen handel en navigatie in de Middellandsche zee op de Maze'.

<sup>132</sup> On the Hoorn chamber see ARH Levantse Handel 292, res. SG 10 March 1644; Canneman, *Dissertatio*, 62-63; down to the 1650s, in years when grain prices in Italy were high, Hoorn's role was certainly substantial; thus, in 1646 when some sixty-six vessels sailed from Amsterdam for the Mediterranean, at least another thirty sailed from Hoorn, see *Bronnen tot de geschiedenis van den Levantschen handel* I, 152.

<sup>133</sup> Canneman, *Dissertatio*, 64-65.

<sup>134</sup> British Library Add. Ms 36785, fos. 26v-27; Davis, 'English Imports from the Middle East', 199.

<sup>135</sup> Thijs, *De zijdenijverheid te Antwerpen*, 3-4.

<sup>136</sup> A mere 34, 3251b in 1646 and scarcely more in 1667/8, see Wätjen, *Niederländer im Mittelmeergebiet*, 256; Brugmans, 'Statistiek', 141.

distribution of French and Rhenish wines to northern Europe, they tended to ship relatively little wine from the Mediterranean at any rate until after 1672. The English, by contrast, shipped remarkably little French or German wine but sizeable quantities of southern wines, in the third quarter of the century, mainly from Spain and the Canaries. In the field of olive oil, the Dutch (after 1647) concentrated on Spanish oils, the English on Puglian and Gallipoli oils. As Sir Josiah Child noted 'our country consumes within itself more of Spanish wines and fruit, Zant currans and Levant oyls then any country in Europe'.<sup>137</sup> Every year, whole fleets of English ships, twenty together in February 1665 for example, entered the Mediterranean to 'load oils of Gallipoli and Puglia and currans of Zante'.<sup>138</sup> In the case of currants, it was certainly the heavy demand at home which provided the key to English control. According to the English consul at Venice, in 1672, it was especially England's women and children who demanded Zante currants for their 'cakes and mince-pyes'.<sup>139</sup>

But one simply can not infer a general English ascendancy in Italian trade between 1647 and 1688 from these specialised strands. Each in its own way is a special case. There were other sectors of Italian trade, involving both bulky and valuable merchandise where Dutch preponderance is just as obvious. Rice from the Po valley, for instance, was imported in only small amounts into England but was carried in some quantity by the Dutch both to Spain and to northern Europe. In 1646, 2,534,060 lb of Italian rice, worth £ 30,000, were imported to Amsterdam compared with only one fifth of this amount imported into England in 1663.<sup>140</sup> In 1646, Amsterdam imported 55,050 lb of Idrian quicksilver compared with far smaller quantities shipped to England; in the late seventeenth century, Holland exercised a virtual stranglehold over the distribution of Idrian quicksilver.<sup>141</sup> And then, of course, the Dutch virtually monopolised the shipping not just of grain to Italy but of Baltic naval stores, gunpowder, copper, and Russian products including caviare, most of which, as we have seen, was distributed from Livorno. On top of this we must take into account the enormous scale of Dutch pepper and spice consignments to Italy, Turkey, and Spain. In 1646, pepper and spices valued at over £ 60,000 accounted for more than a quarter of the value of all Dutch exports to Italy.<sup>142</sup> The Dutch Smyrna convoy, six 'great ships' and two men of war, which reached Livorno in September 1670, carried besides cloth, Spanish silver, and colonial dyestuffs, no less than 595,000 lb of pepper, in 1,700 bales, a quantity representing nearly ten per cent of Europe's total annual pepper consumption.<sup>143</sup> As a rule, the value of England's imports from Italy, boosted by the high cost of silk, greatly exceeded the value of her exports to Italy. England seems to have run a rather unfavourable balance of trade with the central Mediterranean, caused largely by

<sup>137</sup> Sir Josiah Child, *A New Discourse of Trade* (London 1693) preface.

<sup>138</sup> PRO SP 98/5. Read to Bennet, Livorno, 14 February 1665 and SP 98/11, fo. 17. Dethick to Williamson, Livorno, 19 May 1670.

<sup>139</sup> PRO SP 99/51. Doddington to Arlington, Venice, 11 March 1672; in 1669 more than six times as much Zante currants were shipped to London as had reached Amsterdam the previous year, British Library MS Add. 36785, fo. 47v; Brugmans, 'Statistiek', 144.

<sup>140</sup> British Library MS Add. 36785, fos. 26v-27, 52v-53; Wätjen, *Niederländer im Mittelmeergebiet*, 255.

<sup>141</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>142</sup> Ibidem, 296.

<sup>143</sup> PRO SP 98/11. Dethick to Williamson, Livorno, 8 September 1670.



the refusal of most of the Italian states to admit foreign woollen cloth.<sup>144</sup> The Dutch could not sell their *lakens* in Italy either, except to a small extent in Naples and Sicily. But they could and did sell to Italy large amounts of linen and camlets as well as spices and Baltic products. In short, there seems little doubt that the Dutch plied a more evenly balanced commerce with Italy than did their English rivals and that the value of their exports to Italy tended to exceed those of England. In 1663 and 1669, English exports to Italy (mostly 'new draperies') were worth £ 170,478 and £ 250,209 respectively.<sup>145</sup> Dutch exports just from Amsterdam by sea to Italy already reached £ 168,710 (1,855,815 guilders) as early as 1646 and that is without counting the value of the linens sent to Genoa and Venice overland, the Russian products shipped direct from Archangel to Livorno, or the large grain shipments by sea from Hoorn which, in 1646 (even if much of the grain was rye) must have been worth at least another £ 40,000.<sup>146</sup>

The fifth and last phase in the evolution of the Dutch *straatvaart* during Holland's golden age began with the outbreak of the Nine Years' War (1689-98) and continued down to the end of the Franco-Dutch conflict, in 1713. Braudel, who denies the impact of the Spanish embargoes in the first half of the century, also assures us that the efforts of the French state to subvert Dutch trade after 1667 were largely or wholly ineffective.<sup>147</sup> But, again, he is simply wrong. This fifth phase is characterised by relentless French pressure which drastically weakened the *straatvaart* though, of course, France could not wholly undermine Dutch navigation to the Mediterranean.

But why, one asks, should the Nine Years' War, and the War of the Spanish Succession (1702-13), have had an altogether severer and longer term impact on Dutch Mediterranean commerce than the three Anglo-Dutch wars (1652-4, 1665-67, and 1672-74) given that England surpassed France as a maritime power? At first glance this seems especially perplexing in that in the two later wars, England and the United Provinces were allied, the maritime powers possessing together an overwhelming naval superiority over France.

In fact, naval force was a relatively minor element in the situation. Down to 1688, the economic factors buttressing the Dutch *straatvaart*—Leiden *lakens*, heavy home demand for Turkish yarns, and Dutch primacy in Spanish trade—ensured rapid recovery from the Republic's maritime wars. Nor was Dutch sea-borne trade always paralysed by war. If the Dutch fared badly overall during the first Anglo-Dutch War (1652-4), they won in the Mediterranean, shutting the English out of southern Spain and blockading an English Smyrna fleet in Livorno. In January 1653, the English Levant Company lamented that for the present English Mediterranean trade was lost, the 'Dutch by giving protection to their merchants having now totally gained the same to the dishonour and losse of this nation'.<sup>148</sup> Attempts

<sup>144</sup> PRO SP 98/9, fos. 73, 181, 241-42, 330. Finch to Arlington, Florence, 5 March, 8 May, 24 July and 16 October 1668.

<sup>145</sup> British Library MS Add, 36785, fos. 21, 38v.

<sup>146</sup> ARH Levantse Handel 264, fos. 3v, 40; *Bronnen tot de geschiedenis van den Levantschen handel* I, 152; Wätjen, *Niederländer im Mittelmeergebiet*, 355.

<sup>147</sup> Braudel, *Civilisation matérielle* III, 217-218.

<sup>148</sup> PRO SP L05/151, P. 183.

to retrieve the trapped fleet were crushed by the Dutch in the battle off Livorno in March 1653. During the second Anglo-Dutch War (1665-67), there was deadlock in the Mediterranean which temporarily paralysed the trade of both sides. Briefly, it was the French who profited. But despite their 'now having the whole Levant trade' in their grasp, expert observers of the Mediterranean scene knew that this French predominance was built on flimsy foundations and would vanish as soon as Holland and England made peace.<sup>149</sup> For the French lacked manufactures suited to the Ottoman market.

Colbert, for his part, recognized that there could be no sustained French breakthrough in the Levant without first producing a French woollen cloth of high quality and competitive price. The French drive to undermine Anglo-Dutch commercial preponderance in Italy and Turkey was certainly well underway by the late 1660s and there can be no question that the initiative for this came not from merchants but from the state. Dutch skilled artisans were brought at government expense to Languedoc and settled at the two largest cloth factories under royal protection, at Saptès and Villenouvelle, to adapt the technical innovations which had given Leiden *lakens* their edge in quality and price over Venetian cloth.<sup>150</sup> The state helped the cloth producers of the Carcassonne region with procuring Spanish wool, by buying quantities of cloth and distributing them in Paris, with interest free loans and by paying money incentives to Marseille merchants to export the cloth to Smyrna.<sup>151</sup> By 1670, the Languedoc woollen industry was certainly producing 'draps fins de toutes sortes de couleurs, aussi beaux et aussi fins que ceux de Hollande'.<sup>152</sup> But for many years, the quantities reaching Smyrna were too small to make much impact. In the four years 1667-1670, only 859 Languedoc cloths in the Dutch style were exported to Turkey. And in the whole of the first seventeen years of Colbert's initiative (1666-1683) only 4,506 Languedoc fine cloths reached Smyrna.<sup>153</sup> It was not until 1685-6 that larger quantities were sent and that it was reported to Paris, for the first time, that sales of French cloth in Turkey were beginning to eat significantly into sales of Leiden *lakens*.<sup>154</sup> All reports confirm that it was the Dutch primarily, rather than the English, who suffered from this growing French encroachment. By 1698, Marseille merchants were selling 3,200 Languedoc cloths yearly in Turkey, valued at around £ 64,000.<sup>155</sup> By this date the French had conquered something like half of the former Dutch cloth market in the Ottoman empire. Moreover, in their attempts to counter the threat, Dutch merchants had been forced to drastically cut their prices.<sup>156</sup>

<sup>149</sup> PRO SP 98/7. Chillingworth to Arlington, Livorno, 23 August 1666 and Finch to Arlington, Florence, 26 October 1666.

<sup>150</sup> The basis of Leiden's superiority were technical innovations which were both labour-saving and economical in use of wool, see P. Boissonade, 'Colbert, son système et les entreprises industrielles d'état en Languedoc (1661-1683)', *Annales du Midi* 14 (1902) 11-12.

<sup>151</sup> *Ibidem*, 12-14; *Correspondance administrative sous la règne de Louis XIV* III, 508, 622-627, 643-644; Elzinga, *Het voorspel*, 126.

<sup>152</sup> Boissonade, 'Colbert', 12.

<sup>153</sup> *Ibidem*, 16-17.

<sup>154</sup> *Correspondance administrative sous le règne de Louis XIV* III, 650; *Recueil des Instructions*, 29, *Turquie*, 124.

<sup>155</sup> Boissonade, 'Colbert, son système et les entreprises industrielles', 27.

<sup>156</sup> *Bronnen tot de geschiedenis van den Levantschen handel* II, 262, 303-304; Robert Paris, *Histoire du commerce de Marseille: Le Levant (1600-1789)* (Paris 1957) 544.

Thus the outbreak of the Nine Years' War came just after the initial breakthrough of Carcassonne Dutch style woollens on the Ottoman market. The insecure conditions at sea affected all parties, the Dutch being forced to consolidate their Levant traffic into one annual convoy which clearly had many disadvantages from a commercial point of view.<sup>157</sup> Marseille now had a distinct edge over Amsterdam and London in that it was close enough to the Levant, and the Italian ports, to serve as an entrepot for the growing volume of local neutral shipping, chiefly Genoese and Livornese, which plied between Italy and the Levant.<sup>158</sup> Marseille was also a convenient entrepot for the Hanseatic shipping which now carried Levant goods from southern France to Spain and northern Europe.

As we see from Table 6, the volume of Dutch shipping entering the Mediterranean, as reflected in the *lastgeld* returns, fell off markedly during the Nine Years' War while the brief recovery in 1698-99 was not sustained in 1700 and 1701. Then, during the 1702-13 war, Dutch Mediterranean trade, again encumbered with high insurance costs and a rigid convoy discipline, suffered an even severer contraction than during the previous war. The number of Dutch merchant houses at Smyrna, having risen from around fifteen in the mid 1650s to about twenty-five by 1688 now steadily sank, reaching a nadir of only six or seven by 1719.<sup>159</sup>

Table 6: *Lastgeld* returns and numbers of Dutch ships entering the Mediterranean in 1645-48 and 1689-1725<sup>160</sup>

<i>Year</i>	<i>Lastgeld</i>	<i>ships</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Lastgeld</i>	<i>ships</i>
1645	8,701	(79)	1708	5,629	65
1646	10,480	(85)	1709	3,621	50
1647	12,124	(109)	1710	3,530	47
1648	12,980	(117)	1711	2,851	42
1689	(6,000)		1712	2,744	38
1690	(6,000)		1713	7,073	122
1694	20,511		1714	13,829	205
1697	6,567	60	1715	8,085	141
1698	16,577	147	1716	8,996	
1699	17,144	180	1718	6,883	
1700	9,701	105	1719	6,938	
1701	6,725	88	1720	5,291	
1702	4,757	50	1721	4,845	
1703	2,284	16	1722	9,364	
1704	3,638	33	1723	6,617	
1705	3,347	35	1724	6,369	
1706	5,298	56	1725	7,983	
1707	4,318	49			

<sup>157</sup> *Bronnen tot de geschiedenis van den Levantschen handel* II, 295-297, 310.

<sup>158</sup> Even in peace time most western shipping docking at Smyrna originated from Mediterranean ports; in January 1669, for instance, there were thirty vessels anchored at Smyrna, comprising a few large Dutch and English vessels and a majority of small ships mostly from Livorno, Genoa and Marseille, see ARH *Levantse Handel* 123/i. Jacob van Dam to Directors, Smyrna, 28 January 1669.

It was in fact precisely during the peace years 1698-1701, that the directors of the Dutch Levant Trade chambers in Holland, and their consuls in the Mediterranean, first realised just how serious was the structural crisis that now confronted them. By 1700, the Dutch consul at Smyrna estimated that average annual sales of Leiden *lakens* in the Levant had fallen by over half from the levels prevailing before 1689 and were now running at only about 2,500 yearly.<sup>161</sup> Not only were the French now selling more cloth than the Dutch in Turkey they were buying increasing quantities of mohair yarn as well as of cottons and silks. Some of the 'Turkish yarns' shipped to Marseille were being loaded there by Dutch vessels for Holland; but there were also increasing signs that more mohair was being used by manufacturers in France.<sup>162</sup> More Levant goods were also reaching Holland from London. In response to the crisis, the directors proposed that the States General now ban the indirect importing of Turkish merchandise, from France and England.<sup>163</sup> This proposal was widely debated, in the city councils of Leiden, Haarlem, Middelburg, Rotterdam and Amsterdam as well as in the States of Holland and among the Levant Trade chambers. But, as happened so often during the Dutch Golden Age, the interests of one grouping, the Levant merchants, now clashed head-on with those of another, the manufacturers of Leiden and Haarlem. Delegates from Leiden and Haarlem insisted that their factories and workshops already faced severe shortages of mohair yarns, silks, cottons and gall-nuts and that if the flow of Turkish raw materials from Marseille and London were cut off, the only result would be still graver shortages and higher prices.<sup>164</sup> Leiden and Haarlem were adamant and in the end no action could be taken.

In the years after the Treaty of Utrecht (1713), Dutch observers, such as Daniël Jean de Hochepped, consul at Smyrna, did not expect the Dutch Levant trade to recover to its former 'flourishing' state.<sup>165</sup> Even so, they were appalled by the almost total lack of recovery. 'Contrary to all expectation', Hochepped wrote from Smyrna, in Januari 1721, this traffic 'has declined more and more and now seems to be lapsing into total decay'. But he was in no doubt as to the reason. The French now seemingly held all the advantages and increasingly dominated commerce throughout the Near East. Their Languedoc woollens sold at lower prices than the Dutch and English equivalents and were preferred by the Turks also for their patterns and colours. Whereas once the Dutch and English had carried Turkey's exports of mohair yarn to the west, now the French alone carried 4,000 bales each

<sup>159</sup> ARH *Levantse Handel* 122. M. du Mortier to SG, Smyrna, 9 October 1657; W.E. van Dam, 'Eenige lotgevallen van Jacob van Dam, consul te Smirna van 1668-1688', *Bijdragen voor Vaderlandsche Geschiedenis en Oudheidkunde* 4th series 6 (1907), 121; *Bronnen tot de geschiedenis van den Levantschen handel* II, 299; G.R. Bossch-Erdbrink, *At the Threshold of Felicity. Ottoman-Dutch Relations during the Embassy of Cornelis Calkoen at the Sublime Porte, 1726-1744* (Ankara 1975) 33.

<sup>160</sup> The figures for the years 1645-1648, 1702-1715 and 1718-1725 are from *Bronnen tot de geschiedenis van den Levantschen handel* I, 152 and II, 30, 112, for the figures for 1689-1690, 1694, and 1697-1701, see ARH *Levantse Handel* 7, res. 22 August 1691, 8 res. 1 June 1695, 20 August 1698 and 26 October 1699 and vol. 9 res. 25 November 1700, 30 November 1701 and 13 September 1702; for the figure for 1716, see vol. 11 res. 18 December 1717.

<sup>161</sup> *Bronnen tot de geschiedenis van den Levantsche handel* II, 99, 303.

<sup>162</sup> *Ibidem*, 310.

<sup>163</sup> *Ibidem*, 98-104, 275-276, 303-305; see also ARH *Levantse Handel* 323, pp. 12-13. res. of the Middelburg chamber of the Levant Trade directors.

<sup>164</sup> *Bronnen tot de geschiedenis van den Levantsche handel* II, 98-99.

<sup>165</sup> *Ibidem* II, 373-374. Daniël de Hochepped to SG, Smyrna, 10 January 1721.

year, over two-thirds of the total supply.

By the 1720s, the Dutch Levant trade was at a strikingly low ebb. It had declined severely in absolute terms and not just relatively.<sup>166</sup> Since 1689 the structure of this trade had changed and become seriously weakened. This went hand in hand with a marked deterioration, since 1702, in Dutch trade with Spain. In some measure, these two processes were obviously linked, Holland now having less access to Spanish silver and losing much of the carrying trade between Spain and Italy. Both processes are also closely linked to the marked contraction in Dutch trade with Genoa, Livorno, and Venice which set in at the end of the seventeenth century.<sup>167</sup> Only Dutch trade with Marseille, buoyed by the re-export of Levant goods from that port remained vigorous in the early eighteenth century. But to see the development of Dutch Mediterranean commerce in the seventeenth century as just a process of rise and fall is to miss its essential features. Nothing could be more misleading than to contemplate the phenomenon in Braudel's terms as a long phase of expansion, down to 1650, followed by a long phase of contraction. What the evidence does show is a highly complex evolution through five phases, phases not just of expansion and contraction, but in which the structure of the *straatvaart*, using the term 'structure' in the specifically non-Braudelian sense intended here, is each time transformed. As each phase gives way to the next, a changed confluence of political and economic forces gives rise to a radically altered pattern of trade. And in each case it is the impact of state power on the market-place which is the *primum mobile* of change.

<sup>166</sup> Masson, *Histoire du commerce français dans le Levant au XVIIIe siècle*, 374-375; Bossch Erdbrink, *At the Threshold of Felicity*, 142; for the still influential view that from the end of the seventeenth century Dutch commerce declined relative to that of other powers but not in absolute terms, see Johann de Vries, *De economische achteruitgang der Republiek in de achttiende eeuw* (Amsterdam 1959) introduction.

<sup>167</sup> G.J. Hoogewerff, 'De Nederlandsch-Duitsche gemeente te Livorno en haar kerkhoff', *Mededelingen van het Nederlandsch Historisch Instituut te Rome* 7 (1927) 173-74.

## OLIVARES AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE SPANISH NETHERLANDS, 1621-1643

Ever since the 1550s the Spanish crown had become used to seeing the Netherlands, or that part of the Netherlands under its rule, as the strategic hub, the *place d'armes* (*plaza de armas*) of the Monarchy. Until Philip IV made Portugal the main theatre of Spanish operations following the Peace of the Pyrenees (1659), that is for over a century, the Netherlands were the principal pivot of Spanish hegemony or would-be hegemony in Europe. The Lerma years were, in important respects, an exception to this rule for Lerma's policy was to disengage in the north and reorientate Spain's basic aspirations towards the south.<sup>1</sup> But the basic thrust of Spanish strategy from the 1550s to 1659 was to shift the focus of struggle with France from Italy to the Low Countries, to seek to bridle France and overawe western Christendom from her northern stronghold.<sup>2</sup> The Netherlands, moreover, were admirably suited to this role given the conditions and character of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century warfare with its emphasis on the new-style fortifications impervious to artillery barrage. Consisting of a dense clustering of fortified towns and great fortresses, linked by waterways, canals and dikes, the whole country was an almost impenetrable defensive maze; while at the same time, with its advanced economy, equipped to maintain and supply without disruptive effects on the local populace even the largest standing army, it was the perfect base, being so close to Paris, from which to mount offensive pressure or the threat of it. From across the borders of Spain's all but impregnable Netherlands bastion both the Paris basin and the Rhineland lay alluringly open and accessible.

In his approach to the strategic possibilities of the Spanish Netherlands

<sup>1</sup> J.I. Israel, *The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World, 1606-1661* (Oxford 1982), 3-11, 17-18; it is worth pointing out (again) how misleading is Stradling's claim that Lerma had 'no positive or dynamic purposes', see R.A. Stradling, *Philip IV and the Government of Spain, 1621-1665* (Cambridge, 1988).

<sup>2</sup> J.I. Israel, 'Spanje en de Nederlandse Opstand', *Republiek tussen vorsten* ed. Frouke Wieringa (Amsterdam-Zutphen, 1984), 51-3; on the Spanish strategic debate in the 1550s, see M.J. Rodríguez-Salgado, *The Changing Face of the Empire. Charles V, Philip II and Habsburg Authority, 1551-1559* (Cambridge, 1988), 171-6.

Olivares stood much closer to Charles V, Philip II, and Spanish policy-makers of the late 1640s and 1650s than he did to Lerma. In some respects his approach was traditionalist. But there was also a marked streak of originality in Olivares' policy towards the Spanish Netherlands. The essential statecraft of the Conde Duque has been well characterized by John Elliott as a quest to weld the sprawling Spanish Monarchy into a more integrated whole, to achieve a 'genuine partnership' between Castile and the rest, to cut back maladministration and corruption, to mobilize the empire's resources more efficiently, to revive commerce and industry, and insofar as 'customary rights and constitutions' impeded the attainment of these goals to sweep them aside.<sup>3</sup> No sooner do we pose the question of the Conde Duque's impact on life, war and politics in the Spanish Netherlands than we encounter a complex mixture of tradition and innovation.

But it needs to be emphasized that even that part of Olivares' approach to the Spanish Netherlands which was traditional involved a process of forceful reassertion, fraught with drama and tension. For the suspension of Spain's traditional post-1550 relationship with the Netherlands during the Lerma period had been a prolonged one. Indeed, during the Lerma years the South Netherlands had stood in a looser relationship to the Spanish crown than did Spain's other European dependencies: Portugal, Naples and Lombardy. Admittedly, the formal independence conceded to the Archdukes by the dying Philip II in 1598 was in many respects a sham.<sup>4</sup> The army of Flanders continued to be the main armament of the Monarchy and continued to be paid by, and remained under oath to, the king of Spain. The three most crucial strongholds of the country – the citadels of Antwerp, Ghent and Cambrai – as well as an assortment of lesser ones, remained firmly under the thumb of Spanish garrisons and governors. The Archdukes' foreign policy was, in most respects, thoroughly subordinate to that of Spain. Furthermore, Albert and Isabella generally made little effort to oppose Spanish requirements and demands. Albert, for example, though it went against his own inclinations, on being prodded by the then Spanish minister at Brussels, Don Balthasar de Zúñiga (Olivares' uncle) entered fully into the Spanish general embargo against Dutch trade and shipping of the years 1598-1608.<sup>5</sup> Yet, even though the South Netherlands of the Archdukes was,

<sup>3</sup> J.H. Elliott, *The Count-Duke of Olivares. The Statesman in an Age of Decline* (New Haven and London, 1986), 676-7, 680-1.

<sup>4</sup> J. Lefèvre, 'Les ambassadeurs d'Espagne à Bruxelles sous le règne de l'Archiduc Albert', *Revue Belge de Philologie et d'Histoire* ii (1923), 64-7; H. de Schepper, 'De katholieke Nederlanden van 1589 tot 1609', *Algemene Geschiedenis der Nederlanden* vi (Haarlem, 1979), 290-2.

<sup>5</sup> De Schepper, loc.cit.; J. de Sturler, 'Un épisode de la politique douanière des Archiducs: l'expérience de Juan de Gauna (1603-1605)', *Revue de l'Université de Bruxelles* xlii (1936/7), 364, 371, 385.

unquestionably, a satellite of Spain, it was still the case that Albert and Isabella maintained an ostensibly sovereign court with the ability to distribute favours and posts, confer ennoblement, and conduct an apparently independent diplomacy. It was also they who administered justice and collected taxes and who, through a lavish programme of artistic and ecclesiastical patronage, built up their local prestige and authority. The trappings of independence together with the development of a courtly culture and system of patronage based on Brussels inevitably whetted the appetite of the Flemish and Walloon nobility to play a more conspicuous part than they had been able to do since the 1580s in the political, administrative, military and diplomatic life of their provinces.<sup>6</sup>

Furthermore, during the period 1598-1618 Lerma's innovative imperial strategy encouraged this distancing of the South Netherlands provinces from Castile, lessening the emphasis on their function as Spain's principal military base. For Philip III's favourite strove for a lasting peace with the Dutch rebels, first through his secret peace feelers to The Hague of 1606-7 and then again, in 1612, with Rodrigo Calderón's secret mission to the Netherlands, offering to abandon Spanish sovereignty over the northern Netherlands provinces, and concede the Dutch outright political and religious independence from Spain, in exchange for Dutch evacuation of all the Indies, 'east and west'.<sup>7</sup> At the same time Lerma set to work to exploit Spain's traditional anti-Moslem fervour, endeavouring to redirect Castilian aspirations southwards towards North Africa, Italy and the Levant. Accordingly, in his Low Countries policy, the duke tended to encourage Albert and Isabella in their quasi-independence from Spain, as well as in their efforts to minimize friction with the French, the German Protestants, and, after 1607, with the Dutch.<sup>8</sup>

The Archdukes were greatly helped by their harmonious working relationship with Lerma and remained in close touch with him by means of correspondence and through their agents at Madrid. With Lerma's backing they consolidated their position and their prestige, as well as that of the Catholic Church, in the southern Netherlands, not least by diverting large resources from the military sector for use in other spheres. As a result of Lerma's statecraft, the army of Flanders was drastically cut as from 1608, falling within a few years from 60,000 to

<sup>6</sup> De Schepper, loc.cit., 283-4; Victor Brants, *La Belgique au XVII<sup>e</sup> siècle, Albert et Isabelle. Etudes d'histoire politique et sociale* (Louvain-Paris, 1910) 16, 27; J. Lefèvre, *Spinola et la Belgique* (Brussels, 1947), 15, 23-8, 51.

<sup>7</sup> Israel, *The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World*, 12-14, 20-1.

<sup>8</sup> J. Lefèvre, 'L'intervention du duc de Lerme dans les affaires des Pays-Bas (1598-1618),' *Revue Belge de Philologie et d'Histoire* xviii (1939), 478-81.



under 20,000 men.<sup>9</sup> The Archdukes drew great benefit from this, on the one hand basking in a relaxation of fiscal pressure on their war-ravaged country while at the same time being able to increase massively their spending on ecclesiastical and secular building, patronage, and creation of new posts.<sup>10</sup> A frenzy of church-building such as was unique in the history of the southern Netherlands, was set in motion. Albert assiduously flattered the nobility drawing them to his court with a lavish distribution of favours and offices, in some cases using money remitted from Madrid specifically for the upkeep of the army and the fortifications. While the Archdukes took good care not to convene the States General again after their difficult experiences with that body in 1600, they took pains to foster good relations with the provincial estates with the result that the latter tended to increase their hold over the fiscal process and to air their constitutional pretensions with enhanced boldness.<sup>11</sup> With the army's troop strength drastically reduced, it was an easy matter for the Archdukes to win added popularity locally by cancelling most of the billeting of soldiery on the citizenry, relocating the remaining troops in purpose-built barracks which Albert now had constructed right across the South Netherlands from Dunkirk to Geldern.<sup>12</sup> A leading member of the Council of State in Madrid commented sarcastically after Albert's death that he had been such a 'good prince' that he had treated the populace of the southern Netherlands 'more like children than subjects'.<sup>13</sup>

Many of the changes in the South Netherlands which we associate with the Olivares era began in fact in the wake of Lerma's downfall in 1618. The rapid expansion of Spanish military and naval power in the 'loyal' Netherlands began immediately. The dispatch from Madrid to Brussels, in July 1618, of the hard-line *marqués de Bedmar*, bearing highly detailed instructions drawn up by the new regime, put an end to the pampering of the South Netherlands under lax supervision from Spain.<sup>14</sup> Zúñiga realised that the 'obedient' provinces had now to be more rigorously disciplined and subordinated to Castilian control if Spain's wider imperial goals in Europe were to be attainable. If the southern Netherlands were once more to function as the main *plaza de armas* from which Spain sought to dominate Europe, checking France

<sup>9</sup> Geoffrey Parker, *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, 1567-1659* (Cambridge, 1972), appendix A.

<sup>10</sup> Brants, *ibid.*; H. de Schepper, 'Belgium Nostrum' 1500-1650. *Over integratie en desintegratie van het Nederland* (Antwerp, 1987), 34.

<sup>11</sup> Brants, *La Belgique*, 52-7.

<sup>12</sup> See, for instance, F. Nettesheim, *Geschichte der Stadt und des Amtes Geldern* (Crefeld, 1863), 372.

<sup>13</sup> Archivo General de Simancas (hereafter AGS) Estado 2037. *Consulta of the Consejo de Estado*, Madrid, 14 April 1623, fo. 3.

<sup>14</sup> Lefèvre, 'Les ambassadeurs d'Espagne', 76.

and the Dutch and intervening at will in Germany, then Spanish control at Brussels had to be made more effective, the army of Flanders vastly expanded, the contributions of the 'loyal' provinces very substantially increased, remittances from Spain boosted, and extensive new billeting arrangements for the additional soldiery imposed on the South Netherlands towns.

Part of this ambitious programme was achieved before Albert's death in July 1621. In three years the army of Flanders trebled in size, a good deal of work was done on improving the country's fortifications, and the plans for the establishment of a royal armada in the Flemish sea-ports had begun to be implemented under the supervision of the Spanish official, Juan de Villela.<sup>15</sup> Even so, Albert was undoubtedly a restraining influence during these years, especially in the spheres of taxation, expenditure and patronage and at the time of the popular protests and disturbances in Brussels, in 1620, intervened forcefully to prevent the use of Spanish troops to suppress their 'insolence'.<sup>16</sup> Only after Albert's demise and the formal reversion of the South Netherlands to the Spanish crown, in accordance with the provisions of the testaments of Philip II and Philip III in the event that Albert should die childless, was the way opened for a more radical, far-reaching programme of political and administrative reform. Isabella, now Philip IV's regent, was instructed as to whom she must consult in making decisions and appointments. Albert had already kept the grand *Conseil d'état*, staffed by the country's leading seigneurs to one side, preferring to control the administration through a small inner commission of officials several of whom were Spaniards.<sup>17</sup> But there was now a total separation between the old *Conseil d'état* whose functions were henceforth largely ceremonial – though the title of *conseiller d'Etat* remained a prestigious one – and the small, secretive body of jurists and Spanish officers who actually ruled the country. To liaise with the regent and her advisers on administrative matters, patronage and appointments, the king in 1621 revived the former Council of Flanders at Madrid. Matters of high policy affecting the 'loyal' Netherlands remained the responsibility of the Spanish Council of State.

Zúñiga and his colleagues reversed Lerma's priorities. They forged closer links between Castile and the Spanish Netherlands. Whereas Lerma and Albert had wanted to renew the Twelve Years' Truce, on its expiry in 1621, Zúñiga opposed the making of any new deals with the

<sup>15</sup> J. Alcalá-Zamora y Queipo de Llano, *España, Flandes y el Mar del Norte* (Barcelona, 1975), 156–7; Israel, *The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World*, 166.

<sup>16</sup> Lefèvre, 'Les ambassadeurs d'Espagne', 79.

<sup>17</sup> De Schepper, 'De katholieken Nederlanden', 284; P. Janssens, 'L'échec des tentatives de soulèvement aux Pays Bas sous Philippe IV (1621–1665)', *Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique* 92 (1978), 111–12.

Dutch unless, and until, the latter were prepared to make much more extensive concessions to Spanish interests than had been the case in 1609. It is not that Zúñiga believed the reconquest of the rebel northern provinces by Spain to be a practicable proposition. On the contrary, he fully realised that Spain could now no longer hope to reconquer the Dutch provinces, given the strength of their defences, their great forces on land and sea and their various alliances.<sup>18</sup> Nevertheless, he was adamant that Spain must revert to war with the Dutch unless adequate concessions were forthcoming. This would be a war of attrition designed to wear the Dutch down. For until the 'rebel' provinces could be weakened sufficiently to compel them to evacuate the Indies, re-open the Scheldt and allow the public practice of Catholicism in their territory no settlement with them could be acceptable, secure or honourable for Spain.

Zúñiga and his noble allies at Madrid were perfectly aware that Albert's death opened the way not only to a tighter Spanish grip over the South Netherlands and a more efficient military and naval build-up but also to far-reaching administrative and fiscal reform. At the meeting of the Council of State in Madrid which considered the news of Albert's demise, the duke del Infantado, one of Zúñiga's allies, declared that government finance and military administration in the South Netherlands had languished in deplorable 'disorder' for years due to the fact that whilst the Archduke had lived Spínola, who could never be moved to oppose the man who had made his career possible in anything, had been utterly impervious to pressure for change from Madrid; now that Albert was dead, he insisted it was vital to press on with stringent reform at once; for if the administration of the South Netherlands was not now rigorously taken in hand by Spanish ministers all the additional money which Castile was now remitting to the South Netherlands to finance the military and naval build-up might just as well 'be thrown in the street'.<sup>19</sup> Another minister, the conde de Benavente, commented that with Albert's death, the Spanish crown could now syphon off much of the cash being raised by the provincial estates of the South Netherlands for other purposes to help pay the upkeep of the army of Flanders thereby relieving some of the pressure on Castile itself.<sup>20</sup>

But there was to be no clean sweep in the Spanish Netherlands in 1621. With a major war now in progress and a vast military machine to manage, it was essential to ensure stability and continuity as well as greater administrative and financial efficiency. Isabella, who was held to

<sup>18</sup> Archives Générales du Royaume, Brussels (hereafter AGR) SEG 183, fos.168-70. Zúñiga to Juan de Ciriza, Madrid, 7 April 1619.

<sup>19</sup> Archivo General de Simancas (hereafter AGS) Estado 2035. Consulta of 30 July 1621, fo.3. 'Voto del duque del Infantado'.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, fo.5. 'Voto del conde de Benavente'.

enjoy the love and esteem of the common people, was retained as the king's regent and Spínola, regarded in Madrid as indispensable, as commander of the army. This made it inevitable that there should be a basic split in the government at Brussels with those who were identified with the Albertine legacy and local interests on the one hand, and the 'Spanish' party, those who were, or who made themselves, the instruments of closer control from Madrid.<sup>21</sup> On the one side were Isabella, Spínola, Chancellor Peckius of Brabant (all advocates of peace with the Dutch) and other leading officials and nobles of the provincial assemblies, on the other the king's chief minister at Brussels during the 1620s, the marqués de Bedmar (subsequently cardinal de la Cueva), the Spanish *tercio* commanders and governors of the main fortresses who were mostly hostile to Spínola (of whom they were openly jealous), and a handful of local nobles and jurists, such as the comte de Coupigny, a leading figure in the financial administration, and Pieter Roose who was to be Olivares' right-hand man, men who built their careers on their unswerving devotion to the service of the crown.

In the years 1621-2, before Olivares emerged as the dominant voice in Spanish policy-making, the tendency among Spanish ministers was to support the views of the 'Spanish' party at Brussels and to strengthen their hand in the running of the Spanish Netherlands and the army of Flanders. Ministers agreed with the conde de Salazar, one of the leading Spaniards in the South Netherlands, that the local nobles were not men in whom the king could have full confidence. In August 1621 Philip IV instructed Isabella that the 'government of the strongholds which are now in the hands of Spaniards have to be kept in Spanish hands when they become vacant and in those which are newly captured, where it is convenient, you should also appoint Spaniards'.<sup>22</sup> For a time this was the policy adopted. When Jülich fell to the arms of Philip IV in January 1622, for example, the Infanta named Diego Salcedo as the town's new military governor. It was also laid down that as far as possible the new royal *armada* of Flanders whose ships were now under construction at Dunkirk and Ostend should be placed under Spanish commanders.<sup>23</sup>

Olivares was as determined as any of the king's ministers to make the partnership of Spain and the Spanish Netherlands more effective in every way possible. This relationship was the strategic lynch-pin of the empire. But he was also extremely wary of trying to achieve this simply by denying positions of power to non-Spaniards and discriminating in

<sup>21</sup> R. Delplanche, *Un légiste anversois au service de l'Espagne, Pierre Roose, Chef-Président du Conseil-Privé des Pays-Bas (1586-1673)* (Brussels, 1945), 25; P. Janssens, 'De landvoogdij van Isabella, 1621-1633', *Algemene Geschiedenis der Nederlanden* vi, 380.

<sup>22</sup> Archives Générales du Royaume (hereafter AGR), Secrétairerie de l'Etat et de Guerre (SEG), 186. Philip to Isabella, Madrid, 23 October 1621.

<sup>23</sup> AGR SEG 185, fo. 184. Archduke Albert to Philip IV, Brussels, 30 April 1621.

military and administrative appointments against the local nobility. The great danger in the policy advocated by the 'Spanish' party at Brussels, as Olivares seems to have grasped, and taken to heart, in a way that his colleagues at Madrid mostly did not, was that nothing would be gained by antagonizing local opinion in the South Netherlands, Spínola included, by foisting on the country too many Spaniards and Spanish points of view. Olivares recognized Spínola's greatness as a commander and refused to undermine his authority over the army even after the disastrous failure of the siege of Bergen-op-Zoom, during the summer of 1622, and his inexplicable (and highly damaging) inertia during the summer of 1623 when the strategic situation in Germany, favourable to Spain, forced the Dutch to split their forces and when criticism of the great Italian amongst the Spanish *maestres de campo* in Flanders waxed to unprecedented levels.<sup>24</sup> One of Olivares' earliest direct interventions in Netherlands affairs was to reject pressure for closer supervision of Spínola's conduct of the war from Madrid, arguing that many promising enterprises in the past had been damaged in the Spanish Monarchy through failure to allow those entrusted with their execution enough freedom of action.<sup>25</sup>

Nor did Olivares subscribe to the view that key military commands in the Low Countries should, as a matter of course, be denied to the local nobility and entrusted to Spaniards. By the mid 1620s the policy in the Spanish Netherlands was to show full confidence in the loyalty and military ability of local nobles. When Breda was captured in 1625, this, a garrison of crucial significance, was entrusted to the baron de Balançon and his *tercio* of Walloon and Burgundian troops.<sup>26</sup> 'S-Hertogenbosch (Bois-le-Duc), the most crucial of all the Spanish strongholds under threat in the late 1620s in the Low Countries, a stronghold which commanded a large and populous region, was entrusted to Anthonie, baron van Grobbendonck. Still more striking was the controversial decision to place the entire army of Flanders under the supreme command of count Hendrik van den Bergh at the time of Spínola's departure for Spain, in 1628. Van den Bergh was a nobleman whose loyalty it was important to the crown to retain, being governor of the Overkwartier region of Roermond and Venlo, a personage of great influence in the Maas valley and considerable military experience. Of all

<sup>24</sup> AGS Estado 2037. Consulta 14 June 1623.

<sup>25</sup> AGS Estado 2037. Consulta 10 May 1623, 'voto' of Olivares: 'y estando tan apartadas aquellas provincias tendria por mas combiniente que se prosiguiese en la confianza que se ha hecho, sin acortar la mano por ningun caso, pues es lo que mas obliga a las personas de partes, por que la execucion y resolucion pende dellos con lo qual no les quede escusa ninguna como les quedaria en caso que se les mandase executar . . .'

<sup>26</sup> V.A.M. Beerman and J.L.M. de Lepper, 'De lotgevallen van de stad', *Geschiedenis van Breda* ii (Schiedam, 1977), 57-8.

the South Netherlanders entrusted with high military responsibility by Olivares, he and Jan van Nassau were the most prominent. But he was also on lamentably bad terms with the senior Spanish officers of the army several of whom, at a critical juncture in 1624, had pointedly refused to serve under him. Furthermore, his family was linked with the House of Orange and it was alleged that his sisters (with whom he was rumoured to live in incestuous intimacy) held Protestant sympathies. It was thus no small thing that the king, at Olivares' insistence, confirmed early in 1629 that van den Bergh was to be commander-in-chief during Spínola's absence, expressly commanding that the senior Spanish *maestres de campo* in the Netherlands, Francisco de Medina and Juan Bravo, were to serve under him.<sup>27</sup>

This was a major Olivarist initiative. Van den Bergh was the only Netherlander ever to command the army of Flanders. It was not long though before a flood of criticism of his incompetent conduct of the disastrous 1629 campaign shook even the Conde-Duque's confidence in him. But he was left ostensibly in charge for the time being. Isabella being secretly instructed not to reveal that the king had lost confidence in him, until he was relieved of his command during 1630.<sup>28</sup> Two years later, during the desperate military crisis of 1632, the count betrayed his monarch and defected to the Dutch. This fiasco was no doubt intensely embarrassing for Olivares personally and eliminated any possibility of another Netherlander being appointed to supreme command. Inevitably this sorry experience heightened Olivares' wariness of the South Netherlands nobility as a whole. But while van den Bergh's treason was a bitter humiliation for Olivares' policy of entrusting more key posts in the empire to non-Castilians, and in the Spanish Netherlands that policy was now modified, the Conde Duque was by no means yet willing to abandon a policy which he saw as fundamental to the survival of the Monarchy.

Olivares, immersed in his schemes to achieve a greater integration of the parts and peoples of the empire, continued to seek the trust and co-operation of the local nobility at any rate for a time. He needed their military support and their services as garrison and *tercio* commanders. He needed their backing in the provincial estates without whose collaboration taxation could not be increased and recruiting, billeting, and many other processes directly linked to the war-effort could not be effectively organized. He also needed the consent and participation of the local nobility if his Union of Arms project was to have any real meaning in the Spanish Netherlands context. This meant that the Conde Duque

<sup>27</sup> AGR SEG 200, fo.138. Philip IV to Isabella, Madrid, 5 April 1629.

<sup>28</sup> AGR SEG 201, fo.265. Philip IV to Isabella, Madrid, 9 October 1629; Archivo Histórico Nacional, Madrid, Estado legajo 727. 'Voto del conde mi señor [Olivares] sobre cosas de Flandes' (September 1629), fo.10.<sup>v</sup>.

was compelled to set himself, as he had done from the outset, against the preferences and prejudices of the 'Spanish' party in the army of Flanders and in the central government at Brussels. The Conde Duque doubtless had little patience for the persistent political demands of the provincial estates such as their pleas for the government of the country to revert to that presided over, as in the days before the coming of the Duke of Alva, by a powerful *Conseil d'Etat* staffed by the 'principaulx seigneurs et officiers de guerre naturels du pays'.<sup>29</sup> Nor had he the slightest intention of permitting a further increase in the influence of the estates. But if his broad vision of the future of the Monarchy was to have any meaning he had to listen and respond to the complaints about the paucity of senior military and administrative positions being assigned to native Netherlanders not only in the Spanish Netherlands proper but also in the neighbouring Spanish-occupied areas of Germany where the main Spanish strongholds – Wesel, Rheinberg, Lingen, Jülich, and Orsoy – though partly garrisoned by Walloon soldiery were exclusively under Spanish commanders.<sup>30</sup>

The introduction of the Union of Arms into the Spanish Netherlands has hitherto received scant attention from historians. During the mid 1620s the essence of Olivares' policy in the Spanish Netherlands was to change fundamentally the balance of cost of the war with the Dutch by placing the army of Flanders on the defensive, as was done following the Breda campaign (1625), and reducing the army's troop strength substantially while simultaneously boosting the proportion of the cost of its upkeep paid by the 'loyal' provinces.<sup>31</sup> Meanwhile pressure was to be kept up on the Dutch by means of the war at sea and a general river embargo, designed to stop the traffic on all the waterways linking the South Netherlands and Germany with Dutch territory. In the context of the Union of Arms, Olivares originally hoped to coax the provinces of the Spanish Netherlands into assuming responsibility for maintaining 20,000 troops, half of the projected total force of infantry required under the new strategy, leaving 20,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry to be provided by the rest of the Monarchy.<sup>32</sup> However, neither Isabella nor Spínola proved at all responsive to the scheme. Implementation of the Union in the Spanish Netherlands began only in September 1627 with the arrival of Olivares' kinsman, the marqués de Leganés, with

<sup>29</sup> See States of Artois to Philip IV, Arras, 8 March 1630 in Ch. Hirschauer *Les Etats d'Artois de leurs origines à l'occupation française, 1340-1640* (2 vols. Paris-Brussels, 1923) i, 352 and ii, 203.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*; British Library (hereafter BL) MS Add. 14007, fo. 427; for similar complaints about the lack of positions for 'gens de guerre de la nation', see M. Gachard (ed.) *Actes des Etats Généraux de 1632* (Brussels, 1853), 40-5.

<sup>31</sup> Israel, *The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World*, 162-6.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*; AGS Estado 2040 'El Conde Duque sobre la forma en que se podría encaminar en Flandes lo de la Union'; Elliott, *The Count-Duke of Olivares*, 271-7.

instructions to put the Union to the provincial assemblies.

Leganés lost no time in getting down to business, laying the terms of the proposed Union before the estates of the two most important provinces, Brabant and Flanders, on 23 and 27 September respectively.<sup>33</sup> It should be noted that Olivares' Union of Arms in the Spanish Netherlands required a commitment from the 'loyal' provinces not only to shoulder more of the cost of the war, while Castile shouldered less, but also a willingness to go on indefinitely with what the Conde Duque envisaged as a long war of attrition. For both these reasons, Leganés put great emphasis on this being a war in the interest not only of the Monarchy as a whole but also of the 'loyal' Netherlands specifically. His addresses to the South Netherlands provincial assemblies are indeed striking examples of Olivarist propaganda. In Olivares' statecraft genuine religious motivation played little (if any) role. But when it came to persuading the South Netherlanders that the Dutch war was their war, and that they must take over a larger part of the burden of it, Olivares had no inhibitions about depicting the conflict – which in fact was being fought for reasons of *reputación*, and Spanish and Portuguese maritime and colonial interest – as essentially a struggle to safeguard and consolidate Catholicism in the South Netherlands. Leganés argued that the prolonged conflict with the Dutch was unavoidable because they would only permit the public exercise of Catholicism in their territory if the king allowed Calvinist preaching in his 'loyal' provinces and this, if conceded, would, as had been shown by the aftermath of the Pacification of Ghent of 1576, lead to the rapid disintegration of Catholic worship in the southern provinces.

Whatever they thought of this argument, the southern provinces did, one by one, agree to enter into 'Olivares' 'buena, perpetua e ynseparable union de armas', on condition that the rest of the king's dominions did likewise, as Aragon, Valencia, Sardinia and Mallorca already had, and provided also that certain other conditions were met. In particular, the 'loyal' provinces demanded more military and administrative posts for the local nobility.<sup>34</sup> By December 1627 all the southern provinces had consented and this was both represented at the time, and has been since, as a resounding success for Olivares' statecraft.<sup>35</sup> But is this view of the matter correct? How much substance was there to Olivares' Union of Arms in the Spanish Netherlands? The great seventeenth-century Dutch

<sup>33</sup> BL Ms. Add. 14007, fos. 365-7; Lieuwe van Aitzema, *Historie of verhael van saken van staet en oorlogh in, ende ontrent de Vereenigde Nederlanden* (14 vols. The Hague, 1667-71) ii, 412-20.

<sup>34</sup> BL MS Add, 14007, fo. 367.

<sup>35</sup> H. Lonchay, J. Cuvelier and J. Lefèvre (eds.) *Correspondance de la Cour d'Espagne sur les affaires des Pays-Bas au XVII<sup>e</sup> siècle* (6 vols. Brussels, 1923-37), ii, 525, 530; Elliott, *The Count-Duke of Olivares*, 275.



chronicler Lieuwe van Aitzema for one dismissed the whole exercise as a dead letter on account of the comparatively small number of troops the 'royal Netherlands' in fact agreed to maintain – only 12,000 men, a mere fifth of the numbers maintained at that time by the United Provinces, and also because of the conditions attached and the southern provinces' generally uncooperative attitude.<sup>36</sup> Certainly it is true that the ordinary subsidies of the States of Flanders to the crown, having risen substantially in the early 1620s, did not rise any further in the years following the introduction of the Union of Arms.<sup>37</sup>

In Olivares' eyes the main point of the exercise was to secure a hefty reduction in the proportion of the army of Flanders's costs being shouldered by Castile. In fact the 12,000 men paid for by the 'loyal' Netherlands did represent a sharply rising proportion of the army in the late 1620s but this was only because the Conde Duque insisted, against the advice of other ministers, on cutting the army to the bone, indeed far below the level which Spínola regarded as safe.<sup>38</sup> This precipitated a series of bitter clashes with Spínola who now returned to Spain, leaving responsibility for an army which did indeed prove too weak to stand up to the Dutch, to others. Thus it was not only the Mantuan war and the loss of the Mexican silver fleet of 1628 to Piet Heyn which so gravely weakened Spain's position in the Netherlands in the late 1620s, leading to the disastrous defeats of 1629 and 1632. At the root of it all lay Olivares' unrealistic Low Countries strategy. By the early 1630s the army of Flanders had once again to be greatly expanded, the burden falling principally on Spain and Spanish Italy.

The military disasters of 1629, especially the loss of 's-Hertogenbosch, the gateway and bastion of the whole of the Meierij, a region comprising 140 villages and forty monasteries as well as the unfortified towns of Helmond and Eindhoven, transformed the strategic situation, plunging the Spanish Netherlands into profound crisis. In the 'loyal' provinces the defeats precipitated a powerful back-lash both against the war and the Spaniards, who were universally blamed for the catastrophe. In her panic, Isabella informed the king that there was now open talk that the provincial estates should take matters into their own hands and 'to save themselves' open peace negotiations with the Dutch which, she remarked in anticipation of Olivares' and the king's reaction, 'sería la total ruina'.<sup>39</sup> While the cardinal de la Cueva emphasized the general loathing of the South Netherlanders for 'our nation', Isabella identified the cardinal as being especially detested by the people and nobility alike.

<sup>36</sup> Aitzema, *Historie* ii, 420.

<sup>37</sup> J. Dhondt and H. van Houtte (eds.) *Tafels van de resolutieboeken der Staten van Vlaanderen (1580-1656)* (2 vols. Brussels, 1936-41) i, 95, 107, 112.

<sup>38</sup> Israel, *The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World*, 162-5.

<sup>39</sup> AGR SEG 201. Isabella to Philip IV, Brussels, 28 September 1629.

She pleaded for a royal settlement with the Dutch, to forestall the southern provincial estates, on whatever terms could be secured.

There was indeed a marked restlessness among the Flemish and Walloon nobility in the autumn of 1629 as well as unmistakable signs of popular agitation and cases of Protestant sympathizers at Antwerp and Ghent, aroused by the prospect of further Dutch successes, hurling stones at Catholic images.<sup>40</sup> In this tense situation the duke of Aerschot and the archbishop of Mechelen assumed the role of intermediaries between the illegal gatherings of nobles in various provinces and the government in Brussels. Philippe-Charles, duke of Aerschot, governor of Namur and a member of the *Conseil d'Etat*, was the first of the noblesse of Brabant and hitherto had been a close supporter of Isabella. Now, albeit tentatively and discreetly, he put himself at the head of the moderate opposition to royal policy. The universal mood was one of bitter criticism of the conduct of affairs in the South Netherlands since the death of the Archduke Albert. Despite the fact that many of the Spaniards in the country had married local noblewomen,<sup>41</sup> the South Netherlands nobility's most powerful grievance was their resentment over the role of the Spaniards in their country. The nobles, in their petition to Isabella, blamed the Spaniards for every military disaster reaching back to the battle of Nieuwpoort (1600), the loss of 's-Hertogenbosch being expressly pinned on the Spanish administration in Brussels, which had allegedly neglected to supply the brave baron Grobbendonck with sufficient powder.<sup>42</sup> While the nobles 'of this land' were fighting the war on behalf of the king 'risking their lives for little or no reward', they complained, the pick of the posts in the army and administration were still being assigned to Spaniards who have come to the Netherlands and are 'mostly very poor and of no merit'.<sup>43</sup>

But the clamour was not just for more positions. The high noblesse were now stirring up the estates to resist further royal fiscal demands, and to press harder for an increased political role for the provinces, as well as for the king to revert to the pre-Alva system of government through a *Conseil d'état* constituted of the 'principaulx seigneurs' of the country.<sup>44</sup> The deputies of the towns to the States of Hainault were called on by a leading magnate, Albert de Ligne, prince de Barbançon, to refuse further *aides* to the government until the crown agreed to convene the States General to redress the provinces' grievances.<sup>45</sup> The States of

<sup>40</sup> AGS Estado 2322. Cardinal de la Cueva to Philip IV, Brussels, 9 and 18 September 1629; M. Gachard, 'Philippe-Charles, prince-comte d'Arenberg, duc d'Aerschot', in his *Etudes et notices historiques concernant l'histoire des Pays Bas* (3 vols. Brussels, 1890) ii, 165-6.

<sup>41</sup> J. Lefèvre, 'La compénétration hispano-belge aux Pays-Bas catholiques pendant le XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle', *Revue Belge de Philologie et d'Histoire* xvi (1937), 605-7.

<sup>42</sup> BL MS ADD.14007, fos.427-8.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, fo.428.

Brabant refused for many months to pay further *aides* for the upkeep of the army. Ironically, at least one of the disaffected nobles, van den Bergh, had just been named by the king as one of those whom Isabella was to consult in her secret truce feelers to the Dutch, along with De la Cueva, Balançon, and the ultra loyal Hainault noble, Claude de Lannoy, comte de la Motterie and governor of Maastricht.<sup>46</sup>

The crisis in the Spanish Netherlands in turn provoked deep dismay at Madrid. Aghast the king resolved to go in person to the Low Countries to retrieve the situation and it was all the Conde Duque could do to hold him back. Olivares himself, though seized by severe bouts of depression, adhered doggedly to the view (which now had few further advocates) that there could be no settlement with the Dutch 'rebels' until Spain had weakened them sufficiently to extract '*condiciones razonables*'. He insisted that the main factor in the recent military disasters and loss of *reputación* had been precisely the vain hopes aroused by the late truce contacts with The Hague. For instead of tensing itself to confront the enemy, the army of Flanders had dropped its guard, its officers attending 'banquets and enjoying themselves in Brussels'.<sup>47</sup> What was needed was to put all thought of a settlement out of mind and for both regime and army in the South Netherlands to regain their effectiveness and resilience.

Olivares remained determined to keep the South Netherlanders in their place. The provincial assemblies were to have no role in the truce negotiations with the Dutch. Nor were some of their other demands to be listened to. Strongly committed as he was to the *Almirantazgo* and Spain's general embargo against Dutch shipping and goods, he ignored the protests of the South Netherlanders at the appointment of a Spanish official, Hurtuño de Urizar, to the crucial new post of inspector-general (*veedor-general*) of commerce in the South Netherlands. For to appoint a Netherlander to supervise the checking of cargoes consigned from Flanders to the Iberian Peninsula would have been to invite evasion and fraud. Yet Olivares remained eager to cultivate the nobility and estates of the 'loyal' Netherlands, being convinced that without their support and co-operation the situation could not be restored. The detested Cardinal de la Cueva was recalled and replaced by the marqués de Aytona, a Catalan and one of Philip's most placatory and skilful ministers. The comte de Solre, one of the few reliably royalist nobles of the South Netherlands, a man extensively employed by the king as a diplomat, was

<sup>44</sup> Hirschauer, *Etats d'Artois*, i, 352 and ii, 203; A. Waddington, *La république des provinces-Unies, la France et les Pays-Bas espagnols de 1630 à 1650* (2 vols. Paris, 1895) i, 147.

<sup>45</sup> P. Henrard, *Marie de Médicis dans les Pays-Bas (1631-1638)* (Brussels, 1876), p.203.

<sup>46</sup> Lonchay, *Correspondence* ii, 454.

<sup>47</sup> Archivo Histórico Nacional, Madrid, Estado legajo 727. 'Voto del conde mi señor sobre cosas de Flandes' (September 1629), fos.5-6.

sent from Madrid to Brussels bearing a batch of ostentatiously soothing letters from the king to each of the provincial assemblies, assuring them of his esteem and affection and assuring them of his attentiveness to their grievances.<sup>48</sup> The high noblesse of the Spanish Netherlands – Aerschot, van de Bergh, the comte de Hennin (Alexandre, duc de Bournonville) and the princes of Barbançon, Espinoy, and Chimay were assiduously flattered. There were proposals to confer fresh titles and honours on the archbishops of Mechelen and Cambrai, on the bishop of Ghent, and on Balançon and de la Motterie. In July 1630, Balançon and de la Motterie were appointed honorary members of the *Consejo de Guerra* (Council of War) in Spain.<sup>49</sup>

Don Francisco de Moncada, marqués de Aytona (1586–1635) was in many ways precisely the man for the occasion. Owing perhaps to his own Catalan background, he showed from the outset real sympathy for the grudges and aspirations of the local aristocracy whom he proposed to treat ‘como a buenos hermanos’.<sup>50</sup> In his hands the policy of fostering the confidence and loyalty of the South Netherlands nobles was more than mere lip-service. One modern historian has even written that ‘Aytona par une conduite tout opposée à celle de ses compatriotes, suivit une politique de franche collaboration avec les gens du pays’.<sup>51</sup> Writing to the king in December 1630, Aytona emphasized the danger, now that van den Bergh had been removed from command of the army, that the king might seem to his Netherlands subjects to be lacking in confidence in them and to be unwilling to entrust their leading personages with major military responsibility when in fact he had such excellent local commanders at his disposal as Jan van Nassau, Balançon, and the comte de la Motterie.<sup>52</sup> Aytona made a special point of cultivating Jan van Nassau whom he put in command of the large-scale (though unsuccessful) amphibious assault on Tholen launched in September 1631.

The Conde Duque was determined to reform the administration and the army in the Spanish Netherlands.<sup>53</sup> If he was firmly opposed to the political aspirations of the provincial estates, he was also deeply dissatisfied, even scathing, about the performance of the Spanish officials and officers in the country and longed for a less corrupt, more reliable political and military organization which would be an effective instrument for the carrying out of his and the king’s orders. In 1630 a

<sup>48</sup> Gachard, ‘Philippe-Charles, prince-comte d’Aremberg’, 166; Hirschauer, *Etats d’Artoise*, ii, 199.

<sup>49</sup> Lonchay, *Correspondence* ii, 525, 530.

<sup>50</sup> Waddington, *La République des Provinces-Unies* i, 103; H. Lonchay, *La rivalité de la France et de l’Espagne aux Pays-Bas (1635-1700)* (Brussels, 1896), 25–6.

<sup>51</sup> Hirschauer, *Etats d’Artois* i, 355.

<sup>52</sup> AGS Estado 2149. Aytona to Philip IV, Brussels, 28 December 1630.

<sup>53</sup> Elliott, *The Count-Duke of Olivares*, 390–1, 405–6.

special junta was formed in Madrid to advise on ways to improve the machinery of government in the Spanish Netherlands and the most abrasively royalist of the native members of Isabella's inner council, the Louvain-trained jurist Pieter Roose was summoned from Brussels to assist with its deliberations. In Madrid Roose set to work with his habitual zeal. In February 1631, he completed a forty-six page memorial on how to undermine the power of the provincial estates entitled 'De la forme de subordonner les Etats' and an assortment of papers concerning the pruning of offices, checks on bureaucratic corruption, and reorganisation of provisioning and military finance.<sup>54</sup> The Conde Duque was thoroughly impressed. Roose struck him as being just the man he needed to take the machinery of government in the South Netherlands in hand. The jurist was promptly named 'president' of the *Conseil d'Etat* at Brussels and sent back armed with sweeping powers to investigate, and reform, every area of administration from the enforcement of the trade embargoes against the Dutch to the accounting of military expenditure.<sup>55</sup>

Aytona and Roose, together with the capable new Castilian commander of the army, the marqués de Santa Cruz, initially succeeded in restoring some semblance of stability to the Spanish Netherlands. But scarcely had they done so than the Dutch, in the summer of 1632, launched their most ambitious land offensive of the war, advancing rapidly up the Mass valley, capturing Venlo, Straelen Roermond, Maastricht and Limburg in rapid succession. The Spaniards, despite receiving assistance from the Imperialists, proved unable to stem the advance. The entire South Netherlands was plunged again in profound turmoil. The defeat was not just serious but the most spectacular and humiliating suffered by Spanish arms in the Low Countries thus far.<sup>56</sup> Furthermore, at the start of the Dutch offensive, the count van den Bergh who, for some time, had been in treasonable contact with the Dutch Stadholder, Frederick Henry, rose in open revolt taking refuge at Liège where he issued a series of printed manifestos calling on the nobility of the South Netherlands to rise in armed rebellion against Spain.<sup>57</sup> Van den Bergh's proclamations violently denounced Spanish despotism and arrogance, accusing the Castilians in the South Netherlands of behaving insufferably towards the local nobility.

Faced with incipient revolt, chronic lack of funds, and massive defeat at Dutch hands, Isabella and Aytona now gave way to the ever more insistent pressure of the provincial estates for the calling of the States

<sup>54</sup> Delplanche, *Un légiste anversois*, 28-30.

<sup>55</sup> Elliott, *The Count-Duke of Olivares*, 406.

<sup>56</sup> Israel, *The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World*, 186-8.

<sup>57</sup> BL Add. 14007, fos.433-40; J.J. Poelhekke, *Frederik Hendrik. Prins van Oranje* (Zutphen, 1978), 373-4.

General in order to open direct negotiations with the Dutch. This was a momentous step. The States General of the 'obedient' provinces had now not met for over three decades and it was one of the fundamental tenets of Olivares and his colleagues that they should not, under any circumstances, be convened. But now the regent at Brussels yielded in the name of the king. Those provincial assemblies which were not already in session gathered, delegates for Brussels were chosen, and in September 1632 the last ever gathering of the States General of the southern Netherlands was convened. Something of the mood of the country can be gauged from Aytona's lament 'el odio en que estamos los españoles no es creíble'.<sup>58</sup> In addition to the instructions of their provinces to seek the opening of formal negotiations with the Dutch, with a view to ending the war as speedily as possible, the delegates brought all the usual complaints of the provinces about Spanish domination of the army and administration.<sup>59</sup> The Brussels States General, with the duke of Aerschot at its head, lost no time in opening direct negotiations with the Dutch States General at The Hague, at the same time initiating a general propaganda drive in favour of peace, the most eloquent manifestation of which was Eric Puteanus' pamphlet *Des Oorlogs en Vredes Waegschaele*, a passionate plea for an end to the strife dedicated to Aytona, addressed to the king and published at The Hague!

The convening of the Brussels States General, in the circumstances of 1632, was, in Aytona's view, an unavoidable necessity. Olivares, however, profoundly disapproved, being utterly convinced that nothing but evil would come from it. He repeatedly expressed his amazement that Aytona should have authorized such a step.<sup>60</sup> For even those members of the States General at Brussels who were acting in good faith, would, in his view, still be guided by the interests of their own provinces rather than by those of the Monarchy as a whole. In a typical flight of rhetoric, Olivares declared in the Council of State, in March 1633, that 'every hour [since direct talks, States to States, had commenced] that the total loss of those provinces to the Dutch is averted is one more miracle that Our Lord works principally by the hand of this minister', that is Pieter Roose.<sup>61</sup>

But, for the moment, royal authority in the Spanish Netherlands was so weakened that Olivares and the king were compelled to dissemble their true feelings in their public pronouncements and correspondence.

<sup>58</sup> Lonchay, *La Rivalité*, 26

<sup>59</sup> M. Gachard (ed.) *Actes des Etat Généraux de 1632* (Brussels, 1853), instructions to the delegates of Artois, Hainault, and Luxemburg, pp. 21-4, 33-4, 42.

<sup>60</sup> AGS Estado 2151, consulta 29 May 1633 'voto del señor Conde Duque', fos. 3, 6<sup>v</sup>

<sup>61</sup> 'El negocio primero político y mayor', exclaimed Don Gaspar, in June 1633, 'ha de ser deshacer esta junta compuesta de tantos infieles', AGS Estado 2151, 'voto del señor Conde Duque sobre las cartas del Presidente Roose', 25 June 1633.

Rather king and Conde Duque publicly praised the States General for its 'wisdom' and 'loyalty', even while courteously rejecting their proposals. Olivares' worst suspicions were confirmed when the talks became deadlocked and Aerschoot tried to prevent their collapse by pressing for Spanish concessions to the Dutch in the Indies. If the Dutch agreed to evacuate Brazil, could not Philip, as a *quid pro quo*, be moved to legalize their commerce with Brazil and also with some of the Portuguese conquests in Asia?<sup>62</sup> The royal reply, of July 1633, to this proposal is a classic instance of Olivarian political discourse.<sup>63</sup> The loyal Netherlands could not secure a genuine peace for themselves, Philip assured them, by sacrificing the interests of Castile and Portugal; by that road they would come only into abject subservience to the 'rebels'. The well-being and security of every part of the Monarchy depended on the unity of the whole, each part relying on, and undertaking to assist the rest.

From the outset Olivares and Roose worked assiduously behind the scenes to sabotage the proceedings at Brussels and The Hague, using every expedient to hand. The Conde Duque was ever more captivated with the iron resolution and machiavellian skill displayed by Roose at this time.<sup>64</sup> Roose, for instance, categorically refused to sign new *pouvoirs* for the Brussels States General's negotiating team, pretending that their credentials based on Philip's authorization for Isabella to negotiate, of 1629, were sufficient while in fact Philip had secretly cancelled this authorization in a letter to Roose of November 1632.<sup>65</sup> When Aerschoot travelled to Madrid at the end of 1633 in a last effort to save The Hague negotiations, Olivares did not hesitate to arrest and harshly interrogate the figure who had emerged as the head of the constitutional opposition to royal policy in the southern Netherlands. The duke was held in captivity until he died six years later.

Apart from the comte de Warfusée, very few South Netherlands nobles went so far as to join van den Bergh in taking up arms, in collusion with the Dutch, against the crown. Nevertheless, it is totally misleading to suggest that van den Bergh was 'supported by only one or two minor nobles' and that otherwise the South Netherlands nobility remained basically loyal.<sup>66</sup> On the news of van den Bergh's defection, and summons to the nobles of the South Netherlands to revolt against Spain, the States of Flanders, Artois and Lille-Douai-Orchies (which were then

<sup>62</sup> Israel, *The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World*, 247-8.

<sup>63</sup> AGR SEG 206, fos.361v-2. Philip IV to the Brussels States General's negotiating team, Madrid, 19 July 1633.

<sup>64</sup> 'Pedro Roose', enthused Don Gaspar, 'es de los hombres de mas partes que he conocido en toda mi vida y de los mas enteros y realengos que es possible hallarse', AGS Estado 2151, consulta 2 March 1633.

<sup>65</sup> M.G. de Boer, *Die Friedensunterhandlungen zwischen Spanien und den Niederlanden in den Jahren 1632 und 1633* (Groningen, 1898), 54.

<sup>66</sup> Stradling, *Philip IV and the Government of Spain*, 186-7.

all in session) had no choice but to denounce his treason in categorical terms and affirm their 'absolute loyalty' to the crown.<sup>67</sup> But in addition to van den Bergh's treason involving the heretic Dutch rebels, there was another, more widespread and partially overlapping conspiracy which looked rather to France and in this conspiracy, orchestrated by Richelieu, most of the leading nobles of the South Netherlands were involved.<sup>68</sup> Albert de Ligne, Prince de Barbançon, an intimate friend of van den Bergh, vigorously condemned the latter in an (unsuccessful) bid to deflect suspicion from himself but he too was up to his neck in anti-government intrigue.<sup>69</sup> So was Louis, count of Egmont, who now fled to France, Guillaume de Melun, prince d'Espinoy (also a member of the Conseil d'Etat), the comte de Hennin, Georges Carondelet, baron de Noyelles and governor of Bouchain, the baron de Crèvecoeur who was governor of d'Avesnes, the marquis de Tressigny who was governor of Philippeville, and a whole assortment of other powerful personages.<sup>70</sup> By the spring of 1634 by when Roose – whom Olivares had put in charge of leading the investigations and taking the appropriate suppressive measures – had most of the details, it was clear that the upper and middle reaches of the South Netherlands nobility were riddled through and through with disloyalty and treason. Espinoy and Hennin followed Egmont's example and fled to France, like him both subsequently being condemned to death in their absence. Barbançon was caught and incarcerated at Antwerp. The *grands seigneurs* of the Spanish Netherlands were purged *en masse* from the *Conseil d'Etat*.

The conspiracies, unrest and constitutional agitation of the years 1632–4 effectively destroyed Olivares' attempts to forge a genuine partnership between Castile and the South Netherlands. Aytona and Roose continued to put in a good word for the occasional able Netherlander who was free of suspicion such as the baron van Grobbendonck who was cleared of personal responsibility for the fall of 's-Hertogenbosch and appointed governor of Louvain. But Olivares himself evidently now lost all interest in seeking out and fostering talented Netherlanders for royal service. The king's younger brother, Don Fernando, the Cardinal-Infante, who arrived to take over as governor-general of the Spanish Netherlands in the autumn of 1634 was neither encouraged, nor showed the slightest inclination, to flatter the local nobility. On the contrary, he declared himself distinctly unimpressed with Jan van Nassau, the comte de la Motterie, Jean de Maisières (the new governor of Breda) and indeed

<sup>67</sup> Henrard, *Marie de Médicis*, 237–8.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*, 203, 241, 252–3; Waddington, *La République des Provinces-Unies* i, 146–8, 150, 203; Janssens, 'L'échec des tentatives', 112–14.

<sup>69</sup> Henrard, *Marie de Médicis*, 247.

<sup>70</sup> Gachard, *Etudes* ii, 380–3; Lonchay, *Correspondence* iii, 13; J. Cuvelier, 'Pierre Roose', *Biographie Nationale de Belgique* xix, 58; Janssens, 'L'échec des tentatives', 116.



all the senior Netherlanders serving in the army.<sup>71</sup> Jan van Nassau came under suspicion and was eventually, in 1637, eased out of his command. By the late 1630s, the military commanders whom the Cardinal-Infante regularly consulted consisted of Prince Thomas of Savoy until he left in 1639, the marqués de Fuentes, the Neopolitan *maestre de campo* Andrea Cantelmo, the Portuguese Felipe de Silva who commanded the cavalry and was governor of Antwerp, and other non-natives. The Netherlanders had effectively been squeezed out.

But whilst the standing of the South Netherlands nobility in the army and local administration collapsed as a result of the events of 1632-4, the native element among the soldiery of the army of Flanders greatly expanded both in absolute terms, and as a proportion of the whole, which meant that more and more Walloon and Flemish troops were serving under non-Netherlanders. For the arrival of the Cardinal-Infante fresh from his triumph over the Swedes at Nördlingen (1634), was followed, in the spring of 1635, by the outbreak of the long-expected war between France and Spain. The Spanish Netherlands now faced major enemies on both sides. If Olivares' strategy in the Netherlands since 1625 had involved cutting back the army to a minimum and keeping it on the defensive, his strategy now was to use the South Netherlands as both the anvil and the hammer of the Monarchy, to turn it into a massively armed base equipped both to divert French efforts away from Spain and Italy and to deliver the blows to the Dutch and French with which the Conde Duque aspired to extricate Spain from her now terrible predicament. Remittances from Spain and Spanish Italy for the army of Flanders were dramatically increased. The army's troop strength rose from under 50,000 in the late 1620s to around 90,000 in the late 1630s. Meanwhile, while the number of Spanish and Italian troops based in the Spanish Netherlands rose in proportion, the number of German troops, German mercenaries being progressively harder to find owing to the escalation of the struggle in Germany, markedly decreased both in absolute and proportionate terms. To fill the gap the government recruited more and more native troops.<sup>72</sup>

But it was not only in the sense that Olivares now strove to maximize whereas previously he had sought to minimize the army's size and striking power that his strategy in the Low Countries changed radically from 1635. After 1635 the Conde Duque also took to intervening much more than had been his wont in the past in the actual use of the army.

But it is utterly wrong to suppose that Olivares now launched a 'great offensive against France' as has been claimed.<sup>73</sup> R.A. Stradling's assertion that after 1633 the 'Spanish-Dutch conflict was fading into the

<sup>71</sup> Lonchay, *Correspondence* iii, 79 and 109.

<sup>72</sup> Parker, *Army of Flanders*, appendix A.

<sup>73</sup> Stradling, *Philip IV*, 79.

background, ceasing to be a "hot" war (except in the maritime theatre) and that by default conditions approximating to those of armistice held sway until the Treaty of Munster' is a total misconception.<sup>74</sup> It may be true that France was now Spain's most powerful enemy; but in the opening years of the Franco-Spanish war the French armies were still rather disorganized and lacked combat experience. Furthermore Spain had no territorial or other objectives on the French side and none of the major cities of the Spanish Netherlands were immediately at risk from the French. By contrast Olivares considered it absolutely essential to rebuild the territorial depth and strategic viability of Spain's *plaza de armas* on the Dutch side and especially to recapture such major fortified crossing-points over the rivers Maas and Rhine as Maastricht, Rheinberg and Orsoy and to build a new cordon of the defensive positions across northern Brabant to link up with the Rhine.<sup>75</sup> At the same time Antwerp, Ghent and Bruges were all immediately at risk from nearby Dutch forces, as was Breda which was precariously exposed but which was vital to Spanish interests both for reasons of *reputación* and because it was needed as a bargaining counter in what the Conde Duque hoped would be the pending negotiations with the Dutch. Another point made by various Spanish ministers during the years 1635-40 was that the population of the South Netherlands itself, and certainly that of the two politically most important provinces, Brabant and Flanders, much preferred *guerra offensiva* against the Dutch to an offensive against the French because the latter strategy would inevitably bring about the loss of further parts of Brabant and Flanders to Protestant control while concentrating against the Dutch would prevent precisely that.<sup>76</sup> Finally, any towns captured from the Dutch could be reintegrated into the Spanish Netherlands while anything taken from the French would eventually have to be returned.

For these reasons there was no 'great offensive' against France nor any intention of launching one, at least not with the Monarchy's main forces, in the Spanish Netherlands. Far from the Spanish-Dutch struggle 'fading into the background' in the years after 1635 it now flared up with renewed intensity. After fending off the ineffective French attack of 1635, the Cardinal-Infante recaptured Gennep and Limburg and seized the key Rhine fortress of Schenkenschans. At the same time, in line with Olivares' policy, he reopened truce talks with the Dutch to see whether

<sup>74</sup> R.A. Stradling, *Europe and the Decline of Spain* (London, 1981), 103-4.

<sup>75</sup> AGS Estado 2153, 'Voto del conde duque' (16 November 1635); AGS Estado 2051, 'Voto del conde-duque' (17 June 1636); Israel, *The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World*, 251, 253, 258.

<sup>76</sup> AGS Estado 2053 consulta of the *junta de estado*, 7 March 1638, fo.7. 'Voto del marques de Villafraña'; BL MS 14007, fos.73-4. Philip IV to Cardinal-Infante, Madrid, 30 August 1639.

they could now be induced to evacuate Brazil. So far was the Conde Duque from preparing any 'great offensive against France in 1636-7' that he admonished the Cardinal-Infante again and again through the winter of 1635-6 to expend every effort against the Dutch, fortifying Helmond and Eindhoven as well as Gennep, moving up all available forces to the Meierij, Cleves, and the Lower Rhine, and above all to do his utmost to secure Schenkenschans which the Dutch (who were thoroughly alarmed that Gelderland and Overijssel now lay virtually open to the Spaniards) were launching an unusual winter campaign to retrieve.<sup>77</sup> All this was vastly more important to the Conde Duque during the first half of 1636 than any possible foray into France which, indeed was then absent from his mind. When the Dutch recovered Schenkenschans and Goch, early in 1636, Olivares raged uncontrollably bewailing the loss of what he regarded as a crucial opportunity for extricating Spain from the strategic trap in which she now found herself.<sup>78</sup> As late as June 1636 the Cardinal-Infante was receiving orders from Madrid – not to invade France – but to concentrate around Helmond and Eindhoven and to try to retake Schenkenschans.

The truth is that Olivares planned no great move against France in the years 1636-7 and the foray to Corbie, however great the panic it may have caused in Paris, was of merely secondary significance within the context of the Conde-Duque's strategy of the late 1630s. In 1637, the plan, once again was to concentrate on the Dutch. The Cardinal-Infante succeeded in recapturing Venlo and Roermond, much to the joy of the South Netherlands populace, and was about to besiege Grave or another Dutch stronghold when reports of French incursions into Artois and Hainault caused him to turn back to face the French. This he did with the support of his military subordinates but against the advice of Roose.<sup>79</sup> As a result the Dutch were able to besiege and recapture Breda.<sup>80</sup> For months after Olivares raged over the Cardinal-Infante's 'disastrous' mistake in turning against the French instead of pressing on with the siege of Grave, tightening the blockade of Maastricht, and persevering with the efforts to re-establish Spanish power on the lower Rhine.<sup>81</sup> In

<sup>77</sup> AGR SEG 213, fos.396-8. Philip IV to Cardinal-Infante, Madrid, 11 December 1635: 'aquellos (Schenkenschans) se ha de mantener a qualquier precio . . .'; AGS Estado 2153, 'voto del Conde Duque, 16 November 1635.

<sup>78</sup> 'Pues veo señor que se ha perdido la maior joia que el rey nuestro señor tenía en esos estados para poder acomodar sus cosas con gloria . . .', BL Add.14007, fo.57. Olivares to Cardinal-Infante, Madrid, 25 May 1636.

<sup>79</sup> AGR SEG 214, fo.565. Philip IV to Cardinal-Infante, Madrid, 13 June 1636.

<sup>80</sup> AGS Estado 2052. consulta 7 October 1637, 'voto del Conde Duque mi señor sobre despachos de Flandes y Alemania'.

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, AGR SEG 217, fos.352-3. Philip IV to Cardinal-Infante, San Lorenzo, 20 October 1637; AGR SEG 217 fos.358-60 'Discurso que aca se ha hecho en la disputa sobre atacar Grave o otra plaza de importancia, o Matrique, o acudir a la frontera de Francia'.

January 1638 the Conde Duque again laid down that the Dutch front was the main theatre of operations, the French front secondary.<sup>82</sup> Even as late as August 1639, when the increasing French pressure was compelling Spain to assign greater priority to the French front, the Conde Duque was still urging the Cardinal-Infante nevertheless to keep up as much offensive pressure as possible on the Dutch side as it was vital for Spain to recapture Maastricht, Rheinberg, Wesel and also Grave, for only by retaking these key strongholds could the Spanish grip on the great rivers, and on the gateways to the North Netherlands and Germany be restored.<sup>83</sup>

During the last years of his ascendancy in Spain, Olivares' strategy in the Low Countries was to concentrate the bulk of Spain's military strength there and to use that strength as a defensive bridle, protecting Italy and Spain as well as the South Netherlands, against France, while simultaneously waging offensive war against the Dutch. One significant result of the Conde Duque's statecraft in the Netherlands after 1635 was the long-term revival of Spanish power in Limburg, Geldern, and the Roermond-Venlo area and more temporarily in Cleves and a large part of the Meierij, especially the towns of Helmond and Eindhoven. To accomplish his post-1635 goals in the Low Countries, Olivares needed men and money in unprecedented, prodigious quantities. But to administer this colossal deployment of resources without excessive waste and inefficiency, it was essential that the Spanish crown should dispose in its Netherlands provinces of a government machinery which was reliable and effective at least in those sectors which had some bearing on the war effort. For inevitably Olivares was now leaning on the Spanish Netherlands to a greater extent than ever. Recruiting, billeting, procurement of horses and supplies, construction of new – and the repair of old – fortifications, and of course, taxation and maritime privateering were all now proceeding on a considerably vaster scale than in the 1620s and early 1630s. Yet this more efficient extraction of resources was achieved not by coaxing local co-operation, showing confidence in the nobility, and seeking to create a sense of partnership. The crown now ignored the nobility and took less trouble over its dealings with the provincial assemblies, exacting the acquiescence required by means of intimidation and the use of more and more foreign officials and officers, many of them Portuguese or Italian as well as Castilian. By the late 1630s not only was the larger part of the payments system between Spain and Antwerp being handled by the Portuguese New Christian bankers of Madrid and their Portuguese factors in Antwerp but the leading Antwerp Portuguese, most notably Don García de Yllan, were also now handling the provisioning, and especially the supply of bread, horses and

<sup>82</sup> AGS Estado 2156, consultas 8 January and 9 March 1638, 'votos' de Olivares.

<sup>83</sup> BL Add. 14007, fos.73-4.

gunpowder, to the army.<sup>84</sup>

Pieter Roose was the lynch-pin of the administration, the man who, more than any other, was the embodiment of royal policy in the Spanish Netherlands. Olivares knew perfectly well that his Brabantine protégé was heartily detested by virtually everyone of consequence in the country. He even regarded this as proof of his worth.<sup>85</sup> The Conde Duque's confidence remained unshakeable that if anyone could hold administrative abuse and malpractice in check in the Spanish Netherlands, and ensure that the resources flowing in from Spain and Spanish Italy were not dissipated uselessly through mismanagement, it was the cold, unbending, isolated Pieter Roose. Again and again Olivares backed up Roose's advice and judgments in the face of a hail of hostile criticism. With the leading South Netherlands noblemen cowed or in exile most of the open opposition to Roose's austere handling of affairs emanated from the southern European officials and commanders. But Olivares took no notice. Prince Thomas of Savoy loathed Roose and eventually left the king's service in the Low Countries largely because of him.<sup>86</sup> The Cardinal-Infante himself complained continually of Roose's meddling and insolence but could do nothing to dislodge him.

In the final phase of the Olivares era, following the Catalan Revolt and the secession of Portugal in December 1640, the Spanish Monarchy faced its severest crisis yet. Desperate measures had to be taken to raise armies in the Peninsula. The recruiting drives in Castile were intensified. It also now became the practice to ferry substantial bodies of Walloon troops from the Netherlands to serve in the Peninsula using the royal *armada de Flandes*, the king's warships based at Dunkirk. Under this sort of pressure the Conde Duque and the king had no choice but to swallow their pride and seek at least a partial rapprochement with the South Netherlands magnates including some of those implicated in the treason of 1632-4. Overtures were made. Barbançon was released from prison in June 1642 and commissioned to serve as one of the Walloon commanders in the Peninsula, with presumably some of his confiscated property being returned to him. Yet the essential strategy which Olivares had adhered to in the Netherlands since 1635 remained intact. Despite the desperate situation in the Peninsula, it was decided that the army of Flanders should remain the main fighting force of the Monarchy, that Spain, in other words, should continue to concentrate her military capability in the north. In 1640 a total of 4,300,000 ducats, an extremely high level of remittances, was sent from Madrid to the Spanish Netherlands and the flow continued at this very high level also following

<sup>84</sup> See below pp.341-2; Hans Pohl, *Die Portugiesen in Antwerpen* (Wiesbaden, 1977), 236-9.

<sup>85</sup> Lonchay, *Correspondence* iii, 200.

<sup>86</sup> Delplanche, *Un légiste anversois*, 100-2.

the secession of Portugal in December.<sup>87</sup>

In the long run it may be that this crucial decision was a disastrous error from the Spanish point of view. Certainly it meant that Castile fought the Catalan and Portuguese insurgents in the Peninsula with ill-trained, poorly equipped and supplied, and relatively small forces. The reconquest of Catalonia, consequently, was to prove painfully slow and difficult while Portuguese independence, still precarious in the 1640s, was not seriously challenged until after 1659 by which time it was probably too late. Yet however surprising in modern eyes, in the circumstances of the time the decision was a perfectly logical one. For in the South Netherlands Spain had not only her experienced, seasoned troops but the fortifications and bases with which to sustain their effectiveness, the means to feed, clothe and equip her soldiery, a highly efficient transport system and a smoothly functioning administration geared to handling a major military effort. The Spanish Netherlands was still a uniquely valuable strategic asset, still an effective bridle on France. For despite the setbacks in Catalonia and Portugal, the French, with an entrenched highly trained Spanish army in their rear, close to Paris, could now no more than before shift the bulk of their forces southwards for an all-out attempt either on Spain or Italy. Militarily, the Spanish Netherlands were still the Monarchy's trump card and such they remained down to the Peace of the Pyrenees.

To conclude we may assert that Olivares' policy in the Spanish Netherlands does show important elements of continuity with the past. The tendency to regard the Spanish Netherlands as Spain's bridle on France, the *plaza de armas* of the Monarchy, neither began nor ended with Olivares though he was the foremost exponent of the concept. The decision to base a royal armada in Flanders and turn the Flemish sea-ports into a major privateering base goes back to the years of the Zúñiga regime. Yet at the same time, there is no denying that a distinctively Olivarist approach to the government of the Spanish Netherlands did evolve during the 1620s. It is an approach which can be said to have had two distinct phases. In the first phase, down to 1632, the essence of the policy was to try to create an authentic partnership between Castile and the Spanish Netherlands by cultivating the local nobles and provincial estates and, at the same time, to render Spain's main military base less of a burden to Castile not only in terms of cost but also in terms of numbers of Spanish troops transferred to the Low Countries. This policy broke down under the weight of the Netherlanders' grievances against Spain, the discontent of the South Netherlands nobles, and the growing threat from France. After 1635 Olivares' policy in the South Netherlands was very different in a number of respects. His strategy now was to maximize instead of minimize Spain's military build-up in the Spanish Netherlands

<sup>87</sup> See, for instance, AGS Estado 2056, *consulta* 1 June 1641.

and to do without the good will and support of the South Netherlands provinces, swamping the administration and the higher echelons of the army with Spaniards, Portuguese, and Italians. Yet even after 1635 certain features of the former Olivarist approach to the government of the Spanish Netherlands persisted and even received added emphasis. Olivares redoubled his efforts to force an administrative machinery in the country which would be under the thumb neither of the local nobility nor of the Spaniards based in the country, and thanks to the tireless zeal of Pieter Roose, by no means wholly without success. Furthermore, despite the break with the Walloon magnates, the administration and army in the Spanish Netherlands after 1635 did in some respects come to reflect Olivares' ideal of a more integrated monarchy to a greater extent than had been the case in the 1620s. The old dependence on large numbers of extraneous, mostly German, mercenaries ended. By the late 1630s the army of Flanders consisted overwhelmingly of the king's own subjects with unprecedentedly large Spanish and Italian contingents stationed in the country as well as greatly increased numbers of Walloon and Flemish troops under arms. The role of the Genoese bankers in handling the *asiento* payments to Antwerp was markedly reduced, the main responsibility now being assigned to the Portuguese New Christians who were the king's subjects. In as far as outsiders secured the pick of the military and civil posts in the Spanish Netherlands, these now included an appreciable number of Italians and Portuguese as well as Castilians. Taken together, the two phases of Olivares' statecraft in the Spanish Netherlands are among the most important manifestations of his political career.

## SPAIN, THE SPANISH EMBARGOES, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR THE MASTERY OF WORLD TRADE, 1585-1660

Much has been written about the economic weakness of Habsburg Spain. So much so that it is easy to forget that Spain at the close of the sixteenth century, and during the first half of the seventeenth, was in some respects much the greatest economic power on earth.<sup>1</sup> The Spanish crown had, by the 1570s, largely sealed off Spanish America from non-hispanic Europe, securing a vast captive market which afforded Castile the bulk of the world silver supply and of tropical America's output of indigo, cochineal, tobacco, and dye-woods. This in itself was no small bureaucratic and economic feat. But there was more. When, in 1580, Portugal and the Portuguese overseas empire were joined to the Spanish crown, Spain suddenly found herself in an unrivalled position from which to dominate world trade routes, markets and resources. The Spanish crown was by far the world's largest handler of bullion, American and Guinea gold as well as silver. Castile, Valencia, Ibiza, Portugal, and the salt-pans of the Spanish Caribbean together accounted for nearly all of the world's then accessible deposits of good quality marine salt, a product vital for the Dutch fisheries and those of Norway and the Baltic. Portugal's colonies of Brazil and São Thomé provided the bulk of Europe's sugar supply. By the 1590s Lisbon had for a century been Europe's leading emporium for pepper, fine spices and other East India commodities. Castile, furthermore, was the sole source of the high-grade merino wool which had long been, and until the late eighteenth century continued to be, the mainstay of Europe's fine cloth industry.

Seeing such vast economic leverage accumulated in their hands, it was natural that after 1580 Spanish ministers should have begun to give serious attention to schemes for mobilizing Spain's enormous economic power against her European rivals and enemies;<sup>2</sup> and if the first attempts to impose embargoes on the trade and shipping of Spain's enemies

<sup>1</sup> Antonio Domínguez Ortiz, 'Guerra económica y comercio extranjero en el reinado de Felipe IV', *Hispania* xxiii (1962), 70.

<sup>2</sup> Felipe Ruiz Martín, 'La etapa marítima de las Guerras de Religion. Bloqueos y contrabloqueos', *Estudios de Historia Moderna* (University of Barcelona) III (1953), 183-6.



showed that there were many difficulties to be overcome before such action could be effective, it should cause no surprise that Spanish ministers should have continued for many decades after to be mesmerized by the possibilities offered by the embargo as an instrument of state. But how important a factor in Spanish and world history was this enduring Spanish preoccupation with the embargo? Although a considerable amount of evidence has been adduced to show that this aspect of Spanish statecraft was indeed of fundamental importance,<sup>3</sup> most historians have tended, and still tend, to de-emphasize, marginalize, or even ignore it. It would be hard to guess, for instance, from the brief references to this topic in the outline works on early modern Spain by Henry Kamen and R.A. Stradling that the imposing and maintaining of the economic embargoes, and the diplomatic campaigns to back them up, were one of the most fundamental and far-reaching aspects of Spain's role in the wider world from the zenith of her power until far into the period of her decline.<sup>4</sup>

Nor is this universal tendency to marginalize Spain's waging of economic warfare against her European opponents at all surprising when one considers the weight of scholarly authority on which it rests. It was one of the central contentions of Fernand Braudel that this type of state action in the early modern context, whether attempted by Spain, France, or any other power, did not and could not substantially affect, or divert, the ebb and flow of material life, the underlying interaction between markets.<sup>5</sup> Braudel's dismissing of the Spanish embargoes as a secondary phenomenon subsequently received emphatic support from a whole array of historians including José Alcalá-Zamora, Henry Kamen, James Casey, R.A. Stradling, Pauline Croft and most recently Carlos Gómez-Centurión.<sup>6</sup> All these writers insisted that the various embargoes imposed by the Spanish crown against the Dutch, English, and French were based on unrealistic assumptions and represent an overestimation of what the bureaucratic apparatus of the time could achieve. Dismissing Philip IV's embargo of 1621-47 against the Dutch as so much wasted effort, Alcalá-Zamora insisted that the 'Dutch merchant fleet instead of being reduced to inactivity, overcame without difficulty the obstacles to

<sup>3</sup> J.I. Israel, *The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World, 1606-1661* (Oxford, 1982) 134-43 et seq.

<sup>4</sup> Henry Kamen, *Spain, 1469-1714. A Society of Conflict* (London, 1983), 207-8; R.A. Stradling, *Europe and the Decline of Spain* (London, 1981), 58, 63-4.

<sup>5</sup> Fernand Braudel, *La Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen à l'époque de Philippe II* (2 vols. Paris, 1966), 569-74; Fernand Braudel, *Civilisation matérielle, économie et capitalisme XV<sup>e</sup>-XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle* (3 vols. Paris, 1979) iii, 175, 218.

<sup>6</sup> José Alcalá-Zamora, *España, Flandes y el Mar del Norte (1618-1639)* (Barcelona, 1975), 178-86; Carlos Gómez-Centurión, *Felipe II, la empresa de Inglaterra y el comercio septentrional (1566-1609)* (Madrid, 1988), 362.

their trade imposed by the Spanish crown.<sup>7</sup>

The Braudelian view of the Spanish embargoes fits well with the wider trend in early modern historical studies to play down the capacity of the early modern state to intervene with effect in economic and social life. It also appears to accord with the numerous contemporary Spanish statements to the effect that the embargoes were often circumvented and were evaded on a massive scale. This is what Henry Kamen meant when asserting that 'there is substantial contrary evidence' against my argument that the embargoes exerted a deep and enduring impact.<sup>8</sup> Certainly contemporary Spanish ministers frequently observed, as a member of the Council of State put it, in August 1605, that 'we hear on all sides that great quantities of Dutch goods enter these realms in violation of the royal prohibition with false documents and through other ruses . . . and the lack of diligence shown by the ordinary magistrates in punishing and suppressing such activity'.<sup>9</sup>

Given that so many historians have argued for the ineffectiveness of the embargoes, and the contemporary testimony as to the prevalence of evasive practices, it is understandable that Braudel's stance on the issue should continue to command widespread acceptance. Yet, for all that, it seems to me vital that his view of the matter be strongly challenged. For not only does the Braudel-Kamen view, as I shall call it, render it impossible to understand why the embargo policy became a central preoccupation of the Spanish crown, as it most certainly was, for over a century; but it also obscures, I shall argue, some of the most important changes in European commerce and shipping of the early modern era. If, in what follows, I depict the Braudel-Kamen view of the Spanish embargoes as one of the great errors of modern historiography I do not mean merely that it is a mistake which is frequently repeated but that it is a basic misconception which conceals and confuses a whole series of fundamental shifts and changes on the early modern European scene.

There is little doubt that the first general embargo, imposed against both the English and the Dutch in 1585 was haphazard and ill-planned and was widely evaded through all manner of subterfuges. Large numbers of Dutch vessels took to sailing first to Hanseatic ports to obtain Hanseatic papers before sailing on to the Iberian Peninsula where they frequently succeeded, at least at first, in passing themselves off as 'Hanseatic'.<sup>10</sup> Even so the initial arrest decreed by the crown netted

<sup>7</sup> Alcalá-Zamora, *op. cit.*, 183-4.

<sup>8</sup> See Henry Kamen's review of my *Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World* in the *Times Higher Education Supplement* of 19 November 1982.

<sup>9</sup> Quoted in Gómez-Centurión, *Felipe II*, 362.

<sup>10</sup> Fernand Braudel, *La Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen à l'époque de Philippe II* (Paris, 1949), 492-5; Gómez-Centurión, *Felipe II*, 211-15; Carlos Gómez-Centurión, 'Las relaciones hispano-hanseáticas durante el reinado de Felipe II', *Revista de Historia Naval* XV (1986), 70-9.

around one hundred Dutch ships in Portugal as well as a substantial number in the ports of Castile. Furthermore, it is scarcely valid to point out the subterfuges the Dutch resorted to without also mentioning the subsequent crack-down on supposedly 'neutral' vessels in Iberian ports. The most dramatic coup was the general arrest and search of 'neutral' ships carried out by the duke of Medina Sidonia in the ports of Andalusia in January 1587. This well co-ordinated sweep netted thirty-one disguised Dutch vessels in Cadiz alone, the total for the whole of Andalusia amounting to ninety-four ships manned by 1,600 seamen.<sup>11</sup> Ships, cargoes and the 868 cannon found on board were all seized. The idea that Dutch merchants could simply shrug off such losses as if they were nothing is, of course, absurd. Rather Dutch business suffered a stinging blow as we see from the sudden drop, as from 1587, in the number of Dutch ships sailing to the Iberian Peninsula and then on, direct to the Baltic. Compared with the numbers of Dutch ships which made this voyage before 1587, and again between 1590 and 1597, the totals for 1587-9, after a sharp drop in 1586, represent a virtual collapse. It is perhaps just possible that the Danish officials who kept the Sound toll registers entered in their lists ships which they knew were Dutch as sailing from 'Hamburg' or 'Lübeck'. But there is no indication that this *did* happen while there is incontrovertible proof that during these years there was a vigorous boom in the Hanseatic *Spanienfahrt*, a boom, moreover, which was concentrated more on Lübeck than on the Elbe estuary ports.<sup>12</sup> Even if some of the Hanseatic vessels sailing to the Iberian Peninsula and then listed, on passing eastwards through the Sound, as 'Hanseatic' were really Dutch, the numbers can not have been enough to match the massive contraction in shipping sailing from the Peninsula to the Baltic listed as 'Dutch'. Even though very few Amsterdam freight contracts (the most conclusive evidence for the effectiveness of the Spanish embargoes after 1598) have survived for the 1580s, there is reason enough, particularly in the light of what happened later, to infer that even the comparatively short-lived and inefficient embargo of 1585-90 against the Dutch had an appreciable impact and was one of the factors contributing to what was unquestionably a rather serious economic depression in the northern Netherlands during these years.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>11</sup> Archivo General de Simancas (hereafter AGS) E-Flandes, legajo 2218-120 'Lo que ay en el embargo de las urcas que se han detenido en el Andalusia por el Duque de Medina Sidonia' (I am indebted to Captain José Ignacio González-Aller Hierro for making a copy of this document available to me); Gómez-Centurión, *Felipe II*, 215.

<sup>12</sup> B. Hagedorn, *Ostfrieslands Handel und Schifffahrt vom Ausgang des 16. Jahrhunderts bis zum Westfälischen Frieden (1580-1648)* (Berlin, 1912), 228-9; Ellinger Bang, *Tabeller i*, 86-363.

<sup>13</sup> Ernst Baasch, *Holländische Wirtschaftsgeschichte* (Jena, 1927), 256-7.

*Table 7 Dutch and Hanseatic Shipping sailing from Spain and Portugal direct through the Sound to the Baltic, 1581-90*  
(ships per year)

Year	Dutch	Hanseatic	Year	Dutch	Hanseatic
1581	92	58	1586	22	52
1582	76	45	1587	12	82
1583	78	46	1588	4	87
1584	93	48	1589	3	83
1585	71	64	1590	101	128

Source: N. Ellinger Bang, *Tabeller over skibfart og varetransport gennem Oresund, 1497-1660* (3 vols. Copenhagen 1906-33) i, 86-363.

In 1590 Philip II decided to lift the embargo on the Dutch, doubtless to help relieve the acute shortages of masts, ropes, pitch and other vital naval stores which developed in the Peninsula in the wake of the failure of the Armada, while retaining the prohibition on trade with the English. This new situation with the Dutch being allowed to trade (albeit with occasional interruptions, as in 1595) while the English were kept out was certainly one of the main factors in the spectacular growth of the Dutch 'rich' trades during the 1590s. Spanish policy had the effect of locking the English into stagnation whilst (inadvertently) helping to propel the Dutch entrepot into its post-1590 phase of unprecedented rapid expansion. Historians have often assumed that the tremendous impetus which characterized the Dutch trading system in the 1590s was a direct result of the Spanish recapture of Antwerp in 1585 and the closing of the Scheldt to maritime traffic. But this is an oversimplification of a more complex process. For most of the major Antwerp emigré merchants importing spices, sugar and other high-value wares from southern Europe tended to migrate first to north-western Germany rather than to the northern Netherlands.<sup>14</sup> In the immediate aftermath of 1585, with the northern Netherlands gripped by recession, it was Hamburg, Cologne and the other commercial centres of north-western Germany rather than the Dutch maritime towns which inherited Antwerp's mantle as Europe's central storehouse for the 'rich' trades, albeit only briefly.<sup>15</sup> Although Hamburg's primacy in the distribution of spices and

<sup>14</sup> Hermann Kellenbenz, 'Der Pfeffermarkt um 1600 und die Hansestädte', *Hansische Geschichtsblätter* lxxiv (1956), 33-6; G.S. Gramulla, *Handelsbeziehungen Kölner Kaufleute zwischen 1500 und 1650* (Cologne, 1972) 205-7; J.I. Israel, *Dutch Primacy in World Trade, 1585-1740* (Oxford, 1989), 32-5.

<sup>15</sup> Israel, *Dutch Primacy*, 41-2; Hermann Kellenbenz, *Unternehmerkräfte im Hamburger Portugal- und Spanienhandel, 1590-1625* (Hamburg, 1954), 47.

sugar to northern Europe persisted until the mid 1590s, the shift towards Dutch hegemony, and the movement of Antwerp emigré merchants and sugar refiners from Germany to Holland, began with the lifting of the depression in the northern Netherlands, in 1590, and the onset of an astonishingly vigorous boom. The sudden recovery and tremendous expansion had several causes. Strategic factors, especially Philip's decision to switch his main military effort in the north from the Dutch provinces to France and the subsequent Dutch counter-offensive of the years 1590-97 which cleared the Spaniards from all the rivers linking Holland with Germany played a major part. But there can be little doubt that one of the most crucial factors behind the unprecedented impetus of Dutch long-distance commerce from 1590 was the lifting of the Spanish embargo against their cargoes and products, including textile manufactures, whilst England remained under Philip II's ban.<sup>15</sup> It may be true that English merchants did not easily relinquish their lucrative traffic with the Iberian Peninsula and, by a variety of subterfuges continued to send some merchandise to Spain.<sup>16</sup> But the point is *not* that remitting English goods to the Peninsula was impossible, or anything like it, but simply that it was now much easier, cheaper, and more convenient to ship in Dutch cargoes.

On the accession of Philip III in 1598, Spanish ministers decided to revert to a policy of embargo against the Dutch.<sup>17</sup> They did so because they were convinced (quite rightly) that the recent rapid expansion of Dutch commerce and shipping had very appreciably strengthened the United Provinces and provided the rebel Dutch state with the means not only to keep up the struggle against Spain but greatly to improve their forces and fortifications. Philip's ministers were also convinced that Iberian salt was indispensable to the Dutch herring fishery, one of the pillars of their trade, and that high-grade salt and other southern European goods, together with silver and colonial products, were the motor of the recent Dutch conquest of the 'rich' trades of the Baltic and northern parts generally and here too they were right.<sup>18</sup> The Conde de Chinchón's formula expressed in the Council of State, in 1605, that the 'rebels sustain the war with the proceeds of the trade with the Peninsula, and from their fisheries', was something of an exaggeration but had a

<sup>15</sup> Israel, *Dutch Primacy*, 39-41, 49-51; see also Braudel, *La Méditerranée* (1949), 495-6; M. Ulloa, *La hacienda real de Castilla en el reinado de Felipe II* (Madrid, 1977), 269-70, 278-9.

<sup>16</sup> Pauline Croft, *The Spanish Company* (London, 1977), p. xxix.

<sup>17</sup> Teófilo Guiard y Larrauri, *Historia del consulado y casa de contratación de Bilbao y del comercio de la villa* (2 vols. Bilbao, 1913) i, 244; E. Stols, *De Spaanse Brabanders of de handelsbetrekkingen der zuidelijke Nederlanden met de Iberische wereld, 1598-1648* (Brussels, 1971) i, 8-9.

<sup>18</sup> W. Brulez, 'De zoutinvoer in de Nederlanden in de 16<sup>e</sup> eeuw', *Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis* lxxviii (1955), 184-5; Israel, loc. cit.

considerable core of truth.<sup>19</sup>

That there would be subterfuge and evasion on a massive scale was obvious to Spanish ministers from the outset. From all sides streamed reports of Dutch merchants resorting to the use of Hanseatic papers, certificates and ships and crews, to camouflage their Iberian commerce.<sup>20</sup> The Sephardi Jewish community of Amsterdam switched, from 1598 until the lifting of the new general embargo in 1608, to the systematic use of North German in place of Dutch ships and crews and took to importing a large part of their Iberian produce via Emden where a subsidiary Portuguese Jewish community took root for the interim.<sup>21</sup> Large quantities of Dutch merchandise also began entering Spain from 1598 via La Rochelle and other west coast French ports in all kinds of small French craft.<sup>22</sup> Yet, extensive though the evidence of evasion is, it does not mean that the embargo was essentially ineffective or that Spanish ministers showed themselves, by their persistence in going on with it, to be blind to the facts or lacking in realism. On the contrary, such key ministers (and undoubted realists) as the conde de Chinchón and Balthasar de Zúñiga had very good reasons for repeatedly reaffirming their commitment to the embargoes against the Dutch and English and their determination to tighten up their implementation.<sup>23</sup>

Except for a period in 1603-4 when the embargoes were modified – against Zúñiga's advice – to an across-the-board 30% duty on all imports and exports not certified as coming from, or destined for, the Habsburg Netherlands,<sup>24</sup> a device which its instigator, the Basque official Juan de Gauna, had assured Lerma and the king would do more damage to the Dutch than a blanket prohibition, the policy of shutting the Dutch out of the trade of Spain and Portugal was rigidly adhered to from the autumn of 1598 down to 1608. The full embargo was reimposed, on the recommendation of Chinchón and other leading ministers in September 1604.<sup>25</sup> A variety of expedients were found to tighten its implementation. Prodded by Zúñiga, the Archduke Albert was

<sup>19</sup> M. Alcocer y Martínez (ed.) *Consultas del Consejo de Estado, (1600-1606)* (2 vols. Madrid, 1930-2) ii, 207. *consulta* 10 May 1605.

<sup>20</sup> C. Fernández Duro, *Armada española desde la unión de los reinos de Castilla y de Leon* (9 vols. Madrid, 1895-1903) iii, 229; Alcocer y Martínez, *Consultas* i, 19-23.

<sup>21</sup> E.M. Koen, 'Amsterdam notarial deeds pertaining to the Portuguese Jews in Amsterdam up to 1639', *Studia Rosenthaliana* ii, pp. 120, 124, 258-9, 263, 270 and iii, 114, 118, 119, 121, 123, 235, 246.

<sup>22</sup> Alcocer y Martínez, *Consultas* i, 21; A. Girard, *Le commerce français à Seville et Cadix au temps des Habsbourg* (Paris, 1932), 54.

<sup>23</sup> Alcocer y Martínez, *Consultas* i, 264-5, and ii, 87, 207, 241.

<sup>24</sup> J. de Sturler, 'Un épisode de la politique douanière des Archiducs: l'expérience de Juan de Gauna (1603-5)' *Revue de l'Université de Bruxelles* xlii (1936/7), 369; M.A. Echevarría Bacigalupe, 'Un episodio en la guerra económica hispano-holandesa: el Decreto Gauna (1603)', *Hispania* xlii (1986), 58, 66-8.

<sup>25</sup> Alcocer y Martínez, *Consultas* ii, 81, 87, 90.

compelled, from 1599, to enforce the embargo also in the Habsburg Netherlands.<sup>26</sup> Inspectors or *veedores* of commerce were posted in various Spanish ports. Iberian merchants were subjected to an increasingly elaborate system of checks and certificates. The embargo was eventually extended to include Emden.<sup>27</sup>

But perhaps the most telling proof of the crown's commitment to the embargo policy was the intensive diplomatic campaign undertaken to back it up. Historians have thus far taken little note of the lengths to which Spanish ministers were prepared to go to underpin their embargo policy. So it is worth emphasizing that from the late 1590s onwards, the embargoes were, for decades on end, one of the principle concerns of Spain's European diplomacy. Major clauses of the Anglo-Spanish peace of 1604, for example, were devoted to ensuring that English merchants and ships would not, with England now at peace with Spain, cover for the Dutch.<sup>28</sup> James I undertook not only that his subjects would not supply or sell Dutch-owned cargoes, or products, in Spain, Portugal, Flanders 'or other realms of the king of Spain' but that all English consignments to the Peninsula had to be accompanied by certificates and seals affixed at the place of provenance; and that any goods shipped from England 'quae nec registratae nec segillata fuerint, cadant in confiscationem et sunt ut dicitur de bona preda'.<sup>29</sup> Spanish and Portuguese officials, in other words, did not need to prove that merchandise arriving on English vessels was actually Dutch. It was enough for the certificates to be pronounced unsatisfactory for English cargoes to be seized without the merchants having any recourse to the English crown. This same sweeping provision was then inserted into the Franco-Spanish trade agreement of October 1604.<sup>30</sup> As for the Spanish-Hanseatic treaty of November 1607, most of this accord was concerned with procedures for eradicating Dutch participation from trade between Germany and the Peninsula. Again it was laid down that cargoes not accompanied by satisfactory certificates and seals would be subject to confiscation on suspicion of being Dutch.<sup>31</sup>

Adherents of the Braudel-Kamen view of the Spanish embargoes

<sup>26</sup> Stols, *Spaanse Brabanders* i, 8, 13.

<sup>27</sup> Philip III to duke of Medina Sidonia, Madrid, 5 April 1607 in *Colección de documentos inéditos para la historia de España* (hereafter CODOIN) (113 vols. Madrid, 1842-95) lxxxi (1883), 351.

<sup>28</sup> Joseph Antonio de Abreu y Bertodano, *Colección de los tratados de paz, alianza, neutralidad, garantía*, etc. (12 vols. Madrid, 1740-52), section 'Reynado del señor Rey D. Phelipe III', vol. 1, 256-8; Jaime Carrera Pujal, *Historia de la economía española* (5 vols. Barcelona, 1943-4) i, 327-8; Croft, *The Spanish Company*, 12.

<sup>29</sup> Abreu y Bertodano, *Colección*, section 'Reynado del señor Rey D. Phelipe III' i, 257.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, i, 288-90; Echevarría Bacigalupe, 'Episodio en la guerra económica hispano-holandesa', 85.

<sup>31</sup> Abreu y Bertodano, *Colección*, section 'Reynado del señor Rey D. Phelipe III' i, 384-9.

contend that all this had little effect and that Spanish ministers were wasting their time.<sup>32</sup> But to subscribe to this approach is to miss (or in Braudel's case thoroughly misconstrue) some of the most dramatic shifts in international commerce of the early seventeenth century. The evidence of the Amsterdam freight-contracts – which represent between one third and half of the total Dutch navigation to the Peninsula – show that Dutch navigation to Castile collapsed in 1599 and remained at a very low level in subsequent years (see Table 8). It is true that the impact was less overwhelming with respect to Valencia and especially Portugal. The Council of State at Madrid frequently complained that the enforcement of the embargoes was markedly more lax in Portugal than in Castile and the Dutch evidence confirms that this was so.<sup>33</sup> Nevertheless, the fact remains that the larger part of Dutch navigation to Portugal was also eradicated at this time.<sup>34</sup> Furthermore in as far as the Dutch continued sailing to Portugal they were compelled, by the embargo, to divert away from the main centres, Lisbon and Setúbal, and concentrate on such northern ports as Aveiro and Viana where the chances of evading the embargo were best.<sup>35</sup> Spanish ministers were therefore correct in their conclusion that, despite the highly imperfect implementation of the embargo in Portugal, its effects on the Dutch trading system were nevertheless far-reaching.

*Table 8 Surviving Freight Contracts for Voyages  
from Amsterdam to the Iberian Peninsula, 1597-1602*  
(ships per year)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Dutch ships to Castile</i>	<i>Dutch ships to Portugal</i>	<i>Dutch ships to Valencia and Mallorca</i>	<i>Hanseatic ships</i>
1597	65	117	10	1
1598	44	149	8	4
1599	1	12	2	8
1600	4	49	4	10
1601	8	52	2	10
1602	5	25	4	9

Source: J. W. Ijzerman, 'Amsterdamsche bevrachtingscontracten 1591-1602, 1. de vaart op Spanje en Portugal', *Economisch-Historisch Jaarboek* xvii (1931), 163-291.

<sup>32</sup> Echevarría Bacigalupe, 'Episodio en la guerra económica hispano-holandesa', 86; Gómez-Centurión, Felipe II, 361-7.

<sup>33</sup> See, for instance, Alcocer y Martínez, *Consultas* ii, 204-5.

<sup>34</sup> Virginia Rau, *Estudos sobre a história do sal português* (Lisbon, 1984), 163, 173-5.

<sup>35</sup> Rijksarchief in Zeeland, Middelburg, Archive of the States of Zeeland vol. 2091 'Deductie van de redenen' (January 1622), fos. 1<sup>v</sup>-2.



The Sound toll registers tell the same dramatic story (see Table 9). In 1599 the Dutch traffic direct between the Iberian Peninsula and the Baltic, and vice versa, was not merely damaged or depressed: it collapsed. After 1599 the Dutch direct trade between the Peninsula and the Baltic remained severely depressed down to 1609, languishing at extraordinarily low levels in the years 1605-7. The slack, and with it the connections and profits, were taken up by the Hanseatic towns, Emden (until 1607) and, to a lesser extent Denmark and Norway.<sup>36</sup> It may be that some of these ships were actually Dutch masquerading as 'Hanseatic'; but there is no doubt that there was actually a tremendous boom, based on the suddenly flourishing *Spanienfahrt* in the North German ports between 1598 and 1609 and that a great deal of traffic was diverted away from Holland and Zeeland. In the case of those ostensibly 'Hanseatic' ships hired for voyages to the Peninsula at Amsterdam we can see from the notarial deeds and freight contracts that they were

*Table 9 Voyages from the Iberian peninsula  
direct to the Baltic, 1596-1609  
(ships per year)*

<i>Year</i>	<i>Total*</i>	<i>Dutch</i>	<i>North German</i>	<i>Danish/ Norwegian</i>
1596	173	133	28	11
1598	167	107	54	6
1599	166	12	130	20
1600	213	26	153	31
1601	171	42	103	25
1602	97	10	80	7
1603	115	28	73	14
1604	128	27	84	17
1605	101	1	80	16
1606	96	0	79	14
1607	123	0	98	24
1608	151	19	105	18
1609	131	68	50	11

\*The total includes a small number of English, Scottish and French vessels.  
Source: Bang, *Tabeller i*, 146-206.

<sup>36</sup> Hermann Kellenbenz, 'Spanien, die nördlichen Niederlande und der skandinavisch-baltische Raum in der Weltwirtschaft und die Politik um 1600', *Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte* xli (1954), 306-8; Rau, *Estudos*, 175-7; Adolf Jürgens, *Zur Schleswig-Holsteinischen Handelsgeschichte des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts* (Berlin, 1914), 196-7.

actually North German ships.<sup>37</sup> It is true that the Emden entrepot which flourished exceedingly between 1599 and 1607 was essentially just a transit centre for the Dutch market and emporium. But the evidence shows that it was a transit centre which, in the main, employed German ships and crews rather than Dutch vessels supplied with Emden certificates and that it was therefore an entrepot which was syphoning off freightage and work for seamen as well as drawing away commercial profits and rendering Holland's links with southern Europe indirect.<sup>38</sup>

We see then that the impact of the Spanish embargoes of 1598-1608 on Dutch and everyone else's trade within Europe was in fact enormous. The bulk of the Dutch traffic with the Iberian Peninsula was eliminated; Dutch carrying between the Peninsula and the Baltic was prostrated, the Dutch were hit by a serious shortage of high-grade salt for their fisheries and Baltic trade; and Zeeland's previously flourishing transit trade with the Habsburg Netherlands was effectively ruined.<sup>39</sup> All this, combined with the intensified raiding campaign which the embargo policy made possible – for how could the Spanish attack Dutch merchant ships at sea when they admitted them to their ports? – also seriously impeded the progress of Dutch Mediterranean trade.<sup>40</sup> Yet the impact goes much further than this and it was precisely the unforeseen consequences of the embargo strategy which ultimately cancelled out its prejudicial impact on the Dutch European trading system.

For the Dutch reaction to the Spanish embargo of 1598 was to embark on a vast and totally unprecedented expansion of their traffic outside of Europe. Spanish ministers saw this as a direct response to Spain's measures and, in my view, they were absolutely right. It is remarkable how reluctant modern historians have been to accept what was not only the commonplace Spanish and Portuguese explanation for the sudden, explosive Dutch penetration of the Indies at the close of the sixteenth century,<sup>41</sup> but also that of the Dutch. But what are the facts? Before 1598 there had been only a handful of tentative exploratory Dutch voyages to the Indies east and west. Then, quite suddenly, from 1599 – not a year earlier and not a year later – great numbers of Dutch ships took to sailing each year to the Caribbean, East Indies and West Africa. The standard explanation given in early seventeenth-century Holland for this astounding phenomenon in world history was this: in 1599 the Dutch were barred by the Spanish crown from obtaining the salt, spices, sugar,

<sup>37</sup> Koen, 'Amsterdam notarial deeds', *Studia Rosenthaliana* ii, 120, 124 *et. seq.*

<sup>38</sup> Hagedorn, *Ostfrieslands Handel und Schiffahrt*, 228-9, 406, 409; Kellenbenz, 'Spanien, die nördlichen Niederlande', 307-8.

<sup>39</sup> F. Snapper, *Oorlogsinvloeden op de overzeese handel van Holland, 1551-1719* (Amsterdam, 1959) 53.

<sup>40</sup> Israel, *Dutch Primacy*, 53-61.

<sup>41</sup> With the Portuguese secession from Spain in 1640, this became part of Portugal's anti-Spanish propaganda, see Fernández Duro, *Armada española* IV, 274.

other colonial goods and bullion which they required for their European trade; their response was to voyage in great numbers to the Indies to procure what they needed at source. Chroniclers, the great scholar Grotius, the West Africa merchants, the East India Company directors all explained the matter in these terms.<sup>42</sup> What is more it remains the most convincing explanation as to why the Dutch break-through in the Indies occurred so suddenly, on such a scale and at this particular moment, however much anyone influenced by the Braudel-Kamen view of the Spanish embargoes might fight shy of it.

The scale of the Dutch maritime expansion outside of Europe in the decade 1599-1608 is certainly staggering. Before 1598 only two or three Dutch ships per year had ventured as far as West Africa. In the decade 1599-1608 around 200 Dutch vessels sailed to the Guinea coast, an average of about twenty per year.<sup>43</sup> The first Dutch fleet to sail out to the Caribbean for salt made the voyage – the reader should not be surprised – in the year 1599.<sup>44</sup> Between the summer of 1599 and the end of 1605 no less than 768 Dutch ships sailed to the shores of Venezuela and New Granada for salt and to trade.<sup>45</sup> In just four years, from 1598 to 1601, thirteen Dutch fleets, amounting to some sixty vessels, sailed for spices and pepper to the East Indies.<sup>46</sup> The cumulative impact of all this on world commerce and world politics was overwhelming. But does it mean that the Spanish embargo policy, for all its effect within Europe, was a disastrous fiasco which brought Spain and Portugal only setbacks and humiliation? Not entirely. By 1603 ministers at Madrid knew that everything now depended on their capacity to check and, if possible, suppress Dutch navigation outside Europe.

Was this feasible? In the Spanish Indies at least it would seem that it was. In the years 1603-9 Spain mounted a vigorous counter-offensive in the Caribbean not just attacking the Dutch salt ships at Punta de Araya but extending the embargo policy albeit in a peculiarly drastic form. Besides salt and bullion the Dutch were obtaining large quantities of tobacco from the Venezuela coast and also hides from western Española. In a bid to break this traffic, ministers at Madrid ordered an end to cattle-ranching in western Española and sent in troops to suppress the

<sup>42</sup> Th. Velius, *Chronyk van Hoorn* (4th edn. Hoorn, 1740), 505-6; J.I. Pontanus, *Historische beschrijvinghe der seer wijt beroemde coop-stadt Amsterdam* (Amsterdam, 1614), 181, 267; Israel, *Dutch Primacy*, 61-3, 68.

<sup>43</sup> *Kroniek van het Historische Genootschap gevestigd te Utrecht* (31 vols. Utrecht, 1846-75) xxvii (1871), 262.

<sup>44</sup> Velius, *Chronyk van Hoorn*, 505.

<sup>45</sup> E. Sluiter, 'Dutch-Spanish Rivalry in the Caribbean Area, 1595-1609', *Hispanic American Historical Review* xxviii (1948), 178.

<sup>46</sup> J.G. van Dillen, *Het oudste aandeelhoudersregister van de Kamer Amsterdam der Oost-Indische Compagnie* (The Hague, 1958), 11.

opposition, burn the ranches and scatter the settlers who had been trading with the Dutch.<sup>47</sup> In 1606 the crown also imposed a ban on tobacco growing in Venezuela. The combined effect of these measures, and the attacks on the Dutch salt fleet at Punta de Araya, was considerable. The evidence suggests that Dutch activity in the Caribbean was in fact drastically curtailed during the last few years of the embargo, after 1606,<sup>48</sup> as it was to be again later from 1622 to 1647.

Some of the effects of the Spanish embargo against the Dutch of 1598–1608 were abundantly evident at the time. But the full significance of the embargo, and the accompanying Spanish maritime raiding campaign, only became apparent with the lifting of the embargo and suspension of the raiding campaign with the signing of the Twelve Years' Truce, in April 1609. The signing of the Truce is not just a major landmark in the history of the political struggle between the Spanish crown and the Dutch but marks a fundamental watershed not only in Spanish and Dutch but in all maritime and trade history. For all at once the Dutch were free to return to the ports of Spain, Portugal, and Flanders and exempt from attack by Spanish warships and privateers. This meant in the first place that the Dutch could now again participate fully in the carrying traffic between the Iberian Peninsula and the Baltic, on the one hand, and between the Peninsula and Italy, on the other. But it also meant, after years of relatively high freight and insurance charges, that Dutch shipping costs for all routes suddenly fell precipitately as from 1609 and continued at exceptionally low levels, placing all rivals, including the English, in a hopelessly uncompetitive position, down to 1621.<sup>49</sup> This fall in Dutch freight rates was, of course, particularly marked in the case of voyages to Spain and Portugal (see Table 10).

The consequences of all this for the Dutch, their trade rivals, and Spain were extremely far-reaching. Almost at once the Dutch resumed their former dominance of the carrying traffic between the Peninsula and the Baltic (see Table 11). Hanseatic, English, Danish and Norwegian trade with Spain and Portugal were all drastically cut back.<sup>50</sup> It is indeed no accident that it was precisely during the Truce years that the Dutch were at the zenith of their ascendancy over the commerce of the Baltic. At the same time the lowered freight charges, safer navigation, and resumed access to Spanish silver – their main means of exchange in the Levant – lent major new impetus to Dutch Mediterranean enterprise.<sup>51</sup> Down to

<sup>47</sup> Duarte Gomes Solis, *Disursos sobre los comercios de las dos Indias* (Madrid, 1622), 88; Sluiter, 'Dutch-Spanish Rivalry', 188–90.

<sup>48</sup> Sluiter, 'Dutch-Spanish Rivalry', 192–3.

<sup>49</sup> P.J. Blok (ed.) 'Koopmansadviezen aangaande het plan tot oprichting eener compagnie van assurantie (1629–1635)', *Bijdragen en Mededelingen van het Historische Genootschap gevestigd te Utrecht* xxi (1900), 47 et seq.

<sup>50</sup> Israel, *Dutch Primacy*, 87–93.

*Table 10 Dutch Freight Rates for voyages to Portugal for salt  
and back to the Dutch entrepot, 1600-1620*  
(guilders per last of salt)

<i>Date</i>	<i>Ship (lasts)</i>	<i>Rate</i>
April 1600	De Sloep (70)	37
July 1601	De Moeriaan (50)	29
October 1604	't Paradijs (60)	29.5
May 1609	De Boschieter (80)	12.75
July 1610	De Pelicaen (114)	9.5
June 1611	De Waterhont (105)	9.5
April 1612	De Witte Valck (90)	11
April 1618	De Swarte Raven (150)	9.5
September 1620	De Schuijr (120)	9

Source: Gemeentearchief Amsterdam, card index to the Notarial Archive, section 'Soutvaart'.

1609 the Dutch had played only a marginal role in the Mediterranean rich trades, having been a factor of some importance only in the shipping in of cheap Baltic grain. From 1609 – that is, as the Venetian consul at Aleppo made careful note, from 1609 precisely<sup>52</sup> – the Dutch moved strongly in to the high-value commerce of Venice, Livorno, North Africa, Cyprus and Aleppo and rapidly outstripped the English who down to 1609 had had a considerably larger Levant trade than the Dutch. The lifting of the Spanish embargoes made the Dutch, for a short time, a major trading power in the Levant and, indeed, in some areas of the Near East, notably Cyprus and Egypt, the leading trading power.<sup>53</sup>

It was not therefore obstinacy, blindness to reality, or a refusal to face facts which led Spanish ministers, headed by Balthasar de Zúñiga, to reimpose their embargo against the Dutch in Portugal, Spanish Italy and Flanders as well as Spain in April 1621. Rather the decision was made in the full knowledge of what had transpired before 1609 and all the difficulties which a policy of full-scale embargo involved. Spanish ministers knew that their new embargo would be partially evaded, that they would meet with obstruction particularly in Portugal, that Iberian salt exports – those of Ibiza and Valencia as well as those of Portugal –

<sup>51</sup> J.G. van Dillen *Van rijkdom en regenten* (The Hague, 1970), 71-2, 87; J.I. Israel, 'The Dutch Merchant Colonies in the Mediterranean during the seventeenth century', *Renaissance and Modern Studies* xxx (1986), 90-4.

<sup>52</sup> Guglielmo Berchet, *Relazioni dei consoli veneti nella Siria* (Turin, 1866), 151.

<sup>53</sup> *Relaciones de Pedro Teixeira* (Antwerp, 1610), 198; K. Heeringa (ed.) *Bronnen tot de geschiedenis van den Levantschen handel* (3 vols. The Hague, 1910-17) i, 463, 481.

*Table 11 Voyages from the Iberian Peninsula direct to the Baltic through the Danish Sound, 1618-41*  
(ships per year)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Dutch</i>	<i>North German</i>	<i>Danish/ Norwegian</i>
1618	181	168	11	2
1619	135	119	15	0
1620	105	91	10	4
1621	61	36	22	2
1622	56	2	41	12
1623	99	3	62	31
1624	86	2	65	16
1625	40	0	31	8
1626	36	0	35	1
1627	22	1	21	0
1628	9	0	7	2
1629	14	0	11	3
1630	28	3	22	3
1631	64	10	42	9
1632	30	6	20	3
1634	55	25	28	1
1636	43	18	22	2
1637	39	10	28	1
1638	66	27	35	4
1639	64	41	20	2
1640	30	14	15	1
1641	56	34	17	4

Source: Bang, *Tabeller* i, 218-340.

would collapse, that the crown would suffer appreciable financial loss through lost customs revenue,<sup>54</sup> that shortages of vital naval stores would soon develop,<sup>55</sup> and that the checking of 'neutral' ships would lead to diplomatic friction with the English, French and Hanseatics as well as an assortment of lesser maritime powers. The embargo was reimposed because Spain's most experienced and influential ministers – Zúñiga, the duque del Infantado, the marqués de Aytona, and the conde de Olivares – considered that for Spain it was a vital expedient of state, the likeliest method of putting such pressure on the Dutch as to reduce

<sup>54</sup> Alcocer y Martínez, *Consultas* ii, 90.

<sup>55</sup> Antonio Domínguez Ortiz, 'Guerra económica y comercio extranjero en el reinado de Felipe IV', *Hispania* xxiii (1963), 73.

them to a condition in which they would be prepared to make the sort of concessions to Spain which ministers judged indispensable for any acceptable, honourable and secure settlement.<sup>56</sup>

The Spanish embargo against the Dutch of 1621–47 was the most sustained and elaborate of all the embargoes imposed by the Spanish crown during the Habsburg era. In these years the Spanish embargo reached its point of fullest development as an instrument of state and of economic warfare. The principle that the embargoes could not be trusted to, or implemented with sufficient efficiency except by removing all responsibility for trade regulation and inspection from the hands of local magistrates and municipalities was now taken much further than before. This led to serious clashes over local privileges, or *fueros*, in the Basque provinces,<sup>57</sup> Galicia, Navarre and above all Portugal. But the crown was adamant. Ministers no longer had any intention of relying on Portuguese officials to impose the embargoes on Portugal. Even before the extension of the jurisdiction of the *Almirantazgo* to cover Portugal in 1628, Castilian officials, under the supervision of the *Consejo de Guerra* in Madrid were sent in to take charge in the Portuguese ports and, as far as possible, eliminate contact with the Dutch. This was done in the years 1622–4 at Lisbon and Setúbal;<sup>58</sup> and, later also in Oporto and Faro. Inevitably this policy aroused intense resentment locally. The Lisbon city council regarded the use of Castilian officials to impose the embargoes as a major factor in the deepening trade depression which, from 1621, extended its grip over the country. In February 1622 Lisbon complained to the king that the main cause of the lack of trade and grain shortage afflicting the city was the harassment of ‘neutral’ ships and crews caused by the king’s officials ‘que aqui residem pelo coroa de Castella’.<sup>59</sup> Protesting again about the effect of using Castilian officials to implement the embargoes in Portugal in February 1625, Lisbon put it to the king that ‘native Portuguese’ ought to be handling the king’s investigations into trade irregularities.<sup>60</sup>

The *Almirantazgo* – one of the most important institutional innovations of the Olivares era in Spain – was instituted in 1624 originally only in the ports of Andalusia. It failed to develop, as ministers had hoped into a European equivalent of the Spanish trans-Atlantic convoy system, organizing armed convoys to sail to Flanders and North

<sup>56</sup> AGS Estado 2036 consulta, Madrid, 6 July 1622 fos. 1<sup>v</sup> and 5, *votos* of the duque del Infantado and marqués de Aytona; AGS Estado 2037, consulta 14 June 1623, fo. 4, ‘voto’ of Olivares.

<sup>57</sup> Guiard y Larrauri, *Historia del consulado* i, 271–3, 284–5.

<sup>58</sup> AGS Guerra 895. Diego López de Haro to Philip IV, Lisbon, 7 January and 19 May 1623.

<sup>59</sup> E. Freire de Oliveira (ed.) *Elementos para a história do município de Lisboa* (19 vols. Lisbon, 1882–1943) iii, 31.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, iii, 154.

Germany. But as a trade inspectorate and system of commercial courts, a sort of Inquisition of commerce, it achieved a thoroughness and stringency which soon made it the most feared institution in Spain after the Inquisition itself. Once it had proved itself more effective than earlier arrangements as an instrument for checking and regulating activity in the ports, the crown gradually transferred not just the inspecting of ships, cargoes and warehouses throughout Castile, the Basque provinces, and Navarre to this organization but also the judging and settlement of all cases arising out of the embargo decrees.<sup>61</sup> A *Tribunal Mayor del Almirantazgo* was set up at Madrid in 1625 to function rather like the *Suprema* of the Inquisition with respect to heresy, as a court of final appeal, a supervisory body and as a council to advise the king on everything concerning the regulation of trade and shipping. In August 1628 it was decided to extend the authority of the *Almirantazgo* to Portugal; and the Castilian apparatus of trade control in the Portuguese ports was brought under its remit.<sup>62</sup> Also in 1628, the jurisdiction of the *Almirantazgo* was extended to the realms of the crown of Aragon as well. That there was strong opposition to the *Almirantazgo* in Valencia, as elsewhere, is not surprising. But whether the removal of the most energetic of the *Almirantazgo*'s judges at Alicante in 1642 for applying the *Almirantazgo*'s directives 'too rigorously' is really a sign that the organisation had little impact in Valencia, as has been suggested, may be doubted.

If the bureaucratic effort that went into implementing the embargo of 1621-47 went further than in the past, the same is true of Spain's European diplomatic drive to back it up. There was in fact much that Spain could do by diplomatic means to reinforce the embargo policy. Having imposed the embargo on the Spanish possessions in Italy as well as in the Peninsula, heavy pressure was brought to bear on the Republic of Genoa to cease importing grain and Baltic stores from the United Provinces.<sup>63</sup> Historians habitually question whether such pressure, in the early modern context, could possibly have been effective. But, as it happens, we have several very specific pieces of evidence which prove the efficacy of this pressure not for a year or two but for the whole of the next quarter of a century. There is an Amsterdam admiralty report of

<sup>61</sup> Domínguez Ortiz, 'Guerra económica y comercio extranjero', 80, 85, 94; Israel, *The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World*, 205-9; the claim that 'the inspectors and officials of the *Almirantazgo* had always been refused entry into Vizcaya on the grounds that their activities would infringe the province's *fueros*' in J.H. Elliott, *The Count-Duke of Olivares* (New Haven and London, 1986), p. 45, is not strictly correct as its officials were certainly seizing cargoes and ships in Bilbao in the early 1630s, see Israel, *The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World*, 208-9.

<sup>62</sup> P.T. Rooney, 'The Habsburg Government of Portugal in the reign of Philip IV (1621-40)' (unpublished University of Keele Ph.d. thesis, 1988), pp. 140-1, 173.

<sup>63</sup> AGS Estado 1884. Philip IV to viceroy of Naples, Madrid, 22 January 1622.



1627, for instance, which states that, owing to Genoa's reluctance to deal with the Dutch, very few Dutch vessels any longer called there.<sup>64</sup> It was estimated that at that time eight times as many Dutch ships were calling at Livorno as at Genoa. Nor, apart from the Dutch consul, were there any longer any Dutch factors residing in Genoa. A later English document tells us that it was not until after 1647 that the Genoese Republic switched back as far as official purchases on behalf of the state were concerned, from buying grain and stores from the Hanseatics and English to dealing with the Dutch.<sup>65</sup>

One of the central Spanish diplomatic objectives linked to the embargo policy was to mobilize the Emperor to help put pressure on Hamburg and Lübeck to admit a Spanish resident to check and certify cargoes for the Peninsula on behalf of the *Almirantazgo*.<sup>66</sup> The Emperor gave some support to this initiative and appointed the Walloon nobleman Gabriel de Roy whom Philip IV had selected to co-ordinate the embargo policy in the north as well as the projected Spanish-Austrian Baltic *armada* (with which the Habsburgs planned to assert their hegemony over the Baltic) as 'General-Kommissar der Baltischen und Ozeanischen See'. At the assembly of the Hanseatic League which gathered at Lübeck, in April 1628, the Austrian minister Schwarzenberg, with de Roy at his side, formally proposed the 'establishment of a Hanseatic Company for the Spanish trade' to interlock with the *Almirantazgo*.<sup>67</sup> But the Hansa towns tenaciously resisted the Spanish and Austrian pressure that they admit de Roy on behalf of the king of Spain to check cargoes for the Peninsula, having no wish to compromise their independence or antagonize the Dutch. Eventually, however, the Spanish crown got round this difficulty by signing an anti-Dutch commercial agreement with Denmark which enabled Philip IV to post de Roy as his resident in the Elbe port of Glückstadt which, conveniently for the *Almirantazgo*, is located between Hamburg and the open sea.<sup>68</sup> Thus, in the early 1630s the *Almirantazgo* was able to impose a stringent checking system whereby all cargoes dispatched from anywhere in northern Germany to the Iberian Peninsula had to be certified as being non-Dutch by Gabriel de Roy. Cargoes which lacked de Roy's

<sup>64</sup> Heeringa, *Bronnen* i, 112; see also E. Grendi, 'I Nordici e il traffico del porto di Genova, 1590-1665', *Rivista Storica Italiana* lxxxiii (1971), 34, 55, 67.

<sup>65</sup> John Thurloe, *A Collection of State Papers* (7 vols. London, 1742) ii, 144-5.

<sup>66</sup> M.E.H.N. Mout, 'Holendische Propositiones: een Habsburgs plan tot vernietiging van handel, visserij en scheepvaart der Republiek (ca. 1625)', *Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis* xciv (1982), 351-6.

<sup>67</sup> R. Häpke, *Niederländische Akten und Urkunde zur Geschichte der Hanse und zur deutschen Seegeschichte* (2 vols. Munich-Leipzig, 1913-23) ii, 406-8.

<sup>68</sup> AGS Estado 2332. Gabriel de Roy to Philip IV, Wismar, 2 December 1630; L. Laursen, *Danmark-Norges Traktater, 1523-1750 IV (1626-1649)* (Copenhagen, 1917), 87-8.

certificates were subject to automatic confiscation, on suspicion of being Dutch, on arrival in Spain. The increasingly tense relations between Denmark and the United Provinces in the period 1630–45 ensured the continuance of Danish backing for Spain's embargo policy in the north. The joint Spanish-Danish checking and confiscation procedures were subsequently further extended and refined under the Spanish-Danish treaty of March 1641.<sup>69</sup> Almost the whole of this treaty, incidentally, was concerned with different aspects of Spain's embargo against the Dutch.

Another key component of Spain's economic war against the Dutch through diplomacy was the Anglo-Spanish peace treaty of 1630. This repeated the clauses of the 1604 treaty requiring English cargoes for Spain and Portugal to be covered by certificates and seals from their place of provenance, giving Spain the automatic right to confiscate English cargoes (and as it proved also ships) which were not satisfactorily authorized.<sup>70</sup> English merchants whose ships and cargoes were seized by the *Almirantazgo* after 1630 for violating the embargo decrees – one of the English consignments seized at Bilbao contained Silesian linen which merely lacked a certificate from Gabriel de Roy – tried to enlist the help of the English government against the *Almirantazgo* but to no avail.<sup>71</sup> Charles I's policy was to seek a harmonious working relationship with Spain which meant acquiescence in the embargo policy. English merchants were simply told by their own ministers that under the terms of the 1630 treaty there was no recourse against the *Almirantazgo*.

The Spanish embargo of 1621–47 against the Dutch was the most sustained, intensive and carefully planned of the Spanish embargoes of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and it was the one which exerted the greatest effect. If José Alcalá-Zamora (much praised by Kamen and Stradling for the reliability of his views!) held that the Spanish measures were completely ineffective,<sup>72</sup> in reality this embargo was one of the most decisive factors in the whole of early modern maritime and trade history. Vast and extremely wide-ranging shifts in international exchange and commerce resulted from it.<sup>73</sup> The great bulk of Dutch navigation to the Iberian Peninsula, certainly more than three-quarters and, until the Portuguese secession of 1640, probably over ninety per cent, was suppressed. The Dutch carrying traffic direct between the

<sup>69</sup> Laursen, *Traktater* IV, 280–311; O. A. Johnsen, 'Les relations commerciales entre la Norvège et l'Espagne dans les temps modernes', *Revue Historique* lv (1930), 79–81.

<sup>70</sup> Abreu y Bertodano, *Colección*, section 'Reynado de Phelipe IV' ii, 218–20.

<sup>71</sup> British Library MS. Eg. 1820, fos. 13<sup>v</sup>, 24; British Library MS. Add. 36448, fo. 13 et seq.

<sup>72</sup> Alcalá-Zamora, *España, Flandes y el Mar del Norte*, 183–4.

<sup>73</sup> Israel, *Dutch Primacy*, 121–96.

Peninsula and the Baltic, and vice versa, almost totally collapsed in the 1620s and achieved only a very modest recovery during the 1630s when restricted numbers of passes were sold to the Dutch from Brussels for Dutch vessels to be used to ship in grain and fetch salt (see Tab. 12). At the same time Dutch freight and insurance charges were forced up sufficiently drastically to erode some of the Dutch competitive edge in northern European waters and all of it in southern European waters.<sup>74</sup> Indeed the Dutch Levant trade almost completely collapsed in 1621 and was not to revive until after 1647.<sup>75</sup> The Dutch trade to Italy was also seriously damaged albeit the traffic to Livorno and Venice survived at a reduced level.<sup>76</sup> The consequences of all this for the rivals of the Dutch were immense. Having slumped disastrously in 1609, the *Spanienfahrt* of the Hanseatics, Danes and Norwegians recovered spectacularly as from

*Table 12 The Rise in Dutch Freight Rates for Voyages  
to Portugal to fetch salt for the Dutch Entrepot, 1618-36  
(guilders per last)*

<i>Date</i>	<i>Ship (lasts)</i>	<i>Rate</i>
April 1618	De Swarte Raven (150)	9.5
May 1619	Den Coninck Davidt (105)	10
May 1619	De Witte Leeuw (125)	9
September 1620	De Schuijcr (120)	9
September 1622	De Makreel (170)	21.5
October 1622	De Landman (160)	20
April 1623	(hired French vessel)	60
April 1624	(hired Hanseatic vessel)	34
April 1630*	De Vergulde Snoeck (120)	30
May 1630*	De geele Pynas (150)	32
March 1635*	De Nooteboom (90)	28.75
March 1636*	De Hoope (140)	42

\*These ships had been issued with (expensive) passes by the authorities in Brussels.

Source: Gemeentearchief Amsterdam NA 241, fo.85 and NA 670, fo.16, NA 1041, fo.227 and card index to the Notarial Archive, section 'Soutvaart'.

<sup>74</sup> J. Schreiner, *Nederland og Norge, 1625-1650. Trelastutførsel og handelspolitik* (Oslo, 1933), 48-50; P.H. Winkelman (ed.) *Bronnen voor de geschiedenis van de Nederlandse oostzeehandel in de zeventiende eeuw VI* (1617-25), 81, 191, 197 et seq.

<sup>75</sup> Israel, 'Dutch Merchant Colonies', 94-6.

<sup>76</sup> Heeringa, *Bronnen* 1, 497-8, 505-6.

1621 precisely.<sup>77</sup> Between 1621 and 1647 Hamburg not Amsterdam was the main pivot of commercial interaction between the Iberian Peninsula and the Baltic.<sup>78</sup> But the greatest gains at Dutch expense were made after 1630 by England. Between 1630 and 1647 the English reigned supreme not only in Iberian but in all Mediterranean commerce.<sup>79</sup> So total was the English ascendancy over northern Europe's trade with Italy and the Levant in these years that Amsterdam merchants thought of this sector of world trade as a complete write-off from their point of view, a traffic which had fallen wholly into English hands.<sup>80</sup>

Perhaps no better example can be found to demonstrate Spain's basic success in cutting the Dutch off from direct access to the Iberian market than the English grip over Spain's wool and colonial dyestuff exports.<sup>81</sup> From the 1630s onwards Spanish merino wool was of vital importance to the Dutch cloth industry owing to Leiden's shift over to the manufacture of high-quality cloth based on Spanish wool. But how did Spanish wool and dyestuffs reach the Dutch market in the period 1630-47? The answer is that these vital commodities were bought up by the English in Spain, in exchange for English textiles, shipped in English vessels to England and then re-shipped, often via the Dover entrepot, to Holland where the English sold them for high prices. 'When that state [the United Provinces] were at wars with the Spaniards', noted an English observer some years later, [the wool sacks] 'were carryed to them by the English, one only of this nation resident in Madrid sending 500 baggs to them yearly, proceeded from the effects of English commodities.'<sup>82</sup>

The Spanish embargoes against the Dutch and French (1635-59) were in fact, the main basis of the extraordinary prosperity of English commerce with Spain and the Mediterranean world generally in the 1630s and early and mid 1640s. The steady growth of English cloth sales in Spain and Turkey more than compensated for the steady decay of English cloth sales, under the pressure of Dutch competition, in the Baltic. But England's success as a trading power in southern Europe proved to be built, in large part, on precarious foundations. Contrary to what has sometimes been alleged, there were no inherent strengths in

<sup>77</sup> Ch. F. Wurm, *Über des Lebensschicksale des Foppius van Aitzema* (Hamburg, 1854), 32; Kellenbenz, *Unternehmerkräfte*, 60-4.

<sup>78</sup> E. Baasch, 'Hamburgs Seeschiffahrt und Warenhandel vom Ende des 16. bis zur Mitte des 17. Jahrhunderts', *Zeitschrift für Hamburgische Geschichte* IX (1894), 310-31.

<sup>79</sup> Israel, *Dutch Primacy*, 150-6.

<sup>80</sup> Heeringa, *Bronnen* 1, 1075; Blok, 'Koopmansadviezen', 51, 65.

<sup>81</sup> H. Taylor, 'Trade, Neutrality and the "English Road", 1630-1648', *Economic History Review* 2nd ser. xxv (1972), 250; J.I. Israel, 'Spanish Wool Exports and the European Economy, 1610-40', *Economic History Review* 2nd ser. xxxiii (1980), 205-6, 208-9.

<sup>82</sup> *A Brief Narration of the Present Estate of the Bilbao Trade* (London? 1650?), 9.

English trade and shipping such as could sustain her trade primacy in the south once the political framework which made it possible was transformed. No sooner were the Spanish embargoes against the Dutch lifted, in the summer of 1647, than the hollowness of England's ascendancy in southern European trade was revealed. Indeed, English trade with Spain and the Mediterranean declined so rapidly in the late 1640s that it is no exaggeration to say that within a year or two her former primacy was in ruins. The fall in Dutch freight and insurance charges for southern European destinations eliminated England's previous competitive edge. Spanish goods, including the wine of the Canary Islands, and the products of Italy and the Levant began to pour into England indirectly via the Dutch entrepot which is what made necessary the introduction of the Navigation Act, in 1651. The Dutch began to outdo the English in the selling of good quality cloth in Spain and Turkey and, being able to afford to offer higher prices, soon eased the Spanish wool trade out of English hands.<sup>83</sup> 'The commodities of Spaine are so enhanced and bought up,' lamented one English onlooker,

and the cloathing of Holland within these few years so thriveth and increaseth that whereas we formerly brought home foure or five thousand baggs of cloth wooll and the Hollanders scarce a thousand, which they had then by re-shipping, theirs being prohibited, they now carry away five or six thousand and wee bring not past 12 or 1500 in the yeare at most.

By 1650 the Dutch were already as dominant in the Spanish trade as the English had been five years earlier. But the balance was yet to be still further tilted against the English. After the treaty of Münster (1648) and the Spanish-Dutch maritime agreement of 1650, Spain's leverage over the mechanisms of international trade was substantially reduced. The great period of Spain's impact on international trade relations was now over. The *Almirantazgo* was barred by the terms of these agreements from demanding certificates of the Dutch, or searching their ships and warehouses in Spain with the rigour with which they had previously searched English and Hanseatic ships and warehouses in quest of Dutch goods. After 1648 it was, therefore, difficult for the Spanish crown to enforce its ban against French goods (which had been prohibited since 1635) or its new embargo of the years 1655-60 against the English. These changes, together with Spain's loss of control over Portugal since December 1640, placed the Spanish crown in a relatively weak position.

<sup>83</sup> Thurloe, *State Papers* 1, 200; B. Worsley, *The Advocate, or a Narrative of the State and Condition of things between the English and Dutch Nation, in relation to Trade* (London, 1652), 5, 7, 9; J.E. Farnell, 'The Navigation Act of 1651. The First War and the London Merchant Community', *Economic History Review* 2nd ser. XVI (1963/4), 450.

<sup>84</sup> *A Brief Narration of the Present Estate of the Bilbao Trade*, fo.2.

We know, furthermore, from the constant complaints of Spanish ministers during the late 1650s that the Dutch took advantage of their now privileged situation to smuggle large quantities of both French and English goods not only into Spain itself but also now, although not yet on so large a scale as subsequently, through the Caribbean ports of the Spanish Indies.<sup>85</sup>

But this does not mean that the Spanish embargo of 1655-60 against the English should be regarded as ineffective or unimportant. On the contrary, all the signs are that it further weakened what was already a much reduced English role in Spanish trade and further damaged England's position in the Mediterranean. The exclusion of English ships and merchants, if not of their goods, from the Spanish market was in itself of great advantage to the Dutch who were at the peak of their ascendancy over the Spanish trade and, via Cadiz, the traffic to Spanish America, during the late 1650s. In Spanish southern Italy and Sicily, the one part of the Mediterranean world where English trade primacy seems to have survived intact in the years 1647-55, the English grip was now (temporarily) broken and Dutch firms based in Naples and especially Messina took over the traffic.<sup>86</sup>

The lifting of Spain's embargoes against France, in 1659, and England, in 1660, are not yet quite the end of the story. In the late seventeenth century a series of Spanish embargoes against French trade and shipping did much damage to the French role in the Spanish and Spanish America trade and strengthened that of the Dutch and English.<sup>87</sup> But these later embargoes, and most notably that of 1689-97 during the Nine Years' War, were in part foisted on Spain by her English and Dutch allies. Moreover, following the abolition of the *Almirantazgo* (under Dutch pressure) in 1661 and the increasingly enfeebled grip of the Spanish crown over customs procedures at Cadiz and the flow of traffic to Spanish America, these later embargoes were somewhat pale reflections of those imposed by Spain with such determination during her age of greatness.

We may say by way of conclusion that Braudel's contention that the Spanish embargoes were ineffective and essentially marginal phenomena is completely wrong. Henry Kamen's defence of Braudel's position, claiming that even if there are signs that the Dutch suffered some

<sup>85</sup> AGS Estado 2089. Esteban de Gamarra to Philip IV, The Hague, 31 August 1656; Algemeen Rijksarchief, The Hague, SG 704/-ii. Gamarra to States General, The Hague, 17 November 1655.

<sup>86</sup> The three English merchant houses at Messina were shut down in November 1655 and all English stock seized, leaving the trade in the hands of the Dutch, Algemeen Rijksarchief, The Hague, SG 7047-ii. Dutch consul to States General, Messina, 16 November 1655.

<sup>87</sup> Girard, *Commerce français*, 273-5, 529-30.

disruption there is 'contrary evidence' which shows the basic ineffectiveness of Spain's embargoes proves, on close consideration, to be groundless. Yet the Braudel-Kamen view of the Spanish embargoes is constantly repeated and has been categorically subscribed to by a remarkably long list of historians. The fact that this view is wrong and is constantly repeated, however, is less important than the fact that it is so utterly misleading. For to subscribe to it is to miss some of the most basic shifts in early modern maritime and trade history. It is this above all which qualifies the Braudel-Kamen view of the Spanish embargoes to be classified as one of the fundamental mistakes of early modern historical studies.

THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE RIVALRY  
DURING THE THIRTY YEARS WAR: GABRIEL DE ROY  
AND OLIVARES' MERCANTILIST PROJECTS, 1621-1645

AMONG THE MAIN strategic aims of the Spanish monarchy during the age of Olivares none was more relentlessly pursued, at all stages, than the effort to curtail and undermine Dutch economic power both in Europe and in the rest of the world. By the later years of the Twelve Years Truce (1609-21), the Dutch were seen in Madrid not just as rebels and heretics but as subverters of the world economic order and colonial system. The continued blocking of the Scheldt, paralysing the sea-borne trade of the Spanish Netherlands; Dutch dominance of Baltic commerce and of the supply of northern products to Spain, Portugal, and Italy; Dutch colonial expansion in the Far East, Caribbean, and Africa: all this was seen as an affront and an insidious danger to the monarchy, a drain on its resources which could no longer be tolerated.<sup>1</sup> From the moment Dutch ships and goods were banned by royal decree from Spain, Portugal, and Spanish southern Italy in April 1621, Philip IV's ministers set to work to extend, refine, and intensify their grandiose programme of economic war against the Dutch. This vast process comprised not only a system of interlocking embargoes on Dutch products and Dutch-owned merchandise of any sort throughout the Spanish empire; a new customs machinery in Spain, Portugal, and Flanders; and the river blockade of the Dutch Republic mounted in the years 1625-9; but also a series of measures designed to replace the Dutch as the main trading partners of the monarchy with the Hansa towns of North Germany (together with the commercial and industrial towns of the Spanish Netherlands) and to regenerate Spain's own colonial trade and that of Portugal.<sup>2</sup> Together, the total package of Spanish mercantilist

<sup>1</sup> Jonathan I. Israel, 'A Conflict of Empires: Spain and the Netherlands, 1618-1648', *Past and Present*, lxxvi (1977), 34, 37-9; see above, 1, 4-6.

<sup>2</sup> Jonathan I. Israel, *The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World, 1606-1661* (Oxford, 1982), pp. 205-16, 285-92.



measures in the 1620s and 1630s represents one of the most fundamental and decisive factors shaping the development of the world economy in the seventeenth century.

Among these Spanish mercantilist measures, one which was to have particularly wide ramifications was the setting up of the *Almirantazgo* of Seville in 1624. The purpose of this present article is to review the evolution of Spanish mercantilist policy in this period, and in particular trace the rise of the *Almirantazgo* as a major force in European economic life, by focusing on the career of Gabriel de Roy, the Walloon nobleman who became Spain's leading expert on northern trade, who has been called the 'moving spirit' behind the *Almirantazgo*,<sup>3</sup> and who was more responsible than anyone else for implementing Spanish mercantilist policy in northern Europe.

Gabriel de Roy, seigneur de Chanteraise and of Popernol, was born around 1570 in the province of Artois in the Spanish Netherlands, to a distinguished military family.<sup>4</sup> Leaving the ancestral home in 1590 'with the intention of seeing the world', he was taken first into the service of Pedro Coloma, a friend of his father and a senior Spanish financial official in Brussels, who was later dismissed for fraud. After a time, anxious to see more of the world, he left Brussels and set out on a European tour, travelling first to the Imperial court at Prague and then to several lesser princely courts of Germany. From the Holy Roman Empire, he planned to proceed to Constantinople but, prevented by the 'wars of Hungary', travelled instead, via Bratislava, to Cracow where he stayed for some time as a visiting nobleman at the Polish court. From Poland, he journeyed across Lithuania and Courland and then took passage on a ship from Riga to Stockholm. After touring Sweden, he sailed back to Königsberg from where he continued, at a leisurely pace, visiting Danzig, Lübeck, several parts of Denmark, Hamburg, Bremen, Emden, and finally Cologne. The exceptional command of French, Spanish, Dutch, and German which he had by this time acquired, and his easy familiarity with both matters Spanish and with northern Europe, were to be the foundation of his career.

At Cologne he joined forces with an Augustinian friar who had been entrusted by Philip II with a very special commission. This was to obtain for the king a holy relic, the 'skull of the glorious martyr Saint Lawrence'

<sup>3</sup> S.H. Steinberg, *The 'Thirty Years' War' and the Conflict for European Hegemony, 1600-1660* (London, 1977), pp. 46-7.

<sup>4</sup> See 'Relacion sumaria del preceder y acciones de Gabriel de Roy' (1617), A[rchivo] G[eneral de] S[imancas] Estado 2847; see also Eddy Stols, *De Spaanse Brabanders of de handelsbetrekkingen der zuidelijke Nederlanden met de Iberische wereld, 1598-1648* (Brussels, 1971), p. 18.

from a monastery in Gladbach in the duchy of Jülich, and bring it to Madrid.<sup>5</sup> The friar employed de Roy to buy up a quantity of additional holy relics both from ecclesiastical establishments and from dealers in and around Cologne. He then sent de Roy to Madrid to render the king a first-hand account of the state of the thus far fruitless negotiations over the skull. As zealous as ever to obtain the relic, Philip sent de Roy to Rome with orders for the Spanish ambassador there. De Roy waited four months at Rome while the ambassador extracted a bull from the Pope commanding the monks of Gladbach to surrender the skull. Armed with this bull, de Roy returned to Cologne. But although the monks now complied, the duke of Jülich-Cleves refused to allow the relic out of his territory, so that de Roy and the friar were forced to return to Spain without the skull but with a 'very large quantity' of other holy relics for the king. 'His Majesty, having inspected and venerated every one of them, commanded that they be deposited at San Lorenzo el Real [The Escorial].'<sup>6</sup> Thanked and rewarded by the king, de Roy returned to Flanders.

He next found employment as a secretary at the court of the Archduke Albert, at Brussels, then as secretary in the field to the commander of the Spanish army in Flanders, the admiral of Aragon, Don Francisco de Mendoza. De Roy was captured with the admiral at the battle of Nieuwpoort in 1600, and remained sporadically in his company throughout the latter's captivity in Holland.<sup>7</sup> 'Sporadically' because de Roy's obvious usefulness as an intermediary soon came to the notice of the Dutch stadtholder, Prince Maurice, who sent him on several missions to Brussels to help arrange ransoms for Spanish prisoners held by the Dutch. On the admiral's release in 1602, de Roy accompanied him back to Spain, remaining in his service for six more years. In November 1606, the admiral, an enemy of Philip III's favourite, the duke of Lerma, was arrested and locked up. De Roy remained in contact with him for a time but then suddenly returned to Flanders in 1608. He himself was then arrested in Brussels on the king's orders, and brought back to Spain. His subsequent treatment, which included torture, succeeded apparently in extracting information to the detriment of the admiral, for the latter's lawyers then tried to nullify his evidence by vilifying him as corrupt and

<sup>5</sup> Philip's obsession with the cult of St. Lawrence arose from the fact that the victory over the French at St. Quentin was won on St. Lawrence's day (10 Aug.); a principal duty of the monks at The Escorial was to offer perpetual thanks for this victory, see Geoffrey Parker, *Philip II* (Boston, 1978), p. 171.

<sup>6</sup> See 'Relacion sumaria'.

<sup>7</sup> See 'Relacion sumaria' and *Resolutiën der Staten Generaal XII (1602-3)*, ed. H.H.P. Rijperman (The Hague, 1950), p. 312.

a drunkard.<sup>8</sup> De Roy remained in prison at Madrid for nearly two years before being allowed to return to Brussels.

Soon though he was back in royal service. In June 1613, he was sent by Ambrogio Spínola, the new commander of the army in Flanders, on a secret mission to The Hague. By this time the Brussels administration considered him so expert in Dutch affairs that it was decided to make him Philip III's resident at Cologne, a post largely concerned with monitoring Dutch activity. In August 1616, he was sent back to Holland, this time at the request of the Council of the Indies in Madrid, to gather information about Dutch plans for further colonial expansion. There he made contact with the Dutch admiral, Van Spilbergen, who had raided the Pacific coast of Spanish South America in 1615, as well as with a member of the States-General.<sup>9</sup> Evidently, he did gather a good deal of information on Dutch shipping and manpower especially in the Far East.<sup>10</sup> After several successful months discovering the 'present state of their navigation and commerce with the Indies east and west', he sailed back from Rotterdam to Spain. At Madrid, he compiled reports on Dutch activity, was listened to by the dukes of Lerma and Infantado, and was presented to Philip III. He was now considered one of Spain's foremost experts on the Dutch in general and Spain's leading expert on Dutch colonial matters.<sup>11</sup> At the same time, Dutch intelligence pinpointed de Roy as one of the most extreme and vocal advocates of an anti-Dutch policy in Spain.<sup>12</sup> In 1617, he returned to Cologne, from which he apparently remained in contact with several personages in Holland.

During the opening years of the Thirty Years War, de Roy supplied regular reports to Brussels and Madrid, detailing the movements of the armies and unfailingly castigating the Dutch as the prime instigators of anti-Habsburg activity in the empire.<sup>13</sup> Whether he was filled with genu-

<sup>8</sup> Antonio Rodríguez Villa, 'D. Francisco de Mendoza. Almirante de Aragon', in *Homenaje a Menéndez y Pelayo. Estudios de erudición española*, ed. J. Valera (2 vols., Madrid, 1899), ii. 605-8.

<sup>9</sup> J.C.M. Warnsinck, *De reis om de wereld van Joris van Spilbergen, 1614-1617* (2 vols., The Hague, 1943), i. 169-70.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>12</sup> 'Rapport van Carel van Cracouw als commissaris naar Spanje gezonden' (1618), *Bijdragen en mededeelingen van het Historisch Genootschap*, ii (1879), 103.

<sup>13</sup> See, in particular, de Roy to Juan de Ciriza, 25 March and 2 May 1619, AGS Estado 2306; de Roy to Ciriza, 28 Nov. and to Pedro de San Juan, 5 March 1620, AGS Estado 2307; and de Roy to Philip IV, 8 June 1620, AGS Estado 2308. On his dealings with the papal nuncio at Cologne, see *Nuntiaturberichte aus Deutschland nebst ergänzenden Aktenstücken. Die Kölner Nuntiatur VI*, ed. K. Jaitner (Munich, 1977), pp. 43, 221, 241, *et passim*.

ine animosity, or whether he merely sensed that there was a long and rewarding career to be made out of feeding Madrid's paranoia regarding the Dutch, it is difficult to say. In any case, he lost no opportunity to depict the Dutch as a seditious force undermining the political, religious, and economic peace of the world. One of his principal tasks as Spanish resident at Cologne was to prod the elector, Archbishop Ferdinand, into a more actively pro-Habsburg policy and into aligning, at least diplomatically, with Spain against the Dutch. The elector, whilst showing a strong inclination towards neutrality in the Spanish-Dutch conflict, found himself pushed into siding with Spain temporarily when Dutch troops, in retaliation for the elector's support of the Catholic League against the German Protestants, occupied his fortress of Pfaffenmütze, situated on the Rhine between Cologne and Bonn.<sup>14</sup> De Roy was especially active in the electorate of Cologne during the period of the successful Spanish siege of Pfaffenmütze in 1623, for which he provided local political support.

De Roy's period at Cologne ended in November 1623 when he returned, via Flanders, to Spain, having been summoned back to Madrid to advise Philip IV's new *Junta de Comercio* on Dutch trade and colonial affairs.<sup>15</sup> The *Junta de Comercio*, set up earlier that year, under the presidency of the marqués de Montesclaros, had as its main task the supervision and intensification of Spain's economic war against the Dutch. During the months following his return to Madrid, de Roy was involved in day-to-day discussion, both with ministers and with non-ministerial advisers, of a great many different economic schemes and projects. But the most important was that for an *Almirantazgo de Comercio* (Admiralty of Commerce).<sup>16</sup> This was to be the centrepiece of Spain's mercantilist system during the age of Olivares.<sup>17</sup> Originally, the *Almirantazgo* of Seville (as it was known in the early years), was conceived as a Dutch-style joint-stock company to be modelled on the Dutch East and West India Companies, except that its purpose was to reshape

<sup>14</sup> *Consulta of the Consejo de Estado*, 12 Nov. 1620, AGS Estado 2034; Jürgen Kessel, *Spanien und die geistlichen Kurstaaten am Rhein während der Regierungszeit der Infantin Isabella (1621-1633)* (Frankfurt, 1979), pp. 66-8, 386.

<sup>15</sup> Memorial of Gabriel de Roy, AGS Estado 2334, fo. 53.

<sup>16</sup> On Philip IV's *Junta de Comercio*, see Israel, *The Dutch Republic*, pp. 138-42.

<sup>17</sup> Rafael Ródenas Vilar, 'Un gran proyecto anti-holandes en tiempo de Felipe IV: la destrucción del comercio rebelde en Europa', *Hispania*, xxii (1962). Antonio Domínguez Ortiz, 'Guerra económica y comercio extranjero en el reinado de Felipe IV', *Hispania*, xxiii (1963), 71-113; see also M.E.H.N. Mout, 'Holendische Propositiones: Een Habsburgs plan tot vernietiging van handel, visserij en scheepvaart der Republiek (c. 1625)', *Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis*, xcv (1982), 345-62.

European, not Asiatic or New World, commerce. It was intended that it should attract capital from many quarters but that those who would chiefly invest and participate in it would be the thriving colonies of Flemish and German merchants who, at the time, were the two major elements making up the merchant community of southern Spain and dominating trade between the Andalusian ports and northern Europe, the Hollanders having been eliminated from the scene. The Flemish and Hanseatic merchant colonies of Andalusia, headed by the venerable 'confraternity of San Andrés of the city of Seville, known as the Flemish and German nation', together with their partners and associates in the Spanish Netherlands and in Germany were to be given the monopoly over all trade between Andalusia and northern Europe. If the new company proved successful, it would also rapidly transform the structure of Spain's trans-Atlantic trade, as products from northern Europe shipped out to the Indies on the official convoys sailing from western Andalusia would, in future, only be legally imported by the *Almirantazgo*. The company was to be governed by a board of directors, like the Dutch colonial companies, and was intended to operate a convoy of twenty-four heavily armed merchant vessels of a total of between six and seven thousand tons.<sup>18</sup> Eventually, it was hoped, the *Almirantazgo* would interlock with a projected new Portuguese East India Company and other monopoly companies, including possibly a Spanish West India Company.<sup>19</sup> The ultimate objective was a world-wide network of monopoly systems based in the Iberian Peninsula.

The mercantilist advisers who assisted Olivares and his colleagues in the secret deliberations accompanying the setting up of the *Almirantazgo* were a remarkable, if motley group. Among them were Agustín Bredimus, a German expert on economic affairs who came originally from Trier but had lived for many years in Spain; a Dutch Catholic failed merchant and informant on Dutch commerce by the name of Francisco Rétama, of Jerez; a renegade English Catholic nobleman, Sir Thomas Shirley; and two Portuguese New Christians, Duarte Gomes Solis and Manuel Lopes Pereira, the latter of whom, perhaps the most prolific of all these

<sup>18</sup> Royal *cédula* of 4 Oct. 1624, AGS Estado 2847; Lieuwe van Aitzema, *Historie of verhael van saken van staet en oorlogh in, ende ontrent de Vereenigde Nederlanden* (14 vols., The Hague, 1667-71), ii, 79.

<sup>19</sup> On the plans for other monopoly companies, see A.R. Disney, 'The First Portuguese India Company, 1628-33', *Economic History Review*, xxx (1977), 245; G.D. Winus, 'Two Lusitanian Variations on a Dutch Theme: Portuguese Companies in Times of Crisis, 1628-1662', in *Companies and Trade*, ed. L. Blussé and F. Gaastra (Leiden, 1981), pp. 120-5; Jonathan I. Israel, 'Manuel López Pereira of Amsterdam, Antwerp and Madrid: Jew, New Christian and Adviser to the Conde-Duque de Olivares', below, 258-9.

compilers of secret economic projects for the Spanish crown, had once been a member of the Sephardi Jewish community of Amsterdam.<sup>20</sup> These were then joined by three government officials with long experience of commercial matters and of the Low Countries: Hortuño de Urizar, a Basque; Jan Wouwer, a Fleming; and last but not least de Roy, who as late as 1625 was still styled 'Agent of His Majesty at Cologne'. The essential concept of the *Almirantazgo*, clearly, evolved during 1623; before de Roy arrived back in Spain,<sup>21</sup> and there is no evidence that he played a special role in the subsequent elaboration of the scheme at Madrid. But when it came to laying the foundations and implementing the project, de Roy was from the outset the principal government negotiator involved.<sup>22</sup> It was de Roy who was sent in February 1624 to Seville to present the government's plans and to win over the Flemish and German merchants who controlled Andalusia's trade with northern Europe.<sup>23</sup> It was de Roy who persuaded key Flemish merchants living in Seville such as Guillermo Bequer, Pedro François, and Francisco de Smidt to participate in the new company.<sup>24</sup> And after Seville, it was de Roy who was sent to Lisbon on the king's behalf to win over the Flemish and German merchants based there. From Lisbon, he returned to Madrid but was then sent back to Seville in May 1624 'to complete the arranging of the said *Almirantazgo*'. During these busy months, he negotiated with some of the most influential men of business to be found anywhere in the Hispanic world and presumably had a fair measure of success for, in October 1624, Philip IV went ahead and officially set up the *Almirantazgo* of Seville. Years later, de Roy claimed to have spent 3,000 ducats on his missions to Seville and Lisbon on behalf of the crown in 1624 and to have received back only 500 ducats in expenses.

The *Almirantazgo* of Seville, set up by Philip IV in October 1624, never had much success as a commercial organization. It did fit out some ships, recruit German, Scandinavian, and Flemish seamen, and send some

<sup>20</sup> On these personalities, see Stols, pp. 18-22 *et passim*; José Alcalá-Zamora y Queipo de Llano, *España, Flandes y el mar del Norte, (1618-1639)* (Barcelona, 1975), pp. 178-80, 480-90; Israel, 'Manuel López Pereira', below, 247-8.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 257-62.

<sup>22</sup> 'Relacion sumaria'; *Correspondance du Nonce Giovanni-Francesco Guidi di Bagno (1621-1627)*, ed. B. de Meester (2 vols., Brussels-Rome, 1938), ii. 837-8; Stols; Mout, p. 350.

<sup>23</sup> See 'Relacion sumaria'.

<sup>24</sup> Stols, pp. 18, 22; on the house of Bequer and on Pedro François of Tielt as exporters of wool from Seville to Flanders, see Jonathan I. Israel, 'Spanish Wool Exports and the European Economy, 1610-1640', *Economic History Review*, xxxiii (1980), 198.

cargoes to the north, but these operations never amounted to very much.<sup>25</sup> The crews of two *Almirantazgo* vessels actually mutinied and defected to the Dutch. From the outset the real importance of the *Almirantazgo* lay in the second function which Philip IV assigned to it in his royal proclamation of October 1624: in setting up the organization, the king and his ministers had transferred to it 'jurisdiction civil and criminal in all cases concerning the said *Almirantazgo*, its commerce and traffic, just as is the practice with the *Casa de Contratación de las Indias*'.<sup>62</sup> This last was a reference to the way Spanish trade with the Spanish colonies in the New World was organized, the *Casa de Contratación* in Seville having full jurisdiction over every aspect of navigation to and from, and trade with, the Spanish New World. The new body, like the *Casa de Contratación*, was a combination of monopoly company headquarters, commercial court, and government customs organization. However, where the activities and jurisdiction of the *Casa de Contratación* were confined to Seville and a couple of outports, the *Almirantazgo* was assigned jurisdiction and control over all trade with northern Europe first from all the ports of 'Andalusia and the realm of Granada'. Later, in 1628, this total jurisdiction and customs control over trade with northern Europe was extended to the Castilian north coast, Portugal, Navarre, Valencia, and the rest of Spain.<sup>27</sup> The prosecution and punishment of persons violating the royal ban on trade with the Dutch, in Dutch products, or with Dutch-built ships, was now transferred from the slow-moving ordinary courts of the land to the new special courts of the *Almirantazgo*. The *Almirantazgo* recruited its own inspectorate, first in Andalusia and then in the ports of the rest of Spain and Portugal.<sup>28</sup> To encourage stringency and numerous confiscations a crucial operating principle was borrowed from the all-too-effective Inquisition: the salaries of its officials were, at least in part, to be paid out of confiscations. To co-ordinate the activity of the local *Almirantazgo* inspectorates, and at the same time provide the king

<sup>25</sup> Israel, *Dutch Republic*, p. 205.

<sup>26</sup> See AGS Estado 2847, fo. 2; Antonio Domínguez Ortiz, 'El Almirantazgo de los países septentrionales y la política económica de Felipe IV', *Hispania*, vii (1947), 272-90.

<sup>27</sup> On the extension of *Almirantazgo* jurisdiction, see *Consulta* of the *Consejo de Estado*, 3 Oct. 1628, AGS Estado 4126; Domínguez Ortiz, 'Guerra económica', pp. 80, 90; James Casey, *The Kingdom of Valencia in the Seventeenth Century* (Cambridge, 1979), pp. 97-8; on the confiscation of English ships and cargoes by the *Almirantazgo* on the Basque coast in 1631-3 (for breaking the ban on bringing in Dutch products) see [British Library] Egerton MSS 1820, fos. 13v-24 and Add. MSS 36448, fos. 12-14.

<sup>28</sup> By March 1626, the *Almirantazgo* had a staff of sixty-six inspectors throughout Andalusia, see Domínguez Ortiz, 'Guerra económica', p. 105.

with a permanent new council to advise on European trade in Madrid, Philip IV also set up a central commercial court to govern the *Almirantazgo* in the peninsula, rather as the Suprema did in the Inquisition, except that after 1628 this *Junta de Almirantazgo*, as it was called, had jurisdiction over the entire peninsula, while the Suprema governed the Inquisition only in Castile and the realms of Aragon.

But the *Almirantazgo* in the peninsula was never intended to act independently of the complementary organization which Olivares and his colleagues desired to set up in northern Europe. His work in Spain completed, Gabriel de Roy was dispatched to Flanders at the end of 1624 to set up the *Almirantazgo* in the north. The objective now was to cajole the administration of the Spanish Netherlands, the provincial estates, and the municipalities to co-operate with, and participate in, all aspects of the grandiose new system of imperial commerce within Europe. During the next two and a half years (except for yet another official trip to Madrid and Seville early in 1626 which cost 2,800 ducats in expenses), de Roy worked assiduously, 'negotiating for the establishment of the *Almirantazgo* in Flanders', that is, trying to convince the merchants and the representatives of the provinces and towns that the whole elaborate scheme could be made to work in their interest.<sup>29</sup> But the Antwerp merchant community, sceptical from the outset, was exasperated by the mounting stringency of the *Almirantazgo* in southern Spain and incensed by the confiscation of two shiploads of their goods in Galicia late in 1626.<sup>30</sup> De Roy, with patchy help from king's ministers in Brussels, urged that the king guarantee the safety from Dutch attack of the armed convoys which would sail between Flanders and the peninsula, and argued that the elimination of Dutch goods from Flemish trade with Spain would, in the long run, be to the solid advantage of Flanders.<sup>31</sup> But the business community of the southern Netherlands remained unco-operative, even hostile. Some lesser provinces initially expressed their willingness to participate in the new company if Brabant and Flanders agreed also. But the States of Brabant and Flanders were unmoveable. Philip IV's 'Admiralty of commerce between his obedient lands of Flanders, and other northern provinces, with Andalusia and the realm

<sup>29</sup> AGS Estado 2334, fo. 53; *Correspondance de la Cour d'Espagne sur les affaires des Pays-Bas au xvii<sup>e</sup> siècle*, ed. H. Lonchay, J. Cuvelier, and J. Lefèvre (6 vols., Brussels, 1923-37), ii. 260.

<sup>30</sup> Philip IV to Infanta Isabella, Madrid, 4 May 1627, A[rchives] G[énérales du] R[oyaume, Brussels], SEG 196, fo. 368; *Correspondance de la Cour d'Espagne*, ii. 329, 331-2.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*



of Granada', excluding every form of Dutch participation, proclaimed at Dunkirk on 20 August 1625,<sup>32</sup> remained a lifeless torso.

By 1627, when de Roy was sent on to the Hanseatic towns of the North German coast, Philip and his ministers had effectively given up trying to form a joint-stock company for Spanish trade in Flanders. But they continued to press, despite the campaign of obstruction, for a *Conseil de Commerce* in Brussels which would liaise with the *Junta de Almirantazgo* in Madrid, a new government inspectorate of commerce in Flanders to match that operating in Spain and Portugal, and a new system of certificates to replace those hitherto issued in Flanders by local municipal officials.<sup>33</sup> In one of his few direct interventions in the sphere of commercial policy, Olivares himself urged his most trusted confidant at Brussels, Pierre Roose, to assist de Roy's efforts, on behalf of the government, to revive commerce between all the king's realms cutting out that of the 'rebels' (i.e., the Dutch).<sup>34</sup> In the years 1628-30 one deadline after another was set after which the *Almirantazgo* in Spain would confiscate all cargoes arriving from Flanders not covered by the new certificates issued by the government inspectorate in Dunkirk.<sup>35</sup> But again and again this deadline had to be put back owing to obstruction and opposition. In 1630-1, the *Almirantazgo* did seize several batches of goods from Flanders not covered by the new certificates, provoking a furious outcry from Antwerp, Lille, Bruges, and Dunkirk.<sup>36</sup> Pierre Roose was put to work to overcome the obstruction. In the end, the government did have its way, at least in the matter of certificates, and the merchants of the southern Netherlands trading with the Iberian Peninsula had to submit to increased government control.<sup>37</sup>

To understand why it was that Spanish ministers went to such lengths to impose more rigorous checking procedures on Flemish, German, and (later) Danish-Norwegian commerce with the Iberian Peninsula whilst merchandise from France (until 1635) and from England (after 1630) were admitted by the *Almirantazgo* if accompanied only by certificates issued by ordinary local French and English officials, we must take note

<sup>32</sup> Aitzema, ii. 79-88 gives all the articles and provisions; Stols, pp. 21-2; de Roy accused the merchants of Antwerp of deliberately trying to sabotage his efforts so that they could proceed with their illicit trade in Dutch goods.

<sup>33</sup> Isabella to Philip, 10 March 1628, AGR SEG 198, fo. 127; *Consulta of the Consejo de Estado*, 6 April 1628, AGS Estado 2042; *Correspondance de la Cour d'Espagne*, ii. 329, 363, 456, 578.

<sup>34</sup> Olivares to Roose, Madrid, 18 Dec. 1628, *ibid.*, vi. 302.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, vi. 305-7.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, ii. 575, 577-8.

<sup>37</sup> *Consultas of the Consejo de Estado*, 30 April and 20 May 1631, AGS Estado 2045.

of what became one of the fundamental doctrines of Spanish strategic thinking in the 1620s. This was the notion that whereas Dutch textiles could and did seep through the net into Spain mixed up with Flemish and German textiles, owing to the similarity in the types of fabrics manufactured in these countries, there was little likelihood that rebel cloth could be smuggled into the peninsula intermingled with French or English products, for these were of very different types.<sup>38</sup> Similarly with naval stores from the Baltic, it was assumed that while Dutch-owned consignments might become mixed in with such munitions shipped from Germany, Flanders, or Calais to the peninsula, there was little or no risk of this in the case of England and most of France from where there were no regular shipments of Baltic products to Spain and Portugal. This conviction that rigorous controls in Flanders and Germany would suffice to enable the *Almirantazgo* to achieve its basic aim of eliminating Dutch trade with the peninsula altogether lay therefore at the heart of Spanish mercantilist thinking. This was the logic behind Philip IV's decree of September 1630 whereby the *Almirantazgo* would henceforth no longer admit any Flemish or German merchandise reaching the peninsula from France unless such merchandise (unlike other foreign goods coming from France) were covered by special certificates issued at their places of origin.<sup>39</sup>

Meanwhile, despite the shelving of efforts to bring Spanish Netherlands trade with the peninsula within the projected monopoly company, Olivares and his colleagues pressed on with their scheme for an affiliated Hanseatic branch of the *Almirantazgo*. Proposals for such an extension of the *Almirantazgo* system had been energetically propagated among the German merchants in the peninsula and in the Hansa towns themselves from the outset, from 1624, and it was then that Olivares first sought to persuade the Austrian minister, Count Schwarzenberg, of the benefits of the project for the Emperor as well as for Spain.<sup>40</sup> If Spain needed the Emperor's assistance if she were to bring any real pressure to bear on the

<sup>38</sup> 'Relacion de lo apuntado entre el Presidente de Indias y Juan de Pedroso para lo del comercio', AGS Estado 2847, fos. 4v-5; Israel, 'Manuel López Pereira', below, pp. 256, 263-4.

<sup>39</sup> *Correspondance de la Cour d'Espagne*, ii. 553-4.

<sup>40</sup> Hans-Christoph Messow, *Die Hansestädte und die Habsburgische Ostseepolitik im 30 jährigen Kriege (1627-1628)* (Berlin, 1935), p. 12; F. Mares, 'Die maritime Politik der Habsburger in den Jahren 1625-1628', *Mitteilungen des Instituts für Oesterreichische Geschichtsforschung*, i (1880), 573-6; A. Gindely, 'Die maritimen Pläne der Habsburger und die Antheilnahme Kaisers Ferdinand II am polnisch-schwedischen Kriege während der Jahre 1627-1629', *Denkschriften der kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften*, xxxiii (1890), 2-3; E. Freire de Oliveira, *Elementos para a história do município de Lisboa* (6 vols., Lisbon, 1882-91), iii. 278.

North German ports, the Emperor too, Olivares assured Schwarzenberg, had much to gain from asserting his authority over the Hansa.<sup>41</sup> But it was not until after the defeat of Denmark by the Habsburg armies in Germany in 1626-7 that the way was cleared for Spain and the Emperor to bargain with the Hansa from a position of strength. At this point, the project for a Hanseatic Iberian Company became closely linked at all levels with Olivares' no less grandiose scheme for a joint Austro-Spanish-Polish *armada* in the Baltic. This *armada* was designed to fulfil several functions. It was intended to give the Emperor control over the North German coast and cow Denmark, and to provide a buffer between Poland and her enemy Sweden. But for Spanish ministers the main point of the exercise was to disrupt Dutch Baltic trade, the chief pillar of Dutch economic strength, and at the same time create a secure framework within which Spain could effectively control the carrying trade between the peninsula and northern Europe and thereby create a European trading system.<sup>42</sup>

To exert pressure on the Hansa towns and represent Spain in the Baltic, Olivares and his colleagues decided that Gabriel de Roy was the obvious choice. No one else close to the regime in Madrid and Brussels could match his knowledge of languages, his acceptability at Central European courts, and his knowledge of the Baltic area. In May 1627, de Roy received instructions to proceed from Brussels to Vienna where he was to confer with the Austrian court.<sup>43</sup> From Austria, he went on to the Baltic coast armed with a whole assortment of commissions and instructions from Madrid, Brussels, and Vienna, not to mention bankers' drafts on Lübeck for large sums of Spanish cash. He had a most complicated task before him. He was entrusted both with organizing the new *armada* and with promoting the projected Hanseatic Iberian Company while liaising with three distant capitals as well as with the Baron de Auchy, Philip IV's minister in Poland.<sup>44</sup> At the end of 1627, Philip IV's regent at Brussels, the Infanta Isabella, arranged with the Emperor that he should bestow upon Gabriel de Roy a high-sounding title of com-

<sup>41</sup> Schwarzenberg does seem to have been convinced that it was in the emperor's interest to curtail Dutch economic power in Germany: see Mares, pp. 573-5; Mout, pp. 353-6.

<sup>42</sup> *Consulta junta de estado*, Madrid, 3 Jan. 1628, AGS Estado 2328, fos. 11-12.

<sup>43</sup> Gabriel de Roy to Philip IV, Vienna, 14 July 1627, AGR SEG 126, fos. 273-v.

<sup>44</sup> 'Lo que vos Gabriel de Roy aveys de hazer en la jornada que por mi mando hazeis a las villas anseaticas' (23 April 1627), AGS Estado 2510; *Consulta junta de estado*, 28 Sept. 1627, AGS Estado 2328, fos. 5-5v.

mand over the projected *armada*.<sup>45</sup> In April of the following year, the Emperor duly proclaimed de Roy 'General-Kommissar der Baltischen und Ozeanischen See', at the same time appointing his principal commander in North Germany, Count Wallenstein, generalissimo of the *armada*, and Count Philip von Mansfeld actual admiral of the fleet.<sup>46</sup>

On arriving in the Baltic area, de Roy went first to the great port of Danzig. Although he subsequently portrayed his efforts there in the best possible light, and was warmly congratulated by ministers in Madrid, his actual achievements in Danzig appear to have been slight. Nor was the atmosphere particularly conducive to the success of his complex mission. The burgomasters were highly annoyed by the activities of the Spanish *Almirantazgo*, which had recently seized several Danzig ships and confiscated their cargoes for breaking the embargoes on the Dutch.<sup>47</sup> The Danzig city council was in no mood to listen to de Roy's proposal that a Spanish 'consul' should now be posted in Danzig to monitor trade between the Baltic and the Iberian Peninsula, and told him that they did not believe that the scheme for a Hanseatic Iberian Company, with monopoly rights over Baltic grain shipments to the peninsula, was feasible. However, they did not reject it outright and asked whether Philip IV would now, for this purpose, permit the use of vessels built in Holland; for without Dutch-built ships the Danzig burgomasters could see no hope of handling so large a volume of traffic. De Roy replied that he thought the king would agree to this for a limited time until the Hanseatics had had a chance to increase their shipbuilding capacity.

With nothing accomplished at Danzig, de Roy moved on to Lübeck where he arrived in October 1627. He now had to organize matters with the Lübeck city council and with Wallenstein who was now rapidly bearing down on the Baltic coast, for the setting up of the Austro-Spanish *armada*. At this stage, Philip IV and the Emperor were expecting to be able to hire a large number of Hanseatic vessels, recruit seamen, gather up artillery, and form an effective Baltic force within a short space of time.<sup>48</sup> It was thought that it might soon be possible to launch an attack on the fortresses commanding the Danish Sound. De Roy's arrival at Lübeck was timed to coincide with that of Count Schwarzenberg and his staff, it being their task officially to propose the setting up of a Hanseatic Iberian Company to monopolize the shipping of Baltic products to the peninsula, as well as to arrange the hiring of an adequate

<sup>45</sup> *Correspondance de la Cour d'Espagne*, ii. 356.

<sup>46</sup> Messow, pp. 77-8.

<sup>47</sup> *Consulta del junta de estado*, 3 Jan. 1628, AGS Estado 2328; Messow, pp. 32-40.

<sup>48</sup> Rafael Ródenas Vilar, *La política europea de España durante la guerra de Treinta Años (1624-1630)* (Madrid, 1967), pp. 125-6; Alcalá-Zamora, pp. 65, 241.

number of large ships for the Austro-Spanish *armada*, in the name of the Emperor and as essentially Imperial projects.<sup>49</sup> The Spanish role in inspiring, organizing, and financing the proceedings was deliberately played down, de Roy having previously impressed upon Olivares and his colleagues the difficulty of 'overcoming the blind and ignorant aversion which, generally speaking, they have for Spain'.<sup>50</sup> De Roy played an active diplomatic role behind the scenes, though, striving to combat the tide of Dutch, Danish, and Swedish counter-pressure on the Lübeck burgomasters.

But Lübeck proved no more amenable to Olivares' schemes than had Danzig. The Lübeck city council also perceived numerous practical difficulties in the project for a Hanseatic Iberian Company and was distinctly reluctant to arouse the ire of Denmark, Sweden, and the Dutch. Once again, however, there was no outright rejection of the proposals and initially de Roy was able to put an optimistic gloss on his reports to Madrid.<sup>51</sup> Matters were simply deferred for some months until a gathering of the Hanseatic League could be convened at Lübeck in April 1628.<sup>52</sup> On 5 April, Schwarzenberg, with de Roy at his side, formally outlined before the assembled delegates of Lübeck, Hamburg, Danzig, Stettin, Rostock, Wismar, and other towns the scheme for the 'establishment of a Hanseatic Company for the Spanish trade' which would collaborate and interlock with the *Almirantazgo*.<sup>53</sup> This was followed by intensive discussion but no conclusion. At length, the matter was deferred yet again until the next meeting of the Hanseatic Diet, in September. At the September gathering, the league politely but firmly rejected the proposals.<sup>54</sup> Meanwhile at both meetings of the league, the delegates of the towns complained bitterly over the despotic doings of the *Almirantazgo* in Spain and in particular the proclamation by the *Junta de Almirantazgo* in January 1627, that henceforth neutral vessels

<sup>49</sup> But it was Philip IV who originally asked the Emperor to send a representative to Lübeck, the Emperor having agreed to what was in effect Olivares' request back in August, Gabriel de Roy to Olivares, Vienna, 11 Aug. 1627, AGR SEG 126, fos. 267-8; Gindely, pp. 18-19.

<sup>50</sup> AGR SEG 126, fo. 273v; Messow, pp. 50-1, 57.

<sup>51</sup> Gabriel de Roy to Pedro de San Juan, Lübeck, 20 Dec. 1627, AGS Estado 2321.

<sup>52</sup> Gabriel de Roy to Juan de Villela, Lübeck, 8 Feb. 1628, AGS Estado 2510; Gindely, pp. 24-6.

<sup>53</sup> Rudolf Häpke, *Niederländische Akten und Urkunde zur Geschichte der Hanse und zur deutschen Seegeschichte* (2 vols., Munich-Leipzig, 1913-23), ii. 406-8; Erwin Wiskemann, *Hamburg und die Welthandelspolitik von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart* (Hamburg, 1929), pp. 84-5.

<sup>54</sup> Miroslav Hroch, 'Wallensteins Beziehungen zu den wendischen Hansestädten', *Hansische Studien. Heinrich Sproemberg zum 70. Geburtstag* (Berlin, 1961), p. 147; Messow, p. 86.

leaving Spanish ports had to leave caution money as a guarantee that they would not deliver their cargoes in Dutch ports, money refundable by the *Almirantazgo* only on presentation of signed affidavits from the authorities in ports of destination to the effect that cargoes had in fact been delivered where specified. The outcry from the Hansa towns, coupled with the protests of the city councils of Seville and Málaga led to the cancelling of this much resented measure in the summer of 1628.<sup>55</sup>

Meanwhile the setting up of the Baltic *armada* was making slow progress. After months of delay, Auchy and de Roy passed on to Madrid a request from the king of Poland that units of the Flanders *armada* should be sent to the Baltic to assist him in an attack on the Swedes at Pillau. Olivares exploded in exasperation.<sup>56</sup> It had been made abundantly clear to Warsaw, as to Vienna, that the Flanders *armada* was needed at all times in the west and simply could not be transferred to the Baltic for however brief a time.<sup>57</sup> Spain wanted to establish an *armada* of twenty-four warships in the Baltic, as the marqués de Montesclaros put it, 'so that, with the maritime forces raised by the king of Poland and the Hansa towns, a powerful *armada* could be assembled, strong enough to deprive the Dutch of their trade and remove the tyrant of Sweden [Gustavus Adolphus] from the ports he has captured in Prussia and Pomerania'.<sup>58</sup> Montesclaros reminded his colleagues on the special *junta* 'which deals with the affairs of the Baltic sea' that the king had entrusted de Roy with 200,000 ducats for the acquisition of ships, stores, guns, and crews from the Hansa towns. What exactly had Gabriel de Roy done with the 200,000 ducats? Where was the king's *armada*? Another minister suggested that Gabriel de Roy and Baron Auchy be reminded that their influence on the genesis of the Baltic *armada* project had been considerable and that when they had originally advocated the scheme they had assured the king that ships, stores, guns, and crews were all readily at hand in the Hansa ports.

De Roy did in fact hire a few ships, and recruit some men in Lübeck but the burgomasters, determined to avoid antagonizing the Dutch and Swedes, were beginning actively to obstruct the progress of the *armada*.<sup>59</sup> As the months passed de Roy had little alternative but to switch from a

<sup>55</sup> *Consultas* of the *Consejo de Estado* 14 May, 14 June, and 24 Oct. 1628 and of the *Junta de Almirantazgo* of 31 May and 12 July 1628, AGS Estado 2328.

<sup>56</sup> Auchy to Gabriel de Roy, Warsaw, 5 April 1628, AGS Estado 2328; and *consulta* of the *Junta que trata las materias del Mar Báltico*, 24 May 1628.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*; E. Straub, *Pax et Imperium, Spaniens Kampf um seine Friedensordnung in Europa zwischen 1617 und 1635* (Paderborn, 1980), pp. 293-303.

<sup>58</sup> See the *consulta* of 24 May 1628.

<sup>59</sup> Ródenas Vilar, p. 145.

policy of persuasion to one of ill-concealed threats based on the proximity of Wallenstein. Moreover the relationship between de Roy and Wallenstein was most unfortunate from the Spanish point of view. At their first meeting, at Itzehoe in Holstein, in October 1627, Wallenstein seems to have formed a poor opinion of de Roy and from then on made little attempt to co-operate with him.<sup>60</sup> The marqués de Aytona reported to Madrid from Prague in May 1628, that thus far Wallenstein had done more to obstruct than to advance the progress of the Austro-Spanish *armada*, mainly because de Roy rather than he himself was to have immediate control over it.<sup>61</sup> Progress was speeded up somewhat, however, following the meeting between de Roy and Wallenstein in the summer of 1628 at Prenzlau, on the Brandenburg-Mecklenburg border. At Prenzlau, Wallenstein and de Roy agreed to prepare a total of forty vessels for action by the spring of 1629: this force was to be called the 'Imperial Armada' and would be divided into two fleets to be based either side of Denmark, in the Baltic and the North Sea. A division of labour was agreed on whereby the Emperor, that is Wallenstein, would provide the necessary troops, munitions, and stores, and the Spanish monarch, that is, de Roy, pay for the hiring, building, and maintenance of ships, the guns, and the recruitment of seamen. They agreed that the forty vessels should amount to a total of 9,100 tons, and mount 958 guns, costing 450,000 ducats for the ships and 350,000 ducats for the guns.<sup>62</sup> To this were to be added 240,000 ducats yearly for the crews' wages and other running costs.

The port of Wismar was chosen as the headquarters of the new *armada* and there de Roy and his staff now transferred. By June 1628, de Roy had spent 50,000 ducats fitting out the six ships he had hired at Lübeck and on copper and other materials for the casting of his guns. He reported to Madrid that he would spend the remaining 150,000 ducats with which he had been provided building another twelve warships in and around Wismar and paying the wages of his workmen and seamen down to September 1628. From October onwards, he wrote, he would need a further 40,000 ducats monthly to keep the *armada* in being. By the spring of 1629 Wismar was a veritable hive of activity, de Roy having attracted

<sup>60</sup> 'Den Gabriel de Roy belangend', wrote Wallenstein, in April 1628, 'ich sehe, dass er ein bestia ist ... denn der ander [Schwarzenberg] hat ihn gantz inficirt', Hroch, p. 142; H. Günter, *Die Habsburger-Liga, 1625-1635. Briefe und Akten aus den General-Archiv zu Simancas* (Berlin, 1908), pp. 29-30.

<sup>61</sup> Aytona to Philip IV, Prague, 2 May 1628, Add. MSS 36320, fo. 63.

<sup>62</sup> Gabriel de Roy to Philip IV, Lübeck, 17 July 1628, AGS Estado 2328, fos. 259-60; *Consulta*, 18 Sept. 1628, *ibid.*, fo. 272; Alcalá-Zamora, pp. 269-70.

sail and rope-makers from Hamburg and Lübeck, and seamen from all round the Baltic and North Sea and as far away as Genoa and Venice.<sup>63</sup> De Roy's ships, storehouses, workshops, and massive gun-foundry were the sights of the town which, in 1630, boasted some 2,000 inhabited houses.

Olivares was greatly annoyed by what he judged de Roy's subservience to Wallenstein, considering that at Prenzlau de Roy had diverged significantly from his instructions.<sup>64</sup> Olivares was deeply suspicious of the great general and was now increasingly sceptical as to whether anything much could be hoped for in the way of effective imperialist help for the sea campaign against the Dutch. It seems that what the *Consejo de Estado* in Madrid would have preferred was a smaller, essentially Spanish, *armada* at Wismar which could then act in the Emperor's name together with the Poles against the Dutch and Swedes. But as the months passed it became increasingly obvious that Wallenstein was tightening his grip over both Gabriel de Roy and the 'Imperial Armada'. Even so, Olivares continued to hope for at least some strategic gains for Spain in the Baltic, rejecting Spínola's gloomy assessment that the whole enterprise was a disastrous fiasco 'from which little benefit will be gained'.<sup>65</sup> Disagreement about Baltic strategy merged with the wider confrontation between Olivares and Spínola over virtually every strategic dilemma facing Spain which overshadowed the deliberations of the *Consejo de Estado* in Madrid throughout the years 1628-9.

Meanwhile, yet another strand had been added to Spain's northern strategy at de Roy's prompting in the autumn of 1628. So far the one solid success for the plan to create a Spanish-controlled commercial system in northern Europe had been the commercial treaty which the Infanta Isabella had signed with Duke Frederick III of Holstein-Gottorp. The duke was keen to promote his port of Friedrichstadt on the west coast of Schleswig and had eagerly agreed to Spanish proposals to turn it into an emporium for Iberian trade on condition that he strictly excluded Dutch involvement and that of the Sephardi Jews.<sup>66</sup> The duke also accepted the posting of a 'Spanish' agent in Friedrichstadt to monitor the conduct of trade there, so that during 1628 a certain Quirin Janssens, sent from Flanders, became the first of Philip IV's resident 'agents' for

<sup>63</sup> Häpke, ii. 408-11; Karl-Friedrich Olechnowitz, *Handel und Seeschifffahrt der späten Hanse* (Weimar, 1965), pp. 58-9.

<sup>64</sup> *Consulta* of the Baltic *junta*, fo. 7, AGS Estado 2328, fo. 272.

<sup>65</sup> *Consulta* of Baltic *junta*, 19 Feb. 1629, AGS Estado 2329.

<sup>66</sup> Duke Frederick to Philip IV, Gottorf, 6 Jan. 1628, AGS Estado 2510; A Jürgens, *Zur Schleswig-Holsteinischen Handelsgeschichte des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts* (Berlin, 1914), pp. 208-9.



the controlling of trade in northern Europe outside the Spanish Netherlands.<sup>67</sup> Then in the summer of 1628, the duke wrote to de Roy pointing out that his island of Sylt, with its protected landward-facing bay, off the west coast of Schleswig, would make an ideal naval base for a Spanish *armada* operating against the Dutch, and a perfect anchorage for the projected armed convoys which would carry future trade between the peninsula and northern Europe. De Roy travelled to Sylt to see for himself, and then sent an enthusiastic report to Madrid.<sup>68</sup> On Philip IV's orders, two experts were then sent from Flanders to Sylt and these confirmed de Roy's assessment that Spain would draw much benefit from occupying this remote, wind-swept island.<sup>69</sup> Olivares himself now grew enthusiastic. But de Roy, having first aroused expectations with his overly-confident original assurances that a mere dozen or so warships would suffice to take and hold the island, now became alarmed at the prospect of a probable Dutch counter-attack and drastically raised his estimate of the number of warships that would be needed to secure the new base to thirty-six, three times what he had originally advised. Even then, the *Consejo de Estado* seriously considered pushing ahead with the plan, using a large part of the Cadiz *armada*. But it was soon realized that the ships simply could not be spared if the Andalusian coast was to be protected and Spain's trans-Atlantic convoys properly escorted. The king wrote to Brussels in April 1629 shelving the Sylt scheme indefinitely.<sup>70</sup> It was never revived.

Meanwhile, at Wismar the Austro-Spanish *armada* continued slowly to take shape. In December 1628, de Roy reported that he had now spent 149,000 of his original 200,000 ducats.<sup>71</sup> He had so far constructed five new warships which, added to the six he had hired at Lübeck, made a total of eleven, mounting between them 108 guns. Besides these, a further eleven warships had arrived at Wismar sent by the king of Poland. De Roy now had to pay for the upkeep of the whole of this substantial fleet of twenty-two vessels and the money was running out fast. Wages alone, he reported, were consuming 800 ducats per day. But if the *armada* was proving costly it was also inactive. Wallenstein, who was immersed in intricate negotiations with both the Danes and the Dutch, insisted on

<sup>67</sup> *Correspondance de la Cour d'Espagne*, ii. 404; Isabella to Philip IV, Brussels, 27 April 1629, AGS Estado 2146.

<sup>68</sup> *Consulta*, 26 Nov. 1628, AGS Estado 2328; Alcalá-Zamora, pp. 276-8.

<sup>69</sup> Isabella to Philip, Brussels, 6 Jan. 1629, AGR SEG 220, fo. 7.

<sup>70</sup> Philip to Isabella, Madrid, 5 April 1629, AGR SEG 200, fo. 144.

<sup>71</sup> 'Puntos de lo contienen las cartas de Gabriel de Roy', Madrid, 28 Dec. 1628, AGS Estado 2510, fo. 47.

this, and Wismar was garrisoned with his soldiery. If as late as February 1629, Olivares still entertained some hope of a satisfactory return on Spain's Baltic investment, by May he had totally lost faith in the undertaking, blaming Wallenstein for the fiasco.<sup>72</sup> It is not clear how much Spanish ministers actually knew of Wallenstein's negotiations with the Dutch States General through the Dutch resident at Hamburg, Foppius van Aitzema, but it had by now become crystal clear that as long as Wallenstein controlled the Pomeranian coast the *armada* could not be used against the Dutch. Nevertheless, at the meeting of the Baltic affairs *junta* in Madrid on 5 May 1629, the Conde-Duque urged his colleagues to send the additional 100,000 ducats for which Gabriel de Roy was asking, so that the work at Wismar could continue and the *armada* be kept in being. The plan now was that when the ships presently under construction and being fitted out were ready, they should all at once sail to Spain for use in the west. In the meantime, Olivares urged, Wallenstein should be kept in the dark about this, it being necessary to deal with 'him and with everyone with much dissimulation and secrecy'. However, only another 50,000 ducats were actually sent to de Roy at Wismar.

As the emperor's 'General-Kommissar der Baltischen und Ozeanischen See', de Roy was determined to show at least some trace of independence from Wallenstein and a small number of Dutch, Danish, and Swedish vessels were in fact captured by his raiders during the spring and summer of 1629. Then, in August, there was a successful clash with the Swedish navy off Wismar. Among the prisoners captured and interrogated by de Roy was the Dutch mercantilist writer, Willem Usselinx, one of the inspirers of the Dutch West India Company. But he, along with the rest of the prisoners and the captured ships, were soon released at Wallenstein's command and all raiding ceased. De Roy and von Mansfeld were placed under the strictest orders to keep their ships in port at Wismar on the pretext that the *armada* was not to venture out until it reached its stipulated strength of forty ships.<sup>73</sup> Though strong enough in fact by the summer of 1629 to face up to the Swedish navy, the Wismar *armada* under Wallenstein's control was a phantom force, lacking all reality apart from its mounting cost. Tired of this useless procrastination, the Polish king warned Madrid in January 1630 that whilst he had been willing both to post his navy indefinitely at Wismar and place it under de Roy's control and that of the emperor, he now wanted his ships back for 'not

<sup>72</sup> *Consulta of the Junta del Mar Baltico*, 5 May 1629, 'Voto del Conde-Duque', AGS Estado 2329.

<sup>73</sup> 'Puntos de unos papeles de Gabriel de Roy', AGS Estado 2510, fo. 110; Hroch, pp. 94, 97-8.

only are they idle but they are poorly maintained and are deteriorating'.<sup>74</sup> It would seem, though, that King Sigismund was asked to be patient for, as late as March 1631, the entire Wismar *armada*, including its Polish contingent, was still intact. It was not until the summer of 1631 that the victorious Swedes, who now controlled most of the coastline of Pomerania and Mecklenburg, closed in to blockade Wismar by land and sea. General-Kommissar de Roy seems to have departed the city just before the siege began, leaving a subordinate in charge.<sup>75</sup> When Gustavus Adolphus finally took Wismar in January 1632, he captured the whole *armada*, a vast array of stores, and the 300 guns which de Roy had amassed.<sup>76</sup>

While the sorry tale of the Wismar *armada* wound to its conclusion, de Roy continued his struggle with the Hanseatic League over the projected controls on North German commerce with the Iberian Peninsula. Following the rejection in September 1628 of the scheme for a Hanseatic Iberian Company, de Roy fell back on insisting that the North German ports, in return for the commercial advantages that Philip IV was offering, must allow Spain to post agents whose task would be to issue certificates authenticating cargoes shipped from Germany to the Iberian Peninsula.<sup>77</sup> This network of Spanish residents which, Olivares and his colleagues hoped, would effectively interlock with the *Almirantazgo* to ensure the elimination of Dutch participation in Hanseatic trade with Spain and Portugal, and thus indirectly with the Spanish New World, but which thus far comprised only the one resident at Friedrichstadt, was to come under the overall supervision of de Roy who had been appointed Philip IV's *veedor*, or general inspector, of North German commerce with the peninsula, in September 1628.<sup>78</sup> It seems clear, moreover, from later evidence, that the emperor must at this point have officially sanctioned the arrangement whereby Spain was to have offices of commerce in the North German ports to monitor and help regulate the trade of the Hansa with the peninsula.<sup>79</sup> But Hamburg which accounted for the lion's share of the newly-revived Hanseatic trade with

<sup>74</sup> *Consulta* of the *Consejo de Estado*, 12 June 1630, AGS Estado 2331; *Consulta*, 8 March 1631, *ibid.*, AGS Estado 2329.

<sup>75</sup> *Consulta* of the *Consejo de Estado*, 19 April 1645 and enclosures, AGS Estado 2064.

<sup>76</sup> *Consulta* of the *Consejo de Estado*, 26 Aug. 1632, AGS Estado 2333.

<sup>77</sup> *Consulta* of the *Consejo de Estado*, 29 March 1629, AGS Estado 2064.

<sup>78</sup> This commission was issued at Brussels, see AGR SEG 201, fo. 97.

<sup>79</sup> For instance the Emperor's confirmation of the appointment of a successor to de Roy to issue certificates for Hanseatic trade with Spain dated Linz, 24 May 1646, see *Correspondance de la Cour d'Espagne*, iii. 577.

Spain,<sup>80</sup> and Lübeck which was the second most important participant, were utterly opposed to allowing Spain and the emperor any influence over their economic life and maritime policies and refused to admit either de Roy himself, or a subordinate, as a resident agent of Spain. Hamburg and Lübeck could not, however, prevent the *Almirantazgo* from issuing a proclamation in Spain, as it did early in 1629, that from this time on only such Hanseatic cargoes, or goods arriving on Hanseatic ships, would be admitted to Spain and Portugal as were authenticated by de Roy's certificates. If North German merchants refused to come to de Roy with itemized lists of their shipments, they would not be allowed to trade with the peninsula.

There was an immediate outcry from the merchants. The Hanseatic League protested both to Madrid and to Vienna. What particularly outraged the Hamburg and Lübeck senates was that the French and even the English – England still being officially at war with Spain – were allowed, as before, to ship goods to the peninsula covered only by certificates issued by their own local authorities. Hanseatic representatives were totally unmoved by the Spanish argument that seepage of Dutch products, or goods owned by Dutch merchants, into Spain and Portugal could take place on a significant scale only through Flanders or else through North Germany. In September 1629, with some fifty ships ready at Hamburg to sail around Scotland and Ireland to Spain and Portugal, the Hanseatic League delivered a threat, through the imperial ambassador in Madrid, to dismantle its Iberian trade altogether if the order 'that all ships from the Hansa towns that come without certificates from Gabriel de Roy would be considered contraband' was not rescinded forthwith.<sup>81</sup> The Hansa towns threatened to move their business to Holland, France, and England where they were assured of a better reception. Spain could not afford any interruption in the flow of masts, ropes, pitch, and other vital naval and military stores from Scandinavia and the Baltic, and with the Dutch shut out of the trade, the Hansa were the only possible alternative source of transport for these indispensable supplies. The long and the short of it was that Spain had to avoid an open break with the Hansa. The *Almirantazgo* was instructed to lift its order on cargoes coming from North Germany for the time being until the political obstacles had been removed. This bitterly fought over order was in fact then re-imposed, on the king's instructions, the following year; but following a renewed

<sup>80</sup> Hermann Kellenbenz, *Unternehmerkräfte im Hamburger Portugal und Spanienhandel, 1590-1625* (Hamburg, 1954), pp. 61-3.

<sup>81</sup> *Consultas of the Consejo de Estado*, 1 Sept. and 30 Oct. 1629, AGS Estado 2329; Alcalá-Zamora, p. 279.

torrent of Hanseatic protest, postponed again; the same thing happening yet again in 1631.<sup>82</sup>

In all, the *Almirantazgo's* proclamation requiring all cargoes from North Germany to be covered by de Roy's certificates was published and suspended at least four times between 1629 and the end of 1632 when it was finally enforced.<sup>83</sup> As the argument developed between the thoroughgoing mercantilists at the Spanish court, determined to follow through the programme of economic warfare against the Dutch, and those ministers who judged that imposing de Roy and his certificates was not worth the cost in terms of losing Hanseatic goodwill, de Roy himself, writing from Wismar, became increasingly caught up in the debate. In particular he became embroiled in a bitter feud with Agustín Bredimus who was now acting as the representative of the Hansa at Madrid. In letters sent from Wismar in June and July 1630, de Roy accused Bredimus of seeking to undermine Spain's mercantilist programme and of encouraging the burgomasters of Hamburg and Lübeck to think that he had sufficient influence with Spanish ministers to 'fulfil their desire for the abolition of the registers and certificates of merchandise for Spain'.<sup>84</sup> De Roy's advice was that Bredimus should be expelled from Spain. This advice was first accepted by the king and his ministers and then set aside, presumably to avoid making matters even worse, regarding relations with the Hansa. During his visit to Madrid in the autumn of 1632, de Roy again urged the expulsion of Bredimus and again his advice was first accepted and then, apparently, set aside.

For his part Bredimus insisted that the policy of imposing residents and certificates had 'caused commerce to cease and many fleets which had been made ready for trade not to be sent lest their cargoes be confiscated'.<sup>85</sup> A decade and a half later, around 1645, either Bredimus himself or an associate summed up the Hanseatic merchants' criticism of the *Almirantazgo* and everything connected with it in an anonymous pamphlet entitled *Causas por Donde crecio el comercio de Olanda*. This vehement tract indignantly accused the *Almirantazgo*, along with de Roy and his registers, of undermining and all but destroying Hanseatic commerce with Spain, clearing the path for an inevitable Dutch 'monopoly' of Spanish trade.<sup>86</sup> De Roy's reply to such criticism was that the Hansa's trade with Spain might have suffered some initial dislocation

<sup>82</sup> *Consultas* of the *Consejo de Estado*, 12 Aug. 1630, AGS Estado 2331; de Roy to Philip IV, Madrid, 13 Sept. 1632, AGS Estado 4126.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>84</sup> *Consulta* of the *Consejo de Estado*, 25 Oct. 1632, AGS Estado 2333.

<sup>85</sup> AGS Estado 2331, fo. 124; Alcalá-Zamora, p. 281.

<sup>86</sup> *Causas por Donde crecio el comercio de Olanda*, (Madrid, 1645?), fos. 2v-3.

whilst more stringent checking procedures were being introduced, and Dutch participation weeded out, but that in the long run Hanseatic interests could only benefit, and such remained the prevailing view at court.

It is significant that neither side in this debate suggested that Spain's new controls over northern European trade with the peninsula were inoperable or ineffective. Fernand Braudel, the French *grand maître*, several times asserted that Spain's embargoes against the Dutch had little effect,<sup>87</sup> placing some emphasis on this because his entire, widely-admired vision of the development of early modern European trade was underpinned by his premise that a changing balance of primary material needs, and not events or political factors, was predominantly responsible for shaping its main phases and structure. The Braudelian conception of the ineffectiveness of the Spanish embargoes against the Dutch has subsequently been vigorously championed – with assertions, not evidence – by Alcalá-Zamora and Henry Kamen.<sup>88</sup> But no participant Spanish, Flemish, German, or Scandinavian to the debate about the *Almirantazgo's* drive against Dutch commerce in the 1630s and 1640s thought that it was inoperable, ineffective, or failed to have a drastic effect on the overall pattern of European trade. Nor, on present evidence, is there any reasonable basis for supporting the views of those who assert that Spain's measures against the Dutch had little effect. If the grand concept of Europe's pattern of trade's being determined by primary material needs cannot survive once it is conceded that the pattern could be, and was, radically transformed by state-action, it is time we did dismiss views of Europe's economic history which fail to take proper account of the role of the state in an age permeated with mercantilist ideas.

No one who has studied North German trade with the Iberian Peninsula between 1621 and 1641 (when the Dutch returned to the ports of Portugal) disputes that this was the 'Zeit der Hochblüte der Iberienfahrt' or that this massive upsurge of Hanseatic activity was paid for by the Dutch in many hundreds of lost shiploads.<sup>89</sup> It is true that the high level

<sup>87</sup> Fernand Braudel, *La Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen à l'époque de Philippe II* (2 vols., Paris, 1966), i. 568-9, 572-3; Fernand Braudel, *Civilisation matérielle, économie et capitalisme XVe-XVIIIe siècle* (3 vols., Paris, 1979), iii. 175.

<sup>88</sup> Alcalá-Zamora, pp. 182-5; in his frequent criticisms of my *The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World*, Henry Kamen speaks of 'contrary evidence' without yet having cited any; for a further critique of the Braudelian approach, see Jonathan I. Israel, 'The Phases of the Dutch *straatvaart* (1590-1713), a Chapter in the economic history of the Mediterranean', *Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis* xcvi (1986), pp. 1-30; see above, 133-62.

<sup>89</sup> C.F. Wurm, *Studien ... über die Lebensschicksale des Foppius van Aitzema, ersten niederländischen Residenten bei den Hansestädten* (Hamburg, 1854), pp. 32-3; W.

of traffic from North Germany to the peninsula in the early 1620s – 156 ships from Hamburg alone in 1623 and 138 in 1624 – was not fully sustained in and after 1625.<sup>90</sup> But when we take account of the post-1624 campaign in both Spain and Portugal to eliminate disguised Dutch shipping from this traffic,<sup>91</sup> and the effects of the Polish-Swedish war on grain shipments from the Baltic in the late 1620s, it can be seen that Hanseatic trade with the peninsula in fact held up remarkably well. In the second half of the 1620s, between fifty and one hundred ships sailed yearly from Hamburg to the peninsula, another twenty or so yearly from Lübeck, and smaller convoys from Danzig.<sup>92</sup> These figures were still greatly in excess of anything attained by the Hansa during the Twelve Years Truce. So central was the *Iberienfahrt* in Hanseatic commerce in the 1621-41 period that even in 1625, a low point when only fifty-one ships sailed from Hamburg for Spain and Portugal, Iberian trade still accounted for twenty per cent of all shipping sailing from Hamburg, being by far the most important strand in Hamburg's trade (except for the traffic with the Dutch Republic which was mainly carried in Dutch vessels) dwarfing Hamburg's commerce with Scandinavia, France, or Britain.<sup>93</sup> By 1629, the number of vessels sailing from Hamburg alone, to the peninsula, had risen again to ninety-nine. Because no Dutch-built vessels could be employed in the *Iberienfahrt*, the entire North German coastline now experienced a boom in the building of large ships expressly for the voyage 'northabout' – to avoid the Dutch navy – around Scotland and Ireland, to the peninsula.<sup>94</sup> Certainly, there is evidence of a further contraction in the scale of the traffic, if not at Lübeck where the *Iberienfahrt* was at its height in the 1630s, then certainly at Hamburg.<sup>95</sup> It is likely that this was partly due to de Roy's activities. But one must also remember that after 1630 the English were allowed back into the ports of Spain and Portugal and, from then on, competed with the Hansa for

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Vogel, 'Beiträge zur Statistik der deutschen Seeschiffahrt im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert', *Hansische Geschichtsblätter*, liii (1928), 135-41; Ludwig Beutin, *Der deutsche Seehandel im Mittelmeergebiet bis zu den Napoleonischen Kriegen* (Neumünster, 1933), pp. 44-5; Kellenbenz, pp. 61-3; Karl-Friedrich Olechnowitz, *Der Schiffbau der Hansischen Spätzeit* (Weimar, 1960), p. 50; Israel, *The Dutch Republic*, pp. 93-5.

<sup>90</sup> Ernst Baasch, 'Hamburgs Seeschiffahrt und Waarenhandel vom Ende des 16. bis zur Mitte des 17. Jahrhunderts', *Zeitschrift für Hamburgische Geschichte*, ix (1894), 331.

<sup>91</sup> Israel, *The Dutch Republic*, pp. 135-40.

<sup>92</sup> Baasch; Wurm, p. 33; Vogel, pp. 135-41.

<sup>93</sup> Baasch, pp. 316, 332.

<sup>94</sup> Olechnowitz, *Handel und Seeschiffahrt*, pp. 31-2.

<sup>95</sup> Baasch.

control of Iberian trade. The secession of Portugal which from 1641 allowed the Dutch back into Portuguese ports, thereby stripping the Hansa of much of their previously large share of Portugal's salt exports to northern Europe, was a further blow. After 1641, the building of large ships for the *Iberienfahrt* in North Germany practically ceased.<sup>96</sup> Even so, the Hansa still plied a sizeable trade with Spain. As late as 1646, as we see from the registers of the 'directors' of the Dutch *Levantse Handel* who represented the interests of Dutch merchants involved in both Levant and west Mediterranean trade, the great bulk of southern Spanish goods reaching Amsterdam was still arriving on Hanseatic ships manned by German crews.<sup>97</sup>

By the autumn of 1630, de Roy had come to the conclusion that he was never going to succeed in persuading the Hamburg and Lübeck senates to admit him as Spain's resident or permit Spanish supervision of their thriving trade with the peninsula. In a letter to Madrid on December 1630, de Roy, replying to royal orders of two months before requiring him to spare no effort to disabuse the Hanseatic leadership of the 'idea they have that I have come to restrict their commerce and interfere in their councils', explained that the obstruction he had met with was not due to any misapprehension about his role but to a firm resolution to prevent the introduction of the new certificates system 'since there is an understanding between them and the Dutch rebels that they should not agree to anything prejudicial to the latter'. 'And seeing', he continued, how meagre is the outcome of my repeated efforts, and those that I have made through my confidants in their magistracies, to get them to accept the registers and certificates that Your Majesty desires for the administration of their merchandise in Spain, I have concluded the enclosed agreement with the King of Denmark in consultation with, and with the concurrence of the marqués de Leganés, whom Your Majesty has commanded to take charge of these matters.<sup>98</sup>

Judging from the surprise and annoyance this revelation caused among the *Consejo de Estado* in Madrid, Leganés in fact knew very little about it. Once again, as at Prenzlau in 1628, de Roy had taken the liberty of going beyond his orders. The draft treaty had in fact been signed by de

<sup>96</sup> Pieter Meyers to Gabriel de Roy, Lübeck, 5 Dec. 1644, AGR SEG 232, fo. 232.

<sup>97</sup> Algemeen Rijksarchief, The Hague, *Levantse Handel*, vol. 264, fos. 21, 88, 194v; Herman Wätjen, *Die Niederländer im Mittelmeergebiet zur Zeit ihrer höchsten Machtstellung* (Berlin, 1909), pp. 221-6; of the fourteen ships arriving in Amsterdam carrying wine, wool, olive oil, syrup, raisins, and colonial goods from southern Spain between May 1646 and April 1647, no less than twelve were specified by the Dutch authorities as being North German.

<sup>98</sup> Gabriel de Roy to Philip IV, Wismar, 2 Dec. 1630, AGS Estado 2332.



Roy and a representative of Christian IV of Denmark, at Wismar, on 22 October 1630, nearly six weeks before de Roy wrote to Madrid explaining what he had done. But the draft treaty was itself the result of contacts between Wismar and the Danish court for at least a year before that.<sup>99</sup> De Roy had been negotiating with a court Jew of Portuguese extraction, Alvaro Dinis of Glückstadt, who had served the Danish crown on the Lower Elbe for many years and was, in effect, Denmark's chief expert on everything concerning Iberian commerce.<sup>100</sup> The Danish monarch had long been on the look-out for means to divert some of the burgeoning wartime trade of Hamburg to his own new town of Glückstadt, forty miles further down the Elbe, which he had founded in 1616 and which he had settled with a considerable number of foreigners, including Mennonites, Dutch Remonstrants, and a community of Portuguese Jews.<sup>101</sup> Thus far Glückstadt had been largely a failure, the Jews liking to joke that it was neither a *stadt* nor had much *glück*, but Christian IV's withdrawal from the anti-Habsburg coalition, after his defeat in the German war, now presented a real opportunity to establish a thriving Iberian trade under Danish control. The treaty, which Alvaro Dinis and de Roy negotiated, stipulated in ponderous Latin that owing to seepage of Dutch products 'by fraud and dissimulation' into Hanseatic trade with the Iberian Peninsula, and the refusal of Hamburg and Lübeck to accept the posting of Spanish agents to monitor trade, the kings of Spain and Denmark agreed that a Spanish resident (de Roy) should now be posted in the Danish monarch's port of Glückstadt on the Elbe estuary. From there he was to register, authenticate, and certify all cargoes shipped to the Iberian Peninsula whether from the Elbe (Hamburg), Weser (Bremen), or neighbouring estuaries.<sup>102</sup> Subjects of the Danish crown trading from Glückstadt, but not subjects of the Hansa towns,

<sup>99</sup> L. Laursen, *Danmark-Norges Traktater, 1523-1750*, Vol. IV (1626-1649) (Copenhagen, 1917), 87-8.

<sup>100</sup> On Dinis whose synagogue name was Samuel Yachie and who was styled in diplomatic documents (he also negotiated with Wallenstein) as Albertus Dionysius, see H. Kellenbenz, *Sephardim an der unteren Elbe* (Wiesbaden, 1958), pp. 62-3.

<sup>101</sup> On the Jews of Glückstadt, see *ibid.*, pp. 64-5; Balslev, *De danske jøders historie* (Copenhagen, 1932), pp. 4-5; Jonathan I. Israel, *European Jewry in the Age of Mercantilism, 1550-1750* (Oxford, 1985), pp. 65-6, 91-3.

<sup>102</sup> 'Consul hic stabilietur a persona, ad id autorizata a rege Hispaniarum etc., cum potestate tabulas et registra conficiendi, super omnibus mercibus ex emporiis vel aliis civitatibus ad Albim vel Visurgim sitis versus Hispaniarum regna et provincias mittendis medio juramento coram ipso declarandis et specificatione onerationis navis juxta instructionem ...', Laursen, iv. 91; see also O.A. Johnsen, 'Les relations commerciales entre le Norvège et l'Espagne dans les temps modernes', *Revue Historique*, clxv (1930), 70.

were to have the privilege of being allowed by the Spanish crown to use ships built in Holland to carry their goods to and from the Iberian Peninsula for four years but no longer. No one who was not a subject of the Danish crown was to be permitted to trade with the peninsula using ships purchased from the Dutch. As word of this treaty got about, there was a distinct rise in tension between Denmark and Hamburg as well as between Denmark and the Dutch.<sup>103</sup> The Swedes, too, eyed de Roy's contacts with the Danish crown with intense suspicion.<sup>104</sup>

In his letter of December 1630, de Roy urged Philip IV to ratify the commercial treaty with Denmark as speedily as possible. Olivares, for his part, was both annoyed by de Roy's going beyond his instructions and deeply reluctant to abandon all hope of an agreement with the Hanseatic towns by signing such a treaty, discriminating against Hanseatic interests, with their traditional enemy, Denmark. The *Junta de Almirantazgo* which was asked to examine de Roy's draft treaty also had its reservations.<sup>105</sup> In addition, Bredimus' indignant protests on behalf of Hamburg and Lübeck also had some impact. De Roy's recall to Spain during 1631 was mainly to help resolve what turned out to be an uncommonly thorny issue at court. De Roy, back in Spain, lost no time in protesting at the delay and at Bredimus' role in particular.<sup>106</sup>

It was not until December 1632, more than two years after the draft treaty was negotiated, that de Roy was officially appointed 'resident' of the Spanish crown at Glückstadt and that he prepared to return to North Germany. After delaying for two years, it was at the meeting of the *Consejo de Estado*, on 21 December 1632, that Olivares finally made up his mind, urging his colleagues that the treaty should now be ratified so as not to jeopardize the growing collaboration with the Danish crown. Even so, de Roy was to be instructed to press to the utmost for deletion of the clause permitting Danish subjects to use Dutch-built ships for four years. Olivares wished to remove all suggestion that Danish subjects were to be specially favoured at the expense of Hanseatic merchants.<sup>107</sup> It is striking, though, that in contrast to the 1627 commercial treaty with the duke of Holstein-Gottorp which expressly excluded Jews from participating, the Spanish crown made no such stipulation in 1632, even though

<sup>103</sup> Kellenbenz, p. 29.

<sup>104</sup> *Svenska Riksrådets Protokoll med understöd af statsmedel i tryck utgifvet af Kongl. Riks Archivet I* (1621-1629), ed. N.A. Kullberg (Stockholm, 1878), pp. 162-3.

<sup>105</sup> *Consulta* of the *Consejo de Estado*, 21 Jan. 1631, AGS Estado 2332.

<sup>106</sup> *Consulta*, 5 Oct. 1631, AGS Estado 2333.

<sup>107</sup> *Consulta* of the *Consejo de Estado*, 5 Oct. 1632, 'Voto del Conde-Duque', AGS Estado 2333.

Christian IV had just issued a charter allocating more generous privileges to the Jews in Glückstadt than they had had before, and it was obvious, not least to Olivares, that they had the closest links with Spain and Portugal.<sup>108</sup>

The final arrangements for de Roy's mission to Glückstadt were made in February 1633 when his previous pay and expenses were reviewed to see if any increase was justified.<sup>109</sup> He then left for Glückstadt where he took up his new post and began monitoring both Danish and Hanseatic commerce with the peninsula. As applied in 1633, the new system of certificates covering cargoes sent from Germany to the peninsula affected even German products shipped to the peninsula via England and in English ships. The *Almirantazgo* seized at Málaga a consignment of Silesian linens sent on an English vessel from London in September 1633, simply on the grounds that the linen had come from Germany and was not covered by one of de Roy's certificates. Referring to this seizure, the English resident in Madrid reported back to London (slightly inaccurately) that the 'Spanish king had ordained that no forraïne commodity shall be brought into his kingdoms but with certificate that they come from a contry that is a friend, and to that purpose he placed an officer in Hamburg to give certificates without which no trade is admitted from the said city'.<sup>110</sup> Whereas Braudel, Alcalá-Zamora, and Henry Kamen claim that the *Almirantazgo* and its machinery in northern Europe had little or no effect, Bredimus and his associates protested that de Roy and his staff were fulfilling their functions in a corrupt and despotic manner, tyrannizing over Hanseatic trade with the peninsula and causing great harm to it; but at no point did they suggest that Spain's methods of controlling international trade lacked bite or impact. According to Danish merchants trading with Spain, the *Almirantazgo* was so eager to confiscate cargoes that it sometimes even seized goods that *were* covered by de Roy's certificates.<sup>111</sup>

During the course of the next decade, de Roy and his staff, operating from Glückstadt, kept registers, issued certificates, and generally supervised the flow of trade from both North Germany and the Danish monarchy to Spain and (until 1641) Portugal. It had been no part of the purpose of Olivares and his colleagues to cut back Hanseatic trade with the peninsula to the advantage of the Danish monarchy (Denmark-

<sup>108</sup> Balslev, p. 5; Kellenbenz, *Sephardim*, p. 64.

<sup>109</sup> De Roy received an annual salary as 'comisario de finanzas' at Brussels worth 10,000 *reales* plus 3,600 *reales* in travel expenses, *Consultas* of the *Consejo de Estado*, 31 Jan. and 15 Feb. 1633, AGS Estado 2334.

<sup>110</sup> Israel, *Dutch Republic*, pp. 208-9.

<sup>111</sup> Johnsen, pp. 80-1.

Norway-Holstein) but the location of de Roy's office at Glückstadt and the increasingly close collaboration between Spain and Denmark in the diplomatic sphere inevitably had this result. Especially in the years 1637-43, there was a marked upsurge in commercial and shipping activity at Glückstadt which was then cut short by the Danish-Swedish war of 1643-5.<sup>112</sup> At the same time, masts and other supplies began to be shipped to Spain direct from Norway and there began a programme of building large ships for the Spanish trade in Norway's ports, especially Bergen and Trondheim.<sup>113</sup> This entry of Norway into direct trade links with Spain continued until 1648 when Dutch ships were finally readmitted to Spanish ports. But while the Danish monarchy profited from the situation, and Hanseatic merchants complained, de Roy consistently defended his system of registers and certificates, arguing that the drive to eradicate Dutch involvement benefited both Denmark and the Hansa towns.<sup>114</sup>

As the years passed, de Roy became increasingly enmeshed in the Danish context. He appears to have been a frequent visitor to the royal palace at Glückstadt where the Danish monarch frequently stayed and where one of the principal adornments was a set of portraits of past and present members of the House of Habsburg brought by de Roy from Spain as a gift from Philip IV.<sup>115</sup> Needless to say, de Roy was also closely involved in the negotiations which led to Hannibal Sehested's mission to Spain in 1640-1 and the signing of the new Spanish-Danish commercial treaty of March 1641, one of the most elaborate and refined examples of mercantilist politics to be found in the mid-seventeenth century. De Roy evidently came to believe that the Danish monarchy was the one northern state with which Spain could safely and profitably expand her trading links. Not only was Denmark-Norway-Holstein able to supply shipbuilding timber and other supplies Spain needed but the Danish monarchy, in contrast to England, the Dutch Republic, and North Germany, produced no textiles or other manufactures and did not compete with Spain as a supplier of colonial goods to the European market as a whole. As a result, he explained,<sup>116</sup> the traffic between Spain and the Danish monarchy was, and would remain, nothing more than a straightforward exchange of raw

<sup>112</sup> G. Köhn, 'Ostfriesen und Niederländer in der Neugründung Glückstadt von 1620 bis 1652', *Hansische Geschichtsblätter*, xc (1972), 82-3.

<sup>113</sup> Johnsen, pp. 80-1.

<sup>114</sup> Gabriel de Roy to Lázaro de Rios, Glückstadt, 21 June 1636, AGS Estado 2156.

<sup>115</sup> Emil Gigas, *Grev Bernardino de Rebolledo, Spansk Gesandt i Kjøbenhavn, 1648-1659* (Copenhagen, 1883), p. 21.

<sup>116</sup> This at least is the argument of the anonymous tract on Spanish-Danish trade, of 1641, at the British Library which I take to have been the work of de Roy, see Add. MSS 14010, fos. 221-2.

materials – salt, wine, and olive oil for timber, gunpowder, and Baltic stores – which would neither drain Spain of silver nor flood the Spanish market with unwanted manufactures to the detriment of Spain's industries. Developing closer links with Denmark-Norway-Holstein, de Roy argued, would thus help counteract the enervating, insidious consequences of Spanish trade with other parts of north-western Europe.<sup>117</sup>

The Spanish-Danish commercial treaty of March 1641, drawn up this time in parallel Spanish and German, and signed by Olivares and Sehested in Madrid, was essentially an elaboration of de Roy's earlier monitoring system.<sup>118</sup> It stipulated that merchants leaving the Dutch Republic could participate in Spanish trade if they settled in Glückstadt, or elsewhere in the Danish monarchy, had their names put on a special register, and paid a fee either to Brussels or in Spain. It authorized Philip IV to post Spanish consuls in any Danish or Norwegian ports he chose and spelt out in greater detail than before exactly how the registering and authenticating of Danish cargoes for Spain was to be done. To obtain the requisite certificates, merchants intending to send cargoes to Spain had to swear on oath that the goods being shipped to Spain were 'not made in Holland, nor belong to any person, group or company in those provinces', nor to anyone connected with such persons or companies either 'directly or indirectly'. Where and whenever violation of this rule was detected, the Danish monarch agreed to the automatic confiscation of the cargoes concerned by the *Almirantazgo* in Spain. Furthermore, the Danish crown agreed that from now on Danish and Norwegian ships leaving Spanish ports would have to stipulate where they were sailing to and were to incur a penalty of thirty per cent of the value of the cargoes they shipped from Spain should they fail to deliver their cargoes at these authorized destinations. Merchants would be automatically liable to pay this penalty should they fail to send certificates signed by the relevant local authority to the *Almirantazgo* in Spain within a year and a day of the departure of the ship. Non-payment of the penalty was to incur automatic confiscation of the entire value of the cargo either in Spain or in the Danish monarchy. The proceeds from these penalties and confiscations specified under the new treaty were to be split three ways: 30% was to go to Philip IV's treasury, 35% to the Danish treasury, and the

<sup>117</sup> On the role of foreign manufacturers in the decline of Spain, see Israel, *The Dutch Republic*, pp. 53-5.

<sup>118</sup> On the background of the treaty, see C.O. Bøggild-Andersen, *Hannibal Sehested. En dansk statsmand* (Copenhagen, 1946), pp. 39-41; for the text, see Add. MSS 14010, 'Assiento capitulado entre los dos magestades de Philippe IV Rey de las Españas i Christiano III Rey de Dinamarca' and Laursen, pp. 280-311.

remaining 35% to the official or informer instrumental in bringing the deception to light.

The initiative for this more elaborate system of control came from Spain, and in particular from the *Almirantazgo*, while de Roy himself continued to be seen at court in Madrid as indispensable to the furtherance of Spain's mercantilist policy.<sup>119</sup> Periodically he was sent instructions from Madrid and Brussels concerning changes and modifications that the Spanish crown required in the working of the system. Thus, for instance, shortly after the signing of the new treaty, Philip IV prohibited all foreign trade with his rebellious territories of Catalonia and Portugal and besides issuing an edict to this effect in Flanders, and licensing the Dunkirk privateers to intercept cargoes *en route* to, and from, those destinations, de Roy was sent orders to take all possible steps to eliminate Danish trade with those regions.<sup>120</sup>

But whilst de Roy continued to be seen as indispensable to Spain's mercantilist policy, Spanish ministers were at the same time increasingly prey to doubts about his financial probity. Questions about his handling of the 250,000 ducats with which he had been furnished for the Baltic *armada* had surfaced during his stay in Spain in 1631-2. This was not allowed to interfere with his role as intermediary between Spain and Denmark, or his taking up his post as Spanish resident at Glückstadt. Olivares himself declared at a meeting of the *Consejo de Estado* in Madrid in October 1632, that while it would eventually be necessary to extract some proper account of his expenditure from de Roy, it was not possible to insist on this for the time being because it would seriously delay his departure for Denmark at the very least and 'because we have no one else so expert concerning that king and kingdom'.<sup>121</sup> Six years later, however, orders were sent to Brussels to bring de Roy to account. Whilst de Roy was on a visit to Cologne in the summer of 1638, he received orders from Philip IV's governor of the Spanish Netherlands, the Cardinal-Infante, to come at once to Brussels. De Roy disobeyed this order and returned instead to Glückstadt, sending a letter to Brussels explaining that he had urgent royal business to attend to there.<sup>122</sup> The Cardinal-Infante assumed that these were 'frivolous excuses' and placed de Roy's property in the Netherlands under distraint, threatening to sell it off if de Roy failed to appear promptly to give account of himself. He reported this to

<sup>119</sup> *Correspondance de la Cour d'Espagne*, iii. 295-6, 357.

<sup>120</sup> *Correspondance de la Cour d'Espagne*, iii. 439.

<sup>121</sup> *Consulta of the Consejo de Estado*, 22 Oct. 1632, 'Voto del Conde-Duque', AGS Estado 2334.

<sup>122</sup> Gabriel de Roy to Francisco de Galarreta, Glückstadt, 7 June 1638 and Cardinal-Infante to Philip IV, Brussels, 30 June 1638, AGR SEG 219, fo. 280.

Madrid only to learn that de Roy had indeed been entrusted with vital new negotiations at the Danish court. Once again the pressure was off. During the years 1639-41 whilst de Roy was dealing with the new Spanish-Danish commercial treaty, Philip's ministers had to content themselves with de Roy's explanation that all his receipts and detailed accounts had been left at Wismar, deposited with the city treasurer, when the Swedes had closed in.<sup>123</sup>

It was not until 1644 that the royal administration was at last able to get de Roy to come to Brussels and submit to detailed questioning as to his use of royal funds in 1627-31. A statement was drawn up and sent to Madrid for perusal.<sup>124</sup> The king's auditors were dismayed by what they found. De Roy had compiled an itemized list of expenditure for the period of his stay at Wismar but was able to provide scarcely any corroborating evidence as to its veracity. De Roy claimed to have made efforts to retrieve his papers from Wismar, employing the services of a Lübeck notary, but without success.<sup>125</sup> His claim to have spent 248,598 *Reichsthaler* on ships, guns, and materials seemed plausible enough but the royal auditors were taken aback by the 34,893 *Reichsthaler* allocated to a category of expenses the bulk of which turned out to consist of his own salary and travel costs. De Roy had even allocated sums to cover his alleged unrepaid expenses incurred during his journey to Madrid, Seville, and Lisbon in the years 1623-4.

The *Consejo de Estado* was now in a quandary. De Roy petitioned the king from Brussels asking to be allowed to resume his post and salary as *comisario de finanzas* there 'lest his reputation suffer, he being well-known to the whole of Europe'.<sup>126</sup> The then governor in Brussels, the marqués de Castel-Rodrigo, recommended that he should be restored to his titles and position in view of his 'long and good services' and 'skill and zeal'. There were prolonged deliberations over this thorny issue at Madrid during March and April 1645 which, however, failed to lead to his rehabilitation.<sup>127</sup> In December 1645, de Roy was arrested at Brussels on the king's orders. Shortly afterwards he died.

The memory of de Roy and his certificates lingered on in northern Europe. For over thirty years de Roy had been one of Spain's leading

<sup>123</sup> AGR SEG 219, fo. 487 and SEG 220, fo. 316.

<sup>124</sup> 'Copia de papel de los contadores de la sala de quantas en estos estados ... en razon de la cuenta del comisario Gabriel de Roy', Brussels, 20 Oct. 1644, AGS Estado 2064.

<sup>125</sup> *Consultas* of the *Consejo de Estado*, 21 March and 19 April 1645, AGS Estado 2064.

<sup>126</sup> *Consulta* of the *Consejo de Estado*, 21 March 1645, AGS Estado 2064.

<sup>127</sup> *Consultas* of 21 Feb., 21 March, and 19 April 1645, *ibid.*

advocates and practitioners of economic war against the Dutch. When the decision was made in November 1645 to replace him with a new Spanish resident at Glückstadt, it is significant that his successor was to continue not only de Roy's function within the Danish monarchy but also his function as supervisor of Hanseatic commerce with Spain.<sup>128</sup> And this continuation of Spanish attempts to ensure the exclusion of Dutch participation in Hanseatic trade with Spain was expressly sanctioned by the emperor.<sup>129</sup> De Roy's long residency at Glückstadt was thus a key precedent, model, and symbol of the whole mercantilist notion of government regulation of international trade in the interest of the state. In 1667, during the War of Devolution, when Louis XIV attacked the Spanish Netherlands, Spain's Jewish 'Agent' in Amsterdam, Manuel de Belmonte, compiled an advisory paper for the *Consejo de Estado* in Madrid on how to wage economic war on France, citing de Roy and his activities as the classic example of how to proceed. His advice was that Spain must rigorously ban French ships and goods from Spanish ports and, at the same time, to prevent France trading with Spain indirectly, via the Dutch, empower himself to issue certificates to cover all cargoes shipped from the Dutch Republic to Spain. He believed that the Dutch could be persuaded to agree to this because 'both Holland and the [Spanish] Low Countries have an interest in ensuring that no manufactures reach Spain other than their own and this should be done following the example of what was done in Hamburg during the time of the war with Holland when nothing was allowed through unless accompanied by a pass from Gabriel de Roy'.<sup>130</sup>

<sup>128</sup> *Correspondance de la Cour d'Espagne*, iii. 547-8.

<sup>129</sup> Decree of Emperor Ferdinand III, Linz, 24 May 1646, *ibid.*, iii. 577.

<sup>130</sup> Manuel de Belmonte, 'Los remedios de que se podran usar para estorvar la navegacion y comercio de franceses en los puertos de la Monarchia' (Aug. 1667), Biblioteca Nacional (Madrid) MS 899, fo. 243; on Belmonte, see Israel, *European Jewry*, pp. 134, 136, 142, 246.



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MANUEL LOPEZ PEREIRA OF AMSTERDAM, ANTWERP  
AND MADRID: JEW, NEW CHRISTIAN,  
AND ADVISER TO THE CONDE-DUQUE DE OLIVARES

While the main trend in Portuguese New Christian migration in the early seventeenth century was from Portugal and Spain to the Low Countries, or Italy, there was always a small trickle passing in the opposite direction, from lands where the open practice of Judaism was permitted, back to Spain and Portugal. In most cases, we can only speculate as to the motives of those who returned to a life of apparent Catholic orthodoxy. Frequently difficulties in integrating into Sephardi life, or some form of estrangement from, or rancour against, the leadership of the Portuguese Jewish communities played a part. In some cases it was simply a matter of business opportunities or even just plain bad luck, a transient visit leading to entanglement with the Inquisition. It may be that there were also Sephardi Jews who reverted to Catholicism in the Peninsula out of religious conviction.

Among those Portuguese who did return from Holland to the Peninsula, one of the most intriguing, if hitherto a somewhat shadowy figure, was Manuel López Pereira, a former member of the Amsterdam Sephardi community who became a senior financial official in Madrid. This in itself is remarkable enough but, in addition to the possibly unique course of his career, López Pereira was one of the most important of the small group of experts on foreign trade gathered at the Spanish court in the 1620s, advisors whose tracts and memoranda on international trade rivalry, and Spain's worsening economic problems, played a major role in the framing of Olivares' ambitious programme for the commercial, industrial, and financial regeneration of Spain.

This group of authors of mercantilist projects gathered at Madrid in the 1620s included a German from Trier, by the name of Agustín Bredimus,<sup>1</sup> a Walloon nobleman, Gabriel de Roy,<sup>2</sup> the Dutchman Francisco Rétama, who became a citizen of Jerez,<sup>3</sup> the Englishman Thomas Shirley, and two Portuguese New Christians, one of whom, Duarte Gomes Solís, already has an established place in historical literature as one of the more notable Iberian

\* I should like to thank most warmly for their extensive assistance with this article Professor J. H. Elliot of the Institute for Advanced Study of Princeton University; my colleague Angel García, of University College London, and Jesús Bouza Álvarez, of the University of Madrid.

<sup>1</sup> On Bredimus, who, by the late 1620s, was acting as agent of the Hanseatic towns in Madrid, see José Alcalá-Zamora, *España, Flandes y el mar del Norte (1618-39)*, (Barcelona, 1975) 180, 281, 415.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* 239-42, 274-79; E. Stols, *De Spaanse Brabanders of de handelsbetrekkingen der zuidelijke Nederlanden met de Iberische wereld, 1598-1648*, (2 vols. Brussels, 1971) i, 18-21.

<sup>3</sup> Retama's tract "Consideraciones en rracon de passar el trato a las provinziias ovedientes de Flandes" is printed in Alcalá-Zamora, *op cit.*, 480-90.

mercantilist writers of the seventeenth century.<sup>4</sup> The other Portuguese, Manuel López Pereira, is much less well known than Gomes Solís, presumably because most of his tracts to this day remain unpublished. He was, however, even more prolific than Gomes Solís in the range of his schemes, perhaps indeed the most prolific of any of these authors of projects. And while in several cases he was probably merely drawing on a common fund of ideas, rather than putting forward new ideas of his own, López Pereira's proposals in several respects approximate more closely to the actual lines of Olivares' mercantilist initiatives than those of virtually any other mercantilist writer, or *arbitrista*, of the time. It is thus with some confidence that we can say that he was an influence of some consequence in the formulation of Olivares' policies.

Manuel López Pereira seems to have settled definitively in Spain in 1619, living first as a merchant in Seville but then moving, within a year or two to Madrid. Around the time he moved to the Spanish capital he began compiling and submitting to Philip IV's ministers a hefty series of at least nine or ten economic tracts and possibly even more. These were well received and it is clear that he must have found favour (as well as protection from the Inquisition) at the highest level for it evidently seeped out at court that he had relatives living as Jews in Holland. We have no specific comment by Olivares' himself on López Pereira, but, in 1624, a *junta* of lesser ministers judged him to be a man of "mucha inteligencia" and "muy buen zelo" whose work was to be encouraged.<sup>5</sup> He was recommended for a royal grant, was naturalised as a Castilian subject pending further favours,<sup>6</sup> and subsequently became a royal *contador* (auditor). In the early 1630s, he was in charge of the accounts of the revenues from Olivares' new salt tax.<sup>7</sup> Clearly he proved his worth as an official. From a letter written in Madrid in November 1636, we learn that he was then promoted (we may assume on Olivares' recommendation) to the senior post of *contador de relaciones* with a seat in the royal Council of Finance.<sup>8</sup> Thus, López Pereira spent a great many years in the day-to-day company of Spain's principal ministers. This promotion to a highly prestigious post in the higher echelons of the court bureaucracy, we are told, provoked widespread scandal at court for not only was López Pereira publicly known to be a Portuguese New Christian, but also (it was rumoured) had in early life been publicly condemned as a "judaíser", in an Auto-da-fé in Portugal, and now had a brother living as a professing Jew in Amsterdam. Although the writer of this letter says that he does not know whether these rumours were true or not, we know today that this was indeed the situation.

<sup>4</sup> Gomes Solís' main work was his *Discursos sobre los comercios de las dos Indias* published in 1622 where, among numerous other projects, he suggested that the Spanish crown should allow professing Jews to establish ghettos in the Portuguese East Indies as a way of undermining Dutch and English trade with the Far East; see *loc. cit.* 14-15; Léon Bourdon (ed.) *Mémoires inédits de Duarte Gomes Solís* (Lisbon, 1955) and the extensive relevant sections of C.A. Hanson, *Economy and Society in Baroque Portugal 1668-1703* (Minneapolis, 1981).

<sup>5</sup> For this information, I am indebted to J. H. Elliott for communicating to me the content of a *consulta* in an unnumbered volume of the Montesclaros papers in the private archive of the duques del Infantado, in Madrid.

<sup>6</sup> *Actas de las Cortes de Castilla* xl, 266, session of 8 Jan. 1624.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. xlix (1632) 393.

<sup>8</sup> Antonio Rodríguez Villa, *La Corte y monarquía de España en los años de 1636 y 1637* (Madrid, 1886) 65.

In fact, Manuel had two younger brothers – Antonio and Francisco López Pereira – living as professing Jews in Amsterdam; and Antonio, whose Jewish name was apparently Joseph Israel Pereira,<sup>9</sup> was a man of some prominence in synagogue affairs. He several times served as a member of the governing board of the Neveh Shalom synagogue and was a founding member of the *Santa Companhia de dotar orfãos e donzelas pobres*, (1615) a Portuguese Jewish organisation based in Amsterdam, with secret branches in Antwerp, Rouen, St Jean de Luz, and even in Brazil, dedicated to providing marriage portions for poor Portuguese Jewish girls (and for poor New Christian girls in countries where the practice of Judaism was not allowed) who were willing to abandon Christianity and marry in synagogue in Holland or in Hamburg.<sup>10</sup>

The legend of the Sephardi Jew who migrated back from Holland to the Peninsula, reverting to at least nominal Christianity, and who ultimately became an advisor and confidant of Olivares lived on among Dutch Sephardi Jewry through the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries albeit in a slightly confused form. Daniel Levi de Barrios, who published a chronicle of the Portuguese Jewish community of Amsterdam, in 1683, names the one-time Dutch Jew who made good in Spain becoming, as he put it, *contador mayor* of the king of Spain and *valido* of the Conde Duque not as “Manuel” but as “Antonio” Lopes Pereira.<sup>11</sup> Apart from the confusion of first names as between Manuel and Antonio López Pereira, it may be that Levi de Barrios’ designation of López Pereira as “valido”, that is a favourite and confidant, of Olivares somewhat overstates the case. However, we can be fairly sure that Manuel López Pereira was personally close to Olivares, and was in some sense his protégé, as we know that at the time of the Conde-Duque’s death, Manuel López Pereira, who was evidently still in Madrid, was named in Olivares’ will as one of his (fairly numerous) executors.<sup>12</sup> The story as told by Levi de Barrios was later repeated in the eighteenth century by the Amsterdam Portuguese Jewish chronicler David Franco Mendes.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>9</sup> It seems clear that Antonio Lopes Pereira usually used the name Joseph Israel Pereira in synagogue records and that he was several times treasurer of the Neveh Shalom synagogue, but that he also later claimed the ancient patronymic “Abendana” styling himself from 1622 “Joseph Abendana”. Rather confusingly, there is also one reference in the Amsterdam Portuguese Jewish records to “Izaq Israel Perejra que he Antonio Lopes Pereira” which I take to be a mistake for “Francisco Lopes Pereira”, see *Livro de Bet Haim do Kahal Kados de Bet Yahacob* ed. Wilhelmina C. Pieterse (Assen, 1970) 3, 8, 15-16, 22-4, 37, 51-3; H. P. Salomon, *Portrait of a New Christian. Fernão Alvares Melo (1569-1632)* (Paris, 1982) 51.

<sup>10</sup> I. S. Revah, ‘Le premier règlement imprimé de la “Santa Companhia de dotar orfãos e donzelas pobres”’, *Boletim internacional de bibliografia luso-brasileira*, IV (1963) 659.

<sup>11</sup> Daniel Levi de Barrios, *Triumpho del gobierno popular y de la antigüedad holandesa* (Amsterdam, 1683) section “Casa de Jacob” p. 9; Levi de Barrios’ mistake in turn led the historian A. M. Vaz Dias astray, for the latter found it hard to believe that a Dutch Jew born of a family victimized by the Inquisition, should have reverted to Christianity in the Peninsula and supposed that the continued references to Antonio Lopes Pereira in Amsterdam showed that the story was in fact untrue, see A. M. Vaz Dias, “Losse bijdragen tot de geschiedenis der Joden in Amsterdam”, *De Vrijdagavond* VIII (1931) 23; for more information on Antonio López Pereira, see *Livro de Bet Haim*, 181.

<sup>12</sup> *Memorial Histórico Español* xix 131.

<sup>13</sup> David Franco Mendes, “Memorias do estabelecimento e progresso dos judeus portugueses e espanoos nesta famosa cidade de Amsterdam” in *Studia Rosenthaliana* (henceforward SR), IX (1975) 7-8.

But if Manuel López Pereira's later life became entwined in legend his early life figures in an even more intriguing story and, once again, one that can be shown to be substantially true. One of the principal accounts preserved by the Portuguese Jews of Amsterdam concerning the origins of their community centred around a renowned beauty of Lisbon by the name of Maria Nunes who fled Portugal in the late 1590s, together with her two brothers, a sister, Justa Pereira, and an uncle, after her parents were seized by the Inquisition as "judaisers". According to this story, she was on a ship together with her four relatives (her brothers being none other than Manuel and Antonio López Pereira), when the vessel was intercepted by the English and brought into an English port. According to Levi de Barrios, an English duke fell in love with Manuel's beautiful sister; and sought her love with such ardour that Queen Elizabeth, hearing of this, summoned the girl to appear before her so as to judge her beauty for herself. The Queen was so impressed that she reportedly took Maria Nunes with her in the royal carriage for a ride through London to show off her beauty to the English. But despite all the efforts of the duke to marry her, and make her his duchess, Maria Nunes, wishing to remain true to her secret faith, insisted on leaving England together with her relatives and proceeding to Amsterdam.<sup>14</sup>

In the 1920s, the Dutch Jewish historian Sigmund Seeligmann came upon a letter sent to The Hague by Noël de Caron, the Dutch States General's agent in London, which appears to refer to this episode. The letter is dated 27 April 1597 and relates that among several Dutch ships intercepted by the English, *en route* from Spain and Portugal, was a vessel from Flushing which had on board a group of five Portuguese passengers who were fleeing from Inquisition, one of whom, he mentions, was a young "noble lady" dressed in male attire.<sup>15</sup> These Portuguese were taken to London. De Carron also specifically mentions that the group were on their way to Amsterdam where the girl was to be married. While we can not be certain that this passage refers to the beautiful Maria Nunes and her relatives, it does seem likely; and we do know that the marriage of Maria Nunes to her cousin, Manuel Lopes Homem, was entered in the city registers at Amsterdam on 28 November 1598.<sup>16</sup> At that date her parents were still languishing in the Inquisition gaols in Lisbon. Manuel López Pereira's own marriage, or first marriage, was registered in Amsterdam on 9

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*; Levi de Barrios, *loc. cit.* 5; J. S. Silva Rosa, *Geschiedenis der Portugeesche Joden te Amsterdam, 1593-1925* (Amsterdam, 1925) 2, 6, 8; Wilhelmina C. Pieterse, *Daniel Levi de Barrios als geschiedschrijver van de portugees-israelietische gemeente te Amsterdam in zijn "Triumpho del Gobierno Popular"* (Amsterdam, 1968) 44-5; Mozes Gans, *Memorboek. Platenatlas van het leven der joden in Nederland van de middeleeuwen tot 1940* (Baarn, 1971) 20-1; the parallel between the story of Maria Nunes and her secret loyalty to Judaism with the paragon of beauty and Catholic loyalty shown off at the English court by Queen Elizabeth, embodied in Cervantes' famous story *La española inglesa* was pointed out to me by my colleague Angel Garcia who expects to develop this theme in a forthcoming article. I am much indebted to him for pointing out this remarkable aspect of the subject.

<sup>15</sup> Sigmund Seeligmann, *Bibliographie en Historie. Bijdrage tot de geschiedenis der eerste Sephardim in Amsterdam* (Amsterdam, 1927) 15-18; J. d'Ancona, "Komst der Marranen in Noord-Nederland: de Portugese gemeenten te Amsterdam tot de vereniging (1639)", in *Geschiedenis der Joden in Nederland* ed. H. Brugmans and A. Frank (Amsterdam, 1940) 204-5.

<sup>16</sup> Seeligmann, *Bibliographie*, 15; Gans reproduces a photo of the contract signed by Maria Nunes and Manuel Lopes Homem, Gans, *Memorboek*, 21.

September 1605, by which date his parents were also securely ensconced in the city. Manuel is stated as being then aged twenty-three years old and having been born on the island of Madeira, albeit of a Lisbon family.<sup>17</sup> His bride, Bretis Nunes of Oporto, was a daughter of his father's brother, Pedro Homem, the uncle who had been with him in England, and a sister of Manuel Lopes Homem. Justa Pereira married another cousin, Francisco Nunes Homem, also in 1605. Thus Manuel, Maria, and Justa would all seem to have married their first cousins.

Manuel López Pereira's Jewish name has yet to be identified. As we have seen, Antonio Lopes Pereira was originally styled in the synagogue Joseph Israel Pereira but later, in 1622, he and his cousin, Francisco Nunes Homem, adopted, or discovered, the patronymic "Abendana".<sup>18</sup> Historians disagree over whether the adoption of such medieval Spanish Jewish names by Portuguese *Marranos* returning to Judaism in the seventeenth century indicates a genuine continuity, a recollection of that family's own pre-1492 surname, or whether it was simply a fashionable means of enhancing one's standing in the new milieu to assume patronymics which had once been, and in the Levant still were, prestigious Spanish Jewish names.<sup>19</sup> According to Antonio López Pereira and Nunes Homem they discovered what was their own ancient name, in 1622, learning this from certain relatives "*de sua mispaha em judesmo*", presumably in the Levant. This would then seem to be something of an in between case. Undeniably, though, the family did enjoy high status among early seventeenth-century Dutch Sephardi Jewry. As evidence of this, it is significant that Antonio López Pereira married Maria Pimentel (Judica Abendana), daughter of the "noble" García de Pimentel, the Pimentel (Abeniacar) clan of Venice, Amsterdam, and Constantinople — one of García's brothers was a rabbi in the Turkish capital — being universally acknowledged as one of the most select, as well as wealthiest, Sephardi lineages in early modern Europe.<sup>20</sup> García Pimentel's brother, Manuel Pimentel, is known to have stayed at the French court in 1607, shortly before reverting to open Judaism in Venice, was accepted as a nobleman and caused a sensation with his skill at cards. Despite his deliberately losing to the king on occasion, Henri IV is reputed to have remarked "I am the king of France but you are the king of gamblers".<sup>21</sup> It is evident that the Pimentel-Abeniacar family also came to play a certain role in Manuel López Pereira's own life.

A number of notarial deeds concerning Manuel López Pereira's business activity in the years after his marriage have been preserved in the Amsterdam city archive. In his twenties, he participated as a junior partner in a wide-ranging family concern chiefly

<sup>17</sup> Seeligmann, *Bibliographie*, 22; Pieterse, *Daniel Levi de Barrios*, 45.

<sup>18</sup> *Livro de Bet Haim*, 181; d'Ancona, "Komst der Marranen", 205; Salomon, *Portrait of a New Christian*, 51.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*; Jean Denucé, "De afkomst van Anna de Milan (ca. 1548-1613), stammoeder van het geslacht Teixeira de Mattos", *Antwerpsch Archievenblad* ser. 2, no. 3 (Jan. 1928), 28; J. C. Boyajian, "The new Christians reconsidered: evidence from Lisbon's Portuguese Bankers, 1497-1647", *S.R.*, XIII (1979) 150-51.

<sup>20</sup> Franco Mendes, *Memorias*, 13, 21; E. M. Koen a.o., ed. "Notarial Records in Amsterdam relating to the Portuguese Jews in that Town up to 1639" (in instalments in *SR*) *SR*, xii (1978) 173.

<sup>21</sup> François de Bassompierre, *Mémoires du Marechal de Bassompierre* (4 vols. Amsterdam, 1723) i, 206-8, the story is retold in Levi de Barrios.

involved in importing sugar from Brazil and Madeira, via Portugal, to Holland.<sup>22</sup> In August 1604, Manuel together with his cousin and brother-in-law, Manuel Lopes Homem, bought a quarter share in a large, 240 ton, ship, the *Jaeger*, for 2,000 guilders. But the older man, Lopes Homem, was clearly the senior participant. In January 1605, Manuel Lopes Homem was one of several leading Portuguese Jewish merchants who petitioned the States General to be allowed to continue trading with the Iberian Peninsula despite the growing pressure for Dutch retaliation against Spanish attempts, since 1598, to exclude Dutch shipping and goods from the ports of Spain and Portugal.<sup>23</sup> One cargo of sugar belonging to the family, on board a Portuguese ship sailing from Bahia to Portugal, was seized in 1605 in mid-Atlantic by a Zeeland privateer which involved the family in trying to retrieve their sugar from the admiralty authorities in Zeeland.<sup>24</sup> In August 1608, Manuel López Pereira was accused by an Amsterdam confectioner of having sold him two chests of defective Madeira sugar.<sup>25</sup>

Manuel López Pereira was still living in Amsterdam in July 1609 when he chartered a Dutch ship on behalf of a Lisbon merchant to deliver cargo in Portugal and return with figs to Holland.<sup>26</sup> But at some point between 1609 and 1612, probably quite soon after the signing of the Twelve Years' Truce, he moved to Antwerp where he now acted as the family's agent.<sup>27</sup> In August 1612, the widow of Garcia Pimentel, in Amsterdam, assigned to Manuel López Pereira, in Antwerp, 10,000 guilders out of the large sum of 30,750 guilders which came to her apparently from the fortune of Manuel Pimentel, the "king of gamblers".<sup>28</sup> It is not explained in the document why this large sum was paid over; but as Garcia Pimentel's widow seemingly refers to Manuel López Pereira as her "son-in-law", it may be that his first wife had died and that in choosing a second wife he had followed his brother's example and chosen a daughter of Garcia Pimentel; the money would then be the dowry. Alternatively, the money may have been Maria Pimentel's dowry and was simply being paid over from Antwerp, where it was deposited, to Antonio López Pereira by his brother.

Another key document of 1612 details something of the family's commercial organization following the death of Manuel's father, Gaspar Lopes Homem, in November 1612.<sup>29</sup> This deed indicates that his mother, Mayor Rodrigues, and his brothers, Antonio and Francisco López Pereira, all in Amsterdam, agreed to continue the procedures followed during their father's life-time in collaboration with Manuel Lopes Homem who is stated to have moved from Holland to Lisbon, and latterly to Seville, with Manuel López Pereira, in

<sup>22</sup> "Notarial records" nos. 152, 153, 188, 270.

<sup>23</sup> *Resolutiën der Staten-Generaal*, XIII (1604-1606) ed. H. H. P. Rijperman (The Hague, 1957) 226, 490, 494.

<sup>24</sup> "Notarial Records" no. 188

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.* no. 282.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.* no. 357.

<sup>27</sup> A certain "Emanuel Loupes" figures in the list of Antwerp Portuguese drawn up in 1611 but this may not have Manuel López Pereira, see I. S. Revah, "Pour l'histoire des Marranes à Anvers: recensements de la 'Nation Portugaise' de 1571 à 1666", *Revue des Etudes Juives*, CXXII (1963) 142.

<sup>28</sup> "Notarial records" no. 565.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.* no. 599.

Antwerp, and with Francisco Nunes Homem (later David Avendana), Manuel's cousin and brother-in-law, in Amsterdam. The name of the company was changed from "Gaspar and Manuel Lopes Homem" to the "Heirs of Gaspar Lopes Homem and Francisco Nunes Homem". The fact that Manuel Lopes Homem was now in Seville suggest that his beautiful wife, Maria Nunes, was there also, which, to say the least, would be highly ironic in view of the Sephardi legend centering on her religious constancy and highly intriguing as Seville was a city much frequented by the author of *la Española inglesa*.

For the next six or seven years Manuel López Pereira continued as the family's agent in Antwerp trading, we may surmise, more with Seville than with Lisbon. From an Amsterdam deed, dated 13 November 1617, we learn that Francisco López Pereira, "merchant in Amsterdam", owes "his brother Manoel Lopes Pereira, merchant in Antwerp", the sum of 1,500 pounds Flemish for cash raised by Manuel in payment of merchandise bought on credit by Francisco, in Amsterdam, and shipped to the latter's father-in-law, Manoel Pereira da Costa (alias Francisco Nunes d'Alcobaça), described as presently staying in Trujillo "in Andalusia".<sup>30</sup> Payment was due from Spain for nine consignments of goods which had been shipped to Málaga and San Sebastian, the arrangement being that the father-in-law would remit the cash to Manuel López Pereira in Antwerp. Antonio López Pereira, who owned shares in two or three ships, was also involved in Spanish trade and in February 1618 participated for one third share in a cargo of grain shipped to the family's agent in Málaga, a certain Simão Francisco, the return cargo to Amsterdam to consist of wine, almonds, raisins, and wool.<sup>31</sup> It is clear that the family were also dealing in products from the Spanish Indies for, in 1615, we find Manuel Lopes Homem, in Seville, taking out insurance on two Spanish ships due to sail back with cargo on his account from the Caribbean island of Puerto Rico.<sup>32</sup> Clearly one of the commodities on board were hides; for later that year we find Manuel López Pereira importing 800 West Indian hides to Antwerp.<sup>33</sup>

It seems from one source that Manuel López Pereira was in Seville in 1617.<sup>34</sup> If so, his stay there on that occasion was brief; for in an Amsterdam deed of August 1618 we read that Manuel López Pereira "has come from Antwerp to settle his affairs here".<sup>35</sup> This 1618 visit to Holland, however, did prelude his final departure from the Low Countries and permanent move to Spain. In, or around, 1619 he joined his cousin, Manuel Lopes Homem, in Seville. Although he did not stay long there, it is clear that whilst in Seville he continued in business as a merchant. Judging from two notarial deeds preserved in the Antwerp city archive, his activity during his initial period in Spain centered on importing costly wares from the Spanish Netherlands of a sort apt to be sold to a discriminating noble

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.* no. 1271; from the deeds no. 1197, we learn that in February 1614, Francisco Lopes Pereira (b. 1586) married Beatris Rodrigues, daughter of Francisco Nunes d'Alcobaça, paying 960 guilders to his mistress of many years standing, a Dutch woman named as "Grietgen" by whom he had two children.

<sup>31</sup> "Notarial records" no. 1342.

<sup>32</sup> Stols, *De Spaanse Brabanders* ii, 162-63.

<sup>33</sup> Hans Pohl, *Die Portugiesen in Antwerpen (1567-1648)* (Wiesbaden, 1977) 164.

<sup>34</sup> D'Ancona, "Komst der Marranen", 205.

<sup>35</sup> "Notarial records", nos. 1500, 1505, and 1516.



clientèle or else at court in Madrid. We hear, for instance, of a consignment of pearls sent out to him from Antwerp (presumably originating in the East Indies and brought back first to Amsterdam) and of a large tapestry, woven in, and sent out from, Antwerp, depicting a story from the life of the Roman general Scipio, decidedly the kind of thing to appeal to a man of Olivares' tastes.<sup>36</sup> From this evidence, it may not be too farfetched to infer that López Pereira gained his original entrée at court, either through Olivares himself or some other prominent figure, as a purveyor of jewellery and choice *objets* from the South Netherlands.

But however López Pereira gained his original introduction at court he was well established there by the summer of 1623 as an acknowledged expert on international trade in general and Low Countries commerce in particular. His initial batch of tracts seem to date from the year 1621 and in that year, or shortly after, he withdrew definitively from trade and devoted himself wholeheartedly to his new career as a proposer of economic projects, or *arbitrios*. By 1624, apparently, he had spent a lengthy period at Madrid without returning to Seville (where he had left his wife and children) and was allegedly subsisting at court in a state of "necesidad y empeño".<sup>37</sup> In view of the fact that he had previously been handling costly merchandise, and large sums of money, this may well indicate that his own business affairs had collapsed. Alternatively, or possibly additionally, it may also imply that, for whatever reason, he had broken off relations with his family.

The papers which López Pereira submitted at court in 1621 already reveal that preoccupation with a very wide range of economic issues characteristic of his later tracts of 1623-4. At this time, shortly after the setting up of the *Junta de Reformación*, in Madrid, a government committee charged with finding solutions for Spain's worsening economic problems, the Spanish court was being flooded with discourses on commercial and monetary matters and López Pereira clearly had to fight for attention through a veritable crowd of Castilian as well as would-be foreign *arbitristas*. His initial submissions discoursed on Spain's monetary problems,<sup>38</sup> on the question of foreign imports entering Spain,<sup>39</sup> and on the strategic question of how best to fight the Dutch "rebels" in the Netherlands. Many of his ideas were clearly not original and merely echoed what other and better known *arbitristas* had already written. Thus, his arguments in favour of stringent restrictions and prohibitions to curb the influx of foreign manufactures pouring into Spain were substantially the same as those of Pedro Hurtado de Alcozer and Sancho de

<sup>36</sup> Stadsarchief, Antwerpen, Notarial Archive no. 3619, fos. 132-132v and 489-489v; Pohl, *Portugiesen in Antwerpen*, 173, 188, 207.

<sup>37</sup> Again, I am indebted to Professor J. H. Elliott for this information.

<sup>38</sup> López Pereira's main submission in 1621 is the piece preserved in Archivo Histórico Nacional, Sección de Consejos, libro 1428, fos. 263-74; López Pereira's tract "Medio para la reduccion y consumo del vellon" in the Biblioteca Nacional (Madrid) MS. 6731. "Arbitrios sobre moneda" is undated but may also be one of the early pieces, from 1621; López Pereira's initial batch of tracts was discussed in a report from Juan de Hoces to the king, dated Madrid 17 November 1621 which is printed in Angel González Palencia (ed.), *La Junta de Reformación (1618-1625). Documentos procedentes del Archivo Histórico Nacional y del General de Simancas* (Valladolid, 1932) 162-66.

<sup>39</sup> See the report by Juan de Hoces, p. 166.

Moncada,<sup>40</sup> though given the crucial role of Dutch, Flemish, French and English textiles and other manufactures in undermining Spain's economic vitality at this time, this should not count as a criticism against him.<sup>41</sup> López Pereira's 1621 paper on the Low Countries' war argued that Spain should not try to resume a land offensive against the Dutch in the Low Countries but strive to weaken the "rebels" by means of naval and economic pressure alone. This argument had already been put forward by various writers.<sup>42</sup> Indeed, this was a point of view with a considerable following in Spain. Even so, López Pereira was judged to have argued the point in a way that had to be taken seriously "dando muchos y buenos fundamentos en su proposicion". But what chiefly caught the attention of Spanish ministers in López Pereira's initial batch of memoranda was the detailed knowledge he possessed of commerce and industry in the Low Countries and all aspects of Dutch economic activity in Spain and its empire. Thus, was "digna de ser leyda la proposicion del dicho Manuel López Pereyra, porque della se conoce el trato y estado de los Olandeses y quanto importa el impedilles por todas maneras la saca de plata destos reynos".<sup>43</sup> In 1621, the year in which Spain resumed her Eighty Years' War against the Dutch, this was precisely the aspect of matters which Philip IV's ministers were most preoccupied with.

López Pereira's tracts seem to have been esteemed, then, for the light they cast on Spain's highly problematic economic relationship with the Low Countries rather than for what they say on Spain's domestic economic difficulties, though of course in some respects the two things were inextricable. By 1623, López Pereira had graduated to the inner circle of favoured experts, mostly foreigners, who were assisting the newly instituted *Junta de Comercio*, under the chairmanship of the Marqués de Montesclaros, in its twin tasks of finding means to regenerate Spain's ailing economy and waging economic warfare against the Dutch.<sup>44</sup> He was now formulating proposals which were discussed amid great secrecy. The tracts which López Pereira submitted in 1623-4 include the paper on how to eradicate Dutch merchandise from Spain, published here for the first time as an appendix to this article, a discourse on the waging of maritime warfare against the Dutch from the Spanish Netherlands, a tract recommending the setting up of an East India Company in the Spanish Netherlands, presumably to be based at Antwerp, and another recommending the setting up of a joint stock company to take over the monopoly of Spain's trade with Spanish America, a company to be organized on the same lines as the Dutch colonial companies. Yet, while compiling these pieces, he continued writing other memoranda on Spanish domestic issues. At least two of these, a paper arguing in favour of *erarios*, public loan-banks on the model of the Italian *monti di pietà* which Olivares wanted to establish in Spain, and another on the inadvisability of the Cortes taxing bread and other basic food-stuffs were printed.<sup>45</sup>

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>41</sup> Jonathan I. Israel, *The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World, 1606-1661*, (Oxford, 1982) 54-5.

<sup>42</sup> See, for instance, the memorandum by Hurtuño de Urizar of 3 Feb. 1618 in Archivo General de Simancas (hereafter AGS) Estado 2847.

<sup>43</sup> See again the report by Juan de Hoces in González Palencia *op. cit.* p. 164.

<sup>44</sup> On the *Junta de comercio*, see Israel, *The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World*, 134-42.

<sup>45</sup> See Manuel López Pereira, *Papel referente a la institucion de erarios* (Madrid, 1623) in Biblioteca Nacional (Madrid) V.E. 211/18 and the tract on taxation by Manuel López Pereira in Biblioteca Nacional V.E. 211/19.

Of the (at least) four papers by López Pereira relating to Spain's programme of economic warfare against the United Provinces, the tract "Sobre arajar la entrada de las mercaderías de reveldes", of 1623, was possibly the earliest. It is also a good example of the intimate connection between certain key ideas formulated in López Pereira's tracts and the actual mercantilist schemes embarked upon by Olivares in the mid 1620s. But while López Pereira does clearly foreshadow what was to emerge as royal policy, it is extremely difficult to know how far he was actually influencing the proceedings and how far he was merely echoing and reiterating ideas which were already circulating among Philip's ministers and advisors. In this tract he explores ways of making the royal prohibition on the entry of Dutch manufactures more effective.<sup>46</sup> To stop up the loopholes, argues López Pereira, the crown must fix clearer criteria by which officials in the ports can identify and eradicate contraband goods where these were concealed among cargoes coming from neutral lands and disguised by false seals and papers. López Pereira then lists all the major manufactures imported into Spain from, in turn, Germany, the "rebel provinces" of the Netherlands, the "obedient provinces" (ie. the Spanish Netherlands), France, and England. The chief problem, he claimed, was that the main sea-ports of Flanders – Dunkirk and Ostend – were now blockaded by the Dutch navy so that most merchandise being sent from the Spanish Netherlands to Spain was having to be exported through the neighbouring French port of Calais.<sup>47</sup> This, he believed, was the root of the difficulties confronting the king's strategy. For there was much similarity between the manufactures produced in the two parts of the Netherlands so that it was possible to camouflage "Dutch" as "Flemish" products in a way that was not possible with manufactures from France and England. The Dutch would have no opportunity to mix their goods in with those of the South Netherlands were it still possible to ship merchandise direct from the Flemish sea-ports to Spain. But whilst this could only be done through Calais, the Dutch had the perfect opportunity to subvert Philip IV's ban. "To this port of Calais", wrote López Pereira, "the Dutch bring their manufactures and these then reach these realms mixed up with those produced in the obedient provinces".<sup>48</sup>

Apart from Flemish manufactures, maintained López Pereira, only linens and woollens from Germany could be confused with Dutch products, at any rate once a detailed list of types and categories was drawn up. So different were the manufactures of France and England from those of the Low Countries that there was little or no risk of seepage of contraband Dutch goods into Spain through either of those two countries. To prevent the penetration of Dutch manufactures into the Spanish realms, according to López Pereira, it sufficed to bring in new controls in Flanders and in North Germany. What the king had to do was forbid the importing to Spain of Flemish goods from any English or French port other than Calais; and stop the mixing in of Dutch with Flemish products at Calais by decreeing that, henceforward, all goods exported from the loyal Netherlands to Spain and

<sup>46</sup> See the text from the AGS Estado vol 2847 printed in the appendix below; on Philip IV's prohibition against Dutch goods and shipping, see Israel, *The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World*, 134-42.

<sup>47</sup> See *ibid.* pp. 87, 90; Stols, *Spaanse Brabanders* i, 13, 16, 24, 121.

<sup>48</sup> See p. 261.

Portugal would have to be registered by a specially appointed official who would remit the lists of registered exports separately to Spain, so that the goods could be checked off on arrival. Any supposedly "Flemish" goods which did not figure on the prepared lists in this way should be automatically subject to confiscation. Exactly the same should henceforward apply to any supposedly "German" linens or woollens shipped to Spain from either England or France. For any genuine manufactures of Germany would invariably be exported direct from Hamburg, Lübeck, or another Hanseatic port and not via England or France. Besides excluding Dutch goods from Spain more effectively, López Pereira pointed out that all this would serve to stimulate industrial activity in the Spanish Netherlands.

What is perhaps most significant about this tract is that it was precisely the thinking set out here which determined Olivares' decision to post special agents to register and control exports to Spain in Flanders and North Germany even though no such controls could be imposed in England or France.<sup>49</sup> Here we see a particularly close parallel between López Pereira's proposals and what was actually implemented by the crown. It is also significant that López Pereira states that even the flow of Flemish wares through Calais should only be tolerated by the king until the projected "Company" to handle Netherlands trade, with its heavily armed convoys sailing to Dunkirk, began to operate. Here López Pereira is referring to the so-called *Almirantazgo* which Philip IV set up a few months later and which was indeed intended to control and defend trade between Spain and Flanders by means of powerfully armed convoys.<sup>50</sup> López Pereira's reference to it in this tract may be evidence that he was one of the originators of the scheme which seems highly likely. At the very least, it shows that he was privy at an early stage to secret and highly important matters of state.

One further feature of this tract deserves mention. López Pereira asserts that there should be a total ban on the entry of English "black bays" into the Iberian Peninsula.<sup>51</sup> For while these draperies were woven in England, they were dyed and finished in Holland due to the fact that dyeing techniques were rather backward in England. Thus, this product was a partial Dutch manufacture and should be banned. The author did not expect that the English would take offense at such a ban as long as no hindrance was offered to the entry into the Peninsula of English "white", or undyed bays. These, he recommended, should henceforth be dyed in Seville where, according to him, there was already a dyeing industry expert enough to handle the task and which could be developed. It is striking that exactly the same point about English bays had already been made by the Marqués de Montesclaros

<sup>49</sup> Gabriel de Roy was appointed Spain's "Agent" in North Germany and eventually succeeded in the 1630s, with the aid of the Danish crown in imposing an elaborate system of certificates on all goods shipped between Germany and the Iberian Peninsula; on De Roy and the controls in Flanders, see Israel, *The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World*, 205, 207.

<sup>50</sup> On the *Almirantazgo*, see *ibid.* 204-13; Antonio Domínguez Ortiz, "Guerra económica y comercio extranjero en el reinado de Felipe IV", *Hispania*, xxiii (1963) 71-113.

<sup>51</sup> "Bays" were a light woollen cloth made chiefly in and around Colchester where there was a "Dutch Bay-hall"; the English is a rendering of the Dutch "baai", this cloth having originated in sixteenth-century Flanders.

himself in a *consulta* of October 1622.<sup>52</sup> This may mean that here López Pereira is merely reiterating ideas which had already been in circulation for some time among Philip's economic experts. On the other hand, it is clear that Montesclaros was not the originator of the idea for he says in the same *consulta* that he learnt about this matter whilst serving as the king's *assistente* in Seville. It is therefore just possible that Montesclaros originally conceived this idea from López Pereira whilst the latter was living in Seville. If so, this would suggest that López Pereira's first contact with the Spanish government came about through his meeting this well-connected nobleman in Seville.

López Pereira's other tracts dealing with aspects of the Dutch-Spanish economic conflict are also of considerable interest. His piece on the war at sea, discussed in the Council of State, in Madrid, in February 1624, is probably not one of the earliest statements of Spain's need to switch to a purely defensive strategy on land – the army was then bogged down before Breda – and to a much expanded effort at sea from Spain's ports in Flanders.<sup>53</sup> The council showed interest, though, in his idea, which does seem to have been new, that once Spain had a powerful enough fleet at Dunkirk, part of it could be used to ferry salt from Setúbal to Flanders where the salt could be exchanged for naval stores sent from the Hanseatic towns. This would, he pointed out, save the king from his present need to pay for expensive naval munitions in hard cash and would deal a heavy blow to the Dutch salt trade with northern Europe.

López Pereira's recommendation, along with that of Rétama, that an East India Company, with the right to trade with a large part of the Portuguese empire in Asia, should be set up in the South Netherlands was discussed by the *Junta de Comercio*, in Madrid, in March 1624.<sup>54</sup> The essence of López Pereira's idea here was that such a South Netherlands East India Company, backed by the commercial and distribution facilities of the Low Countries, authorised by the king to trade with parts of Asia from which the Dutch were excluded, would be bound to draw off capital from the Dutch East India Company, if it were advertised that Dutch investment would be accepted; and in this way the Portuguese "estado da India" would be revived from its present languishing state while the Dutch company would be substantially weakened. The *junta*, however, rejected the scheme on the grounds that it ran counter to the essential drift of the king's commercial strategy, which was to eradicate Dutch involvement from the Spanish and Portuguese colonial empires, not encourage it. The junta preferred a different scheme, for a new East India Company, to operate on a joint-stock basis, to be set up in Lisbon and this is what was eventually tried. Ministers also rejected López Pereira's scheme for a Spanish West India Company, to be modelled on the Dutch colonial companies, which he envisaged as having a joint starting capital of several million ducats and a board of thirty directors which would

<sup>52</sup> AGS Estado 2036. *Consulta* of the *Consejo de Estado*, 6 Oct. 1622, fo. 2.

<sup>53</sup> For this tract, see AGS Estado 2038 expediente no. 87; see also AGS Estado 2038 no. 86. *Consulta* of the *Consejo de Estado*, 8 Feb. 1624; on the shift in strategic thinking at Madrid in 1623–4, see Israel, *The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World*, 103–109.

<sup>54</sup> See AGS Estado 2847. Manuel López Pereira, "Sobre que se hagan Compañías de obedientes para contratar en la India oriental" and the *consulta* of the *Junta de Comercio* of 13 March 1624.

draw funds and goods for the Indies trade from the whole of Spain.<sup>55</sup> There was little desire, it would seem, to tamper with the existing system.

To conclude, it is evident that Manuel López Pereira, a former Jew of Amsterdam, succeeded in forging a successful and remarkable career at the court of Philip IV of Spain. While we do not know what considerations moved him to leave the Low Countries and settle permanently in Spain, his tracts suggest a deep-seated hostility to the Dutch Republic and a decided preference for Antwerp and the Spanish Netherlands. Although he had to conform outwardly to Catholicism in Antwerp and Spain, and in the latter country needed official protection from the Inquisition, there seem to be no indications at all in his tracts as to his religious attitudes and beliefs. The nature of his career at the Spanish court, and his rise to the *Consejo de Hacienda*, show that like the Pimentel family and other Portuguese Marrano lineages of his day, he must have had the refinement and manners normally associated with members of the nobility. Finally, it is clear that he was the most prolific, and one of the most influential, of the foreign advisors on trade whom Olivares gathered around him in the 1620s and that his tracts had an appreciable bearing on the conception and implementation of the Conde-Duque's mercantilist projects.

#### APPENDIX

"Sobre atajar la entrada de lass mercaderias de reueldes en estos reynos" (1623)<sup>56</sup>

Manuel Lopez Pereira en prosignicion de lo prometido dize que la maior fuerza de los reinos comsiste en el comun comercio de sus abitadores pues mediante su contratacion engruesan sus caudales y se acresientan los derechos de los prinsipes con que se hazen poderosos y ricos no solo para defenssa y comservacion de sus prouincias sino para ofenca de las contrarias de que tenemos espiriencia costosa en los paizes rebeldes que siendo su tierra tan limitada y breue se an echo poderosos y conquistadores por medio de sus frequentes contratos y negociaciones en todas las partes que se conosen y supuesto que en los prensipios se pudiera remediar este daño no permitiendo que supiesen otras que las destos reinos escuzandose las proibiciones pasadas, contodo oy estan tan adelante con las que tienen entabladas que combiene llevar otro asunto precurando enflaqueser sus fuerças minorandoles la parte que fuere posible de que resultara delibitar (*sic*) su poder y compelerles por nesesidad aprestar la obediencia a V.Magd. cuya es —

Los prensipales comercios que tienen los rebeldes son sinco el primero la negociacion de las partes setentrionales el seg<sup>do</sup> el de Levante, el tersero la sal que pertenden asentar en la

<sup>55</sup> AGS Estado 2847. "Manuel López Pereira dize que la esperiencia muestra que el comercio, negociacion y trato de las Yndias occidentales se va cada día deteriorando . . ."; and *ibid.* consulta of the *Junta de Comercio*, 16 March 1624.

<sup>56</sup> This text is to be found unpaginated in AGS Estado 2847; I would like to record my thanks to the archivists at Simancas for providing me with a photocopy of the complete text and for permission for it to be published as well as for copies of the other Manuel López Pereira tracts dealing with aspects of the Dutch-Spanish conflict.

punta de raia,<sup>a)</sup> el quarto la comp<sup>a</sup> de la Yndia oriental, el quinto las comrespondencias despaña. De los tres primeros se a tratado en papel y descuro que se a dado sobre la desposicion de la guerra que se deue hazer a los dhos rebeldes mostrandose como asistiendo la armada de galiones en los puertos de dunquerque, ostende y en el nuevo descubierto<sup>b)</sup> les inquietaran e infestaran todos sus puertos y ynpidiran la pesca de los arencones y demas negociaciones del septentrion; y como el nego de la punta de raia se enflaquesera y acabara con la sal que los galiones an de lleuar despaña a los dichos puertos para venderse por cuenta de V. Mag<sup>d</sup>, y que el de Levante lo aran con muy grande riesgo y costa respeto de que a la salida de sus yslas y pasar por el estrecho de gibraltar ande encontrar con dos armadas reales y los que se escaparen de la primera pereseran a manos de la segunda o por lo menos que daren tan detirioradas sus fuerças que no poderan consigr efecto considerable. Por manera que resta tratar del quarto comercio de la yndia oriental que tiene tratado particular a que se remite y del ultimo que son las comrespondencias despaña sobre que se dize lo siguiente.

El medio que se a tomado para quitarselas a sido la proibicion general echa contra los dichos rebeldes de que no entren ellos ni sus mercederías en los puertos despaña. Y como es notorio oy se allan en ellos mas generos suios que quando tenian premicion de meterlos de modo que manifestamente surte efecto de la dha proibicion y se el asunto es que no entren combiene se procure otros diuersos caminos enderesados al consecucion deste fin y para que se puedan dar los que combienen sera ness<sup>ro</sup> ante todas cosas mostrar por menor los prensipales generos que se labran en todos los paizes del norte y lo originarios de cada prouincia y los puertos que dellas mas frequentan la negociacion destos reinos para que com particular cuidado se venga en conosimiento de lo que se pertende que sera en esta forma —

Alemania — los puertos que de las prouincias de alemania mas frequentan la negociacion despaña son los de dansich, lubeck y amburgo y de todos ellos el prensipal es el de la siudad de amburgo por estar mas propinco a este mar oceano y porque abunda de cantidad de mercaderes ricos y poderosos que con sus comercios y entiligencias an traído a ella todas las manufacturas de las demas prouincias de alemania. De los dichos puertos lo prensipal que se trae de dansich y lubeck es el trigo y de amburgo vienen las manufacturas seg<sup>tes</sup> — la sera, cobre, azero de toda suerte, estulins, bocasies, lenseria por nombre aneage grega cruda y curada, pano de amburgo, mitones, fustanes, plomo, lino de toda suerte, coxillos que llaman carniseros, clavos de hierro, escritorios, y toda suerte de laton labrado y otras menudencias de poca ymportancia conossidas por manufacturas daquellas parttes de alemania.

Paizes rebeldes — de las dichas prouincias rebeldes los prensipales puertos que comerciavan con espana eran los de olanda y gelanda<sup>c)</sup> y antes de las guerras no tenian manufacturas de ymportancia lo prensipal en que se ocupavan eran en sus pescarias mateca

<sup>a</sup> That is, "Punta de Araya", the great salt-pan in the Caribbean on the coast of Venezuela.

<sup>b</sup> Presumably, López Pereira means Nieuwpoort.

<sup>c</sup> "Gelanda" was the usual Spanish form for Zeeland.

y quezos tambien fabricavan algunas olandas<sup>d</sup>) en leiden sarges que llaman dallave y com ello venian a estos reinos traiendo juntamente el trigo cobre y sera que adquerian de alemania. Despues de las dhas gerras se les passaron muchas naciones con las quales yntroduzieron todas las manifeturas y generos de las prouincias de alemania y otros reinos que lo an senttido arto en sus comrespondencias. Labran oy los dichos rebeldes las olandas cambrai, telillas de toda suerte, tapesarias, sarges de leiden, sarges de senoria, catalufas<sup>e</sup>) de lana, telas de lino y algodón mesclado, picotes<sup>f</sup>) de lana, selicios<sup>g</sup>), transaderas<sup>h</sup>), puntas blancas y de colores, panos que llaman gingaos, poluos asules, terciopelos<sup>i</sup>) de seda y contraechos de tripa, medias de lana, hilo de toda suerte y colores, bomasines,<sup>j</sup>) y otros generos de poca ymportancia. Demas de los referidos traen a estos reinos todos los generos de amburgo y las baetas de ymgalaterra que llevan a teñir en sus prouincias por que no es buena la tinta negra del dicho reino. Tambien meten las espesiaras y panos de algodón que traen de la yndia oriental de modo que todo las dichas manifeturas e generos se an de proibir que no entren en estos reinos como se dira adelante –

Paizes obedientes – los puertos de los paizes obedientes que negocian con espana es el de dunquerque y ostende que oy estan serrados y se paso el comercio a cales de francia que es el mas propinco a los dichos paizes obedientes, en los quales se fabrican todos los dichos generos que vienen de los rebeldes y son tan paresidos unos a otros que defecultosamente se pueden destingir. A este puerto de Cales como tambien les hes propicio a los rebeldes p la paz que tienen con el rey cristianisimo traen sus manifeturas y vienen a estos reinos mesclados con las fabricadas en los estados obedientes con que les hes muy facil transportarlas a ellos para cuyo remedio se apuntara lo nesso<sup>io</sup>.

Reino de francia – los puertos de francia mas ymportantes que tienen conrespondencia con estos reinos son el de cales referido, ruan, samalo, nantes, bordeaux, rochela y san yuan da luz y por todos estos precuran meter los olandeses sus manifeturas y el prensipal por donde entra mas cantidad es el de san yuan da luz q como comfina con espana las meten p tierra con mucha facilidad. Son los ruendes,<sup>k</sup>) creas nabales,<sup>l</sup>) bramantes,<sup>m</sup>) bunes lanas, puntas y otros generos de lemseria conosidos p daquel reino de francia.

<sup>d</sup> “holanda” is given in the eighteenth-century *Diccionario de Autoridades* of the Real Academia Española (reprinted in 3 vols Madrid, 1969) as a “tela de lienzo mui fina”; see also J. Corominas, *Diccionario crítico de la lengua castellana* (4 vols. Madrid, 1954) which likewise gives “holanda” as a “lienzo fino”.

<sup>e</sup> Term deriving from the Italian *cataluffa* denoting a woollen cloth worked to resemble plush or velvet which was originally manufactured in Venice.

<sup>f</sup> According to Corominas, *picote* (from the French *picot*) was a “tela aspera y basta probablemente derivado de picar porque es tan aspera que pica al tocarla”.

<sup>g</sup> “selicios”, presumably *cilicio* given in the *Diccionario de Autoridades* as a “vestidura corta, texida de cerda, por cuya aspereza la usan immediate al cuerpo las personas penitentes”.

<sup>h</sup> That is *tranzadera* given in the *Diccionario de Autoridades* as a “lazo que se forma trenzando alguna cuerda.

<sup>i</sup> “terciopelos”: Martín Alonso, in his *Enciclopedia del Idioma* (3 vols. Madrid. 1958) gives *terciopelo* as “tela velluda y tupida de seda, formada por dos urdimbres y una trama” and also imitations made from inferior materials.

<sup>j</sup> “Bombasines”: a type of silk cloth of Italian origin.

<sup>k</sup> “Ruanes”: Normandy linens.

<sup>l</sup> That is, naval canvas.

<sup>m</sup> Corominas gives *bramante* as an alternative to *brabante* or “clase de lienzo fabricado en dicha provincia”.



Reino de Ymgalaterra — los puertos que negocian deste reino de Ymgalaterra con estos reinos el prensipal es el de la suidad de londres. Por este entra tambien mucha cantidad de manifeturas de los rebeldes, las originarias que se fabrican en el son las baetas<sup>n)</sup> blancas, cariseas,<sup>o)</sup> toda suerte de prepetuanes,<sup>p)</sup> arges ympriales,<sup>q)</sup> panos de londres, panos de bristol, panos redin,<sup>r)</sup> panos sofocas,<sup>s)</sup> cordelates,<sup>t)</sup> baetas angostas de colores, tamaletes, bresuates, frisas, medias de lana, estaño, todas mercaderias conosidas por daquel reino.

Por manera que conforme a los generos de cada prouincia solamente los que vienen de amburgo y los que se fabrican en los paizes obedientes pueden uenir de los rebeldes y traer las armas y sertificaciones de que son echos y fabricados en las dichas partes por que como se a mostrado los de francia y ynglaterra no tienen semilitud con los demas y son buen conosidos y para que se pueda aplicar el remedio que combiene e evitar en gran p<sup>te</sup> los enganos y motious que por este camino hazen los rebeldes para meter en estos reinos sus manifeturas se a de mandar publicar lo siguiente — que ningunas de las manifeturas de amburgo aunque traigan las armas de la dicha suidad puedan uenir a espana por via de francia y inglaterra sino derechoamente y que las que vinieren por sy solas o mezcladas con las demas manifeturas de los dichos reinos sean confiscadas por que es indubitable q todas las dichas manifeturas de amburgo y alemania que uienen p las uias referidas son de olandezes o compradas en los dichos paizes rebeldes y se uerifica esta uerdad con que se fueran pertenecientes a los moradores de amburgo o compratas en la dicha suidad no las nauegaran por las dichos reinos sino derechoamente en sus naos pues las tienen en abundancia y con mas comodidad y menos costa podrian uenir en ellas.

Juntamente se a de publicar que ningunas de las manifeturas de los paizes obedientes puedan uenir por ningun puerto de ynglaterra ni francia saluo por el de cales asta se entable lo prepuesto sobre la armada que a de asestir en los puertos referidos que estandolo se escuzara pues uendran por ellos. Y esto p respecto de que todas las que vienen por fuera del dicho puerto de cales son echas em los paizes rebeldes los quales las meten en estos reinos por las dichas uias de francia y imgalaterra con nombre de fabricadas en los obedientes y por que se podrian ayuntar en este puertto de cales las mercaderias de los rebeldes como esta referido y demesclearsse unas con otras aueria confucion por la similitud omnimoda que entre sy tienen se mandara que sean obligados los mercaderes de los paizes obedientes a traer sertificacion de los cabildos y regimientos de las uillas donde

<sup>n</sup> The Spanish *bayeta* presumably derives from the French *baiette* but it is used in the seventeenth century to refer to English “bays”.

<sup>o</sup> *Cariseas*: this is the Spanish for the English *kerseys*, a type of “new drapery” the name for which seemingly derives from the village of Kersey in Suffolk.

<sup>p</sup> The *Oxford English Dictionary* gives *perpetuana* as a “durable, wool fabric manufactured in England since the sixteenth century”.

<sup>q</sup> According to the *Diccionario de Autoridades* “hai sarga imperial y de Ingleterra, cuyos apellidos toman de la parte de donde vienen” but this would not seem to fit in this instance.

<sup>r</sup> Presumably “cloth of Reading”.

<sup>s</sup> *Panos sofocas*: that is cloth of Suffolk.

<sup>t</sup> *Cordellate*: the *Diccionario de Autoridades* describes this as a “cierto genero de paño delgado como estamena. Llamose assi por el cordoncillo que hace la trama.

se labran y de la cantidad que cada persona manifesta y con la dicha certification se otorge reguistro en el puerto de cales o en la parte que paresiere mejor serca del dicho puerto que como sea placa de los paizes obedientes y p donde an de pasar las dichas mercaderias bastara de modo que en qualquiera de las dichas p<sup>tes</sup> a de assestir una persona comfidente nombrada p su alteza en bruselas que tome relacion del reguistro y sertificaciones y las remita por tierra y mar a los administradores de las aduanas de los puertos donde hizieren los navios su derecha descarga de que resultara cobrar por imtero U Magd sus derechos reales y sera de gran comodidad y vtilidad a los obedientes por que ellos solos vendran a estos reinos con sus mercaderias y enriqueseran y podran mayor seruir a U Magd y auiedo mal despacho y salida de las manifeturas de los rebeldes todos los oficiales y manifetores se ausentaran de los dichos estados y se pasaran a los obedientes com que se hiran acabando sus fuerças.

Y para que esto se execute en las aduanas se dara memoria a los administradores de las de mar y tierra destos reinos de los generos de los estados rebeldes para que uesiten y abran todas las pacas de mercaderias de los reinos referidos y allando en ella algunos de los dichos generos de los rebeldes los tomen por perdidos sin despensacion alguna aunque traigan certification de que son labrados en los obedientes y en amburgo y asymismo que tomen por perdidos todos los demas que vinieren enpacados con ellos.

Y por que las baetas blancas se fabrican en yngalaterra y com queda dicho se transporten a olanda para se tenir de negro y vienen por el dicho reino se a de publicar que no puedan entrar en estos reinos baetas negras y que todas las que vinieren aunque traigan sertificacion de que son tenidas en yngalaterra seran confiscadas por que se suelen dar alli y entran muchos p el dicho respecto y pues a los moradores del dicho reino se les permite que puedan traer las dichas baetas blancas no se les haze agrauio y aqua se podran tenir (como se haze en Sevilla) y se entrodוזiran las tinturas caso bien importante por muchos respectos q se dexan bien considerar.

Asymismo se mande que todos los generos de drogas y paños de la yndia oriental que se truxeren de las partes del septentrion se tomen por perdidos por ser daquela conquista y pertenecientes a esta corona con que se escuzaran las grandes cantidades que los olandezes y inglezes meten en estos reinos que es causa de sustentar los dhos comercios.

Y para que se pueda com distincion poner en efecto todo lo referido se mandara despachar todas las pacas y mercaderias que ubiere en las pacas aduanas y vinieren a ellas tres meses despues de la publicacion deste bando y proibicion y no alegen ynorancia ni se mesclen las mercaderias antiguas con las proibidas de nueuo.

Y que en las aduanas aja aposentos separados donde se pongan y guarden las mercaderias que entraren de cada uno de los dhos reinos para que com mas facilidad a la vista se conosquan los generos de primicion o priobidos y tambien sera de comsideracion que se tenga cuenta con lo que entra de cada prouincia y de lo que sale p<sup>a</sup> cada una dellas por cargo y descargo que es de muy gran consideracion sabersse para todas ocasiones y p<sup>a</sup> otras dependencias de materia destado que pueden suseder.

Y aunque paresse que conforme lo apuntado se podra consigir y danar en gran parte los negocios y tratos de los abitantes de los dichos paizes rebeldes por que se les quita las ocasiones y motiuos que tomauan para negociar en estos reinos se aduierte que todo comsiste en poner en las aduanas personas de buena comsiencia y berdad por que poco

aprovecha preuenir si la que lo a de executar no mira a otra cossa que a su prouecho particular de que se verna<sup>u)</sup> asegir que en lugar de se proibir lo que se pertende recambiara todo en benefo de los comtrarios que sin pagar derechos metran sus mercaderias y haran maiores ganancias como sosedia en tienpo de los 30 p 100 que ni pagauan el dicho derecho ni los demas.

Y porque podra ser que no se pueda remediar este incobeniente paresse que auiendose de segir sera menor premetir que puedan entrar libremente en sus proprias naos y p<sup>a</sup> que no paressea que sera hir contra la reputacion y mostrar flaqueza, consentiendolo, se proponderan medios con que, haziendose, se remedie y alcanse muy maiores vtilidades que ueniendo las dichas manifeturas de los rebeldes como oy vienen sin se poder remediar con lo apuntado en este papel.

<sup>u</sup> “Se verna”: a colloquialism for “se vendra”.

## OLIVARES AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE SPANISH INDIES, 1621-1643

It is striking that a good deal of recent comment about the life and achievements of the Conde Duque de Olivares, stimulated by the publication of John Elliott's masterly and imposing volume *The Count-Duke of Olivares*, has tended to emphasize the great Spanish statesman's limitations and failures. Several of the reviewers have taken the opportunity to underline what they regard as Olivares' basic lack of originality and his general ineffectiveness. What after all was the lasting impact of his policies? The view is rapidly gaining currency that not only did Olivares' policies for Spain and its empire not differ markedly from those of earlier Spanish statesmen but that by and large the results of his manifold endeavours were both few and modest. 'As a reformer', one of the most authoritative of the reviewers summed it up, 'Olivares was a failure'.<sup>1</sup> Yet before such conclusions – which John Elliott himself was reluctant to draw – harden into a new orthodoxy, it is necessary to ask whether the Conde Duque's impact has really yet been sufficiently explored. Olivares being a herculean figure at the helm of a world empire, facing problems and involved in initiatives which spanned the globe, it is not to be expected that any single volume should enter in detail into all of his vast concerns and we must establish whether those dimensions of his activity which have hitherto not received as much attention as they might possibly deserve, do not yield evidence for very different conclusions. Certainly one aspect of the Conde Duque's statecraft which scarcely figures in recent work (and still less in the reviews of John Elliott's masterpiece) but which, at least in my view, is of far-reaching importance is Olivares' enduring preoccupation with Spain's American possessions. For not only did Spanish America furnish an appreciable proportion of the resources on which the Monarchy's continued greatness and Olivares' European initiatives depended but Spain's American dependencies were also directly enmeshed in the political and military conflicts which resulted from his European statecraft.

<sup>1</sup> See I.A.A. Thompson's thought-provoking review in the *English Historical Review* ciii (1988), 680.

In contrast to the extensive coverage given to most aspects of Olivares' political activity, John Elliott, in his *Count-Duke of Olivares* says relatively little about his involvement with Spanish America. Almost the only component of Olivares' work which is presented as having had major consequences for the Americas is his 'Union of Arms' project for the Monarchy, and even here the New World aspect is dealt with only very cursorily.<sup>2</sup> Elsewhere John Elliott has shown that the 'Union of Arms' episode was not the only occasion during the Olivares era for the introduction of major new fiscal initiatives in the Spanish New World.<sup>3</sup> But this wider phenomenon needs to be looked at more closely and, above all, placed in the broader context of the Conde Duque's overall impact on the Spanish Indies.

Historians have tended to assume that Olivares did not personally supervise or concern himself with the government of the Spanish New World. Describing Olivares' appointment as Grand Chancellor of the Indies, in July 1623, John Elliott considers the post essentially a perquisite, an honour bestowed out of regard for achievements unconnected with the government of the Spanish Indies: 'although the Grand Chancellorship carried with it a seat in the Council of the Indies', he writes, Olivares, 'does not seem to have attended its sessions and there is no sign in his surviving papers of personal intervention in the government of the American viceroalties'.<sup>4</sup> The impression given is that the government of the Spanish Indies was left 'on automatic' during the Olivares era and remained largely outside the scope of the Conde Duque's great initiatives.

In what follows the reader will encounter a very different view, one already largely formed in the late 1960s whilst I was researching for my book on seventeenth-century New Spain,<sup>5</sup> a view according to which Olivares inspired and actively promoted a whole set of wide-ranging, interlocking policies which fundamentally influenced the general development of the Spanish New World not only during the quarter of a century or so following 1621 but also for decades after. In some instances, these policies amounted to a basic change of direction. In others Spain's post-1621 initiatives in the New World can rightly be

<sup>2</sup> J.H. Elliott, *The Count-Duke of Olivares. The Statesman in an Age of Decline* (New Haven, 1986), 274.

<sup>3</sup> J.H. Elliott, 'Spain and America in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries', in Leslie Bethell (ed.) *The Cambridge History of Latin America*, vol. 1 (Cambridge, 1984), 330, 332; J.H. Elliott, 'América y el problema de la decadencia española', *Anuario de Estudios Americanos* xxviii (1971), 1-23; see also Antonio Domínguez Ortiz, 'Los caudales de Indias y la política exterior de Felipe 'IV'', *Anuario de Estudios Americanos* xiii (1956), 318-21, 378-9.

<sup>4</sup> Elliott, *The Count-Duke of Olivares*, 156.

<sup>5</sup> J.I. Israel, *Race, Class and Politics in Colonial Mexico 1610-1670* (Oxford, 1975), 135-6 *et seq.*

classified as a continuation of the traditions of previous Spanish government in America. But even in the latter case they were adopted with a determination and in a concerted way which were essentially new. Nor were these wide-ranging, New World initiatives incidental to the Conde Duque's principal goals in Europe. Rather, his American policies, for that is what they were, sprang directly from, and were closely connected with, his main undertakings in Spain and Europe.

Firstly there was the sustained fiscal drive. This had no parallel in intensity or scope in any other period of the history of Spanish America under the Habsburgs. It did have its parallel though in the simultaneous fiscal programmes initiated by the Olivares regime in Castile and also in southern Italy and the Spanish Netherlands.<sup>6</sup> This tax push in the Spanish New World commenced not with the 'Union of Arms' project, in the late 1620s, but with the accession of Philip IV, in April 1621, and arose in the first instance from the resumption of war with the Dutch. Within days of the accession of the new king, a new viceroy being needed for New Spain, the marqués de Gelves, who had proved himself energetic and unyielding in the king's interest as viceroy of Aragon, was appointed to the post. On arriving in Mexico, in the autumn, he set in motion a vigorous campaign of revising tax registers and cracking down on administrative inefficiency and abuse.<sup>7</sup> No less promptly a special 'visitor-general' armed with sweeping powers, was dispatched to Peru to spur the new viceroy there on to comparable measures.<sup>8</sup> The fruit of these efforts in the early 1620s was a sudden and spectacular jump in silver remittances to the crown not only from New Spain and Peru, though these territories continued to provide the great bulk of the resources which the Spanish crown extracted from its New World possessions, but also from New Granada, Central America, Buenos Aires and the islands of the Caribbean.<sup>9</sup> In Peru the trend in remittances to Spain during the six years down to 1621 had been downwards and by 1620 the annual total had sunk below one million pesos. But by 1622 Peru's annual remittance had recovered to 1,180,000 pesos and by 1623 to 1,760,000, in subsequent years the figure climbing still higher. In both Peru and Mexico much of the new money was obtained by revising the *alcabala* assessments, some of the increases being quite hefty. Gelves, for

<sup>6</sup> Elliott, *The Count-Duke of Olivares*, 415, 438, 447; J.I. Israel, *The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World* (Oxford, 1982) 222, 297.

<sup>7</sup> Israel, *Race, Class, and Politics in Colonial Mexico*, 138

<sup>8</sup> M.E. Rodríguez Vincente, *El tribunal del Consulado de Lima en la primera mitad del siglo XVII* (Madrid, 1960), 178; F. Muro Romero, 'La reforma del pacto colonial en Indias', *Jahrbuch für Geschichte von Staat, Wirtschaft, und Gesellschaft Lateinamerikas* xix (1982), 54-7.

<sup>9</sup> Domínguez Ortiz, 'Caudales de Indias', 378-9; J.B. Ruiz Rivera, 'Remesas de caudales del Nuevo Reino de Granada en el siglo XVII', *Anuario de Estudios Americanos* xxiv (1977) 13, 30.

instance, raised the assessment for Zacatecas in 1622 from four to nine thousand pesos yearly.

The 'Union of Arms' did, however, mark the onset of a new phase in the build-up of fiscal pressure in the Spanish New World during the Olivares era. The 'Union' was Olivares' own personal project and, following his partial success with it in Aragon and Valencia in 1626, he was no more likely to neglect its extension to Spanish America than to the Italian possessions and the 'loyal' Netherlands. It may have been the Council of the Indies which issued the instructions to the American viceroys and governors requiring the imposition of new packages of taxation sufficient to reap a further 350,000 ducats yearly from the viceroyalty of Peru, including small amounts from New Granada, Chile and Buenos Aires, and 250,000 ducats more yearly from New Spain and Central America.<sup>10</sup> But the Council was merely following orders from above and the policy which it sought to implement was that of the Conde Duque. It was not the Council which selected new viceroys and governors and the fact that the new viceroy chosen in 1627 to impose the 'Union' in Peru was none other than the conde de Chinchón who the year before had worked with Olivares, as treasurer-general of the crown of Aragon in securing the adoption of the 'Union' in Aragon and Valencia speaks for itself.<sup>11</sup> It is clear enough from where the introduction of the 'Union of Arms' into the Spanish Indies derived its essential impetus.

The new taxation raised under the terms of the 'Union of Arms' was, by definition, required for purposes of imperial defence. It was decided in Madrid that the money should be used to pay for new fighting galleons in part for the main Spanish battle fleet, the *armada del mar océano*, based at Cadiz, and in part for the trans-Atlantic flotas which sailed out to the New World each year and then back carrying the licensed, official trade. Both fleets had now to be strengthened as a result of the increasing Dutch challenge to Spanish sea-power, to protect the sea-lanes and trade and to bolster confidence among the merchants and financiers of Seville and Madrid.

The introduction of the 'Union of Arms' into the Spanish New World required a major further administrative effort. It was not enough just to send detailed instructions explaining the purpose of the scheme and the general lines of the fiscal strategy to be adopted both in Mexico and Peru and in the various outlying areas – New Granada, Venezuela, Buenos

<sup>10</sup> J.L. Muquiz de Miguel, *El conde de Chinchón. Virrey del Peru* (Madrid, 1945), 127-8; R. Vargas Ugarte, *Historia del Peru. Virreinato (Siglo XVII)* (Buenos Aires, 1954), 224-8; Israel, *Race, Class and Politics in Colonial Mexico*, 178-80.

<sup>11</sup> Fred Bronner, 'La Unión de las Armas en el Peru', *Anuario de Estudios Americanos* xxiv (1967), 1133-40.

Aires and Central America.<sup>12</sup> The viceroys and governors had to be galvanized into action and there was opposition from the 'Spanish' town councils of the New World to be overcome. Gelves' successor as viceroy of New Spain, the marqués de Cerralvo had to engage in a good deal of arm-twisting before Mexico City and Puebla de los Angeles, the second city of New Spain, agreed to accept a doubling of the rate at which *alcabala* was assessed from 2% to 4% from 1632.<sup>13</sup> It was estimated that this would raise 200,000 ducats yearly. The remaining 50,000 ducats yearly was to be found through a combination of new excises. In Peru the strategy adopted was broadly similar, the *alcabala* rate being raised there also to 4% as from 1632. Among the new excises introduced in the Spanish New World during the early and mid 1630s were several of the new devices which Olivares imposed on Castile with the object of extracting more from those who could afford to pay whilst not increasing further the burden on the poorer sections of society, notably the tax on the proceeds of office-holding, the *media anata*, and *papel sellado* (stamp duty), the duty on legal transactions.<sup>14</sup>

The final phase of the Olivarist fiscal drive in the Spanish Indies, that of the late 1630s, was the result of the decision taken at Madrid to set up a permanent standing naval force stationed in the Caribbean to be called the *armada de Barlovento*. The idea as such had been in the air since the beginning of the century. But it was only following the Dutch occupation of Curaçao (1634) and the entry of France into the war against Spain (1635) that the political will and resources were found to turn the concept into reality. The impetus for this derived not from the Council of the Indies but from the highest level, in effect from Olivares who on occasion personally chaired the *junta de guerra de Indias* as the special committee for determining Spain's general strategy in the Indies was called. The Council of the Indies was directed to find 500,000 pesos yearly in New Spain, Central America and the Spanish islands of the Caribbean and determine the arrangements and bases for the building, arming and maintenance of fourteen heavy galleons.<sup>15</sup> Obviously most of the money for this would have to come from New Spain. But the crown was also quite serious about raising smaller sums in New

<sup>12</sup> Archivo General de Indias (hereafter AGI), Audiencia de Santa Fé, ramo 3. Philip IV to Don Juan de Borja, president of the Audiencia of New Granada at Bogotá, Madrid, 17 July 1627; Muzquiz de Miguel, *Conde de Chinchón*, 128.

<sup>13</sup> R. Torres Gaytán (ed.) *Documentos relativos al arrendamiento del impuesto o renta de alcabala de la ciudad de México y distritos circundantes* (Mexico City, 1945), p. iv; M. Gáñes Trellez, 'Aspectos socio-económicos de Puebla de los Angeles (1624-1650)', *Anuario de Estudios Americanos* xl (1983), 109.

<sup>14</sup> Rodríguez Vincente, *El tribunal del Consulado de Lima*, 180; Vargas Ugarte, *Historia del Perú*, 224-9.

<sup>15</sup> Israel, *Race, Class and Politics*, 193-8.



Granada, Cuba, and Santo Domingo.<sup>16</sup> The inevitable opposition of the *cabildos* of Mexico City and Puebla de los Angeles was overcome with the usual mixture of coaxing and menaces. It was promised that not only would the armada be largely manned and supplied from New Spain but that a proportion of its officers would be Mexican Creoles. To find the money, New Spain was forced to swallow a further rise of 2% in the rate at which *alcabala* was assessed. Puebla's assessment having been raised in 1632 from 25,000 to 50,000 pesos was now raised to the astronomic level of 75,000 pesos.<sup>17</sup>

A dramatic further escalation of fiscal pressure in Mexico in the late 1630s was achieved in theory but not in practice.<sup>18</sup> The drive to raise this additional revenue was undermined by the economic depression which had gripped Mexico ever since the war with the Dutch, and the rises in royal revenue, had begun, in 1621. However, elsewhere in the Spanish Indies the increase both in revenue and in remittances to Spain was sustained right down to the end of the Olivares era. Despite the decline in silver production in Peru, the viceregal administration at Lima sent back larger and larger annual remittances to Spain, reaching a peak of 2,600,000 pesos in 1642.<sup>19</sup> In New Granada also a steady increase in remittances to Spain was sustained down to the early 1640s.<sup>20</sup>

Closely linked to the sustained fiscal drive was the Olivares regime's assault on administrative corruption and abuse. During the reign of Philip III (1598-1621) supervision of the administration in the Spanish New World from Madrid had been lax and maladministration in Spanish America was widely held to have grown to unprecedented levels.<sup>21</sup> Confronting a not dissimilar challenge in Castile itself, Zúñiga, Olivares and their adherents set out to attack the problem head on and 'create the impression of purification and renewal'.<sup>22</sup> It is true that the moralistic fervour of the opening years of Philip IV's reign did not last. Nevertheless something of the initial reforming zeal did persist in Spain and the Spanish Netherlands down to the end of the Olivares era. Historians might be tempted to dismiss Gelves' puritanical drive as an

<sup>16</sup> AGI Audiencia de México, legajo 31, ramo 4. Marqués de Cadereita to Council of the Indies, Mexico City, 16 July 1636.

<sup>17</sup> Gantes Trellez, 'Aspectos socio-económicos de Puebla', 110-12.

<sup>18</sup> G. García (ed.), *Documentos inéditos o muy raros para la historia de México* (36 vols. Mexico City, 1905-11) vii, 42-4; R. Boyer, 'Mexico in the Seventeenth Century: Transition of a Colonial Society', *Hispanic American Historical Review* lvii (1977), 476; J.I. Israel, 'The Seventeenth-century Crisis in New Spain: Myth or Reality?', *Past and Present* xcvi (November 1982), 153.

<sup>19</sup> C. Bancora, 'Las remesas de metales preciosas desde Callao a España en la primera mitad del siglo XVII', *Revista de Indias* xix (1959), 69-70.

<sup>20</sup> Ruiz Rivera, 'Remesas', 13.

<sup>21</sup> AGI Audiencia de México, legajo 29, ramo 4. Marqués de Gelves to Council of the Indies, Mexico City, 14 November 1621; Israel, *Race, Class and Politics*, 35-6.

<sup>22</sup> Elliott, *The Count-Duke of Olivares*, 103-15.

exception altogether untypical of Spanish American administration in the age of Olivares. But in my view it is more convincing to see it as part, albeit an extreme instance, of a wider reform programme inspired from Madrid and affecting more or less the whole of the Spanish Indies. Given that so much depended on the success of the crown's efforts to boost its American revenues, there is no reason to suppose that the crown was less serious about tackling maladministration in America than it was in Castile or the Spanish Netherlands.

The method which the crown, through the Council of the Indies, employed to tighten its grip on Spanish America administratively as well as militarily in the wake of the resumption of global war with the Dutch, in 1621, was to fill key posts in the Indies with highly experienced soldiers characterised by a high sense of responsibility. Clearly there was a conscious effort to find such men. The first governor of Buenos Aires appointed under the new regime, Don Francisco de Cespedes (1623-31) was a Flanders veteran who significantly strengthened the defences and launched an energetic crack-down on bureaucratic speculation and customs fraud.<sup>23</sup> His successor, Pedro Esteban Dávila, also a Flanders veteran, showed similar vigour both as a soldier and as a reformer earning the unusual reputation of being 'incorruptible'. To help raise the general level, the Council of the Indies over the next two decades sent a succession of *visitadores* to investigate and suppress maladministration, especially practices apt to syphon off resources from government coffers.<sup>24</sup> One of these *visitadores*, Don Pedro de Quiroga, expired of fever whilst investigating bureaucratic fraud at Acapulco in 1637. The most famous was Don Juan de Palafox who was sent to New Spain as *visitador general*, armed with sweeping powers to initiate reform in every sphere of Mexican administration, in 1640.<sup>25</sup> It is worth noting that Palafox was a highly ideological, as well as fervent, moralist who saw himself as an anti-*politique* political philosopher as well as man of action, with a mission to refute Machiavelli and Bodin and forge a truly Catholic philosophy of *raison d'état* based on the idea that moral reform is the key to political efficacy.<sup>26</sup> Palafox, furthermore, was unquestionably an Olivares man. An Aragonese who first showed his zeal for royal service in Olivares' presence at the Aragonese Cortes of 1626, he had been summoned to Madrid, and advanced to a seat on the Council of the Indies, by the conde Duque and the latter's brother-in-law, the Conde de Monterrey.<sup>27</sup> An Aragonese, a puritan, and an expert on the government

<sup>23</sup> R. Tiscornia, *La política económica rioplatense a mediados del siglo XVIII* (Buenos Aires, 1983), 23-4, 30-1, 37-8.

<sup>24</sup> Israel, *Race, Class and Politics*, 170-6, 191-3, 200-1.

<sup>25</sup> Israel, *Race, Class and Politics*, 170-6, 191-3, 200-1.

<sup>26</sup> F. Sánchez-Castañer, *Don Juan de Palafox. Virrey de Nueva España* (Zaragoza, 1964), 20-2.

<sup>27</sup> Juan de Palafox y Mendoza, *Obras* (12 vols. Madrid, 1762) i, 293.

of the Indies, Palafox was an exceptionally highly motivated personality dedicated to the moral and political regeneration of the Monarchy.

The fiscal and reform programmes were designed to extract more resources for the crown. Both were bound to provide opposition just as they did in the Spanish Netherlands and Spain's other European possessions. Olivares knew this and had little choice but to concern himself with the obstruction and resistance to the American policies which arose from his European statecraft. Broad issues affecting the Monarchy as a whole were involved which could not simply be delegated to the bureaucrats of the Council of the Indies. Gelves' reforms in Mexico precipitated a storm of opposition, culminating in the riots in Mexico City of 15 January 1624 when the mob stormed the viceregal palace and overthrew the viceroy.<sup>28</sup> This was a setback with wide and menacing implications, an example which the crown could not afford to allow to be set. The news provoked consternation at Madrid. When Gelves' principal adversary, Archbishop Pérez de la Serna, returned to Spain to try to justify his own opposition, and that of the judges of the *audiencia* of Mexico, he was conveyed directly to the Conde Duque who questioned him at considerable length on what had transpired, carefully dissimulating his own opinion of the archbishop's role.<sup>29</sup> The Conde Duque also pondered long and hard before choosing as successor to Gelves a man who had recently proven his competence and astuteness implementing the royal embargo against the Dutch in the realm of Galicia, the marqués de Cerralvo. Cerralvo succeeded in restoring quiet in New Spain. But much of the previous tension remained and Olivares continued to keep an eye on what potentially was a troublesome situation. His worries over the continued rumblings in Mexico are reflected in the *voto* which he delivered to the *junta de estado* in Madrid in February 1631, following reports of a worsening of the feud which had developed between Cerralvo and the new archbishop of Mexico, Francisco de Manso y Zúñiga. Olivares urged the junta that the principles of *buen gobierno* required the immediate removal of Archbishop Manso from New Spain irrespective of whether it was he or the viceroy who was at fault over the jurisdictional issues under dispute.<sup>30</sup> It is significant that Olivares based his fears that the situation might be a threat to the stability of the viceroyalty on his recollections of

<sup>28</sup> Rosa Feijoo, 'El tumulto de 1624', *Historia Mexicana* xiv (1964), 42-70; Israel Race, *Class and Politics*, 136-60.

<sup>29</sup> AGI Patronato Real, legajo 223, ramo 1. Archbishop Pérez de la Serna to *audiencia* of Mexico, Madrid, 22 June 1624.

<sup>30</sup> Archivo General de Simancas, Estado 2649. consulta of the *junta de estado*, Madrid, 21 February 1631, fo.1<sup>v</sup>. 'voto del conde duque de Olivares'; this consulta was in response to a *consulta* of the Council of the Indies of 18 February 1631 calling the king's attention to the potentially dangerous situation in Mexico, see AGI Audiencia de México, legajo 3, ramo 4, exp. 140.

the troubles of 1624, reminding his colleagues of 'lo que paso con el marques de Gelves y el arçobispo pasado, dividiendose la audiencia en los dos partes'.

Besides demanding the removal of Archbishop Manso – a royal *cédula* ordering the latter's recall was issued soon after – Olivares urged the adoption of a more calculated strategy to control the judges of the *audiencia* of Mexico:

El escarmentar a los de la audiencia no es lo que menos importa assi para el reparo de lo presente, como para que en adelante no sucedan semejantes inconvenientes. Por esto es el Conde Duque de parezer que se les reprehenda el dividirse y abanderizarse, y no estar muy pendientes siempre del virrey, pues esta es su obligacion precissa y no hazerse de la parte de los arçobispos, daño que conviene repararlo eficazmente sirviendose Vuestra Magestad que a los que manifestamente se huviesen mostrado parciales del arçobispo se les mude a plazas que no sean ventaxosas de las que tienen, conque este punto quedara reprimido y prevenido como conviene.<sup>31</sup>

The junta and the king adopted Olivares' advice on the *audiencia* judges as they did on the archbishop. Orders were sent out recalling one of the anti-Cerralvo judges of the *audiencia* of Mexico to Spain and transferring two more to other posts in South America.

Extracting more resources, reforming the colonial bureaucracy, and forestalling local opposition in Spanish America were objectives inherently linked to the interest of the wider Monarchy as a whole. But there were also other Olivarist objectives in the Indies which were no less closely linked to the dynamic of the Conde Duque's statecraft in Europe. One of Olivares' central preoccupations was with the economic decline of Castile and this worrying phenomenon was seen to be inseparably linked to the growing difficulties of the Spanish monopoly traffic with the American dependencies. Not only did Olivares show a 'deep and continuing preoccupation with the fortunes of Spain's American trade'<sup>32</sup> but his proposed remedies for its ills were fundamentally mercantilist in character, requiring a high degree of government intervention and control. The essence of Olivares' answer to the economic decline of Spain was to strengthen the monopoly traffic through a programme of state action designed to curb fraud, contraband, and foreign penetration, while at the same time establishing a parallel organisation called the *Almirantazgo* which was also based at Seville and which was intended to ply a heavily-defended convoy traffic with Flanders and the Hanseatic towns, by-passing the Dutch entrepot. The latter monopoly system was intended to supply the Baltic timber and naval stores as well as the

<sup>31</sup> AGS Estado 2469 consulta 21 February 1631, fo.2.

<sup>32</sup> Elliott, *The Count-Duke of Olivares*, 156.

Flemish textiles without which a Spanish monopoly trade to the Americas could not function.<sup>33</sup> As a convoy system the *Almirantazgo* failed. But this institution did develop into a highly effective Inquisition of trade which cut out most of the flow of Dutch, and later also of French, consignments to Castile, laying the basis for a northern traffic serviced by the Hanseatics and, after 1630, also by the English. It was this controlled northern trade which linked up in Seville and its outports with Spain's monopoly American traffic.

The Spanish America trade was checked, taxed and regulated by the body known as the *Casa de Contratación* long established at Seville. In the view of the *Casa de Contratación* and the principal Indies merchants, Spain's monopoly traffic with the New World was being eroded by four main factors.<sup>34</sup> Firstly there were the irregularities and fraud in the registration and checking of goods passing on the official trans-Atlantic convoys themselves. Secondly, there was (since the 1580s) the contraband route plied chiefly by **Portuguese New Christian merchants** – via Brazil and Buenos Aires and up the River Plate – to Potosí from where unregistered silver was being smuggled back via Buenos Aires to Brazil and Portugal. Thirdly, there was another **Portuguese New Christian contraband system based on the licensed Portuguese slave ships which were permitted to sail direct from Africa to Spanish America and which, in theory, brought only slaves but which, in practice, brought other merchandise as well.** Finally, there was an appreciable seepage of both Peruvian and Mexican silver, via Acapulco, on the Manila galleons to the Philippines where the bullion was sold to Chinese and Portuguese merchants in exchange for Chinese silks and other Far Eastern products. There was not, it is worth noting, any significant Dutch contraband traffic with Spanish America at this time even after the West India Company occupied Curaçao in 1634.<sup>35</sup> The period of major Dutch penetration of the Spanish American market began only after 1647. Spanish mercantilism in the Indies in the age of Olivares was in essence a bureaucratic drive to close the four loop-holes in the hope that success would restore the official monopoly traffic to health and prosperity and that this, in turn, would help revive the Spanish domestic economy.

The Conde Duque took a keen personal interest in the investigations

<sup>33</sup> J.I. Israel, *The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World, 1606-1661* (Oxford, 1982), 205-9, 285-6.

<sup>34</sup> Pierre and Huguette Chaunu, *Séville et l'Atlantique, 1504-1650* (8 vols. Paris, 1955-60) viii, bk.2, pt.2, pp.1523-60; Israel, *Race, Class and Politics*, 99-102; Enriqueta Vila Vilar, 'Las ferias de Portobelo', *Anuario de Estudios Americanos* xxxix (1982), 32-4.

<sup>35</sup> S. van Brakel, 'Bescheiden over den slavenhandel der West-Indische Compagnie', *Economisch-Historisch Jaarboek* iv (1918), 49-50; W.R. Menkman, *De Nederlanders in het Caraïbische zeegebied* (Amsterdam, 1942), 44-5.

into fraudulent registration of goods at Seville.<sup>36</sup> Despite all the usual difficulties attending such initiatives in the early modern context, the crown did manage to put the Indies merchants under considerable pressure and, in January 1627, at a time of desperate financial emergency, the merchants proved willing to dig deep into their pockets to pay a 206,000 ducat indemnity in return for having the enquiries temporarily suspended.<sup>37</sup> After 1627 Olivares continued with a mixture of sporadic investigations combined with the indemnities and forced loans.

The crown also took measures to rectify the situation on the River Plate. Although the decision to establish better safeguards at Buenos Aires and a *puerto seco* (dry port) to act as a barrier at Córdoba, in what is today north-western Argentina, was taken some years earlier, enforcement of the new measures, and the breaking of the River Plate contraband system, took place in the years 1621-4.<sup>38</sup> That there was actually a marked falling off in the flow of contraband traffic between Potosí and Brazil via the River Plate is not in dispute.<sup>39</sup> It would probably be a mistake, though, to attribute the whole of this effect to the endeavours of Spanish bureaucrats at Buenos Aires and Córdoba. Part of it must certainly have been due to the Dutch West India Company's vigorous campaign in the South Atlantic; for the Company's raiding parties captured vast quantities of Portuguese shipping over the quarter of a century following the resumption of the Dutch-Spanish war in 1621. Ironically enough this worked to the advantage of Olivares' mercantilist system; for it rendered the official trans-Atlantic *flotas* sailing from Seville under heavy guard safer and therefore, despite the heavy cost of using them, more attractive to the Castilian and Portuguese business elites than the traffic to, and via, Brazil.

With respect to the Pacific commerce the crown resorted to much more drastic measures during the Olivares era than it had in the past. The coastal traffic between Peru and the Pacific coast of Mexico was deliberately suppressed in the interests of the Monarchy as a whole. After several earlier measures cutting it back, Philip IV, in November 1634, issued a decree completely forbidding this commerce in an effort to halt the percolation of Peruvian bullion to the Far East on the Manila galleons and the swamping of the Peruvian textile market with Chinese silks shipped from Manila via Acapulco.<sup>40</sup> This uncompromising exercise in mercantilist economic management met with bitter resistance from the

<sup>36</sup> Vila Vilar, 'Ferias de Portobelo', 34.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, 55-8; Elliott, *The Count-Duke of Olivares*, 157-8.

<sup>38</sup> Tiscornia, 'Política económica rioplatense', 21-4, 305; Muro Romero, 'La reforma del pacto colonial en Indias', 54-5.

<sup>39</sup> Tiscornia, loc. cit.; A.P. Canabrava, *O Comércio português no Rio da Prata* (São Paulo, 1944), 143-9.

<sup>40</sup> Israel, *Race, Class and Politics*, 100-2, 196-7.

city councils of Mexico City and Puebla de los Angeles.<sup>41</sup> But the crown, strongly backed by the *Casa* and the Indies merchants at Seville, remained adamant. It is doubtless true that the bureaucratic controls set up to enforce the prohibition were to some extent by-passed. There now arose a busy contraband traffic between Peru and a number of ports on the Pacific coast of Central America, especially Realejo, in Nicaragua, from where bullion and Peruvian wine – the importing of which into New Spain the government had previously banned in order to boost exports of Andalusian wine – were transported by mule train to Mexico City.<sup>42</sup> Even so there are plentiful signs that the policy nevertheless had a considerable effect. The Mexico City and Puebla city councils complained incessantly about the prohibition which for some years was the number one Mexican grievance against royal policy.

A key feature of the Spanish mercantilist programme in the New World at the outset of the Olivares era, albeit a phenomenon which cannot be called Olivarist, was the drive to suppress the commercial activity of the Portuguese New Christians. In the years around 1621 the Portuguese resident in Castile and Spanish America still played little part in the official Indies trade. Their speciality, as Amsterdam merchants realised as early as the 1590s, was contraband and the evasion of the crown's controls. Those in the New World were generally illegal immigrants having in many cases arrived in the Spanish colonies on the licensed Portuguese slave ships coming from West Africa.<sup>43</sup> They were looked on with aversion and hostility, coloured by deep suspicion of their religious proclivities, by the established Indies merchants and colonial officials. But whatever the role of prejudice and religious hatred there is no question that the Portuguese New Christians were the driving force behind the illicit trade of the Spanish Indies, from Buenos Aires to the Caribbean at any rate since the 1580s. During the 1620s measures aimed at suppressing the commercial activity of this group were taken at Buenos Aires, Cartagena, Potosí, and also in New Spain where Gelves expelled the 'Portuguese' from the silver-mining centres of Zacatecas and San Luis Potosí and imprisoned a number of them at Veracruz.<sup>44</sup>

Yet even in the early 1620s the government did not attempt to repatriate the growing Portuguese New Christian element in the Spanish

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*; *Relacion de los fundamentos, informes y pareceres . . . sobre si se ha de abrir el comercio que solia aver entre el Peru i Nueva España* (Madrid, 1644), fos. 1-10.

<sup>42</sup> Joseph Ferriol, *En nombre del prior y consules y comercio de la ciudad de Mexico* (Madrid, 1646), fos. 5<sup>v</sup>-7.

<sup>43</sup> Lucía García de Proodian, *Los judíos en América* (Madrid, 1966), 27-8.

<sup>44</sup> J. Gonçalves Salvador, *Os cristãos-novos e o comércio no Atlântico meridional* (São Paulo, 1978), 363; P. Feliciano Velázquez, *Historia de San Luis Potosí* (2 vols. Mexico City, 1947) ii, 115-6; M. Fernández de Echeverría y Veitia (ed.) *Documentos relativos al tumulto de 1624* (2 vols. Mexico City, 1855) ii, 215.

Indies.<sup>45</sup> By 1622, the 'Portuguese' made up something like a quarter of the white population of Buenos Aires.<sup>46</sup> The registration of foreign residents carried out at Cartagena de Indias in the 1620s revealed that there were 154 'Portuguese' in the city, almost ten per cent of the white population.<sup>47</sup> There were also substantial communities at Lima, Potosí, Mexico City, Veracruz and many other places. Furthermore, the influx of Portuguese New Christians now tended to gain momentum due to the economic recession affecting both Portugal and Brazil resulting from the Spanish embargoes against the Dutch and the Dutch onslaught against Portuguese shipping.

It was at this juncture that Olivares' statecraft had one of its most crucial consequences for Spanish America. As a result of the Conde Duque's reorganisation of the Spanish state finances in the years 1626-7 the share of the Genoese bankers who in the past had utterly dominated the crown's foreign payments was reduced and a consortium of Portuguese New Christian financiers, brought from Lisbon to Madrid, was for the first time assigned a major role.<sup>48</sup> This, in turn, rapidly transformed the position of the Portuguese New Christians and all finance and commerce throughout Castile and its American empire. For if the Portuguese were to sustain their new role of advancing cash for the upkeep of the Spanish armies in Europe, they had to be permitted the same opportunities as the Genoese in the American trade, in military and naval contracting and also in Castilian tax-farming with which to generate the necessary resources. From being an essentially marginal group active around the fringes of the Spanish financial and trading systems, the Conde Duque made them an integral part of the privileged business establishment which dominated the economic life of Spain and its New World possessions.

The Portuguese New Christian leadership in Madrid and Seville obtained letters of naturalization and permission to enter the American trade for their sons, brothers, and nephews.<sup>49</sup> Those who set themselves up as official Indies merchants at Seville, in turn, established contact with the leading Portuguese merchants in the main business emporia of Spanish America who now became their factors and correspondents. Then, the leading factors in America, men such as Simón Vázquez Sevilla in

<sup>45</sup> Rather the crown preferred to 'compose' on payment of fines, see Israel, *Race, Class and Politics*, 119-20.

<sup>46</sup> R. de Lafuente Machaín, *Los Portugueses en Buenos Aires, Siglo XVII* (Madrid, 1931) p. 86; Gonçalves Salvador, *Os cristãos-novos*, 362.

<sup>47</sup> Enriqueta Vila Vilar, 'Extranjeros en Cartagena (1593-1630)', *Jahrbuch für Geschichte . . . Lateinamerikas* xvi (1979), 155-6.

<sup>48</sup> J. C. Boyajian, *Portuguese Bankers at the Court of Spain, 1626-1650* (New Brunswick, N.J. 1983), chap. 2.

<sup>49</sup> Boyajian, *Portuguese Bankers*, 20, 32, 121.



Mexico City, and Manuel Baptista Peres in Lima – the latter a relative of at least two of the Madrid Portuguese bankers – set up distributive networks in provincial towns and localities, employing a considerable number of lesser men as dealers and store-keepers.<sup>50</sup> At the same time the increasing acceptance of Portuguese New Christians as military and naval suppliers in Spain and Flanders was also reflected, if only for a short time, in the Indies. Sebastian Vázquez de Acebedo, for instance, a crypto-Jew later arrested and severely dealt with by the Mexican Inquisition, was in 1640 appointed purveyor general, in charge of supplying both provisions and munitions, of the Armada de Barlovento.<sup>51</sup>

Olivares forged a framework within which the Portuguese New Christians in Spanish America rapidly achieved considerable prominence.<sup>52</sup> By the early 1630s they dominated business life, including the distribution of textiles imported from Seville, from Buenos Aires to Zacatecas where Simon Vázquez Sevilla had one of his stores. Jewish prayer gatherings were taking place in the privacy of their homes in many parts of the Spanish New World, including some very remote localities. But the one thing which was largely outside the Conde Duque's power was to protect them from the long arm of the Inquisition which, as far as the New Christians were concerned, remained as a ruthless and brutal organisation in Spanish America as it was soon again to be in Spain itself. In Castile Olivares was in a position to help restrain the Inquisition. At any rate the leading Portuguese of Madrid and Seville remained outside the reach of the Inquisition (for the most part) until after his downfall. It may be that Olivares, whose sympathy for the New Christians was well known, also had a hand in blocking the repeated attempts to set up a fourth New World Inquisition tribunal – the other three were at Mexico City, Lima and Cartagena – at Buenos Aires during the 1620s and 1630s.<sup>53</sup> But however that may be the Inquisition broke the back of the crypto-Jewish community at Lima with its carefully organized mass arrests of 1635, while in 1636 the principal factors of the Portuguese Indies merchants at Cartagena were seized by the tribunal there.<sup>54</sup> In New Spain the Portuguese crypto-Jewish business élite survived a little longer. But in the years 1642-3 they too were rounded up, imprisoned

<sup>50</sup> García de Proodian, *Los Judíos en América* (Madrid, 1966), 69-84; on Simon Vázquez Sevilla, see E. Uchmany, 'Simon Vaez Sevilla', *Michael, The Diaspora Research Institute of the University of Tel Aviv* viii (1983), 126-60.

<sup>51</sup> Archivo General de la Nación, Mexico City, Inquisición 489, fos. 93-6.

<sup>52</sup> P. Collado Villalta, 'El embargo de bienes de los portugueses en la flota de Tierra Firme de 1641', *Anuario de Estudios Americanos* xxxvi (1979), 8-9, 39.

<sup>53</sup> Tiscornia, 'Política económica rioplatense', 72; R. Millar Corbacho, 'Las confiscaciones de la Inquisición de Lima a los comerciantes de origen judeo-portugues de la "gran complicidad" de 1635', *Revista de Indias* xliii (1983), 37.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, 37-42.

and stripped of their possessions.<sup>55</sup> Most of the several hundred Portuguese New Christians arrested by the Inquisition in Spanish America between 1635 and 1643 were tortured, imprisoned for years on end and generally treated very harshly, many of them dying in their Inquisition cells. Everything belonging to them that could be found the Inquisition confiscated.

The Conde Duque deeply influenced the development of the Spanish Indies for more than a quarter of a century. But at no point did he concern himself with the affairs of the Americas more intensively than in the determining of the Monarchy's New World defensive strategy. This became a central issue after 1621 because of the renewed war with the Dutch and the unleashing of the Dutch West India Company's sustained offensive against the Spanish Caribbean and Brazil, a threat compounded in 1635 with the outbreak of war with France. With so many American territories and routes to defend, Spain could not simply settle for a passive stance, leaving it to officials on the spot to decide how to react. On the contrary, Olivares had definite and rather drastic ideas as to how the war in the Americas should be fought and through the *junta de guerra de Indias*, the high-level government committee which he himself at times chaired in person, he insisted on determining Spain's New World strategy himself.

Before 1621 Spanish policy in the Americas had been to maintain fixed garrisons only at a few points, those that were strategically most crucial such as Cartagena, Veracruz, Callao and Acapulco, where major maritime trade routes converged and which would otherwise be particularly vulnerable to attack. After 1621, however, foreign and especially Dutch penetration could be prevented only if a much more ambitious policy was adopted and this new policy Olivares took up, developed and made his own.

During the Olivares era Spain's central objective in the Americas was to establish a cordon of strong-points further forward, right across the Caribbean, to seal off the Spanish Indies from Dutch and French attack, and to provide bases for rapid deployment of forces in the areas most exposed to foreign encroachment. Without this grandiose new policy it would indeed have been impossible to prevent the Dutch West Indies Company, with its massive sea-power and substantial troop strength, from capturing a large number of Caribbean islands, including some major ones, and establishing settlements and bases astride the principal maritime trade arteries. It would also have been impossible to prevent the Dutch exploiting the various Caribbean salt-pans which they had previously used, before the Twelve Years' Truce, to cancel out much of the effect of Philip III's general embargo against them of 1598-1608; and

<sup>55</sup> Israel, *Race, Class and Politics*, 214-15.

this would have undermined Philip IV's new general embargo against the Dutch of 1621-47.

The new Spanish strategy was extremely costly in men and resources, involving a heavy drain on the royal treasuries at Mexico City and Lima. It also required a good deal of complicated co-ordination in the Indies and of close supervision from Madrid. Yet all in all the policy was remarkably successful. In reply to the Dutch harassment of Cuba, the crown strengthened both the garrisons and the fortifications of Havana and Santiago, at an annual cost during the 1630s of over 100,000 pesos.<sup>56</sup> When the Dutch, shut out of the salt-pans of Portugal and Spain, arrived in great numbers to fetch high-grade salt from Punta de Araya, the great salt lagoon on the coast of eastern Venezuela, ministers at Madrid decided to seal off this point also. First a temporary wooden fort was erected, and a fixed garrison moved in, which kept the Dutch out during 1622. Then a major stone fortress was constructed, designed by two of Spain's top military engineers, Juan Bautista Antoneli and Cristóbal de Roda. This fortress, officially known as the Castillo de Santiago del Arroyo de Araya, was then manned continuously by a substantial garrison down to, and beyond, 1648.<sup>57</sup> At the same time, following the repulse of the Dutch from Puerto Rico, in 1625, major new fortifications were constructed there, at Madrid's insistence, at a cost of 110,000 pesos paid out from the treasury at Mexico City.<sup>58</sup> In reply to the Dutch occupation of San Martín, one of the Virgin Islands where there were salt-pans, in 1630, Olivares and his colleagues planned a major counter-attack,<sup>59</sup> the commander of the expedition being given instructions which marked an important change in Madrid's policy on Dutch prisoners taken in the Indies: he was ordered to execute all his prisoners on the spot. This idea, which originated with Olivares personally, was intended to inject an element of psychological terror into the Caribbean conflict which, it was hoped, would weaken or undermine Dutch resolve. The expedition eventually succeeded in ejecting the Dutch from San Martín in 1633. Thankfully the prisoners were not in fact massacred but the Spanish did rebuild the fortress and established a fixed garrison there which the crown continued to maintain, at a cost of a further 70,000 pesos yearly, down to the end of the war with the Dutch.<sup>60</sup> Nor did this garrison while away its time in idleness. Besides repulsing a major new Dutch attack in 1644, led by Pieter Stuyvesant, the Spaniards organized

<sup>56</sup> I. A. Wright, *Historia documentada de San Cristóbal de la Havana en la primera mitad del siglo XVII* (Havana, 1930), 9-11, 123-4, 180-1.

<sup>57</sup> Carlos Felice Cardot, *Curacao hispánico, Antagonismo flamenco-español* (Caracas, 1973), p. 111.

<sup>58</sup> Enriqueta Vila Vilar, *Historia de Puerto Rico, 1600-1650* (Seville, 1974), 40-1.

<sup>59</sup> Th. G. Mathews, 'The Spanish Domination of Saint Martin', *Caribbean Studies* ix (1969), 6-9.

<sup>60</sup> Mathews, 'Spanish Domination of Saint Martin', 9, 18-19.

regular naval patrols around the Virgin Islands in order to keep the Dutch and French away. It was only after 1648 that the Spaniards withdrew and the Dutch and French began to colonize San Martín undisturbed.

In 1634 the Dutch occupied Curaçao and the neighbouring islands of Bonaire and Aruba, an event which caused acute anxiety at Madrid. In January 1635, the president of the Council of the Indies, the conde de Castrillo, and the ordinary members of the *junta de guerra de Indias* were summoned to a grand junta to review Spanish strategy in the Caribbean attended by members of the Councils of State and War and presided over by Olivares.<sup>61</sup> Olivares explained at some length his fears that the Dutch capture of Curaçao with its excellent harbour might delay the sailing of the 1635 treasure fleet for Spain and serve as a spring-board for further Dutch breakthroughs in the Caribbean area. He discoursed also on the Union of Arms in the Americas and the need to mobilise more support in the Indies for Spain's efforts, maintaining that the projected *armada de Barlovento* would not be sufficient as a Caribbean strike force and that four more galleons should be added to the fourteen already planned. Characteristically, he concluded by blaming the loss of Curaçao on the failure of the king's commanders in the Indies to carry out their orders. He reminded his colleagues that, contrary to instructions, the lives of the prisoners taken at San Martín had been spared.

Another grand junta met in Olivares' rooms to discuss Caribbean strategy on 8 March 1635. The Conde Duque was at his most belligerent, insisting

Que en la forma de hazer guerra, entiende [el Conde Duque] se deve Vuestra Magestad servir de tomar resolucion, porque de no haver usado todo rigor con los de las islas de San Cristobal, las Nieves, y San Martin, se sigue el atreverse el enemigo a ocupar nuevos puestos cada dia. Y es muy verisimil que si entendieren ser degollados en qualquiera parte que se hallasen, no yntentarian con tanta facilidad estas ocupaciones, y quedarse de asiento en ellas; y asi lo tiene por punto muy esencial.<sup>62</sup>

Needless to say neither the Inquisitor-General, Fray Antonio de Sotomayor (1632-43), nor the other senior ecclesiastic present, the elderly former Inquisitor-General, Cardinal Zapata (Inquisitor-General 1627-32) saw any difficulty with this. It was the military men present who objected though even they professed, at least, to see nothing against the Conde Duque's contention in principle. The Dutch were 'rebels' and 'heretics' and could therefore justly be slaughtered. Their worry was that

<sup>61</sup> The text of this *consulta*, from AGS Guerra Antigua legajo 3164 is extensively quoted from in Cardot, *Curacao hispanico*, 244-7.

<sup>62</sup> The text of this *consulta* is printed in I.A. Wright and C.F.A. van Dam (eds.) *Nederlandsche zeevaarders op de eilanden in de Caraïbische Zee en aan de kust van Columbia en Venezuela gedurende de jaren 1628-1648* (2 vols. Utrecht, 1934) 1, 206-7.

the Dutch would simply retaliate by massacring the crews of Spanish vessels they intercepted in the Caribbean, paralysing Spain's navigation in the area. This argument persuaded Olivares to relent with respect to Dutch prisoners taken in the New World at sea . . .

pero en tierra entiende . . . que desde luego se deve mandar executar todo rigor con los enemigos que se hallaren en ella, ocupando puestos, para que comienzan de escarmentar y sepan que no les ha de salir tan varato como hasta aqui.<sup>63</sup>

Olivares thus persisted with his advocacy of the deliberate mass execution of Dutch prisoners taken in the Americas on land. It was a considered policy not something uttered in the heat of the moment, pressed over the objections of colleagues at successive meetings of senior ministers at Madrid with the deliberate intention of using this expedient to curtail Dutch infiltration of Spain's Caribbean possessions. Briefly, moreover, this harsh expedient was adopted despite the evident distaste of the commanders on the spot. The expedition mounted from Venezuela in 1636 to remove the colony of Zeelanders established on the island of Tobago wiped the settlement out, slaughtering every man, woman and child.<sup>64</sup> Happily, though, this would seem to be the only case where the Conde Duque's policy was implemented.

The forward, dynamic approach adopted in the Caribbean, like the massive Castilian assistance extended to the Portuguese in their struggle against the Dutch in Brazil during the 1630s, imposed an enormous strain on Spain's imperial finances. But without it it is hard to see how the Dutch West India Company could have been prevented from taking over a considerable number of Caribbean islands, consolidating its hold on what, with Bahia, would have been the larger part of Brazil, and gaining control of the salt-pans of Punta de Araya. The vast military effort and the heavy expenditure involved were closely linked, clearly, to the sustained fiscal drive mounted simultaneously throughout Spain's American possessions; and all these policies need to be seen as part of a grand strategy for the Monarchy as a whole which emanated from, and was co-ordinated by, the Conde Duque personally.

In view of all this our conclusion has to be that it is a mistake to view Olivares as being only marginally concerned with the affairs of the Indies. In reality the Americas were one of his major preoccupations, not just in the sense that they were crucial to his efforts to mobilize Spanish resources in Europe more efficiently than had been done in the past, but as a key arena for his active intervention and supervision. Finally,

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>64</sup> C.K. Kessler, 'Tobago. Een vergeten Nederlandsche kolonie', *West Indische Gids* x (1928), 530-1.

Olivares' statecraft in the New World can be seen to have had a number of long-term effects, as well as some interesting short-term consequences such as the brief penetration of the Portuguese New Christians into the heart of Spanish colonial life. The fiscal drive, the strengthening of bureaucratic checks, and the expansion of Spain's network of New World fortifications certainly had some adverse economic consequences and added to the depression which gripped New Spain and the Spanish Caribbean for many decades to come. But it has to be appreciated that these programmes also strengthened Spain's grip around the edges of its American empire and contributed in no small measure to the creating of a barrier which continued to show great resilience, and, on the whole, kept out the English and French as well as the Dutch, during the second half of the seventeenth century.

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## MEXICO AND THE 'GENERAL CRISIS' OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

THE CONTROVERSY OVER THE "GENERAL CRISIS" OF THE SEVENTEENTH century has now been in progress for nearly two decades.<sup>1</sup> Despite this length of time, and the effort and ingenuity that have been devoted to the question, it does not appear that there is any more agreement yet regarding the nature and even the existence of a general crisis than there was at the beginning. If some historians have sought to explain at least some aspects of the troubles of the period 1620-80 in terms of general factors applying over much of Europe, others have conceded only a coincidence of individual crises in different parts of the continent. Even so, in recent years, those of the latter camp have had to allow not only for increasing evidence as to the gravity of the individual crises but more and more for the evidence of important connections between them. On balance, in the view of many, there has emerged a formidable case for a Europe-wide reversal in the decades 1620-80 of several of the key trends characterizing European development in the long period of steady growth and expansion, 1450-1620.

If the disruption of much of central and eastern Europe in these decades can be attributed to the appallingly destructive Thirty Years War and the devastating rebellion of Chmielnicki, it has become increasingly clear that these great set-backs must, at least in part, be viewed in a wider context of economic collapse in the seventeenth century evident especially in Spain, Italy and the Ottoman Empire.<sup>2</sup> If the marked population decline of Germany, Spain and

<sup>1</sup> Beginning with the publication of R. Mousnier, *Les XVI<sup>e</sup> et XVII<sup>e</sup> siècles* (Paris, 1954), and E. J. Hobsbawm, "The General Crisis of the European Economy in the Seventeenth Century", pt. 1, *Past and Present*, no. 5 (May 1954), pp. 33-53, and pt. 2, *ibid.*, no. 6 (Nov. 1954), pp. 44-65; the scope of the discussion broadened with the appearance of H. R. Trevor-Roper, "The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century", *Past and Present*, no. 16 (Nov. 1959), and the symposium on Professor Trevor-Roper's "general crisis" essay in *Past and Present*, no. 18 (Nov. 1960), with contributions by various scholars, some of which, including those of R. Mousnier and J. H. Elliott, were subsequently republished in Trevor Aston (ed.), *Crisis in Europe, 1560-1660* (London, 1965).

<sup>2</sup> H. Kamen, "The Economic and Social Consequences of the Thirty Years War", *Past and Present*, no. 39 (Apr. 1968), pp. 44-61; W. E. D. Allen, *The Ukraine: A History* (New York, 1963), pp. 104-19; C. M. Cipolla, "The Decline of Italy", *Econ. Hist. Rev.*, 2nd ser., v (1952); J. Lynch, *Spain Under The Habsburgs*, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1965-9), ii, pp. 126-84; B. Lewis, "Some Reflections on the Decline of the Ottoman Empire", *Studia Islamica*, ix (1948).



Poland can be explained largely in terms of local catastrophes, nevertheless these separate disasters have increasingly come to be seen against a background of general demographic reversal also affecting Italy, parts of France, the Balkans, Denmark, Hungary, the Spanish Netherlands and elsewhere, and gently reflected even in the case of England.<sup>3</sup> If the many revolts and disturbances of the middle decades of the century arguably show more differences than similarities, at least few deny the seriousness of the simultaneous social and political crises in Spain, Germany, England, Turkey and Poland. Finally, many even of those who have been critical of the idea of a "general crisis" as such have found it hard to deny that this was an age in which the vitality of many of the traditional centres of European wealth and culture withered and there occurred a vast shift in the centre of economic and cultural gravity from south and central Europe to the north-western fringes of the continent.<sup>4</sup>

Into this picture, exceedingly complex and uncertain though it is, there are several reasons for introducing the question of seventeenth-century Mexico. Possibly no feature of the first great phase of modern Europe's expansion, 1450-1620, driven principally by the energies of Spain, Italy, southern Germany and Portugal, was more important than the ascendancy that Europe, or rather southern Europe, gained during that time over the Americas, Asia and Africa. Europe, led by an increasingly rich and powerful Spain, became during that epoch of expansion the dominant world culture. There is accordingly every reason to postulate that the waning of the overseas supremacy of Spain and Portugal in the seventeenth century and the passing of the initiative, gradually, to the Dutch, French and English, is a major ramification of Europe's seventeenth-century crisis. This in turn, considering the great rôle of Spain's overseas empire in generating Spanish wealth and power, and considering the degree to which the disintegration of Spanish wealth and power was a factor of disturbance in seventeenth-century Europe, inevitably leads

<sup>3</sup> K. F. Helleiner, "The Population of Europe from the Black Death to the Eve of the Vital Revolution", in E. Rich and C. H. Wilson (eds.), *The Cambridge Economic History of Europe*, iv (Cambridge, 1967): for Germany and Bohemia, pp. 41-3, Flanders, p. 45, Italy, pp. 50-2, England, pp. 52-4, and Hungary, pp. 57-8; for Spain, see Lynch, *op. cit.*, pp. 126-30; for the Balkans, see T. Stoianovich, "Land Tenure and related Sectors of the Balkan Economy, 1600-1800", *Jl. of Econ. Hist.*, xiii (1953), pp. 398-411; see also P. Goubert, *Beauvais et le Beauvaisis de 1600 à 1730* (Paris, 1960), pp. 599-617, 622 ff.; and E. Le Roy Ladurie, *Les Paysans de Languedoc*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1966), i, pp. 428, 569-70.

<sup>4</sup> For instance, I. Schöffer, "Did Holland's Golden Age co-incide with a Period of Crisis?", *Acta Historiae Neerlandica*, i (1966), pp. 98 ff.

the historian to examine the link between Spain's colonial problems and the end of the Spanish ascendancy both inside and outside Europe. This conclusion leads naturally to the focusing of attention on the two principal sources of Spanish wealth, Mexico and Peru, and in view of the very important conclusion of Pierre and Huguette Chaunu that the rapid decline of the Spanish Atlantic trading system from 1620 was caused chiefly by the deterioration from 1620 in Spanish-Mexican trade,<sup>5</sup> to consideration of the position of Mexico. This proposal gains further justification when it is noted that there is considerable evidence, which will be examined in some detail further on in this paper, of a partial paralysis of Spanish power in Mexico (the viceroyalty of New Spain) dating from the early seventeenth century, which may well have adversely affected the process of Spanish exploitation of Mexican resources and impaired the ability of the viceregal authorities to help counter the Dutch, French and English challenge in the Caribbean area. The very efficient exercise of Spanish power in Mexico achieved during the reign of Philip II, already deteriorating according to the reports of Philip III's visitor-general to New Spain by the years 1607-9,<sup>6</sup> received a series of additional major set-backs after 1620, beginning with the overthrow of Viceroy Gelves with the popular insurrection of 1624 in Mexico City. In the course of this paper it will be argued that the crisis in seventeenth-century Mexico was an integral part of a two-way process in which problems arising in Mexico affected Spain, and through Spain Europe, and in which Spain, locked in conflict with her enemies for the hegemony of Europe, was driven to intensify her exploitation of the empire which in turn exacerbated the problems arising in Mexico.

The evidence gathered by Pierre and Huguette Chaunu indicating that the rapid decline of Spanish Atlantic trade after 1620 was chiefly caused by a very serious slump in Spanish-Mexican trade, raises the question as to whether there was a major economic recession in seventeenth-century Mexico. The Chaunus assumed that there was and sought to explain this supposed recession by adapting the earlier thesis of Professor W. Borah.<sup>7</sup> Professor Borah had argued that the

<sup>5</sup> Pierre and Huguette Chaunu, *Séville et l'Atlantique, 1504-1650*, 8 vols. (Paris, 1955-60), viii, bk. 2, pt. 2, pp. 1,523-60.

<sup>6</sup> Archivo General de Indias, Seville (hereafter A.G.I.), Indiferente de Nueva España, leg[ajo] 77, fos. 5v-6: Landeras de Velasco to Council (of the Indies), 24 June 1608.

<sup>7</sup> Chaunu, *op. cit.*, viii, bk. 2, pt. 2, pp. 1,558-60; W. Borah, *New Spain's Century of Depression* (Ibero-Americana, xxxv, Berkeley, Calif., and Los Angeles, 1951); P. Chaunu, "Pour un Tableau triste du Mexique au milieu du XVII<sup>e</sup> siècle", *Annales. E.S.C.*, x (1955), pp. 79-85.

seventeenth century was New Spain's century of depression and that this depression was caused by a chronic labour-shortage resulting from the disastrous decline of the Indian population of Mexico. He had demonstrated beyond doubt that in the sixteenth century Mexico had suffered one of the greatest demographic catastrophes known to history and that the Indians had declined from roughly twenty million on the eve of the Spanish Conquest to a wretched two million or so by 1610.<sup>8</sup> The one part of the Borah thesis that seemed unacceptable to the Chaunus was that he had placed the beginning of the great Mexican recession as early as 1580. This seemed unacceptable because it emerged clearly from their figures for trade between Spain and Mexico in the period 1580-1620 that these four decades were in fact the heyday of the Spanish Atlantic system as regards volume of shipping, trade, and returns. Recent research has confirmed that these forty years were indeed the years of a great Mexican boom. Silver production at Zacatecas, the leading Mexican silver-mining centre, did not reach its highest levels until after 1606.<sup>9</sup> San Luis Potosí, the second most important, founded only in 1586, also entered its period of highest production only after 1600, reaching its highest point, according to Diego Basalenque,<sup>10</sup> in the years around 1612. Trade between Mexico and the Spanish Philippines, and between Mexico and Peru, was also at its high-point during these very decades, with great sums of silver and quantities of silks crossing the Pacific in a triangular motion between Mexico, Manila and Peru.<sup>11</sup> In addition, the signs are, these were the best years for the central Mexican textile industry, which had attained a most impressive level by 1604 with, according to Viceroy Montesclaros, some eighty textile workshops (*obrajes*) in the three cities of Mexico, Puebla and Tlaxcala alone with an average work-force of fifty or sixty, and the largest employing one hundred and twenty workers, a very considerable number for an industrial enterprise at that time.<sup>12</sup> Agriculture in the fertile region of the Bajío, the granary of the silver-

<sup>8</sup> W. Borah and S. F. Cook, *The Aboriginal Population of Central Mexico on the Eve of the Spanish Conquest* (Ibero-Americana, xiv, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1963), pp. 4, 88.

<sup>9</sup> P. J. Bakewell, *Silver Mining and Society in Colonial Mexico, Zacatecas, 1546-1700* (Cambridge, 1971), pp. 242, 246.

<sup>10</sup> Diego Basalenque, *Historia de la Provincia de San Nicolas de Tolentino de Michoacán del Orden de N.P.S. Agustín* [a work of the mid-seventeenth century] (Mexico, 1963), p. 225.

<sup>11</sup> W. Borah, *Early Colonial Trade and Navigation between Mexico and Peru* (Ibero-Americana, xxxvi, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1954), pp. 116-27.

<sup>12</sup> A.G.I., [Audiencia de] Mexico, leg. 26: Montesclaros to Council, 20 May 1604 ("obrajes").

mining towns, began to expand dramatically after the end of the fierce Chichimec war in the 1590s, and along with the rapid spread of Spanish estates and rising grain production a number of new towns were founded in the area at this time.

But if the Chaunus were right in claiming that there was no Mexican depression before 1620, were they also right in claiming that there was a prolonged Mexican depression after 1620 and that it was this that did such serious damage to the commerce of Spain? Recently this hypothesis of the Chaunus, and the elements of the arguments of Professor Borah used to support it, have been subjected to some searching criticism. Professor J. Lynch, using some of the Chaunus' own data, has argued that the period after 1620 in Mexico was marked by a "crisis of change rather than stagnation".<sup>13</sup> The revenue of the central treasury in Mexico, he pointed out, rose until 1625 and then fell only slightly, while the *alcabala*, the tax on internal sales, increased until 1638 and even after that date fell only slightly, and the *almojarifazgo*, an impost on maritime trade, also continued to increase until 1638. He also argued that the prohibition on trade between Mexico and Peru after 1631 was "not taken seriously"<sup>14</sup> and pointed out that certain sectors of Mexican commerce, notably the trade in cacao with Venezuela,<sup>15</sup> were expanding during the middle decades of the century. The "change" envisaged by Professor Lynch was a fundamental restructuring of the Mexican economy marked by a certain shift of emphasis away from silver, a diversification of enterprise especially into agriculture, and growing independence, economically speaking, of Spain.<sup>16</sup> P. J. Bakewell, in his study of silver-mining at Zacatecas, has very ably seconded these conclusions. Having shown that silver production at Zacatecas continued to increase after 1620 until 1636 before falling back to levels that were not much different to those registered in the 1580s and 1590s, he went on to question, with considerable justification, whether the rapid decline in Spanish-Mexican trade demonstrated by the Chaunus need in any sense be indicative of a recession in Mexico itself.<sup>17</sup> He argued that the slump in Atlantic trade from 1620 might well be explained in terms of a New Spain becoming more self-sufficient with respect to many commodities, especially foodstuffs

<sup>13</sup> Lynch, *op. cit.*, ii, p. 212.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 226.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 227; E. Arcila Farias, *Comercio entre Venezuela y México en los siglos XVII y XVIII* (Mexico, 1950), pp. 51-61.

<sup>16</sup> Lynch, *op. cit.*, ii, pp. 195, 209, 212.

<sup>17</sup> Bakewell, *op. cit.*, pp. 227-30, 242-3.

and textiles, the retention of more of the king's silver in Mexico for purposes of imperial defence, and the retention of more private silver in Mexico owing to structural changes in the Mexican economy. Spain's loss, in other words, might well have been Mexico's gain. Dr. Bakewell also pointed out, again with considerable justification, that the Chaunus' adaptation of Professor Borah's thesis with respect to the labour-shortage is quite unsatisfactory: by the 1620s, the period of rapid population decrease in Mexico was long past, having in fact preceded the boom, and although there was still a very gradual decline in the numbers of Indians in New Spain in the 1620s and 1630s, and although there is no denying that there was a labour-shortage in seventeenth-century Mexico, the Chaunus' argument that there was such a thing as a critical level, or floor, of about two million Indians beneath which the labour supply could suddenly no longer cope with the needs of enterprise in Mexico is too vague and arbitrary to be at all convincing.<sup>18</sup>

And yet, though no historian can now accept the notion of a long Mexican depression caused by the falling of the Indian population below some hypothetical minimum level around 1620, and despite the undoubted significance of the points made by Lynch and Bakewell regarding tax returns and retention of silver in Mexico, a good case for a prolonged Mexican depression after 1620 does arguably still remain. If Zacatecas continued to expand production until 1636 and then entered a period of recession which was not excessively severe, it should be remembered that Zacatecas was the site of the richest veins of ore in Mexico where the factors reducing the profitability of mining in seventeenth-century New Spain, as identified by Dr. Bakewell, can be supposed to have been operating at minimum severity. San Luis Potosí, the second most productive mining centre, went into decline before Zacatecas, in the 1620s, and was apparently hit harder.<sup>19</sup> The late boom at Parral beginning in the 1630s was more than offset by the recession in silver-mining around Durango and the rest of New Biscay and in New Galicia.<sup>20</sup> Furthermore, the slump in silver, far from causing a diversion of investment into agriculture, caused a major agricultural recession around Celaya and Salamanca and throughout the Bajío, for the heartland of north-central Mexico which had flourished so spectacu-

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 227.

<sup>19</sup> Basalénque, *op. cit.*, p. 225; Primo Feliciano Velázquez, *Historia de San Luis Potosí*, 2 vols. (Mexico, 1947), ii, p. 166; Bakewell, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

<sup>20</sup> A.G.I., Mexico, leg. 34, fos. 81-2: Viceroy Cadereita to Council, 12 July 1638 ("hacienda").

larly in the decades 1590-1620 had prospered on the supply of food to Zacatecas and San Luis and accordingly suffered from a crisis of over-production when the population of the silver towns began to melt away.<sup>21</sup> Similarly, the silver slump adversely affected cattle-ranching in New Biscay.<sup>22</sup> Indeed it may very well be that the drive to acquire Indian lands by Spaniards, which was so marked a feature of the period 1580-1620, slackened appreciably after 1620. Admittedly, Professor Lynch's claim that the progressively more stringent restrictions on the Peru trade culminating in the prohibition of 1631 were "not taken seriously" is by no means without force: it is well known that much silk and bullion smuggling was organized through Central American ports such as Realejo as well as Acapulco. But it is clear from the many bitter Mexican protests of the 1630s and 1640s<sup>23</sup> that the disruption, and probable reduction, of the old legal trade with Peru, and also the progressively tighter controls on trade with the Spanish Philippines, had a serious adverse effect on Mexico City, the hub of New Spain's economy, at a time when Mexico City merchants were suffering from the slump in Atlantic trade and the loss of the entire Mexican silver fleet of 1628 to the Dutch. It also had an adverse effect on the textile manufacturers of Puebla, Mexico's second largest city, who now found their export channels to South America seriously impeded;<sup>24</sup> indeed there are various signs that the once vaunted Mexican textile industry shared fully in the general down-turn of the Mexican economy after 1620 not only at Puebla but also at Mexico City and most disastrously at Tlaxcala.<sup>25</sup> At Mexico City, one of the main causes of this set-back was the disastrous floods of 1629-34, which disrupted all economic life in the capital<sup>26</sup> and caused a serious loss of population, especially white population,

<sup>21</sup> Basalenque, *op. cit.*, pp. 296, 314-15.

<sup>22</sup> A.G.I., Mexico, leg. 34, fos. 81-2: Cadereita to Council, 12 July 1638 ("hacienda").

<sup>23</sup> There are many of these; for a summary, see *Relazion de los fundamentos, informes, y pareceres que por una y otra parte se han deduzido y visto en el consejo real de las Indias sobre si se ha de abrir el comercio que solia aver entre el Peru y la Nueva España o continuarse la suspension o prohibicion que del corre* (Madrid, 1644).

<sup>24</sup> *Actas de Cabildo de la Ciudad de Puebla de los Angeles* (hereafter A.C.P.), microfilm in the Instituto de Antropología e Historia, Mexico City (hereafter I.A.H.), vol. xviii, fos. 256-62.

<sup>25</sup> Jan Bazant, "Evolución de la industria textil poblana, 1544-1845", *Historia Mexicana*, xiii (1963-4), pp. 488 ff.; Biblioteca Nacional de México, MS. 1066, fos. iv, 53v-54.

<sup>26</sup> A.G.I., Mexico, leg. 3, r[amo] 4: Archbishop Manso to Council, 8 Nov. 1629; Biblioteca Nacional de Madrid, MS. 2396, fo. 267r-v.

which apparently had still not been made good two decades later in 1654.<sup>27</sup>

But the question remains, if there was a prolonged depression in Mexico after 1620, how does one account for the continuing high level of tax returns in the viceroyalty? This, it seems to me, is a question of the greatest significance not merely regarding seventeenth-century Mexican history, but regarding the whole problem of Spain's relation to her empire in the "general crisis" period and Spain's bid to prolong her ascendancy, and the religious and social forms she favoured, in an increasingly embattled and disturbed Europe. In the years 1618-25, the Spanish armies in Europe took up new positions in the Alpine passes and on the Rhine and resumed the offensive against the United Provinces from the Spanish Netherlands. In the years 1628-30, the Spaniards' attempt to tighten their grip on northern Italy misfired, Spain became involved in a preliminary struggle with her potentially greatest enemy, France, and had to commit great resources to retain her hold on Milan. In 1633-4, Spain poured forces into Germany to counter the sudden rise of Swedish power and create the conditions which made possible the crushing of the Swedish forces at Nördlingen and the clearing of southern Germany for the Habsburgs. Finally, from 1635 Spain became involved in her great war with France, a war of unprecedented scope fought in the Low Countries, in parts of France and Germany, Switzerland and Italy and in the Pyrenees, and which was to lead eventually to the crippling of Spanish power and, after the suppression of the *Frondes*, the French ascendancy in Europe. Simultaneously, until 1648, Spain was engaged in a vast and costly naval war with the Dutch in the Atlantic, the Caribbean, the English Channel and the Pacific. The immense cost and strain of this effort put an enormous, and eventually overwhelming, pressure on Spain and, through Spain, on the whole Spanish empire. Madrid, in so far as it could, involved all its dependencies in its desperate struggle and in many, and very clearly in the case of Mexico, introduced an exacting programme of tax increases, tighter regulation of trade, and strengthening of fiscal machinery. It is for this reason that it may be denied that the level of tax returns in seventeenth-century Mexico, as indeed in Peru in this period,<sup>28</sup> is in any sense an index of economic performance. Rather it is an index of the pressure exerted by Spain on Mexico and Peru at a very crucial stage in the history of the European balance of power.

<sup>27</sup> I.A.H., Archivo Histórico, MS. 101 ant., "Itinerario", p. 14.

<sup>28</sup> Lynch, *op. cit.*, ii, p. 222.

In 1621 Olivares set to work to improve the financial position of the Spanish monarchy, and to curb wasteful expenditure, and at the same time he took measures to ensure that his reform programme was carried well beyond the confines of Spain itself: a special visitor-general was despatched to Peru, while to Mexico was sent as viceroy, armed with special commissions,<sup>29</sup> to clamp down on tax evasion and to reform the customs machinery of the colony, the marqués de Gelves, former viceroy of Aragon and a very zealous promoter of the king's interests. Gelves carried out his instructions with great, indeed as events were to show, excessive determination. Although there are signs that Mexican commerce was then in an unhealthy state,<sup>30</sup> tax returns within Mexico and public remittances to Spain shot up dramatically.<sup>31</sup> Moreover, despite Gelves's overthrow, remittances under his successor, the marqués de Cerralvo (1624-34), remained very high despite the cost of fighting off the Dutch attempt to seize Acapulco in 1624, of maintaining troops in Mexico City in the aftermath of the insurrection of 1624,<sup>32</sup> and the increase of Mexican consignments to the Philippines to help counter the Dutch threat in the Far East. It was Cerralvo who introduced the new taxation associated with Olivares's "Union of Arms", the conde-duque's most ambitious attempt to force the dependencies to contribute more to the Spanish war effort in Europe, the scheme that met with such strenuous resistance from Aragon and Catalonia; under the "Union of Arms", 250,000 ducats were added to annual tax burden of New Spain in the face of objections from the city councils of Mexico City and Puebla.<sup>33</sup> Viceroy Cadereita (1635-40), another vigorous collector of taxes, while maintaining the stringency of his predecessors, forced through additional taxation to pay for the Armada of Barlovento, the battle squadron then being formed in the Caribbean by the Spaniards to counter the Dutch, adding another 400,000

<sup>29</sup> A.G.I., Mexico, leg. 2, r. 4: Council memorandum on Gelves; A.G.I., Mexico, leg. 29, r. 4: Gelves to council, 14 Nov. 1621; *Relacion del estado en que el marqués de Gelves halló el Reyno de la Nueva España* (? Madrid, ? 1627; copy in Bancroft Lib., Berkeley, Calif.).

<sup>30</sup> A.G.I., Mexico, leg. 29, r. 5: Serna to Council, 12 June 1622.

<sup>31</sup> A.G.I., Mexico, leg. 29, r. 5: Gelves to Council, 16 June 1622; Gelves to Council, 7 June 1623, in *Anuario de Estudios Americanos*, xiii (1956), p. 378; Juan Gutiérrez Flores and Juan de Lormendi, *Relacion sumaria y puntual del tumulto y sedicion que hubo en Mexico . . .* (Mexico, 1625; copy in Bodleian Lib., Oxford), fos. 1-2v.

<sup>32</sup> A.G.I., Mexico, leg. 3, r. 3: Manso to Council, 3 July 1628.

<sup>33</sup> For the opposition of the city councils of Mexico and Puebla, see A.G.I., Mexico, leg. 30, r. 1: Cerralvo to Council, 9 May 1629 and 25 May 1629.



pesos per annum to the Mexican tax burden.<sup>34</sup> It is true that after the fall of Olivares in 1643, the tax drive in Mexico lost some of its intensity, but there was at least one renewed bout of intense fiscal pressure under the young duke of Albuquerque (1653-60), one of the heroes of the Spanish war against the French.

Increased taxation however, was not the only form of Spanish pressure on Mexico in the period 1620-60. Madrid also required of Mexico certain other major concessions in the interests of the Spanish imperial complex as a whole, or rather of Spain itself. The suppression of Mexico's Peru trade in 1631, for example, aroused more opposition in the viceroyalty than did the "Union of Arms" and may be regarded, in view of the importance of the Peru trade in the Mexican economy, as a very drastic measure indeed.<sup>35</sup> Its purpose was to aid Seville, and the ailing textile manufacturers of Castile, by reducing Mexican textile exports to South America while at the same time reducing the flow of American silver to the Far East through Manila and Macao where Mexican merchants were obtaining their Chinese silks and brocades.<sup>36</sup> The measure provoked a storm of protest in New Spain and in Manila, and a most acrimonious exchange between the Mexico City council and the merchant *consulado* of Seville.<sup>37</sup> No less damaging to the Mexican economy was the decision of Madrid in the 1630s to lower the priority of the Mexican silver-mining industry with respect to mercury supplies for the processing of silver ore, in relation to the more productive silver industry of Peru.<sup>38</sup> By 1630, the insufficiency of mercury supplies to Peru from other sources caused a large part of the mercury output of Almadén in Spain, an output traditionally exported to Mexico, to be diverted to Peru. This caused a severe mercury shortage in New Spain for several years and an inevitable fall in Mexican silver production. This blow was followed by another in 1634 when Madrid, desperate for funds and aware of the declining

<sup>34</sup> A.G.I., Mexico, leg. 33, fo. 185: Cadereita to Council, 22 July 1637; and *ibid.*, fo. 194: Cadereita to Council, 22 July 1637; A.C.P., xviii, fos. 252, 256-62; *Consulta de la ciudad de Mexico al excelentísimo señor virey marques de Cadereyta sobre quatro puntos que miran a la conservacion deste reyno* (Mexico, 1636; copy in Brit. Mus.).

<sup>35</sup> *Consulta de la ciudad de Mexico al excelentísimo señor virey marques de Cadereyta sobre que se abra la contratacion del Piru* (Mexico, 1636; copy in Brit. Mus.); *Actas de Cabildo de la Ciudad de México* [title varies], 54 vols. (Mexico, 1889-1916), xxx, p. 212, and xxi, p. 70.

<sup>36</sup> Borah, *Early Colonial Trade*, pp. 124-7.

<sup>37</sup> *Relazion de los fundamentos, informes, y pareceres . . .*; see also both printed *consultas* of the Mexico City council to Viceroy Cadereita.

<sup>38</sup> Bakewell, *op. cit.*, p. 163.

profitability of Mexican mining in relation to costs, refused to supply mercury any longer under the easy credit terms that had prevailed previously and started to call in the hard-pressed mine-owners' mercury debts.<sup>39</sup>

In view of the extent of Spanish demands on Mexico during the years of Spain's long war against her European adversaries, the question arises as to how far the constant and marked instability of the viceregal administration in Mexico during these decades was the result of Madrid's pressure. Under Philip II the grip of the colonial bureaucracy on Mexico had become, by the standards of the time, remarkably tight and efficient. Far from halting the progressive centralization of power in sixteenth-century Mexico, the conspiracy of the leaders of the Mexican-born Spaniards (Creoles) headed by the Avila brothers in the years 1565-7, led only to the further humbling of the descendants of the Conquistadores and, especially under the formidable fourth viceroy, don Martín Enríquez de Almansa (1568-80), a further strengthening of royal and viceregal authority.<sup>40</sup> Enríquez's successors, in the main, met with little resistance to the firm exercise of their authority and the four decades of the great Mexican boom, 1580-1620, coincided with a period of undisturbed, if increasingly corrupt, colonial administration. The seventeenth-century process of the weakening of viceregal authority, as Viceroy Cerralvo noted in 1630 in letters to the Council of the Indies in Madrid,<sup>41</sup> began with the difficulties of Viceroy Guadalcázar (1612-21) in the years 1620-1, leading to his departure to take up office in Peru in somewhat chaotic circumstances,<sup>42</sup> continued with the violent overthrow of Gelves in the insurrection of January 1624, and was resumed from 1628 with the success of Cerralvo's enemy, Archbishop Manso of Mexico, in gathering much Creole support for his policy of opposition to the viceroy.<sup>43</sup> Cerralvo's successor, Cadereita (1635-40), as has been mentioned, met with a storm of protest and left office in circumstances threatening enough for him to inform Madrid that he feared another popular outbreak.<sup>44</sup> His successor,

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 165, 177, 203-9.

<sup>40</sup> L. B. Simpson, *Many Mexicos* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1959), pp. 125-6.

<sup>41</sup> A.G.I., Mexico, leg. 30, r. 3: Cerralvo to Council, 24 Jan. 1639; and *ibid.*, leg. 3, r. 4, no. 140: Cerralvo to Council, 25 Aug. 1630.

<sup>42</sup> A.G.I., Mexico, leg. 74, r. 1: Audiencia (of Mexico) to Council, 4 Jan. 1620; A.G.I., Patronato real, leg. 222, fos. 1,294 and 1,312v.

<sup>43</sup> A.G.I., Patronato real, leg. 225, r. 1: Cerralvo to Council, 4 Jan. 1628; A.G.I., Mexico, leg. 74, r. 4: González Peñafiel to Council (undated).

<sup>44</sup> A.G.I., Mexico, leg. 35, r. 2: Cadereita to Council, 16 Sept. 1640 and 25 Nov. 1640.

Escalona (1640-2), quickly became involved in two major imbroglios and was thrown from power by his adversary Bishop Palafox of Puebla. Salvatierra (1642-8) faced serious disturbances and was removed from his post by Madrid for his failure to control the colony, while the conde de Baños (1660-4) also met with such intense opposition that Madrid thought it politic to remove him before the end of his term.

Detailed analysis of the political disturbances of the years 1620-64 in New Spain suggests strongly the following conclusion: in part, the difficulties of the viceroys, like the economic depression, was the consequence of the pressure emanating from Madrid, but only in part. The political crisis of 1623-4, culminating in Gelves's downfall, one gathers from the information amassed after the uprising by Madrid's special investigator, Martín de Carrillo, and the correspondence of Gelves and his opponents preserved in the *Archivo de Indias* in Seville,<sup>45</sup> was caused by the combination against the viceroy of three important elements in Mexican society: white colonists resenting the sudden intensification of fiscal pressure;<sup>46</sup> office-holders resenting Gelves's puritanical drive against official corruption;<sup>47</sup> and colonists and secular clergy objecting to Gelves's staunch defence of the traditional segregation policy of the Spanish crown and religious orders, which sought to separate the Indian communities from the white, mixed and negro population.<sup>48</sup> Investigation of the opposition to Cerralvo suggests that it derived from two principal sources: once more reaction against intense fiscal pressure and, once again, Creole hostility to the segregation policy and the control of the viceroy's officers over the labour supply that attended it;<sup>49</sup> this time however, office-holders stood aside, for Cerralvo, who was evidently exceedingly corrupt himself, had dropped Gelves's policy of attacking official corruption. The opposition to Cadereita, it appears, stemmed mainly

<sup>45</sup> See especially the five books of papers: A.G.I., Patronato real, leg. 221-5.

<sup>46</sup> A.G.I., Mexico, leg. 29, r. 4: Gelves to Council, 26 Feb. 1622; Antonio de Brambila y Arriaga, *Relacion en favor del marqués de Gelves*, in *Documentos relativos al tumulto de 1624*, vols. ii and iii of 2nd ser. of *Documentos para la Historia de México*, ii (Mexico, 1855), pp. 213-90.

<sup>47</sup> A.G.I., Patronato real, leg. 223, r. 5: "Declaraciones del marques de Gelves"; A.G.I., Patronato real, leg. 221, r. 13: Gelves to Council, 8 Nov. 1622.

<sup>48</sup> A.G.I., Mexico, leg. 29, r. 5: Serna to Council, 12 June 1622; *Relacion del estado*, fo. 5; Bibl. Nac. de Madrid, MS. 2354: "Principio de las disenciones . . .", fo. 191.

<sup>49</sup> A.G.I., Patronato real, leg. 225, r. 2: Manso to Council, 10 May 1628; A.G.I., Mexico, leg. 3, r. 4: Manso to Council, 26 May 1628 and 8 Nov. 1629; A.G.I., Mexico, leg. 30, r. 1: Cerralvo to Council, 9 May 1629.

from renewed fiscal pressure and also from Cadereita's stringent application of Madrid's restrictions on Mexican trade.<sup>50</sup> The fall of Escalona is a rather special case being complicated by the ramifications in Mexico of the great revolts of 1640-1 of Portugal and Brazil against Spain, for the presence of a wealthy Portuguese trading community in New Spain caused a wave of unease among the Mexican Spaniards which enabled Escalona's enemy, Palafox, to capitalize on the viceroy's family connection with the duke of Braganza, the leader of the Portuguese secession, and thereby undermine the viceroy's position at Madrid;<sup>51</sup> nevertheless, Palafox's feud with Escalona had risen in no small degree firstly from Escalona's resistance to Palafox's judicial drive against bureaucratic corruption<sup>52</sup> and secondly from Palafox's sympathy for the Creole party and especially Creole dislike of the segregation policy.<sup>53</sup> Regarding the political crisis of 1645-50 which will be discussed in some detail below, it seems very clear that following the fall of Olivares fiscal pressure played a lesser rôle than previously and that Creole hostility to the viceregal segregation policy and its various administrative implications was in fact the principal reason for the disturbances. In the case of the opposition to Baños, the phenomenon may be ascribed to a combination of a worsening of the economic depression, food shortage and high prices, and continued opposition to the segregation policy.<sup>54</sup>

In view of the indications that the discontent that so disturbed the functioning of viceregal power in Mexico in the years 1620-64 was due as much to Creole dislike of the segregation policy as to fiscal pressure, it becomes necessary to examine the segregation policy and consider why it became so potent a source of contention in seventeenth-century Mexico. Arguably no feature of sixteenth-century Mexican history is more striking or significant than the failure of the

<sup>50</sup> A.G.I., Mexico, leg. 35, r. 2: Cadereita to Council, 16 Sept. 1640; Archivo de los Duques del Infantado, Madrid, Palafox papers (hereafter A.D.I., Pal.), xxxvii, fos. 21-2: Cadereita to conde de Castrillo, 27 Sept. 1638.

<sup>51</sup> Archivo General de la Nación, Mexico City (hereafter A.G.N.), Inquisición, leg. 489, fos. 85-104; A.G.I., Mexico, leg. 4, r. 6, exp[ediente] 281: Palafox to Council, 19 June 1641.

<sup>52</sup> A.D.I., Pal., xlix, fos. 198-9: "Auto secreto sobre los impedimientos que puso a la vissita el señor marques de Villena" (14 Feb. 1642).

<sup>53</sup> A.D.I., Pal., lxiii, fo. 836; A.G.N., cédulas originales, vol. i: crown to Escalona, 10 Feb. 1642.

<sup>54</sup> A.G.I., Mexico, leg. 77: Gines Morote to Council, 25 Aug. 1664, and Audiencia to Council, 14 July 1664, 4 June 1663, 8 June 1663, and Gines Morote to Council, 26 May 1663; *ibid.*, leg. 39, r. 2: Osorio de Escobar to Council, 20 July 1664.

*conquistadores*, and the settlers who came in their wake, to retain control over the Indian communities, the Indian market, and Indian labour, crops, and lands. Had the settlers won the political duel of the sixteenth century and defeated the efforts of the king's officers, doubtless by 1620 traditional Indian community life and agriculture would have largely disintegrated and most of the Indians would have been absorbed into the growing complex of Spanish enterprises, estates and mines. For the Spanish demand for labour and resources, and the vulnerability of the Indians were great. However, powerful forces had acted to strip the colonists of their supremacy over the Indians in the mid- and late sixteenth century, the Indian population, or the larger part of it, was to a considerable extent fenced off from the whites and half-castes, and the institution of the *repartimiento* had been introduced to provide for the labour needs of Spanish entrepreneurs without giving them direct access to the Indian labour force.<sup>55</sup> Certainly many Indians, especially in areas of heavy concentration such as the inner sections of the large cities, slipped the net of what was called the "Indian republic", became *ladino*, or Spanish-speaking Indians, took to dressing like the half-castes, cut their ties with the traditional Indian communities and worked directly for the colonists.<sup>56</sup> But most, even in Mexico City, Puebla and Zacatecas, where the outer or "Indian" wards were separated from the inner city and kept under the religious administration of the friars, continued to live in specifically Indian communities.<sup>57</sup> Moreover, it is becoming increasingly clear to historians that a great deal of Indian land remained in Indian hands in the seventeenth century, and in many areas, such was the effectiveness of the protection afforded by the viceregal authorities, the Indians retained more land than they could effectively use.<sup>58</sup> In the valley of Mexico itself, according to Professor Gibson, the Indian villages and townships possessed about a third of the cultivable land in 1620, which suggests, given that the Indian population of the valley was then very much less than a third of what it had been in 1520, that

<sup>55</sup> C. Gibson and M. Mörrer, "Diego Muñoz Camargo and the Segregation Policy of the Spanish Crown", *Hispanic American Hist. Rev.*, xliii (1963), pp. 558-68; C. Gibson, *The Aztecs under Spanish Rule* (Stanford, Calif., and Oxford, 1964), pp. 81-97.

<sup>56</sup> On the cultural gap between the two categories of Indians, see A.G.N., Historia, vol. ccccxiii, fos. 11-21.

<sup>57</sup> Gibson, *The Aztecs*, pp. 370-7; Bakewell, *op. cit.*, pp. 110-11.

<sup>58</sup> W. B. Taylor, *Landlord and Peasant in Colonial Oaxaca* (Stanford, Calif., 1972), pp. 108, 149, 163, 195; W. S. Osborn, "Indian Land Retention in Colonial Metztitlán", *Hispanic American Hist. Rev.*, liii (1973), pp. 233 ff.

there was actually more land per Indian in Indian possession than there had been before the Conquest.<sup>59</sup>

But although the protective fences around Indian society in Mexico had been erected at the bidding of Madrid and the viceroys, and with the blessing of the friars, the actual guardians of the barriers separating Indian from colonist were the new class of officers and district governors, especially the *corregidores* and *alcaldes mayores*, that arose in the second half of the sixteenth century and became the basis of viceregal authority in the Mexican countryside. These officers had their own very particular reasons for taking the segregation policy seriously. As Viceroy Cerralvo remarked in his report of 1636 to Madrid, the *corregidores* and other district officers were paid only the most trifling salaries yet they eagerly competed and sought after their offices, such were the financial rewards that pertained to the job of collecting the king's tribute, implementing royal and viceregal orders, and "protecting" the Indians from the Spaniards.<sup>60</sup> The *corregidores*, as is well known,<sup>61</sup> regularly made large fortunes by their various methods of extortion including the forced purchase of Indian crops at minimal prices in order to sell at great profit in the towns, conducting compulsory sales of goods at exorbitant prices, taking fees for favours from Spaniards, and making astute use of the *repartimiento* or "Indian share-out". The *repartimiento*,<sup>62</sup> it should be emphasized, was a means of raising forced labour by the viceroy's officers, operating in co-operation with the Indian town councils or *cabildos*, which provided labour to Spaniards without giving them control of the workers. Employers had to abide by fixed rules, pay a standard wage, retain the workers for only a stipulated and usually short period, and then return the Indians to their communities and the supervision of the Indian and Spanish officers. Thus the Indians were in effect supporting two separate economies, that of the Spanish settlers on the one hand and that of the Indian districts functioning chiefly in the interest of the *corregidores*, friars, and Indian hierarchy on the other.

This dual system, and the wasteful and inefficient use of labour that it involved, worked tolerably well as long as the increasing shortage of

<sup>59</sup> Gibson, *The Aztecs*, p. 277.

<sup>60</sup> See Cerralvo's report in *Descripción de la Nueva España en el Siglo XVII*, ed. M. Cuevas (Mexico, 1944), pp. 231-2.

<sup>61</sup> Gibson, *The Aztecs*, pp. 93-4; C. H. Haring, *The Spanish Empire in America* (1947; New York, 1963 edn.), pp. 132-4.

<sup>62</sup> Haring, *op. cit.*, p. 59; C. Gibson, *Spain in America* (New York, 1967), pp. 143-4.

labour was not too pressing and as long as the mining, industrial, and commercial boom of the decades 1580-1620 sufficiently diverted the colonists' thoughts from the possibilities posed by the Indian market, Indian crops and lands, and the very rapid easing of the labour-shortage that could readily be achieved by dissolving the framework of the "Indian republic". However, from 1620, as depression set in, as fiscal pressure mounted, and as the size of the total Indian population continued, even if only slightly, to shrink,<sup>63</sup> there was a very marked heightening of tension between the Spanish settlers and the "parasitic bureaucracy", to use Professor Trevor-Roper's apt phrase, which was exploiting the resources of the "Indian republic". Already before 1620, Creoles such as Gonzalo Gómez de Cervantes, writing in 1599, had complained of the adverse effects of bureaucratic control of the Indians on the settlers,<sup>64</sup> but from about 1620, with the publication in Madrid of the tract of the Mexican Creole Hernán Carrillo Altamirano calling for the abolition of the *repartimiento*,<sup>65</sup> written and sometimes printed attacks on the *repartimiento* in particular, and more importantly, on the *corregidores* and bureaucratic control over the Indians in general, became increasingly frequent.<sup>66</sup> Creole authors asserted that the *corregidores* were systematically subordinating all economic activity in "Indian", that is to say in most areas of central and southern, Mexico to their own interests and intimidating, and often seriously harming, Creole employers. Moreover, as this literary campaign, which was closely linked with the political campaign against viceregal power being led by such men as Archbishop Manso and Bishop Palafox, both great enemies of the *corregidores*, gained momentum, the scope of the attack on the bureaucratic structure in Mexico progressively broadened. In May 1628 Manso, who had made himself spokesman of the Creole interest, advised Madrid to force the viceroys to abolish the

<sup>63</sup> The first increase in Indian tribute returns was noted in 1671; see A.G.I., Mexico, leg. 45, r. 1: Mancera to Council, 5 Apr. 1671; and *ibid.*, leg. 46, r. 2: Mancera to Council, 15 Apr. 1672.

<sup>64</sup> Gonzalo Gómez de Cervantes, *La Vida Económica y Social de la Nueva España al Finalizar el Siglo XVI*, ed. A. M. Carreño (Mexico, 1944), pp. 121-4.

<sup>65</sup> *El Doctor Hernán Carrillo Altamirano vecino y natural de la Ciudad de Mexico ... dize ...* (? Madrid, ? 1620; copy in Brit. Mus.).

<sup>66</sup> Three major examples are: the *Informe que presenta a ... Felipe IV Christóbal de Molina, regidor de la ciudad de Mexico, sobre el sistema de repartimientos y servicio personal de los indios ...* (Madrid, 1625; copy in Archivo Histórico Nacional, Madrid, MS. 307); the blistering attack on the segregation policy, in an appeal to King Philip IV over the head of the viceroy, of Juan Fernández de Vivero, Creole of Tlaxcala: Brit. Mus., Add. MS. 13974, doc. 33; and the critique of the *corregidores* by Luis García de Najera, a wealthy *hacienda*-owner of the Puebla district: A.D.I., Pal., liv, fos. 521-4.

*repartimiento* in all its forms, to reduce the powers of the *corregidores* over the Indians and therefore over whole sectors of the economy, and to leave the Indians "free to work as they please at whatever work they choose, and to go to those employers who offer the best conditions".<sup>67</sup> By November 1629, Manso wanted Madrid to abolish the *corregidores* altogether except for a mere four or five in the regional capitals who should be paid large salaries so as to remove the necessity of corruption and who should be appointed in Madrid, rather than Mexico City where the great majority of existing *corregidores* were appointed, so as to weaken the link between these remaining officers and the viceroys; for the rest, he argued, local administration should be left to the Creole town councils.<sup>68</sup> Palafox, the most outstanding leader of the Creole party in the epoch 1620-64 and the most relentless foe of the *corregidores* as well as of two viceroys, still more vigorously advocated, in his reports to Madrid, abolition of the *corregimientos* and the assignment of local power to the Creole city and town councils.<sup>69</sup>

The rift between officers and colonists was widened somewhat further by an additional factor which added overtones of social snobbery to the quarrel. The viceroys, who were never of Mexican origin themselves, tended to appoint as *corregidores* and other officers men unconnected with local interests and therefore usually not Creoles. In the main, they preferred associates and relatives who would be dependent for their local power on the viceroy alone. Thus in general the *corregidores* were peninsulars or, as the colonists called European Spaniards, *gachupines*.<sup>70</sup> Moreover, there is no doubt that by 1600, and even before, the relationship between Creoles and *gachupines* distinguished by differences of background, manners and accent, was already marred by a measure of rivalry which led frequently to virulent verbal exchanges and not infrequently to violence.<sup>71</sup> Certainly one should not make too much of this factor, for individual Creoles and *gachupines* were perfectly capable of crossing the lines of the conflict between colonists and bureaucracy where this suited their individual interest, but equally clearly such

<sup>67</sup> A.G.I., Patronato real, leg. 225, r. 2: Manso to Council, 26 May 1628.

<sup>68</sup> A.G.I., Mexico, leg. 3, r. 4: Manso to Council, 8 Nov. 1629.

<sup>69</sup> A.D.I., Pal., ix, fos. 56-62, and xxxv, fos. 71-80: Palafox to conde de Castrillo, 7 Sept. and 7 Oct. 1646; A.D.I., Pal., ix, fo. 51: Palafox to Council, 1 Dec. 1646.

<sup>70</sup> See Palafox's observations printed in *Boletín del Archivo General de la Nación*, 1st ser., ii (1931), pp. 814-19.

<sup>71</sup> For the heightening of Creole-*gachupin* tension in 1618, see: Bancroft Lib., MS. M-M 149, "México y sus Disturbios", vol. i, pp. 121-9.



differences did add to the bitterness and intensity of the underlying conflict.

Inevitably, the increased pressure of the Creoles on the bureaucratic complex of the "Indian republic" had the effect of closing the ranks of those who benefited from the existing system — Spanish officers, Indian officers, and friars. Before 1620, it appears that the beneficiaries of the segregation policy were as apt to be rivals as accomplices in extortion. In particular, relations between *corregidores* and the Franciscan, Dominican and Augustinian friars who had converted the Indians to catholicism in the early sixteenth century and continued to administer the bulk of the Indian parishes in the seventeenth, had been bad. Viceroy Montesclaros (1603-7), like Viceroy Enríquez before him, regarded the mendicants as virtual enemies of his officers and sharply criticized them for the avarice they betrayed in the administration of their Indian parishes.<sup>72</sup> After 1620 or thereabouts, however, there was a marked change. No more do we hear of friction between *corregidores* and friars or viceregal diatribes against the latter. Rather the friars became the staunchest allies of the *corregidores* in their resistance to the Creole offensive. The secular clergy, which at its lower levels was overwhelmingly Creole in composition and therefore predisposed to join with the Creole laity in any case, was also extremely eager to wrest the Indian parishes from the friars and for this reason the latter, especially after Archbishop Serna's campaign against them in the years 1618-24,<sup>73</sup> now had even more need for the *corregidores*' support than the *corregidores* had need of theirs. Every viceroy between 1620 and 1664 engaged in imbroglios with the secular clergy on behalf of the friars, with the single and very brief exception of Palafox, and indeed it was the viceroys, with respect to both the internal politics of New Spain and the pressures they applied in Madrid, who were chiefly responsible for keeping the bulk of the Indian parishes in Mexico out of the hands of the secular clergy during the seventeenth century. Creole writers, for their part, vehemently criticized the religious orders, including the Jesuits after their switch from a pro-Creole to an anti-Creole stance in the later 1620s,<sup>74</sup> and not only

<sup>72</sup> *Colección de Documentos inéditos para la Historia de España*, ed. M. Fernández Navarrete et al., 112 vols. (Madrid, 1842-95), xvi, p. 379, and xxvi, pp. 174-5.

<sup>73</sup> *Cedulario de los Siglos XVI y XVII*, ed. A. M. Carreño (Mexico, 1947), pp. 232-3, 263; *Memorial de los Sucedió en la ciudad de Mexico desde el día primero de Noviembre de 1623 asta quince de enero de 1624* (Mexico, 1624; copy in Bodleian Lib.), fo. 6v.

<sup>74</sup> Bancroft Lib., MSS. M-M 149, p. 651; *Relacion del estado*, fo. 6; A.G.I., Mexico, leg. 3, r. 4, exp. 166, fo. 7.

supported the bishops and secular clergy against the friars, but fully expected that victory for the latter in the fight for the Indian parishes would be accompanied by a sharp movement in favour of Creole interests in Indian districts in general.<sup>75</sup> In this connection it is noteworthy that just as the *corregidores* accused the secular clergy, with good reason,<sup>76</sup> in those districts where the secular clergy did hold Indian parishes, of sending Indians away from their villages to work on the *haciendas* of their Creole relatives and friends, so the Creoles accused the friars, with equal justification,<sup>77</sup> of helping *corregidores* and Indian officials to remove Indians from Creole estates and sending them back to their villages.

Probably no personage involved in the commotions of 1620-64 in Mexico looms larger and none has greater claims to be regarded as an archetypal "general crisis" figure than Juan de Palafox. Like the views and actions of Gelves, those of this remarkable Aragonese are a prime example of that "general, non-doctrinal, moral Puritanism" that Professor Trevor-Roper closely associated with the numerous reform movements of the "general crisis" era.<sup>78</sup> Palafox's extensive political writings centre around the question of how the dissolution of the Europe of his day could be halted and the power of Spain which he saw as the key to European stability and the re-assertion of intellectual unity of outlook on the basis of counter-reformation catholicism and southern European baroque values, be revived.<sup>79</sup> In his political career, he had been a protégé of Olivares, distinguished himself in the service of the Spanish monarchy, shown an intense interest in every aspect of the global struggle between Spain and her adversaries from Brazil to Germany, and consistently stressed the need to build up Spanish royal and imperial power. It is accordingly a strange irony, and at first sight rather puzzling, that Palafox should have been the principal author of disturbances that impaired the functioning of viceregal power in Mexico and splintered the authority of Viceroy

<sup>75</sup> Juan Fernández de Vivero, "Discurso": Brit. Mus., Add. MS. 13974, fos. 158-9; Luis de la Palma y Freites, *Por las religiones de Santo Domingo, San Francisco y San Agustín* (Madrid, 1644; copy in Newberry Lib., Chicago), pp. 14-16.

<sup>76</sup> A.G.I., Mexico, leg. 35, r. 3, fo. 6: *Alcalde mayor* of Tlaxcala to Salvatierra, 29 Nov. 1643; *ibid.*, fos. 9v-11: report of *corregidor* of Huejotzingo.

<sup>77</sup> *Fuentes para la Historia del Trabajo en Nueva España*, ed. S. A. Zavala and M. Castelo (Mexico, 1939-46), vii, pp. 4-5, 137-8.

<sup>78</sup> Trevor-Roper, "The General Crisis", *Past and Present*, no. 16, pp. 49-50.

<sup>79</sup> See, for instance, his *Diálogo político del estado de Alemania y Comparación de España con las demas Naciones*, in *Obras*, 12 vols. (Madrid, 1762), x, pp. 56-83; and the *Juicio político de los Daños y Reparos de qualquiera Monarquía*, *ibid.*, x, pp. 36-52.

Salvatierra (1642-8) as effectively as Serna had helped shatter the authority of Gelves and Bishop Osorio de Escobar was to break the conde de Baños.

It seems clear, however, that Palafox launched his attack on Salvatierra, as he had launched his attack on Escalona in 1641-2, only after deep and searching consideration.<sup>80</sup> In his capacity as visitor-general of New Spain, he had been specially empowered by a Madrid increasingly worried by the deterioration of authority in Mexico, to investigate every aspect of administration in the vice-royalty and put forward comprehensive proposals for reform.<sup>81</sup> After a thorough study of conditions,<sup>82</sup> Palafox came indignantly to the conclusion that an appalling loosening of Madrid's grip on Mexico had taken place owing largely to the pressure of a corrupt and embattled bureaucracy which more and more was enclosing and predetermining the viceroy's field of action. Self-interest and a natural inclination to abide by the logic of the bureaucratic structure in Mexico was causing the viceroys to evade and neglect their principal duty, that of serving the interests of the Spanish crown. As Palafox put it, the decrees of Madrid could not have been taken less notice of in Mexico had they been issued by the king of France.<sup>83</sup> Fully aware of its depth and disruptive implications, Palafox viewed the split between bureaucracy and colonists in Mexico with dismay and came to believe that only in a Creole victory, the destruction of the power of the *corregidores* and the religious orders, and the reconstitution of viceregal power on a new basis was there any real prospect of viable solution. Only thus, as he saw it, could the Creoles be genuinely integrated into the structure of the empire and the paralysis of royal power in Mexico cured. This is the logic of his political formula for New Spain: more power to the Creoles and more power to Madrid.

Yet neither Palafox nor Salvatierra, whatever the differences between them, wanted matters to reach the point of a serious political conflict. Just as Palafox and Escalona had hung back in 1640-1 but ultimately been drawn into conflict by the inexorable logic of the rift in the Mexican body politic, so Palafox and Salvatierra were forced into a situation which probably both would have preferred to have avoided. Little by little, at a local level, Palafox was drawn into supporting his lower clergy and the Creoles of his diocese in a series

<sup>80</sup> A.D.I., Pal., xlix, fos. 198-9, and liv, fo. 233.

<sup>81</sup> A.D.I., Pal., lxxx, fos. 35-8: Palafox to Council, 10 July 1641.

<sup>82</sup> A.D.I., Pal., ix, fos. 56-62.

<sup>83</sup> A.D.I., Pal., xxxv, "Cartas sobre la Visita", fo. 75: Palafox to conde de Castrillo, 7 Oct. 1646.

of small incidents which gradually embroiled him with the *corregidores* of Tlaxcala, Cholula and Huejotzingo and their deputies,<sup>84</sup> and then with a progressively wider circle of the viceroy's officers, some antagonized by the erosion of their local power, others threatened by the judicial inquiries linked with Palafox's *visita*, while Salvatierra was slowly drawn into the fight by his *corregidores* as a counter-weight to the visitor-general; the high court (*audiencia*) of Mexico was hopelessly split, and the ground was prepared for full-scale conflict. As the strife developed, Salvatierra, compelled to conceal as much as he could of the true background to the breach between himself and the visitor-general, which did him little credit, and yet compelled to counter Palafox's reports to Madrid, was driven to try to discredit Palafox, to intimidate the Creole city councils of Mexico City and Puebla into denouncing Palafox's *visita* with which they were in fact in complete sympathy,<sup>85</sup> to mobilize the Mexican inquisition against Palafox, and to make maximum use of the smoke-screen thrown up for him by the Jesuits and Dominicans, who in order to help the viceroy resumed a furious squabble over points of ecclesiastical jurisdiction which had previously lapsed.<sup>86</sup> The consequence was the great tension of 1647, the temporary flight of Palafox into the sierra, a string of popular demonstrations in the bishop's favour, and the joint military and inquisition occupation of Puebla and some fifty political arrests of the summer of 1647.<sup>87</sup> These events led in turn to the chronic instability of New Spain of the next three years, marked by a see-saw movement in the balance of power between the opposing parties and a series of administrative and ecclesiastical purges and counter-purges.<sup>88</sup>

<sup>84</sup> Brit. Mus., Add. MS. 13976, doc. 47; A.G.I., Mexico, leg. 35, r. 3: "Informes echos al virrey por las justicias".

<sup>85</sup> *Copia de las Cartas que las Ciudades de Mexico y de la Puebla escribieron a la real persona y sus consejos . . . informando de la verdad de lo que sucedio en la Nueva España* (Mexico, 1648; copy in Bibl. Nac. de México); A.D.I., Pal., vii.

<sup>86</sup> A.D.I., Pal., xxxv, fo. 80: Palafox to Castrillo, 6 June 1646; Palafox, *Carta al Padre Caroché*, in *Obras*, ix, p. 143.

<sup>87</sup> Univ. of Texas Lib., Austin, Texas, dept. of Latin American MSS., MS. G-105, "Relacion veridica de lo acaecido en Puebla"; and *ibid.*, MS. G-106, "Relacion de lo ocurrido en la Puebla de los Angeles"; Brit. Mus., Add. MS. 13976, "Relacion sucinta"; Bibl. Nac. de México, MS. 1216: Palafox, "Quejas contra Salvatierra"; the account of Leonardo de Saldaña, *ibid.*, MS. 890; *Carta del venerable siervo de Dios d. Juan de Palafox y Mendoza al sumo Pontifice Inocencio Decimo* (Jan. 1649), 3rd edn. (Madrid, 1768); A.G.N., Inquisición, vols. 424 and 429.

<sup>88</sup> Gregorio M. de Guijo, *Diario, 1648-64*, 3 vols. (Mexico, 1952), i, pp. 6-17, 59-60, 68-9; A.G.I., Mexico, leg. 76, r. 3: Pedro Melian to Council, 23 May 1649.

Such then was the state into which administration had sunk in Mexico at the time of the most chronic phase of disturbance (1647-53) of the "general crisis" period in Europe, the time of the *Frondes* in France, Cromwell's revolution in England, the revolts of Sicily and Naples against Spain, Chmielnicki's revolt and the greatest massacre of the Jews in eastern Europe before Nazism, and various other assorted commotions across the continent. Admittedly, a great deal of the friction in seventeenth-century Mexico, as identified in this paper, can be said to have been typical of the stresses that tended to develop between colonial bureaucracies and colonists in many parts of the globe at all periods of the history of early European colonialism. In Mexico, the disturbances of 1620-64 were indeed, in certain respects, foreshadowed by the struggle of 1522-67 when the *conquistadores* and their heirs fought a losing battle against the officers of Charles V and Philip II. Tensions between settlers and colonial administration arising from fiscal pressures, bureaucratic corruption, and rivalry between locally-born and European-born are a familiar part of the background to the independence of the whole of Spanish America and Brazil,<sup>89</sup> and are to be seen also in other early colonial contexts such as in Dutch South Africa in the eighteenth century where the Afrikaner was finding himself increasingly out of sympathy with the bureaucrats sent out to administer the colony by the Dutch East India Company.<sup>90</sup> But the commotions of 1620-64 in Mexico can be related to these general problems of early colonialism only up to a point. In general, in early colonialism, there were no significant disturbances intervening between the initial stage comprising the assertion of bureaucratic control over the European settlers, a stage completed in the case of the Spanish overseas empire early in the reign of Philip II, and the final stage, not reached in many cases until the early nineteenth century, of the independence movements against the colonial powers. The special importance of the commotions of 1620-64 in Mexico, irrespective of whether parallel occurrences in other parts of the Spanish colonial empire are encountered or not, lies precisely in this: that they took place at an intermediate stage in the history of early colonialism — being followed by a long period of comparatively stable colonial administration — and as a result of a combination of factors inseparable from the great

<sup>89</sup> R. A. Humphreys, "The Development of the American Communities outside British Rule", *The New Cambridge Modern History*, viii (Cambridge, 1965), pp. 406 ff.; C. R. Boxer, *The Portuguese Seaborne Empire, 1415-1825* (London, 1969), pp. 198-9.

<sup>90</sup> C. R. Boxer, *The Dutch Seaborne Empire, 1600-1800* (London, 1965), p. 266.

crisis of the Spanish monarchy of the middle decades of the seventeenth century which is in turn inseparable, in view of the virtually preponderant position of Spain in the Europe of the early seventeenth century,<sup>91</sup> from the "general crisis" of seventeenth-century Europe.

The relation of the Mexican disturbances of 1620-64 to the tensions implicit in early colonialism in general, however, does significantly affect the theoretical problem of relating the Mexican commotions to the various hypotheses that have been advanced by historians in explanation of the "general crisis" of the seventeenth century. The friction of the years 1620-64 in Mexico between bureaucracy and colonists, complicated by various other factors, has features which are readily compatible with virtually all of the differing theoretical approaches to the "general crisis" in Europe arguably partly because these different theories are somewhat less exclusive of each other than is sometimes suggested, but certainly also because of the wide range of stresses implicit in the colonial situation itself. Accordingly, Professor Trevor-Roper's "general crisis" theory, when related to the Mexican case, bears up well, for it is impossible to deny that a major ingredient of the Mexican crisis was a strong reaction against a virtually unsalaried, wasteful, and parasitic bureaucracy by a broad combination of groups which can be fairly described as the popular party in Mexican politics, and which was supported by the mob in the rising of 1624 and in the demonstrations of 1647 and 1664 in Mexico City and Puebla; moreover, there was indubitably also a movement of non-doctrinal puritanism against bureaucratic corruption and wasteful use of resources. Equally, however, those who argue that the tremendous cost of war was the crucial factor,<sup>92</sup> seeing the intensification of fiscal pressure as the chief cause of the rising tension in Europe, hold their ground; for there can be no doubt as to the importance, in the Mexican crisis, of a sharp rise in taxation and an effective tightening-up of tax-collecting machinery arising from the immense cost of Spain's military undertakings. Similarly, those who regard the general crisis as being essentially a vast shift in the balance of resources, power and culture in Europe due to a purely coincidental combination of the disruption of much of central and eastern

<sup>91</sup> For a recent assessment of the position of Spain in Europe during the reign of Philip III, see H. R. Trevor-Roper, "Spain and Europe 1598-1621", in J. P. Cooper (ed.), *The New Cambridge Modern History*, iv (Cambridge, 1970), pp. 260-82.

<sup>92</sup> See Professor Elliott's contribution to the symposium on Trevor-Roper's "general crisis" essay in *Past and Present*, no. 18 (Nov. 1960).

Europe with the crumbling of the Mediterranean economies of Italy, Turkey and Spain come out well, for Mexico arguably was inescapably involved in the decline of Spain. And last but not least, the Marxist analysis of E. J. Hobsbawm is by no means left without room for manoeuvre; for the signs are that Mexico experienced a serious economic crisis in the seventeenth century, that leading entrepreneurs—mine-owners, textile manufacturers, wealthy merchants, and farmers producing for the urban market—were experiencing increasing difficulties, that these difficulties were at least partly caused by their having to operate within a social and political framework that was basically unfavourable to their interests, and that they supported it if they did not lead, as is shown by the attitude of the Creole city councils and the big landowners,<sup>93</sup> the party that sought to change the prevailing system in ways which would have favoured their interests. As regards the search for fundamental causes of the “general crisis” of the seventeenth century therefore, the circumstances of the Mexican commotions of 1620-64 would seem to be either wholly unhelpful or to encourage, in so far as the tensions in seventeenth-century Mexico can be detached from the early colonial context, a complex approach incorporating elements of all the theories that have so far been advanced.

The Mexican disturbances of 1620-64, to conclude, are linked with the European crisis of the seventeenth century in several important respects. Firstly, economic recession, falling demand for Spanish goods, and the retention of silver for imperial defence in the Caribbean and Pacific, contributed largely to the Spanish Atlantic trade depression that began in the 1620s and, eventually, to the falling value of Mexican remittances to Spain in a period when the Spanish monarchy faced its greatest military and financial emergency in Europe. Secondly, Madrid's efforts to maintain the Spanish preponderance in western Europe in the face of mounting difficulties and opposition led to a marked escalation of fiscal pressure in Mexico and interference in Mexican trade which had the effect of heightening the tensions in the Mexican body politic and, very probably, contributed to the economic slump. Thirdly, the campaign to restrain official corruption launched in Spain by Olivares, and paralleled elsewhere in Europe, was carried to Mexico with important consequences by such notable standard-bearers of the Spanish imperial mission as Gelves, Palafox and Albuquerque. And fourth and finally, the cumulative effects of these three factors —

<sup>93</sup> A.G.I., Patronato real, leg. 225, r. 2: Manso to Council, 10 May 1628.

economic crisis, fiscal pressure, and non-doctrinal puritanism — caused a prolonged political instability in the viceroyalty resembling in several significant ways, and particularly as regards the friction between administration and elements of society, various of the individual political crises in seventeenth-century Europe.



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## THE PORTUGUESE IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY MEXICO

Historians have long been aware that a sizeable Portuguese settlement took place in Spanish America during the period 1580–1640 in which the crowns of Spain and Portugal were united in the hands of the Spanish Habsburgs despite the continued legal separation of the Spanish and Portuguese empires and the continued restriction of the right to settle in the Spanish colonies to “Old Christian” subjects of the crown of Castile<sup>1</sup>. It has also long been known that there were widespread fears of Portuguese sedition in certain areas of the Spanish Indies in the wake of the secession of Portugal from Spain in 1640, notably in the region of the River Plate, at Cartagena de Indias, and in the viceroyalty of Mexico<sup>2</sup>. It has furthermore long been apparent that Spanish suspicion of the Portuguese immigrants in the Spanish Indies, both before and after 1640, was coloured by the tendency in both the Spanish colonial and the Spanish administrative mind to identify migrants from Portugal with the Portuguese *Cristãos novos* and Portuguese crypto-Judaism<sup>3</sup>. Nevertheless, as few

1) See A. P. Canabrava, *O Comércio Português no Rio da Prata, 1580–1640* (São Paulo, 1944), pp. 126–30; R. Ricard, *Los Portugueses en las Indias Españolas*, in: *R(evista) (de) H(istoria) (de) A(mérica)* no. 34, 1952; L. Hanke, *The Portuguese in Spanish America with special reference to the Villa Imperial de Potosí*, in: *RHA* no. 51 (1961); J. Lynch, *Spain under the Habsburgs* (2 vols. Oxford, 1965–9) vol. 2, pp. 58–59, 112–113, 170, 179, 195, 218.

2) See, for instance, C. R. Boxer, *Salvador de Sá and the Struggle for Brazil and Angola, 1602–1686* (London, 1952) pp. 171–173; R. Palma, *Anales de la Inquisición de Lima, Estudio Histórico* (Lima, 1863), p. 13; Diego Barros Arana, *Historia General de Chile* (16 vols, Santiago, 1884–1902), vol. IV, pp. 370–371.

3) Boxer, *op. cit.*, pp. 15, 72; the letter of the Inquisitors Verdugo and Gaytan to the Inquisitor-General (Lima, 4 May 1622), in: L. García de Pradilla, *Los Judíos en América* (Madrid, 1966), pp. 272–274; Informe del Ilmo. Sr. D. Juan de Palafox, obispo de Puebla, al Exmo. Sr. Conde de Salvatierra, Virrey de la Nueva España, 1642 in: G. García and C. Pereyra (eds.), *Documentos inéditos o muy raros para la Historia de México* (36 vols. Mexico, 1905–1911) VII (1906), pp. 26–89, especially pp. 33–34 in which Palafox advises Salvatierra “... *tener atencion con los portugueses de estas Provincias, no dandoles puestos militares, ni jurisdiccion, ni consintiendoles armas de fuego; pues no solo han dado cuidado desde el levantamiento de Portugal y traiciones de aquella corona, sino que aun antes tenian prevenido las cédulas reales un punto tan importante y que no conviene descuidar.*”

would deny, the general picture as to the circumstances and significance of the Portuguese settlement in the Spanish Indies in the seventeenth century remains unsatisfyingly vague and ill-defined. This present essay, based partly on manuscript sources preserved in Mexico and Spain, attempts to delineate in a little more detail than has been done in the past the extent and nature of the Portuguese presence in New Spain in the seventeenth century and especially the half-century 1600–50.

The tension between the Castilian and Portuguese communities that arose in the wake of the Portuguese secession and the political confrontation between the residing viceroy of Mexico, the Duque de Escalona, and the *visitador-general*, Don Juan de Palafox, bishop of Puebla, over the presence of the Portuguese in Mexico, developed only gradually. Escalona was informed of the revolution in Lisbon by a *cédula* from Madrid of 7 January 1641<sup>4</sup>, and was instructed to carry out certain precautionary measures though it was established at the same time, as a general principle, that the Spanish government had no intention of expelling from the Spanish colonies those of its Portuguese subjects that had “composed” with the authorities and who gave no special reason for their loyalty to the Spanish crown to be questioned. No more Portuguese were to be admitted into Mexico. Recent Portuguese arrivals were to be carefully questioned and their papers and letters investigated. Portuguese ships were, from then on, prohibited from Mexican as from other Spanish-American ports. Otherwise Escalona was urged to maintain maximum vigilance and it was left to his discretion to decide whether or not more drastic action such as the forced transfer of all Portuguese residing in Veracruz and other ports twenty leagues inland should be taken. And that was all. It was only, it appears from copies of the letters exchanged by Escalona and Palafox on the subject of the Mexican Portuguese preserved in the Mexican Inquisition files in the *Archivo General de la Nación* in Mexico City, in the autumn of 1641, nearly a year after

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*Y así es sumamente necesario para el comercio y para la seguridad, tener las costas de entrambos mares limpias de este genero de gente y apartarlos de las minas; porque son tan sutiles en adelantar el caudal, como en sustentar sus correspondencias con Holanda y Lisboa, que es el centro unico a donde tiran sus líneas, aborreciendo a nuestra fe la mayor parte de ellos, como hebreos, y a nosotros, como Portugueses.”*

<sup>4</sup>) A(rchivo) G(eneral) (de) (la) N(ación), (Mexico City), (ramo) (de) Inq(uisición), vol. 489, ff. 97–98.

the Lisbon *coup d'état*, that the Portuguese question became a serious issue in the Mexican administration. This was principally owing to the percolation into Mexico through the summer and autumn of 1641 of reports of fresh Portuguese risings, the revolt of Madeira and Brazil against Spanish authority, wild rumours telling of the slaughter of three thousand Castilians in Brazil, and wildly exaggerated reports of the so-called Portuguese conspiracy at Cartagena, the relatively nearby Spanish stronghold in the Caribbean<sup>5</sup>. According to Palafox, by the autumn of 1641, New Spain was confronted by a real danger of Portuguese subversion for the Portuguese were numerous in the viceroyalty, wealthy, fired by the example of their compatriots in Brazil and Cartagena, well-known for their finesse and subtlety in all illicit and secret dealings, "... y estan llenos de esclavos y otros dependientes y finalmente no solo en esta ciudad sino en la tierra adentro tienen todo el poder que basta para hazer embarazo a la seguridad de estos reynos ..."<sup>6</sup>. Palafox also mentioned reports that the Mexican Portuguese were stockpiling firearms and ammunition and spoke of the fears of the Castilian population. "*Los vezinos castellanos de esta ciudad*", he assured the viceroy, "*me dicen a cada passo que andan muy recelossos de los Portugueses*"<sup>7</sup>.

The apprehension of the Castilians was by no means denied by Escalona in his reply to Palafox and the fact that there was a rise in tension between the Castilians and Portuguese in Mexico in 1641 is independently attested by an Inquisition report of late 1641<sup>8</sup>, so that there is no reason to doubt the fact itself. Professor W. Borah, in a recent article, has spoken of the "apprehension and hysteria that arose in Mexico upon the news of the revolt of 1640"<sup>9</sup>. However, Escalona's claim that Palafox was seriously exaggerating the degree of the apprehension in Mexico and his observation that fairly numerous and wealthy though the Portuguese were in Mexico they were considerably more so in the viceroyalty of Peru, so that if there was as yet little sign of Portuguese subversion in Peru there was little

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<sup>5</sup>) AGN, Inq., vol. 489, ff. 85-88. Palafox to Escalona, 20 Nov. 1641.

<sup>6</sup>) Ibid., f. 85.

<sup>7</sup>) Ibid., f. 88.

<sup>8</sup>) AGN, Inq., vol. 489, ff. 99-v.

<sup>9</sup>) W. Borah, The Portuguese of Tulancingo and the Special Donativo of 1642-43, in: *Jahrbuch für Geschichte von Staat, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Lateinamerikas*, vol. IV (1967), pp. 386-98, 394.

reason to expect any in Mexico, deserves careful consideration<sup>10</sup>. It is clear that Escalona and Palafox were already on bad terms, irrespective of the Portuguese question, over disputes arising from Palafox's *visita* and also certain ecclesiastical matters<sup>11</sup>, so that there is good reason to suspect that Palafox was deliberately exaggerating in his assessment of the Portuguese threat in order to lend force to his reports to Madrid that Escalona was not doing enough to guarantee the security of the viceroyalty and his reminder that Escalona's dead wife had been a relative of the new rebel king of Portugal, João IV<sup>12</sup>. Palafox's purpose, it may be suggested, was to undermine confidence in Escalona in Madrid, for reasons that for the most part were unconnected with the Portuguese, and if this was his purpose, then he was soon to be triumphantly successful. Moreover, the possibility that Palafox was indeed wilfully, or at any rate considerably, exaggerating is further suggested by the meagreness of independent evidence indicating that there was a major build-up of tension apart from the already mentioned and rather subdued, even hesitant, report of the Inquisition and a number of testimonies from witnesses specifically collected on Palafox's orders<sup>13</sup>. Professor Borah supplies no evidence with which to support his use of the term "hysteria".

But if the Portuguese-Castilian tension in Mexico in 1641-2 was in fact more of a pretext for political action by Palafox than a real threat describing which one could justifiably use the term "hysteria", the pretext was undeniably well-chosen. Escalona himself had significant Portuguese connections; he belonged to an aristocratic family of Jewish origin<sup>14</sup>; he had appointed several Portuguese *Cristiãos*

<sup>10</sup>) AGN, Inq., vol. 489, f. 95 v. Escalona to Palafox, 20 Nov. 1641.

<sup>11</sup>) A(rchivo) (de) (los) D(uques) (del) I(nfantado), (Madrid), Palafox papers, vol. 49, ff. 198-9, "Auto secreto sobre los impedimientos que puso a la visita el señor marques de Villena" (14 Feb. 1642); *ibid.* vol. 43, f. 836; Villena was the alternative title by which Escalona was known. See also AGN, cédulas originales, vol 1, f. 531. Crown to Escalona, 10 Feb. 1642.

<sup>12</sup>) A(rchivo) G(eneral) (de) I(ndias), (Seville), (Audiencia) (de) México, Leg(ajo) 4, exp(ediente) 281. Palafox to Consejo (de Indias), 19 June 1641; AGN, Inq., vol. 489, ff. 102-104. Palafox to Mex. Inq., 16 Jan. 1642; AGN, reales cédulas dupl., vol. 62, f. 3 v. Crown to Palafox, 18 Feb. 1642.

<sup>13</sup>) ADI, Palafox papers, vol. 65, ff. 310 v.-318.

<sup>14</sup>) Escalona or Villena, Don Diego López Pacheco y Bobadilla grandee of Spain, belonged to a family descended from conversos including the Jew Ruy Capon, see H. Kamen, *The Spanish Inquisition* (London, 1965), p. 20.

*novos* such as the judaizing Captain Sebastián Váez de Acevedo, *provedor-general* of the Armada of Barlovento, to positions of responsibility in Mexico<sup>15</sup>, and in general appears to have shown a tolerance to persons of Jewish descent and connections in the spirit of that of Philip IV's chief minister, the Conde-duque de Olivares. It is also noteworthy that there was no significant Inquisition drive against the Portuguese crypto-Jews in Mexico until after the removal of Escalona, largely owing to Palafox's representations to Madrid, in June 1642<sup>16</sup>. Furthermore, even accepting the viceroy's point that the Portuguese were less strong in New Spain than *Tierra Firme*, the fact remains that they were a comparatively newly-entrenched and increasingly important group in New Spain too. Without doubt the wealth and numbers of the Mexican Portuguese were substantial enough to serve as a convincing, aptly-selected, pretext.

Professor Borah, in the article cited above, has suggested that the Portuguese immigration into Mexico between 1580 and 1640 was significantly larger than historians have tended to assume. Citing evidence relating to the raising of the special donative of 1642-3 in the district of Tulancingo, a mainly Indian district to the east of Pachuca with only a small upper stratum of European settlers, he found that there were in 1643 nine adult male Portuguese in the area. "Unfortunately", wrote Professor Borah, "there are no counts (of the total white population of the district) available, but one may guess that the Portuguese were from 10% to 15% of the adult male (white) population"<sup>17</sup>. Tulancingo, of course, represents too small an area and too small a sample of the white population to have much statistical significance in itself, but if one considers in relation to it available evidence<sup>18</sup> for the neighbouring districts of the *alcaldía mayor* of Pachuca and the *corregimiento* of Huauchinango, which Professor Borah surprisingly omitted to mention, then a somewhat more significant picture begins to emerge. In the silver-mining

<sup>15</sup>) Gregorio Martín de Guíjo, *Diario, 1648-1664* (2 vols. Mexico, 1952), vol. 1, p. 92.

<sup>16</sup>) AGN, Inq., vol. 416, ff. 445-9 v.

<sup>17</sup>) Borah, *op. cit.*, p. 394.

<sup>18</sup>) Colección de documentos inéditos relativos al descubrimiento, conquista y organización de las antiguas posesiones españolas de América y Oceanía, sacados de los archivos del reino, y muy especialmente del de Indias, por D. Luis Torres de Mendoza (42 vols. Madrid, 1864-84), vol. IX (1869), ff. 194-202.

town of Pachuca itself, in the year 1609, there were one hundred European families of which eight were non-Spanish, one being Genoese and seven Portuguese; this is to say that the Portuguese already constituted roughly 7% of the white population of Pachuca only a few years after the large-scale emigration from Portugal, which began early in the reign of Philip III, had commenced. Almost beyond doubt, the proportion by 1640 was significantly greater; indeed 10%, possibly even 15% can reasonably be accounted a conservative estimate. However, taking the white population of the *alcaldía mayor* of Pachuca as a whole, including that is Pachuca's three smaller satellite mining settlements, the Portuguese constituted 5% of the white population in 1609, indeed a reasonable basis for proposing 10% by 1640. At Huauchinango, a predominantly Indian town situated some forty-five miles east of Pachuca, beyond the *corregimiento* of Tulancingo, there were thirty-two European men, women, and children in the year 1609<sup>19</sup> of whom eight were Portuguese – seven belonging to one family – thus placing the Portuguese at 25% of the total. Of course, Huauchinango, like Tulancingo, represents too small a sample to be of any real significance in itself, but with Tulancingo it does underscore the very important information about Pachuca by demonstrating that even in remote districts, further into the interior than such important centres as Pachuca, the Portuguese formed a large minority even at a very early date in the century.

Pachuca, Tulancingo, and Huauchinango are of course neighbouring districts situated in a particular geographical zone to the north-east of Mexico City. The possibility must be reckoned with that there was, for whatever reason, more Portuguese settlement in this region than elsewhere in Mexico. At any rate, without further evidence, there is not sufficient reason to suppose that the Portuguese formed a minority of comparable size to that of Pachuca and its hinterland in the rest of New Spain. Bishop Mota y Escobar's reference to Portuguese in Zacatecas is unfortunately of little help in this regard<sup>20</sup>. His statement that in a total white population of approximately 1200 there were, to his knowledge, some ten or twelve (adult

<sup>19</sup>) Ibid., pp. 123–4.

<sup>20</sup>) Alonso de la Mota y Escobar, *Descripción geográfica de los reynos de Nueva Galicia, Nueva Vizcaya, y Nuevo León* (Guadalajara, Jalisco, 1966), pp. 65–6.

male?) Portuguese and Italians refers to the year 1602, that is to the period immediately preceding the mass emigration from Portugal, and in any case fails to tell us how many of the twelve foreigners mentioned were Portuguese. However, of very considerable value for adding to the evidence of the Pachuca-Tulancingo-Huauchinango area is the information conveyed in a report of Viceroy Escalona to the *Consejo de Indias* in Madrid of 30 December 1641<sup>21</sup>. This report mentions a register of the Portuguese community in Mexico City, supplied by the *corregidor* of the capital to the viceroy and drawn up in response to a printed edict issued by the viceroy a week after his exchange of letters with Bishop Palafox, an edict dated 27 November 1641<sup>22</sup> ordering all Portuguese, and all Creole sons of Portuguese, in Mexico City, to register with the *corregidor's* deputies and to surrender all firearms in their possession within three days. Four hundred and nineteen Portuguese and Mexican-born adult sons of Portuguese were listed as a result and sixteen guns delivered up. Four hundred and nineteen Portuguese *vecinos* would indicate, if one accepts Diez de la Calle's estimate of 8000 white *vecinos* for the total in Mexico City in the mid 1640's<sup>23</sup>, a Portuguese proportion amounting to a little over 5% of the white population of the capital; should it also be thought that it is unlikely, in view of the bad odour in which the Portuguese then found themselves, that quite all the Portuguese in the city did register, that some failed to do so, then one may well be inclined to accept, in the light of Escalona's information, 6% or 7% as a reasonable estimate. In any case, the statistic 419 is a notable one for it is a positive indication of the size of the Portuguese minority in what was the largest city in New Spain and indeed probably in the Americas and, counting women and children, suggests a total *população lusitana* of roughly 1000 to 1500. Although the Portuguese consequently formed a much smaller proportion of the total white population of Mexico City than of Buenos Aires at this time, it is a highly significant fact that measured in absolute terms the Por-

<sup>21</sup>) AGI, México, leg. 4, ramo 6, exp. 306, ff. 4-6 v., Escalona to Consejo, 30 Dec. 1641.

<sup>22</sup>) AGI, México, leg. 4, ramo 6, exp. 305. The same order was apparently sent out to the *corregidores* for general implementation throughout New Spain, see also AGN, ramo de civil, vol. 76, exp. 3.

<sup>23</sup>) Juan Diez de la Calle, *Memorial y Noticias sacras y reales del Imperio de las Indias Occidentales* (1st edn. Madrid, 1646), f. 43 v.



tuguese community of the capital of New Spain was no less than four times that of that celebrated centre of Portuguese settlement on the River Plate<sup>24</sup>.

In the light of the information pertaining to Mexico City, it seems possible to propose with some assurance that although Portuguese minorities in excess of 10% of the total white population, such as that of Pachuca, were perhaps exceptional, Portuguese minorities in the region of 6% were the norm throughout the viceroyalty. Nevertheless, there is good reason to postulate that among the exceptions, to be classed with Pachuca, were some of the most important centres in New Spain. In Veracruz, described by Palafox in his above-mentioned letter to Escanlona as "*la llave principal de estos reynos*", there were in 1641, according to the bishop, "*hay mas portugueses que castellanos*". This is surely a wild exaggeration. But there seems little doubt, in view of the numerous contemporary references to the activities of the Portuguese in the port, that the proportion was very high indeed. The Portuguese *judaizantes* alone, residents of Veracruz, tried by the Mexican Inquisition for judaizing in the decades 1620–1650, included twenty-four adult males<sup>25</sup> which indicates, if one employs Diez de la Calle's estimate of over 500 *vecinos* for Veracruz in the 1640's<sup>26</sup>, that the Portuguese crypto-Jews even without the rest of the *Cristãos novos* let alone the *Cristãos velhos*, constituted 4% of the total white population of the city. Guadalajara, capital of New Galicia and a major trading centre in western Mexico, was the third largest centre of crypto-Judaism in seventeenth-century in Mexico, after Mexico City and Veracruz, seventeen adult male Portuguese judaizers being arrested by the Inquisition between 1620 and 1650, a figure again constituting perhaps 4% of the total. Almost beyond doubt, both Veracruz and Guadalajara had Portuguese minorities in the region of 10% or more of their total white population.

The difficulties in the path of estimating what proportion of the Portuguese in New Spain lived in Mexico City in 1641 would appear

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<sup>24</sup>) A. P. Canabrava, *O Comércio Português*, p. 140; R. de Lafuente Machain, *Los Portugueses en Buenos Aires, siglo XVII* (Madrid, 1931), p. 86.

<sup>25</sup>) AGN, Inq., vol. 399, doc. 12 and case-books of trials of *judaizantes* for 1620–50.

<sup>26</sup>) Diez de la Calle, *op. cit.*, f. 68.

insuperable at least until details are available relating to the mass *composición* of Portuguese illegally resident in New Spain conducted in the years 1595–6<sup>27</sup> and 1641–3. But at least it has come to light that the number of Portuguese who regularized their position in the area under the jurisdiction of the *audiencia* of Mexico – that is exclusive of New Galicia, New Vizcaya, New Leon, Chiapas, and the Yucatan-Tabasco<sup>28</sup> region – and paid their fines under the mass *composiciones* conducted by the officers of Viceroy Guadalcázar and Cerralvo in 1617–19 and 1625 appears to have been 171 and 51 respectively, or 222 in all<sup>29</sup>. Out of this sample of 222 *compuestos* born in Portugal, the Portuguese colonies, or of Portuguese parents in Spain, only 17%, or less than one fifth, lived in Mexico City. Accordingly, were it to prove the case that this proportion in fact corresponds, at least approximately, to the overall pattern of Portuguese settlement in New Spain, that is to say that the *composiciones* of 1595–6 and 1641–3 and the distribution of those Portuguese who either successfully avoided *composición* and being fined or were individually composed and penalized, parallel the *composiciones* of 1617–19 and 1625, then the 419 adult male Portuguese in Mexico City in 1641 would represent roughly 17% of the total number in the area under the jurisdiction of the *audiencia* of Mexico, that is the provinces of Mexico, Puebla, Oaxaca, and Michoacán. It is quite conceivable therefore that there were approximately 2400 adult male Portuguese in the four provinces of inner Mexico in 1641. This would suggest a total *população lusitana* in excess of 8000 for inner Mexico and perhaps 11 000 or 12 000 for Mexico as a whole.

One of the most interesting facts to emerge from a scrutiny of the lists of 1619 and 1625, and the information assembled by the Inquisition regarding the Portuguese *judaizantes*, is that the Portuguese, whether *converso* or non-*converso*, showed no perceptible preference for the silver-mining towns and certainly not for silver-mining. The

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<sup>27</sup>) Colección de documentos inéditos (ed. Torres de Mendoza), pp. 194, 198; Mota y Escobar, Descripción geográfica, p. 66.

<sup>28</sup>) It is clear that there was quite an important group of Portuguese *conversos* in Campeche, as Captain Jerónimo Fernández Correa, an important *judaizante*, and Diego López Cosón, Pedro de Campos, and other Portuguese crypto-Jews were residents of that port.

<sup>29</sup>) AGI, México, leg. 29, ramo 2. Guadalcázar to Consejo, 27 Sept. 1619; AGN, reales cédulas dupl., vol. 50, ff. 122–139.

Portuguese, including the crypto-Jews, were indeed active in Zacatecas, San Luis Potosí, Pachuca, and other centres, but apparently not to any greater extent than they were active in the rest of the country and possibly less. It is true that the lists of 1619 and 1625, excluding as they do Portuguese composed in Zacatecas and the silver towns beyond since those towns were situated in New Galicia and New Vizcaya, give a distorted picture; nevertheless, in view of the fact that San Luis Potosí, the second most important silver-mining centre after Zacatecas and other leading silver towns such as Pachuca, Guanajuato, and Xichú, fell within the boundaries of the four provinces, it is surely significant that only twelve of the 171 of the Portuguese *compuestos* of 1617–19, and seven of the 51 *compuestos* of 1625, were *vecinos* of silver towns. Of nearly 200 Portuguese *judaizantes*, men and women, arrested by the Inquisition for judaizing in Mexico between 1620 and 1650, and this time Zacatecas and the northern towns do enter the calculation, a mere 12% resided in the silver-mining towns.

Of the 171 Portuguese males listed in 1619, besides the twelve from the silver towns, only a further forty-five or so lived in the other main towns of inner Mexico – Mexico City, Puebla, Oaxaca, and Veracruz. Exactly two-thirds of the Portuguese “composed” by Viceroy Guadalcázar farmed, traded, and dwelt in the countryside and small towns mainly of the Bajío, Oaxaca, and the fertile Tlaxcala–Atlixco–Tecamachalco triangle. Of the fifty-one Portuguese *compuestos* listed in 1625, besides the seven in the silver towns, only a further twelve lived in the capital or the main towns; thirty-two dwelt in the countryside and the smaller centres. The Portuguese crypto-Jews, on the other hand, were distributed in a quite different way and were much more concentrated. In their vast majority, they lived in three main centres – Mexico City, Veracruz, and Guadalajara. This difference would appear to correspond to a fundamental difference of social structure as between the non-Jewish and the Jewish groups (the latter being defined as the crypto-Jews and non-judaizing *conversos* together). In the main, it may be fairly said, the Old Christian Portuguese who settled in Mexico came from a peasant, artisan, and small-trading background and, on settling in New Spain, tended to live by farming, craft skills, and small-town trading or else in the arid, undeveloped, frontier areas of the far north as

soldiers, explorers, and small-traders<sup>80</sup>. The *Cristãos novos*, on the other hand, who were, contrary to the belief of Palafox and numerous of his contemporaries, almost certainly the smaller group, were predominantly from a non-artisan urban background – most of the Portuguese crypto-Jews in seventeenth-century Mexico had been born in Lisbon, Seville (of Portuguese parents), and Castelobranco – and naturally gravitated towards the Mexican commercial rather than silver-mining cities and the ports.

The register of 1619, besides giving an idea of the distribution of the Portuguese community does also throw some welcome light on its occupation-structure. Many of the settlers, as has been said, were farmers, ranchers, and soldiers; a considerable group, usually resident in the smaller towns, made its living by transporting crops and goods by trains of packmules. Perhaps more striking though, is the large number of artisans listed, resident both in the small towns and the large cities, especially cobblers, barbers, carpinters, dyers, and leather workers. At the bottom of the social-scale, there was a small group of Portuguese married to Indian women – a sure sign of poverty and lowly station in Mexican Colonial life – and near destitute vagabonds, such as the young, unmarried, Francisco Ledo who was in Huauchinango in 1609, men of no fixed occupation; to this group, though not included in the lists of *compuestos*, might be added the community of half-Portuguese *mulatos* and *mestizos* representatives of which, including a Portuguese *morisco* born in the Portuguese colony of Tangier accused of engaging in sorcery, are sometimes to be encountered in the Inquisition files. Further up the scale, some of the Portuguese artisans in Mexico were highly skilled men. When Viceroy Gelves (1621–4), the most intolerant of the seventeenth-century viceroys regarding the Portuguese, launched his great drive to expel the Portuguese from the silver-mining towns<sup>81</sup>, the *corregidor* of San Luis Potosí entered an urgent though fruitless request for two Portuguese bellows-makers of San Luis to be exempted on the

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<sup>80</sup>) Luis Navarro García, *Sonora y Sinaloa en el siglo XVII* (Sevilla, 1967), pp. 23, 43, 52–3.

<sup>81</sup>) Antonio Brambila y Arriaga, *Relación en favor del marqués de Gelves, Virey que fué de esta Nueva España*, in: M. Fernández de Echeverría (ed), *Documentos para la Historia de México*, 2nd series, vol. III (Mexico, 1855), pp. 213–291, especially pp. 215, 255.

grounds that they were irreplaceable. During Gelves' term of office, the number of Portuguese vagrants in Mexico City, enormously swelled by the addition of those, including artisans and entrepreneurs, who had been driven from the silver towns, were among the most unruly and combustible elements in the capital and it is clear that the Portuguese played a conspicuous role, and were one of the first groups to become involved, in the insurrection in Mexico City of 15 January 1624 which resulted in the sacking of the viceregal palace and the residences of a number of officials and the overthrow of Gelves<sup>32</sup>.

The Portuguese Jews however, though falling into three quite distinct categories<sup>33</sup> – firstly, the *judaizantes*; secondly, those who though they were non-judaizing *Cristãos novos* were unable for various reasons to escape effective inclusion in the New Christian caste in Mexican society; and thirdly, effectively assimilated *Cristãos novos* – had a quite different occupation-structure. The *judaizantes* showed a strong tendency to gravitate, in their socio-economic as well as religious relations, around the handful of big Jewish capitalists and import-export merchants men like Simón Vázquez Sevilla and Matías Rodríguez de Olivera in Mexico City and that remarkable slave-factor, textile importer, and general contrabandist of Veracruz, Don Francisco de Tejoso<sup>34</sup>; the *judaizantes*, dealing in expensive cloths, silks, slaves, cacao, and other merchandise, were mainly big-city subsidiaries and retailers working for those few of their number who had made large fortunes. Slaving, it is worth mentioning, was engaged in by Jewish entrepreneurs usually only initially, in order to gain entry into Mexico and a financial foothold; many of the leaders of the Mexican community had come to the New World via Angola

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<sup>32</sup>) AGI, Patronato real, leg. 223, ramo 5, f. 109 v.; Juan Gutiérrez Flores and Juan de Lormendi, *Relacion sumaria y puntual del tumulto y sedicion que hubo en Mexico* (Mexico, 1625), ff. 8 v.–9 v.

<sup>33</sup>) Categorization of Jews and Jewishness remains of course a largely unresolved historiographical and indeed political problem; doubtless there are other ways of categorizing the Mexican Jews of Portuguese descent and further categories that could be drawn; for a discussion of the varying standards of religious observance among the *judaizantes*, see: S. B. Lieberman, *The Jews in New Spain* (Miami, 1970).

<sup>34</sup>) AGN, Inq., vol. 399, doc. 12; *ibid.* vol. 426, ff. 544–5 v.; vol. 488, ff. 586–v.; vol. 409, f. 579–v.; vol. 489, ff. 383–4 v.

and built up from small beginnings; subsequently, there was a marked tendency to switch from slaves to textiles<sup>35</sup>. The non-judaizing *Cristãos novos*, it is safe to say, similarly tended to follow the various non-artisan urban pursuits in which they had specialized in Portugal, Spain, and in several cases Italy and France: that is to say they entered commerce and the professions. It was largely because of this striking difference in the occupation-structure and social location as between *Cristãos velhos* and *Cristãos novos*, it may be suggested, that the latter group, though almost certainly the minority, loomed so large in seventeenth-century Spanish-American minds.

The Portuguese *conversos* who were non-judaizing but whose Jewishness nevertheless impinged strongly on their careers, are in some respects the most interesting of the three Jewish categories. As so often with Jews in history, a great deal is missed if one fixes one's attention only on those who were, or who tried to be, observant Jews. In Spanish and Portuguese society, Jewishness as well as being associated with Judaism was also something quite apart, a social caste or racial category defined by the *limpieza de sangre* concept, statutes, and certificates, a fact which exerted a powerful influence over the lives of many *Cristãos novos* who felt no particular allegiance to Judaism. Men like the *Bachiller* Don Bernardo Guerrero, a lawyer attached to the *audiencia* of Mexico who had changed his surname, whose father had been reconciled for judaizing by the Peruvian Inquisition, who became involved in Bishop Palafox's struggle with the Mexican Inquisitors in 1647 and was arrested for uttering an angry outburst about the Inquisition and saying of Viceroy Salvatierra, Archbishop Mañozca, and the Inquisitors "*son todos muy lindos ladrones*"<sup>36</sup>, were not *judaizantes* but figured prominently in the social and psychological tension between the Old and New Christian groupings in seventeenth-century Mexican society. Among the instances of this type that might be cited, one of the most important was Bishop Palafox's political secretary, Melchor Juárez, an eminent figure in Mexican politics in the 1640's who played a leading role in the legal process of Palafox's *visita*, heading investigations into the

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<sup>35</sup>) AGN, Inq., vol. 399, doc. 12; vol. 395, doc 3 "proceso contra Melchior Rodríguez López"; vol. 409, ff. 203-6 v.

<sup>36</sup>) AGN, Inq., vol. 429, ff. 406-v.

conduct of various *corregidores* and other royal officers and remaining one of Palafox's chief aides during the latter's brief term as viceroy (June–October, 1642) and subsequently. He was commonly held to be Portuguese though Palafox himself denied that he was Portuguese and referred to him as a native of Badajoz<sup>37</sup>; he was probably born in Badajoz of Portuguese parents. After the Inquisition launched its great drive against the *judaizantes* in the summer of 1642, Juárez name cropped up repeatedly in connection with various of the judaizers. The Mexican Inquisition reported to the *Suprema* in Madrid that although there was no evidence of judaizing in Juárez' case, it was clear that he was closely linked socially with Portuguese Jews and had stayed for a period with a group of them, had had sexual relations over a period with one of the Portuguese-Jewish women arrested in 1642, and that it understood that several of Juárez' relatives in the peninsula had been taken for judaizing by the Inquisition of Llerena, including his brother. The Inquisition spoke of him, on these grounds alone, as "*un ministro traydor*" and asked what prospect there was of having him removed from his position of power and responsibility<sup>38</sup>. Juárez' career was not however cut short. When Bishop Palafox was no longer able to protect him, owing to the vicissitudes of Mexican politics in the 1640's Juárez seems to have betrayed his former patron, possibly being blackmailed by the Inquisition, and to have become secretary to none other than Palafox's fiercest opponent, Archbishop Mañozca, *visitador* of the Mexican Inquisition.

As a rule, it may be said that those Portuguese that successfully penetrated into the upper reaches of Mexican society in the seventeenth-century were either observant or else non-observant Jews. Research has shown that the leading Portuguese mentioned in Palafox's papers in connection with the Portuguese-Castilian tension of 1641/1642 were, apparently without a single exception, – though this was not known at the time – of Jewish background<sup>39</sup>. Sebastián Váez de

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<sup>37</sup>) ADI, Palafox papers, vol. 64, ff. 225–6.

<sup>38</sup>) AGN, Inq., vol. 416, ff. 427–v., 466.

<sup>39</sup>) See the "Ynformacion fecha con ocasion de las Nuevas que binieron de Castilla de Levantamiento de Portugal, de la provencion que iban haciendo los portugueses desta Nueva España y de lo que se ha averiguado en esta razon". ADI, Palafox papers, vol. 65, ff. 310 v.–15 v. and vol. 66, ff. 114 v.–5 v.

Acevedo, the *proveedor-general* of the *Armada* of Barlovento, holds a prominent place on the list: "*tiene lugar*", we are told, "*entre los ricos de primera classe, llego a la mayor opulencia con el trato de los negros que rescatava de Angola y otras partes de Africa asi como Simon Vaez Sevilla, Antonio Mendez Chilon, y otros . . . y despues la dexaron ocupandose en otros gruesos tratos*". Antonio Váez de Acevedo, a brother of Sebastián, commanded an infantry detachment in Mexico City and held other offices, subsequently becoming *alcalde mayor* of Pampanga in the Philippines before being seized by the Inquisition as a *judaizante*. Matías Rodríguez de Olivera is described as a Portuguese and "*hombre opulento con mucha estimacion en toda la ciudad, agasajavanle los virreyes; comunicava con las personas mas nobles y lucidos con meritos de rico solamente*". Simón Montero, another on Palafox's list of leading Portuguese, later turned out to be a Jew of Castelobranco, who had spent some time in the ghettos of Rome, Livorno, and Pisa before making his way to New Spain to make his fortune. Francisco de Tejoso, though estimated on Palafox's list to be worth a mere 70 000 pesos, is mentioned, as he had been on a special *audiencia* report on smuggling drawn up in 1621, as a leading merchant and personality of Veracruz<sup>40</sup>. Gregorio de Guijo tells us, writing of the great *Auto de fe* of 1649 in Mexico City, "*entre los de Sanbenito perpetuo, fue uno el capitan Simon Vaez Sevilla persona que el y su mujer doña Juana de Rivera mandaron esta ciudad, y eran visitados por los oidores y oidoras, regalados y respectados como si fueran los mas nobles del reino; fue su padre de dicho capitan carnicero en Casteloblanco, de donde fue natural, y falta de verdugo hizo el oficio: su padre de dicho capitan Sebastian Vaez de Acevedo fue costalero, y tenia por oficio alquilar en su tierra costales y hacer talegas*"<sup>41</sup>.

But although all the Portuguese notables listed by Bishop Palafox in 1641 were in fact Jewish, there are at least two cases of Portuguese notables in Mexico, of a slightly earlier period, who may have been *Cristãos velhos*, though this is by no means certain. Of particular interest is Simón Enríquez, *regidor* and *depositario general* of the

<sup>40</sup>) AGI, México, leg. 74, ramo 2. Pedro de Vergara to Consejo, 20 March 1621.

<sup>41</sup>) Gregorio M. de Guijo, *Diario, 1648-1664* (2 vols. Mexico, 1953), vol. I, pp. 46-7.



Mexico City *cabildo* in the early 1620's whose certificate of *limpieza de sangre* declaring him to be free of the taint of Moorish or Jewish blood, a *fidalgo de cota de armas* and "*fillo legitimo de Antonio Enriquez e de Ana Bas sua molher . . . naturaes e moradores que foraon na ciudad de Tangera pessoas nobres decendentes de nobre linage dos Enriquez que en este reino saon fidalgos . . .*", apart from being curiously vague, is quite possibly the only document in the Portuguese language to be found in all the records of the Mexico City council <sup>42</sup>.

Another Portuguese personality of some eminence in New Spain was Fray Pedro de Santa María, an Augustinian friar sent from Rome to serve, much to the displeasure of his brethren, as Provincial of the troubled Augustinian province of Michoacán in the years 1629–34; it had been hoped, vainly as it turned out, that a Portuguese would succeed where others had failed in reducing the bitter mutual resentment that had arisen between the Creole and peninsular friars of the province <sup>43</sup>.

The pre-eminence of the Jews among those Portuguese who rose into the upper reaches of Mexican society in the seventeenth century is perhaps most convincingly and readily explicable in terms of their particular socio-economic background. Old Christian Portuguese of comparable ability to Melchor Juárez, Simón Vázquez Sevilla, or Matías Rodríguez de Olivera would scarcely have had much reason to be in Mexico; there would have been opportunities enough for such men of talent nearer home or in the Portuguese colonies. The *Cristãos velhos*, the farmers and artisans who made up the bulk of the *população lusitana* in New Spain had doubtless come to the Spanish New World in search of better opportunities too, but in their case it was mainly their rural background and lack of capital, literacy, and career expertise that had blocked their path in Portugal, not the effects of general discrimination against the *converso* population. The Portuguese Jews in Mexico, like the *Cristãos novos* generally in the Portuguese-speaking world, were essentially bourgeois in character, enterprising and

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<sup>42</sup>) *Actas de Cabildo de la Ciudad de México* (54 vols. Mexico, 1889–1916), vol. XXII, p. 246.

<sup>43</sup>) Diego Basalenque, *Historia de la Provincia de San Nicolás de Tolentino de Michoacán del Orden de N.P.S. Augustin* (Mexico, 1963), pp. 387–90, 398–402.

literate and even where their fathers had occupied the humblest positions in Portugal, as evidently in the case of such leading figures as Simón Vázquez de Sevilla and the Vázquez de Acevedo brothers, were sufficiently adept at acquiring the social graces to gain entry to the society of viceroys, *oidores*, and regional governors.

It is perhaps significant in this connection that the leading members of the Portuguese-Jewish community in New Spain had widely scattered social and business connections in southern and central Spain, Peru, the Philippines, Central America, Venezuela, and, intriguingly, to a certain degree in Italy, but scarcely at all in Portugal or Brazil: to a considerable extent evidently they had broken their links with Portugal. The connections with the Philippines, Peru, and Venezuela will cause little surprise for in the specific context of Mexican commercial development in the seventeenth century, it is to be expected that the *Cristãos novos* played a prominent role in Pacific trade and in opening up the new and highly successful cacao trade with Venezuela<sup>44</sup>; more striking perhaps, especially in view of the traditional bias in Jewish historiography stressing the emigration of *conversos* from the Spanish and Portuguese speaking world in the seventeenth century, is the weight of evidence pointing to migration of Portuguese Jews from France, Holland, Marocco, and especially Italy into Spain and Spanish America during the reign of Philip III and the years of the ascendancy of the Conde-duque de Olivares. At least a score of the *judaizantes* of Portuguese background taken by the Mexican Inquisition between 1620 and 1650 had lived in Italy and France – particularly Livorno, Pisa, Ferrara, Bordeaux and Rouen – and other countries where Portuguese Jews were active during this period<sup>45</sup>. The pressure to emigrate from Italy, it is apparent,

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<sup>44</sup>) Simón Vázquez Sevilla and Antonio Vázquez de Acevedo were plainly not the only Mexican-Portuguese Jewish entrepreneurs closely connected with the Philippines, see AGN, Inq., vol. 399, docs. 12 and 13, vol. 416, ff. 413, 539; see also vol. 430, f. 532 v., information on Pedro de Campos a Portuguese-Jew of Caracas and exporter of cacao to Mexico.

<sup>45</sup>) Details of some of these links are given, in A. Wiznitzer, "Crypto-Jews in Mexico during the Seventeenth Century", in: *The American Jewish Historical Quarterly*, vol. 51 (1961), pp. 223, 227, 242, 243, 257; for others, omitted from Wiznitzer's list, see AGN, Inq., vol. 489, f. 384 v.; vol. 463, ff. 380-3, 579 v.-80, 583; vol. 378, ff. 287-8; vol. 416, ff. 519-20 v.; vol. 431, proceso no. 3, Julián Álvarez of Amsterdam. One interesting example is that of Diego Pérez de Albu-

caused by the sharp down-turn of the Italian economy in the early seventeenth century and the deterioration in the general position of the Jews in Italy, combined with the manifold social and economic attractions of the Spanish empire in the period 1600–1640, were often more than enough to counteract fear of the Inquisition and the statutes against New Christians.

But if it is granted that the more prominent sectors of the *população lusitana* in seventeenth-century Mexico were Jewish and that the Jewish section of the Portuguese population in Mexico had few remaining links with Portugal, the question arises as to how far this group was in fact consciously Portuguese. Plainly Palafox, like most other Spaniards of his time, tended to see the Portuguese, Jews and non-Jews, as being both deeply committed to the cause of the Portuguese restoration and militant Portuguese nationalism; Spanish inquisitors had long been suggesting that both kinds of Portuguese, *Cristãos novos* and *Cristãos velhos*, were prone to co-operate especially at the expense of Spaniards<sup>46</sup>. The Mexican Inquisition, in its letter to the *Suprema* of September 1643 deliberating the pros and cons of expelling its Jewish *reconciliados* to Spain or the Philippines pointed out that “*son todos Portugueses, o descendientes dellos, y si passassen desterrados a España se podrian comunicar con los traidores de Portugal, y si a las Filipinas alli a unirse con los de la India, y ser causa de grandes daños*”<sup>47</sup>. However, it is equally clear that the Portuguese *Cristãos velhos* similarly tended to regard the *Cristãos novos* as political traitors deeply implicated in the Dutch successes in Brazil and other forms of subversion against Portugal<sup>48</sup>. In fact, though the matter is far from clear-cut, recent research has suggested that the prospect of religious toleration under the Dutch was much less enticing in the eyes of Brazilian *Cristãos novos* than is often supposed and it is important to bear in mind that the Portuguese restoration did in

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querque who was brought up as a Jew in Bordeaux and resided in various parts of France, including Rouen, before entering Spain and deciding, “*por ser tanto su pobreza*”, to emigrate to the Indies which he did in 1618; in Puebla, he joined with a small group of Portuguese Jews of predominantly French background. Subsequently, he became a *vecino* of Zacatecas; AGN, Inq., vol. 348, ff. 167–549.

<sup>46</sup>) The letter of Inquisitors Verdugo and Gaytan in: *Proodian*, op. cit., 273.

<sup>47</sup> AGN, Inq., vol. 416, f. 445.

<sup>48</sup>) João Lucio d’Azevedo, *História dos Cristãos Novos Portugueses* (Lisbon, 1921), pp. 236–7.

fact lead to important instances of Jewish participation in the Portuguese national movement including in the bitter colonial war with the Dutch<sup>49</sup>. While there is not a trace of evidence that the so-called *complicidad grande* uncovered by the Mexican Inquisition in the latter months of 1642, was, despite the confusion of certain historians, anything more than a secret, non-political, social and religious association of essentially passive nature<sup>50</sup>, there are a few signs that at least some of the Portuguese Jews in Mexico did sympathize to some degree with the Portuguese national movement. Luis Núñez Pérez, a Portuguese-Jewish peanut-seller who arrived in Mexico in 1641 after passing from Seville and the Canaries through Angola, Portuguese Brazil, Netherlands Brazil and Venezuela as well as Cartagena and Havana was found by the Inquisition to have upon his person political papers revealing him to be a fervent supporter of Portugal even against the United Provinces. The documents, we are told, "*contenia los acuerdos entre la corona de Portugal, y estados de Holanda, de que dio traslado a otros tres Portugueses, que con el se lamentaron que dichos acuerdos mas eran en favor de los de Holanda que en provecho de Portugal ...*"<sup>51</sup>. The Inquisitors, interestingly, also attributed to Luis Núñez Pérez the belief "*de que venia una gruesa armada de Portugueses contra esta tierra*".

The fact that the New Christian background of the Portuguese *conversos* in Mexico was generally concealed, especially before the wave of arrests of 1642, tended to tighten the rather complex bond between the *Cristãos velhos* and *Cristãos novos* and therefore strengthen the tendency of the Portuguese in Spanish-America to seek eachothers company, though it is also true that sudden suspicion of Jewishness sometimes occasioned violent ruptures between previously close Portuguese families.

Portuguese settlement in seventeenth-century New Spain, it may be said in conclusion, was widespread, complex, and sizeable. Any

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<sup>49</sup>) Eduardo d'Oliveira França, Um Problema: A Traição dos Cristãos Novos em 1624, in: Revista de História (São Paulo) XLI (1970), pp. 21-71; Anita Novinsky, Os Cristãos Novos na Bahia (São Paulo, 1972), pp. 142-143, 160-162; C. R. Boxer, A Great Luso-Brazilian Figure: Padre Antonio Vieira, in: The Fourth Canning House Annual Lecture, 1957 (London, 1963), p. 17.

<sup>50</sup>) AGN, Inq., vol. 416, ff. 445-449 v.; see also S. B. Liebmann, The Great Conspiracy in New Spain, in: The Americas, XXX (1973), pp. 18-31.

<sup>51</sup>) AGN, Inq., vol. 412. Proceso contra Luis Núñez Pérez, ff. 416-543.

notion that the Portuguese who entered the viceroyalty were mainly merchants, or mainly New Christians, or that they settled only in certain specific places such as the leading commercial centres or the silver-mining towns would, it appears, be ill-founded. Both *Cristãos velhos* and *Cristãos novos*, persons of rural and of urban background, farmers and artisans, vagrants and capitalists, were strongly represented. The *Cristãos novos* tended to concentrate in the main towns where their leaders, the upper stratum of the *população lusitana* in Mexico, figured prominently, if only briefly, in the most influential circles of the viceroyalty. The *Cristãos velhos* on the other hand, with a rather different distribution and occupation-structure were to be found in all areas from the tropical lowlands of Central America to the arid frontier regions of northern Mexico and in a wide variety of activities. Only in the royal administration and possibly among the clergy were they thinly represented. A reasonable guess would be that by 1641 the whole Portuguese community in Mexico constituted approximately 7% of the total white population.

Despite the very real differences between *Cristãos velhos* and *Cristãos novos*, differences of background, occupation-structure, and religious and racial attitudes, nevertheless, prior to 1642 when a large part of the Portuguese upper stratum was shown to be Jewish, the two groups were one in some degree especially with respect to their common Portuguese nationality and idiom, the *Cristãos novos* having a vested interest, insofar as they could not represent themselves as Castilians or Creoles, in stressing that aspect of themselves that was Portuguese. This element of unity was reflected especially sharply in the attitude toward the Portuguese of the Spaniards. The latter almost invariably bracketed the two groups of Portuguese, Jews and non-Jews, together treating them equally with a somewhat mistrustful tolerance, an attitude by which the *Cristãos velhos* suffered perhaps but the *Cristãos novos*, at least for a time, gained.

Finally, it is clear, as Viceroy Escalona emphasized, that the Portuguese immigration into Mexico in the first half of the seventeenth century was merely part of a much wider phenomenon embracing the whole of the Spanish Indies. Taken together with the Portuguese immigration into the viceroyalty of Peru, the Caribbean islands, and indeed Brazil in this period, it is evident, when the many tens of thousands involved are seen in relation to Portugal's modest popula-

tion of a little more than one million, that the settlement in Mexico was part of a truly massive exodus from Portugal. In the seventeenth century, the age of the general crisis, Portugal by no means escaped the effects of economic decay and adverse changes in social structure that effected so much of Europe. But the Portuguese crisis, which apparently involved a drift from the countryside and fall in agricultural production as well as commercial difficulties<sup>52</sup>, was distinctive in that the demographic stagnation that attended it was the result not of population decline or lack of growth as in Germany, Spain, Poland, Italy, or the Balkans, but of massive emigration to the Americas, emigration of very mixed social composition. Thus the extensive Portuguese settlement in Mexico in the seventeenth century may be regarded as being partly a manifestation of the "General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century" both in that it reflected the drift of population from the Portuguese countryside and small towns and the flight of Portuguese entrepreneurs from a depressed Portugal, a declining Spain, and a stricken Italy.

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<sup>52</sup>) F. Mauro, *Le Portugal et l'Atlantique au XVII<sup>e</sup> Siècle (1570-1670). Etude Economique* (Paris, 1960), pp. 500-3; A. H. de Oliveira Marques, *History of Portugal* (2 vols., New York and London, 1972), vol. I, pp. 323-4.

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DUARTE NUNES DA COSTA (JACOB CUIEL) OF HAMBURG,  
SEPHARDI NOBLEMAN AND COMMUNAL LEADER, 1585-1664

Among the handful of western Sephardi patricians ennobled by European monarchs in the seventeenth century, one of the most remarkable in the secular sphere, as well as one of the most active in synagogue affairs, was the former Marrano Duarte Nunes da Costa, known in the synagogue as Jacob Cuiel, the man who served as "Agent" of the Crown of Portugal at Hamburg from 1641 down to his death in 1664. In 1641, King John IV of Portugal made him a knight of his royal household (*cavaleiro fidalgo*), the same rank as was subsequently bestowed, in 1645, on Duarte's eldest son, Jeronimo Nunes da Costa, who served as "Agent" of the Crown of Portugal in the United Provinces from 1645 until his death in 1697.<sup>1</sup> Although Duarte himself spent only a few years in Holland, in the early 1620s, his life and career were linked in all sorts of ways with the rise and progress of Dutch Sephardi Jewry. In some respects he was a typical representative of an élite. But, when compared with other wealthy western Sephardi patricians, he does seem to have shown an exceptionally strong commitment to Judaism and the furtherance of Sephardi communal life.

According to the well-known geneaeological narration compiled by Isaac de Mattatia Aboab, Duarte Nunes da Costa was born on 26 September 1587 and was the eldest son of the Lisbon physician Dr Jeronimo Nunes Ramires (1545-1609) and his wife, Maria da Fonseca.<sup>2</sup> Thus, in accordance with Sephardi naming practice, Duarte named his eldest son after his own father. Jeronimo Nunes Ramires was in turn the son of a certain Duarte Nunes of Coimbra after whom Duarte Nunes da Costa himself was named. This Duarte Nunes, we know, was a moderately well-to-do cloth merchant and was almost certainly a crypto-Jew as a letter which mentions him, dating from 1560 tells us that he carried on a correspondence with a brother, Fernão Nunes who had fled to the Ottoman Empire and reverted to open Judaism in Constantinople,<sup>3</sup> and since most of his children can be shown,

\* The research on which this article is based was greatly assisted by Marcel Cuiel, of Caracas, a direct descendant of Duarte's, by Edgar Samuel, director of the Jewish Museum in London, and Antonio de Vasconcelos Simão who located all the material found in Portuguese archives. I am immensely grateful to all three.

<sup>1</sup> The exact date of Duarte's ennoblement was 14 June 1641, see British Library MS.Add. 46912, fos.11r-v; Jonathan I. Israel, "The Diplomatic Career of Jeronimo Nunes da Costa", *Bijdragen en Mededelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden* vol. 98, pp. 167-68.

<sup>2</sup> I.S. Revah, "Pour l'histoire des Nouveaux-Chrétiens Portugais. La relation généalogique d'I. de M. Aboab", *Boletim Internacional de Bibliografia Luso-Brasileira* II (1961), 30 see also the extensive notes on the Nunes da Costa family in Hermann Kellenbenz, *Sephardim an der unteren Elbe* (Wiesbaden, 1958).

<sup>3</sup> See the minute of the letter sent to the Inquisitors from Constantinople by Father João Dias in 1560 in Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo, Lisbon (= ANTT) Santo Officio, Papeis avulsos M 7-2608.



from a wide variety of Inquisition evidence, to have been crypto-Jews. Among these, one of Duarte Nunes da Costa's more notable uncles, was Diogo Peres da Costa who spent over twenty years as an itinerant merchant in various parts of the Spanish viceroyalty of Peru before being denounced by the Peruvian Inquisition and searched for unsuccessfully in Potosí, Lima, and Cuzco where his name was publicly called out in the churches. He is known to have escaped (via Seville) to Venice and, from there, migrated to the Holy Land, where he settled in Safed, and reportedly took as his surname what we may infer was the family's late medieval Spanish patronymic – "Curiel".<sup>4</sup> While living the life of a Jew in Safed, this Curiel was burnt in effigy in the Auto-da-Fé at Lima in March 1605.<sup>5</sup> One child of Duarte Nunes who did become a sincere Christian, however, was Bishop Francisco de Vitoria (1540-92) who was perhaps the only Portuguese New Christian to become a Catholic bishop in the sixteenth century and was certainly the first bishop on the soil of what is today Argentina, being raised to the diocese of Tucumán, the first Argentinian diocese, by Philip II of Spain in 1577.<sup>6</sup> But unlike other bishops, Bishop Francisco de Vitoria seems to have had an inordinate interest in trade and was effectively the first to establish the contraband commerce from southern Brazil via Buenos Aires and the river Plate to Potosí.<sup>7</sup>

Dr Jeronimo Nunes Ramires himself showed much less zest for travel than most of his brothers and is mainly noted for his long Latin treatise on blood-letting.<sup>8</sup> Shortly after his death, in 1609, his brother-in-law, Thomas da Fonseca, was seized by the Lisbon Inquisition for judaizing. This placed others of the family in such danger that a sizeable group, including Duarte's mother, Maria, Duarte himself, and his younger brother, Lopo Ramires (later a prominent Jewish figure at Amsterdam) moved from Lisbon to Madrid where they were to remain for nearly two years.<sup>9</sup> But, then, the Inquisition tribunal of Toledo were alerted to the presence of at least one member of this judaizing group and orders were signed in Toledo, on 26 June 1611, for the arrest of the lawyer Duarte Nunes Vitoria who was both Duarte Nunes da Costa's cousin (being a son of another of Duarte Nunes' sons, Luis Nunes Vitoria) and his brother-in-law, being the husband of Duarte Nunes da Costa's elder sister, Guiomar da Costa.<sup>10</sup> Once again in peril, Duarte Nunes Vitoria, returned to Lisbon (probably in order to bring out Guiomar and their children,

<sup>4</sup> Revah, "Pour l'histoire des Nouveaux-Chrétiens Portugais", 298; L. García de Proodian, *Los Judíos en América*.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.; Ricardo Palma, *Anales de la Inquisición de Lima* (Lima, 1863), 6.

<sup>6</sup> Gil González Davila, *Teatro Eclesiástico de la primitiva iglesia de de las Indias Occidentales* (Madrid, 1655) ii, fos. 52-v; I. de M. Aboab states incorrectly that Francisco also became Archbishop of Mexico, a report which is based on a confusion of names.

<sup>7</sup> A.P. Canabrava, *O comercio português no Rio da Prata (1580-1640)* (São Paulo, 1944) 61-3, 87; C.R. Boxer, *Salvador de Sá and the Struggle for Brazil and Angola, 1602-1686* (London, 1952) 75.

<sup>8</sup> See Jeronimo Nunes Ramires, *De Ratione Curandi per Sanguinis Missionem* (1st edn Lisbon, 1608 and 2nd edn. Antwerp, 1610); see also Diogo Barbosa Machado, *Bibliotheca Lusitana Historica, Critica e Cronologica* (Lisbon, 1747), 509-10.

<sup>9</sup> ANTT Inquisição de Lisboa tom. 6172, "Proceso de Duarte Nunes Vitoria", fos. 23, 38, 40, 44.

<sup>10</sup> Archivo Histórico Nacional, Madrid Inquisición legajo 169, no. 5.

who seem to have remained in Lisbon) while the rest beat a hasty retreat across northern Spain, crossing the French frontier and settling at St Jean de Luz.

While Duarte, his mother and others of the family escaped safely from Spain, Duarte Nunes Vitoria, Guiomar da Costa, and two others of Duarte's sisters were seized by the Inquisition in Lisbon, interrogated, tortured, imprisoned, and finally publicly exhibited in autos-da-fé before eventually being able to escape Portugal for freedom and a Jewish life in Holland. In their confessions before the Inquisitors, they disclosed various details about the crypto-Jewish religious gatherings which had taken place in the home of the late Dr Jeronimo Nunes Ramires. They revealed, among others things, that the family's spiritual guide in Lisbon had been none other than Dr Felipe Rodrigues Montalto, the same who later gained fame throughout the Sephardi world under the name Eliahu Montalto and who, in 1612, was called to the French court, by the French Queen-Mother who was desirous of his medical services and who conferred upon him the unique privilege of permitting him to practice Judaism openly in France. It has not hitherto been realised by historians that even before he left Portugal, Montalto was a zealous proselytizer among the Marranos. One of Duarte's sisters describes him in his Lisbon days as "grande letrado nas cossas da Ley de Moyses".<sup>11</sup> This piece of testimony together with the evident fact that Montalto proved to be one of the most determined and vehemently anti-Christian of all early seventeenth-century Jewish polemicists demonstrates not only the presence of genuine crypto-Jewish sentiment among New Christian circles in Lisbon at the end of the sixteenth century, but also that resentment at the cruelties of the Inquisition readily developed, in some individuals, into a more general aversion to the Church and its teachings.<sup>12</sup> Indeed, it is my contention that something of this anti-Christian fervour, so evident in Montalto, also left its mark on Duarte Nunes da Costa, Lopo Ramires, and others of their circle.

Montalto's intimacy with Duarte's family arose in the first instance from the fact that his wife, Jeronima da Fonseca, was a sister of Duarte's mother.<sup>13</sup> He and Jeronimo Nunes Ramires had both married daughters of the famous Dr Lopo da Fonseca. Moreover, Montalto was not only a central figure in the family gatherings in Lisbon, we also know that he remained in correspondence with Maria da Fonseca and her children after he migrated to Italy to live first as a New Christian in Tuscany and then openly as a Jew at Venice. From Venice, he kept in touch with Duarte's family whilst they were in Lisbon and subsequently whilst they lived in Madrid and St Jean de Luz as well as afterwards. Thus he knew all about the perilous "occurrences of Lisbon and Madrid" and, in a letter which he sent to St Jean, in August 1611, describes the great joy felt in his household in Venice on learning of the family's successful flight from Madrid to St Jean.<sup>14</sup> He goes on to remonstrate with the one member of the group, Pero Rodrigues, husband of one of Duarte's aunts, who felt no

<sup>11</sup> ANTT Inquisição de Lisboa tom. 7192, "Proceso de Duarte Nunes da Costa", fos. 9, 12v.

<sup>12</sup> On Montalto's fervent anti-Christianity, see Cecil Roth, "Quatre Lettres d'Elie de Montalto: contribution à l'histoire des Marranes", *Revue des Etudes Juives* LXXXVII (1929), 137-168; Cecil Roth, *History of the Jews in Venice* (new edn New York, 1975), 242-44.

<sup>13</sup> Revah, "Pour l'histoire des Nouveaux-Chrétiens Portugais", 302.

<sup>14</sup> Roth, "Quatre lettres", 148.

particular allegiance to Judaism and preferred to remain Christian than revert to semi-concealed Jewish practice in France as the rest were doing. This immediate reversion to a semi-concealed Judaism in a country where Judaism was officially prohibited is, it seems to me, one of the strongest pieces of evidence undermining the arguments of those scholars who claim that by the early seventeenth century there was no authentic crypto-Jewish tradition in Portugal.

If Duarte Nunes da Costa's father had been a physician and his grandfather an inland cloth merchant, several of his uncles had, as we have seen, entered the exhilarating sphere of colonial trade and travelled widely, as did so many of the new generation of Portuguese New Christians after 1570. With the rise of the Brazilian sugar plantations in the last quarter of the sixteenth century, and the rapid expansion of Spanish American silver-mining, as well as the accompanying increased demand in Ibero-America for African slaves, an unprecedented wealth of new opportunities had arisen. A vibrant trans-Atlantic commercial system had come into being and, for the moment, was based firmly on Portugal and Spain. Besides Diogo Peres da Costa and Francisco de Vitoria, mention should also be made of Duarte's oldest paternal uncle, Fernão Lourenço Ramires, who was active in Lisbon in the 1570s as a "Guinea merchant" and who subsequently also migrated to the Ottoman Empire where he too reverted to open Judaism and adopted the name "Curiel".<sup>15</sup> He is reported to have died at Tripoli in Lebanon. Duarte thus grew up in a Lisbon effervescing with a first wave of Marrano colonial entrepreneurs, and the exotic expertise they had acquired, as well as in a milieu suffused with vibrant crypto-Judaism. There is no reason to doubt, therefore, that the expertise Duarte exhibited throughout his long career in the Brazil trade, the East India trade and, in particular, in diamonds was acquired in his birth-place, Lisbon, before his flight from the Inquisition.

The testimony of his sisters before the Lisbon Inquisitors shows that Duarte had already made several business trips to Madrid, or had moved there, some time before his mother and other relatives fled Lisbon.<sup>16</sup> Probably, he was selling diamonds or other Portuguese colonial wares in the Spanish capital. After departing Madrid, we lose sight of him for several years so that we do not know whether he moved directly from Spain to Florence where he was living some years later or whether he too spent some time at St Jean before moving on to Italy. Either way, he certainly remained in close contact with his family, at St Jean, and, after his mother's death, in 1614 (when Lopo Ramires took his youngest sister and other relatives to Amsterdam) with Lopo in Holland.<sup>17</sup> Indeed, Duarte's business activity in Tuscany was clearly carried on in co-operation with Lopo at Amsterdam, as well as with correspondents in Lisbon. In 1617, for example, merchandise sent by Lopo from Amsterdam, was loaded together with other goods, on Duarte's instructions, at Livorno, onto a ship bound for Tunisia which, unfortunately, sank off Sardinia.<sup>18</sup> Duarte's involve-

<sup>15</sup> Revah, "Pour l'histoire des Nouveaux-Chrétiens Portugais", 298.

<sup>16</sup> ANTT Inquirição de Lisboa tom. 7192, "Proceso de Duarte Nunes da Costa", fos. 3, 10v, 15v.

<sup>17</sup> Maria da Fonseca died at St Jean in February 1614, and Lopo arrived in Amsterdam from St Jean, with his youngest sister, Isobel, in March.

<sup>18</sup> E.M. Koen, "Amsterdam notarial deeds pertaining to the Portuguese Jews in Amsterdam up to 1630", in instalments in *Studia Rosenthaliana*, nos. 767, 1027, 1449, 1470.

ment in the Barbary trade (which was to continue, as we shall see, after he moved to Amsterdam) was presumably connected with the increasing demand at Lisbon for supplies of Mediterranean red coral which was needed for the trade with India.<sup>19</sup> Much of the red coral shipped out to Goa from Lisbon came originally from the Tunisian coast. No doubt, Duarte, like Lopo imported Indian diamonds from Lisbon, along with other Portuguese colonial merchandise, and, like Lopo, he might well, through his agents in Lisbon, have sent goods on the Portuguese East India carracks to Goa.

But throughout his long life, Duarte showed great zest for other things besides trade. In view of the prominent role he played in communal life in Amsterdam from the moment he arrived there, in 1621, it seems clear that he must have gained extensive experience of synagogue affairs whilst in Tuscany. A piece of evidence which vividly illustrates his interest in Judaica is his acquisition, in 1618, whilst in Pisa, of a beautifully decorated medieval Iberian Hebrew bible which he purchased from a member of the Rosilho family, from Fez. As Duarte himself inscribed on the inside of its cover, he bought this venerable bible for its beauty and rarity with a view to keeping it as a treasured family possession.<sup>20</sup> And we know that it did stay in the possession of the Curiels in Amsterdam down to the early nineteenth century. After Duarte's death, it came into the possession of Jeronimo Nunes da Costa who evidently put this bible, as it was known as being one of the most ancient possessed by Dutch Sephardi Jewry, at the disposal of Joseph Athias whilst he was preparing his historic *Biblia Hebraica* of 1667, the "most famous publication to issue from among us in this city" as David Franco Mendes called it.

Duarte, unmarried apparently whilst at Madrid, was married to Ynes Lopes Jorge (Leah Abaz) at some point between 1611 and 1617. To marry an heiress from among the élite of the Antwerp Portuguese New Christian community indicates that he must already have had considerable wealth and status of his own. We do not know the dates of birth of Duarte's two eldest daughters, but we do know that his third child and eldest son, Jeronimo Nunes da Costa, was born at Florence on 29 May 1620.<sup>21</sup> Duarte and his family were still in Florence for a short time after April 1621, the month in which the Twelve Years' Truce between Spain and the United Provinces expired, disrupting so many of western Sephardi Jewry's trade links;<sup>22</sup> but the expiry of the truce, with the banning of all Dutch ships and goods from Portugal, as well as Spain, and the halting of the Dutch carrying trade between the Iberian Peninsula and Italy, would have put a virtual stop to Lopo's and Duarte's previous methods of collaboration. On 30 June 1621, Lopo, at Amsterdam, drew up a notarial deed authorizing "Duarte and Luis Nunes da Costa, merchants at Florence" to collect his share of a debt owed to them by Abraham Cohen de Lucena, at Pisa.<sup>23</sup> Luis, Duarte's nephew, being the eldest son of his sister, Guiomar,

<sup>19</sup> On the role of coral in the diamond trade, see G. Yogev, *Diamonds and Coral. Anglo-Dutch Jews and Eighteenth-century Trade* (Leicester, 1978), 102-4.

<sup>20</sup> *Catalogue de vente de la succession de feu M.D. Henriques de Castro* (Amsterdam, 1899), pp. 44-5; I am told that this bible is today in the collection of the Hispanic Society of America, in New York.

<sup>21</sup> Revah, "Pour l'histoire des Nouveaux-Chrétiens Portugais", 305.

<sup>22</sup> Jonathan I. Israel, "Spain and the Dutch Sephardim, 1609-1660", below, pp. 371-6.

<sup>23</sup> Koen, "Amsterdam notarial deeds" no. 2445.

seems to have been brought up in Duarte's household after the seizure of the boy's parents in Lisbon and to have remained with him subsequently. Thus, it is very likely that Duarte was still in Tuscany at the time of a sensational sale of diamonds in 1621. A large stock of diamonds looted by Algerian pirates from a Portuguese vessel was sold off at Livorno and Florence at rock-bottom prices. With this sale, according to the source used by Braudel, "all Italy became rich".<sup>24</sup> If still present, Duarte was well placed to take advantage of the coup.

Duarte arrived in Amsterdam probably late in 1621 and lost no time in establishing himself socially and commercially in his new milieu. Naturally he joined the same synagogue that his brother was active in – the *Beth Ya'acov*. The fact that he was then already a man of means is shown by his relatively high *finta* assessment (26 guilders), and by his purchase of a large house from a Dutch book-binder on the *Jodenbreestraat*, in March 1622, for 5,900 guilders. From Amsterdam, he resumed trading both with Tuscany and North Africa as well as, by surreptitious means, with Lisbon. In March 1622, taking advantage of high food prices in Italy, Duarte and Lopo jointly freighted a vessel loaded with grain and beans to Livorno.<sup>25</sup> More riskily, in the years 1623-4 they chartered several North German ships and crews, provided with false Hanseatic papers, to sail to Setúbal to load salt ostensibly for a Hanseatic port but in fact for the Dutch market.<sup>26</sup> In 1624, Duarte was one of eleven Amsterdam Portuguese Jews who petitioned the Amsterdam city council to press the States General to send letters to several North African potentates to assure the latter that they were Dutch and not Iberian subjects.<sup>27</sup> Unlike most other Sephardi merchants in Holland, Duarte Nunes da Costa also took an interest in the newly set up Dutch West India Company and its ambitious plans for expansion in Hispanic America, investing 4,000 guilders in the company, an amount surpassed by only one other Jewish investor, namely Bento Osorio, who invested 6,000 guilders, and equalled by only one other, namely Francisco Coutinho, both of whom, like Duarte, also had commercial connections in Italy.<sup>28</sup>

Meanwhile, within a very short space of time, Duarte made a notable impact on Dutch Sephardi communal life. Where his brother, Lopo, was of rather abrasive disposition and was one of the perpetrators of the bitter split which had taken place within the *Beth Ya'acov* community in 1618,<sup>29</sup> leading to the formation of a break-away congregation, *Beth Israel*, which brought the total of Sephardi congregations in Amsterdam up to three, Duarte prided himself on his skill as a peacemaker and conciliator. What his exact role was in the complex communal negotiations of 1622 we can perhaps never know for sure.

<sup>24</sup> Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II* (2 vols. London, 1973) ii, 889.

<sup>25</sup> Gemeentearchief (hereafter GA) Amsterdam, Notarial Archive (=NA) 628, pp. 472-73.

<sup>26</sup> GA Box Index, Portuguese Joden, Soutvaart 1623-4.

<sup>27</sup> *Les Sources Inédites de l'histoire du Maroc* ed. Henri de Castries Ist. ser. vol. IV (Paris-The Hague, 1913), p. 29n.

<sup>28</sup> H. Wätjen, *Das Judentum und die Anfänge der modernen Kolonisation* (Berlin, 1913), 32-3.

<sup>29</sup> J. D'Ancona, "Komst der Marranen in Noord-Nederland", in *Geschiedenis der Joden in Nederland* ed. H. Brugmans and A. Frank (Amsterdam, 1940) 22-30.

According to the chronicler and poet Daniel Levi de Barrios, writing some sixty years later, from second hand information, it was Duarte, or as he calls him Jacob Curiel, who played the leading part in bringing the wrangling to an end and in reconciling the estranged communities. It is quite true that in 1622 the basis was laid for future co-operation between the three synagogues in Amsterdam along radically new lines. Following the collapse of Dutch trade with the Iberian Peninsula, in 1621, the entire economic position of Dutch Sephardi Jewry began to deteriorate and the three synagogues were faced by a sudden crisis compounded of mounting demand for poor relief and diminishing income. Duarte, it seems, played a key role in the talks which led (in February 1622) to the setting up of the *Imposta* board which was the centrepiece of a new communal strategy. The purpose of the *Imposta* was to tackle the sudden acute problem of poor relief and, more generally to "discuss matters general and necessary to the nation and its preservation".<sup>30</sup> The intention was that the board would collect a common tax, or *imposta*, on all commercial and financial transactions engaged in by the membership of the three congregations with which to meet the sharply rising cost of poor relief. At the same time, the board actively promoted the re-emigration of poor Jews, particularly to Italy and the Islamic countries where, it was considered, there were better prospects for settling and employing them. At the same time, great stress was laid in the board's regulations on the continuing need to assist poor New Christian refugees who wished to leave the Iberian Peninsula, or France, and revert to open Judaism in Holland. The emergency was not to be allowed to dilute the proselytizing zeal of the community. In general terms, the *Imposta* was a success. As time went on, the board gradually acquired additional tasks and continued, down to 1639, to serve as the co-ordinating steering committee of Amsterdam Sephardi Jewry and its mouthpiece in dealings with the city authorities.

Duarte, Lopo, and their cousin, Duarte Nunes Vitoria (Abraham Curiel), were all voted onto the six-member *Imposta* board at various times during the 1620s. Duarte Nunes da Costa was elected a *parnas* of the *Beth Ya'acov* community in 1624 and it was in that year that he also served as a member of the *Imposta*. One of the resolutions which he signed in that capacity authorised the sending of 200 guilders to Palermo as a ransom for a rabbi's mother and children reportedly held in captivity there by the Spaniards. The report proved to be untrue, however, and the remittance was cancelled.

According to Levi de Barrios, Duarte's second son, Manoel, was born in Amsterdam at the time of the negotiations which led to the reconciling of the three communities; and it was to perpetuate the memory of this reconciliation that Duarte decided to give him the Hebrew name *Selomoh*, a name deriving, the chronicler implies, from the Hebrew word *shalom*.<sup>31</sup> This rather charming story as to how Duarte came to call Manoel *Selomoh*, Levi

<sup>30</sup> GA Amsterdam, Portugees Joodse Gemeente no. 13 "Libro dos termos da ymposta da nação", founding articles.

<sup>31</sup> Daniel Levi de Barrios, "Vida de Ishac Huziel", p. 4 in *Triumpho del gobierno popular en la Casa de Jacob* (Amsterdam, 1683): "Echò la pasion' writes our author, la mançana de la discordia entre las cabeças de las tres congregaciones de Bet Yahacob, Neve Shalom, y Bet Israel, en el año de 1619, y el cuerdo y solícito Jacob Curiel (que despues fue Regente del Rey Don Iuan Quarto de Portugal en Hamburgo) por la dicha que tuvo de deponerlos en paz, llamò en la circuncion a su segundo hijo *Selomoh* que significa *Pacifico*".

de Barrios presumably heard many years later from Duarte's eldest son, Jeronimo. To further celebrate Duarte's role as a communal peacemaker, and perhaps at Jeronimo's suggestion, Levi de Barrios composed the following sonnet:

Lo discorde aruina la conciencia<sup>32</sup>  
y dividiendo el pueblo lo enflaquece,  
con la vengança al animo envilece,  
y con la ira es landre de la ciencia.

Enciende quien lo apaga, à la clemencia,  
aclara a la salud quien lo obscurece,  
da a la agudeza luz quien lo entorpece,  
y quien lo abate, enxalta a la opulencia.

Marchitó en Amsterdam Hebrea planta  
calor discorde de maestros sabios:  
revivela Curiel con la paz santa:  
Un Salomon alcança en sus victorias:  
y borrando el papel de los agravios,  
haze escribir su nombre en las Memorias.

By the mid 1620s, the Spanish embargoes against Dutch trade were biting harder than ever. More and more of Amsterdam's former commerce with the Spanish and Portuguese empires was being diverted to Hamburg. This is the background against which we must place Duarte's decision, after roughly five years in Amsterdam, to emigrate to the Lower Elbe, following in the footsteps of numerous other Amsterdam Sephardim who had migrated to north-west Germany since 1620.<sup>33</sup> Duarte was still in Amsterdam in May 1626 when, together with Lopo and two other Sephardi merchants, he arranged a cargo to be shipped to the corsair base of Saleh, in Morocco,<sup>34</sup> but he left Holland with his family and belongings shortly after, settling first not in Hamburg but in Glückstadt. However, this time Duarte timed matters badly, his arrival in Glückstadt co-inciding with Denmark's entry into The Thirty Years' War and the consequent advance of the Habsburg armies into North Germany. The defeat of the Danish army at Lutter, on 27 August 1626, spelt the end of Glückstadt's period of prosperity and, when it became clear that Glückstadt, being a Danish possession, was about to be besieged, many of the Sephardi merchants settled there, including Duarte, moved hastily to Hamburg. During 1627 Duarte re-established himself once more both in Jewish community life and in commerce.<sup>35</sup> From 1627 down to

<sup>32</sup> Ibid, p. 5.

<sup>33</sup> See below, 370-1.

<sup>34</sup> GA Amsterdam NA vol. 633, fo. 58.

<sup>35</sup> Staatsarchiv Hamburg (= SAH), Reichskammersgerichtsakten L60, fo. 75; the earliest reference to Duarte in Hamburg which I found in the Staatsarchiv there concerned a cargo of sugar consigned to him from Portugal, see SAH Admiralitätskollegium F4/3, p. 2.

the early 1640s, he was to be one of the most active Portuguese Jewish merchants in Hamburg, dealing mainly with Lisbon and Amsterdam and in a wide range of products, though with a particular emphasis on sugar and especially diamonds. Through most of this period, down to the secession of Portugal from Spain, in December 1640, Duarte collaborated closely with his brother and other Sephardi merchants in Amsterdam in circumventing the Spanish embargoes against Dutch trade with Portugal. He was thus frequently acting on behalf of his Amsterdam correspondents. In the autumn of 1630, for example, a Hamburg ship, the *St Pieter*, returned from Lisbon to Hamburg with various packets of diamonds and pearls from the Portuguese East Indies all marked "DNdC" and consigned to Duarte Nunes da Costa; but the bulk was actually for his brother and wealthy cousins, Francisco and Manoel Ramires Pina, and others living in Amsterdam.<sup>36</sup> The brothers also had connections with Portuguese New Christians in Antwerp and, despite the war, were able to effect a number of transactions in the Spanish Netherlands. In November 1631, a London merchant was empowered to act for Duarte and Lopo in recovering a consignment of Hondschoote says which had been loaded on their joint account at Calais onto a ship bound for Oporto but which had been seized by the English.<sup>37</sup>

Besides collaborating with his relatives in Holland, Duarte conducted a fair amount of routine trade with Lisbon, exporting rye, wheat, and textiles of various kinds, and importing chiefly Brazil sugar and Indian diamonds.<sup>38</sup> He occasionally sent consignments of textiles and other manufactures to other parts of Portugal, including Madeira, and sometimes also to Spanish ports such as Málaga and San Lúcar.<sup>39</sup>

In the late 1630s, a new and rather more political phase of Duarte's career began as a result of his contacts with the man Lopo later to referred to as "our good friend Garcia de Yllan", a Portuguese New Christian merchant of Antwerp with close ties with Spanish ministers in Brussels.<sup>40</sup> Don Garcia de Yllan, as he was known, stood in high regard at the court of the Cardinal-Infante, younger brother of Philip IV of Spain and governor of the Spanish Netherlands in the years 1635-41. By means of his courtly connections, his business acumen, and his wide network of contacts spanning much of western Europe, Yllan obtained the contracts to supply bread, gunpowder and other essential supplies to the Spanish Army of Flanders over a period of years. Probably through Garcia de Yllan, Duarte and Lopo also formed a link with the naval contractors supplying the main Spanish battle fleet at Cadiz. The three years 1636-39, when Olivares was preparing his great *armada* which was eventually to be destroyed by Tromp at the Downs, in 1639, were the peak period for shipments of naval stores and munitions from Hamburg to Cadiz, Lisbon and Corunna and reliable contacts were needed to help co-ordinate the flow of these supplies on the Hanseatic convoys which sailed each year "northabout" (ie. round Scotland and Ireland) – to avoid the Dutch navy – to the Peninsula. The two most prominent of

<sup>36</sup> GA Amsterdam NA vol. 257, fos. 703-4v.

<sup>37</sup> GA Amsterdam NA vol. 941, fo. 410.

<sup>38</sup> On Duarte's grain shipments to Lisbon, see Admiraltätskollegium F3/5, pp. 28, 76, 79, 84.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid. Admiraltätskollegium F4/5, p. 8 and F4/9, fo. 25.

<sup>40</sup> See the references to Yllan in Kellenbenz's *Sephardim*.



these munitions dealers among the Hamburg Jews were, evidently, Silvio del Monte (Selomoh Cohen) and Duarte Nunes da Costa. Several letters are extant, both in the city archive, at Hamburg, and in the *Archives Générales du Royaume*, at Brussels, which show Duarte's central role as a supplier of gunpowder and other munitions both to the Spanish navy and to the Army of Flanders during this period.<sup>41</sup> Duarte's name began to appear in government correspondence. In the summer of 1639, 200,000 lb of gunpowder consigned by Duarte to the Spanish Netherlands for the Army of Flanders was held up by Danish officials at Glückstadt, which prompted the Cardinal-Infante to write to King Christian IV of Denmark, who was then on friendly terms with Spain, to assure him that Duarte Nunes da Costa and del Monte were acting on behalf of Spain. Christian thereupon released the powder consignment at which the Cardinal-Infante wrote again thanking the Danish monarch for his courtesy "in the matter of Duarte Nunes da Costa".<sup>42</sup> Indeed, Duarte seems to have continued sending large quantities of munitions both to Spain and the Spanish Netherlands until a few months after the Portuguese secession from Spain in December 1640. There survives in Brussels an undated draft but clearly written in the spring of 1641, from the context, of a letter from the Cardinal-Infante to King Christian, referring to another consignment of gunpowder which was to be shipped via Glückstadt and Dover (to avoid the Dutch navy) to the Spanish base at Dunkirk.<sup>43</sup> But this was Duarte's last undertaking for Spain. His first munitions contract with the new régime in Portugal is dated 3 August 1641.<sup>44</sup>

News of the Lisbon *coup d'état* of December 1640, we know, caused intense excitement among the Portuguese Jewish and New Christian diasporas. The proclaiming of the duke of Braganza King John IV of Portugal in place of the Spanish monarch and the start of what was to be a long and bitter struggle for independence from Spain elicited – at least initially – a good deal of sympathy among the exiles. As the oppression of the New Christians in Portugal had become much more relentless and systematic than previously from around 1580, thus roughly co-inciding with the beginnings of the Spanish régime, and since the Inquisition was the one Portuguese institution which opposed the break-away from Spain, there seems to have been among the exiles an expectation that independence under a native Portuguese king would lead to a weakening of the Inquisition and some mitigation of the persecution. Indeed, among some Portuguese New Christians abroad the events of December 1640 were soon invested with distinctly messianic overtones as we see from the testimony of several alleged judaisers interrogated by the Inquisition in Mexico City in 1642.<sup>45</sup> Duarte Nunes da Costa was one of those who responded to the news of the Portuguese revolt against Spain with what can only be described as genuine zeal.

An envoy from the new Portuguese king, a nobleman, arrived in Hamburg a few weeks after the *coup d'état*, in January 1641, bearing news of the secession, letters of credit with

<sup>41</sup> Kellenbenz, *Sephardim*, 146, 168, 178, 265, 352.

<sup>42</sup> Archives Générales du Royaume, Brussels, SEA 558, fos. 92-3, 98-v, 102.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid. fo. 207.

<sup>44</sup> Frédéric Mauro, *Le Portugal et l'Atlantique au XVII<sup>e</sup> siècle (1570-1670). Etude économique* (Paris, 1960), 46.

<sup>45</sup> Jonathan I. Israel, "The Portuguese in Seventeenth-century Mexico", *Jahrbuch für Geschichte von Staat, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Lateinamerikas* vol. 11 (1974) pp. 29-30 ; see above, 328-9.

which to buy munitions, and a warning for the king's younger brother, Dom Duarte, who was then in command of a cavalry regiment in the service of the Austrian Emperor, at Regensburg.<sup>46</sup> No doubt the fact that Duarte Nunes da Costa was already one of the principal munitions dealers of Hamburg, and that he was Portuguese, were two major reasons why he was chosen, or asked, to undertake the role of acting as agent of the Portuguese crown in North Germany. But there was clearly also another reason. For it seems that he had already for some time been acting as Dom Duarte's banker and postal agent and that this army officer and member of the high Portuguese nobility now proclaimed a royal prince in Lisbon had stayed for some time in Duarte's house, in Hamburg, in 1639.<sup>47</sup> It would be interesting to know whether Dom Duarte, whilst staying in the house of the Nunes da Costa was aware that the Inquisition back home had recently completed its file on Duarte, satisfied itself that he was a flagrant judaiser and had him publicly burned in effigy in an Lisbon Auto-da-fé. It was because Duarte Nunes da Costa was in contact with Dom Duarte, as well as the fact that he was a munitions supplier, that the Portuguese envoy was eager to make use of his services.

Whether the warning reached Dom Duarte too late, or he was too slow in acting on it, he was arrested on the Emperor's orders, at Spanish request, and imprisoned first at Passau, then Graz and, finally, after having been handed over to the Spaniards, at Milan. The long imprisonment of Dom Duarte at Milan until his death in the royal fortress there, in September 1649, became something of a European *cause célèbre*, numerous potentates, including Queen Christina of Sweden, taking a keen interest in it. There were to be numerous royal and princely requests for his release on grounds of courtly compassion, none of which was ever acted on. Duarte Nunes da Costa, for his part, succeeded in re-establishing contact with the prince through his correspondent in Nuremberg whilst he was being held at Graz; and throughout the time he was held at Milan, Duarte remained his chief means of communication with Lisbon and the outside world generally. From the moment contact was restored, Duarte began remitting the prince money, books, and other necessities. The hapless prince replied from Graz, thanking him for 3,000 florins he had thus far received, sending his compliments to the Nunes da Costa household, and expressing the hope that he would one day be able to repay what Duarte had done for him.<sup>48</sup>

The three main strands of Duarte Nunes da Costa's involvement with Portugal's struggle for independence were as a munitions supplier, as the main channel of communication with Dom Duarte, at Milan, and as a sort of auxiliary to the Portuguese diplomatic offensive which now took place in northern Europe. On occasion, this latter gave Duarte scope for a role in politics itself. Thus, for instance, after John IV's first envoy to Sweden, Francisco de Sousa Coutinho, had succeeded in gaining Swedish recognition for the new Portuguese Monarchy, he consulted Duarte, on the king's orders, in the summer of 1641, as to how

<sup>46</sup> *Lettres de M.J. de Wicquefort* (2nd edn, Utrecht, 1712), pp. 130-131.

<sup>47</sup> ANTT Miscellanea da Graça cela O, caixa 17, tomo 4B, pp. 552-53. Duarte Nunes da Costa to Conde de Vidigueira, Hamburg, 27 June 1643; José Ramos-Coelho, *História do Infante D. Duarte irmão de el-rei D. João IV* (2 vols. Lisbon, 1889) i, 267.

<sup>48</sup> ANTT Misc. da Graça, loc. cit. pp. 609-11. Dom Duarte to Duarte Nunes da Costa, Graz, 14 July 1642.

best to protest before the Imperial Diet of the Holy Roman Empire, gathered at Regensburg, at the Emperor's seizure of the king's brother. Duarte advised that it would be neither safe nor dignified for Sousa Coutinho, his secretary, or any Portuguese representative to risk entering Germany without a safe-conduct from the Emperor who had aligned himself with Spain against Portugal.<sup>49</sup> Sousa Coutinho had to content himself with publishing and distributing in Germany, with Duarte's assistance, a Latin manifesto appealing to the Diet for Dom Duarte's release. In the early 1640s, Duarte Nunes da Costa was, in effect, unofficial Portuguese *chargé d'affaires* in Germany.

From August 1642, the co-ordination of Portuguese diplomacy in northern Europe (and the efforts to effect Dom Duarte's release) were entrusted to John IV's ambassador at Paris, the Conde de Vidigueira, later known as the Marquês de Niza. While Duarte continued corresponding fairly regularly both with ministers in Lisbon and with Portuguese diplomats in Holland, Sweden and, later, at Osnabrück, his main official correspondence from that date onwards was with Vidigueira, at Paris. This correspondence, like much or most of Vidigueira's mail, passed through the hands of Duarte's nephew, Duarte Rodrigues Lamego, a prominent Portuguese New Christian merchant of Rouen.<sup>50</sup> Although he still held no formal title as "Agent", Duarte's position in the fledgling Portuguese diplomatic network was fully recognized and regularized. He had been ennobled by the king in June 1641 and entered in the secret Portuguese diplomatic cipher as number "14". Undoubtedly, he was trusted with a good many secrets, especially matters concerning Portuguese relations with Germany and Sweden and the Dom Duarte affair. When Sousa Coutinho arrived in The Hague, in July 1643, to take up his post as ambassador there, Vidigueira wrote to him from Paris, among other things assuring him of the reliability of Duarte Nunes da Costa and his son Jeronimo. Sousa Coutinho replied that

"Your Excellency anticipated me in recommending Duarte Nunes da Costa and his son, for I would have written likewise to you as a result of my long knowing these men, both on account of the general debt that the realm owes to them and my particular obligation towards them, and thus it is most willingly that I acknowledge Your Excellency's recommendation".<sup>51</sup>

After settling in Hamburg late in 1626, Duarte Nunes da Costa seems to have led a much more sedentary life than previously and only very rarely left the city. However, he did make a trip to Amsterdam and The Hague in August 1643.<sup>52</sup> Besides visiting his son, friends and relatives who, he recounts, made quite a fuss of him, he spent a good deal of

<sup>49</sup> ANTT Misc. da Graça, loc. cit. p. 652; Ramos Coelho, *História do Infante* i, 411; Kellenbenz, *Sephardim*, 354.

<sup>50</sup> Duarte was the eldest son of a younger sister of Duarte's, Beatriz Henriquez (Sarah Rodrigues Lamego), wife of the well-known judaising merchant of Rouen, Antonio Rodrigues Lamego.

<sup>51</sup> *Correspondência diplomática de Francisco de Sousa Coutinho durante a sua embaixada em Holanda*, ed. E. Prestage, e.a. (3 vols. Coimbra-Lisbon, 1920-55) i, 21.

<sup>52</sup> ANTT Misc. da Graça, loc. cit. pp. 497-500, 649-53. Duarte Nunes da Costa to Vidigueira, The Hague, 17 and 31 August 1643.

time at the Portuguese embassy in The Hague conferring with Sousa Coutinho and Dr Botelho de Moraes, the envoy who was then *en route* between Lisbon and Stockholm charged with gaining Queen Christina's support and protection for the projected Portuguese delegation to the European peace conference shortly due to open at Münster and Osnabrück. No doubt he was asked to brief his superiors on political circumstances in Germany. He was also brought into a new and picturesque plot to effect Dom Duarte's escape from the royal fortress at Milan by disguising him as one of the wagoners who came and went on the daily food wagons. This, like all the other schemes, proved in vain.

Dr Botelho succeeded in the first part of his mission, in Stockholm, and then went on to Germany, landing at Wismar, on the Baltic coast. Duarte sent his younger sons, Manoel and Jorge Nunes da Costa to meet him there.<sup>53</sup> And, indeed, he was in urgent need of their assistance, for he was in poor health and while fluent in Latin spoke no German. Moreover, he and Duarte's sons, were marooned at Wismar for many weeks owing to the outbreak of war between Sweden and Denmark and the movement of Swedish troops from North Germany towards Jutland. Dr Botelho finally reached Hamburg in February 1644 and spent the next two months recuperating in the comfort of the Nunes da Costa household. Whilst he was there the house was naturally the focus of a great deal of attention. The Hamburg burgomasters came several times to pay their respects and to discuss problems encountered by Hamburg shipping in Portugal. Botelho finally set out from Hamburg for Osnabrück on 11 April 1644. As no cash had reached him from Lisbon, Duarte spent nearly 5,000 *cruzados* in equipping him with coach, horses, servants and suits befitting his status as Portugal's chief envoy to the European peace congress.<sup>54</sup> He was escorted from the walls of Hamburg to Osnabrück by Swedish troops. However, before any progress had been made, Botelho died at Osnabrück in December 1644 and Duarte had to arrange the return of his body, papers and possessions first to Hamburg and then to Portugal.

A necessary ingredient in all Duarte's functions on behalf of Portugal was his wealth and financial expertise. Duarte was the Hamburg correspondent of the Lisbon New Christian bankers, Balthasar Rodrigues de Mattos and Manoel Garcia Franco, who handled the Portuguese crown's foreign payments. But, in general, Duarte did not act as a regular banker for the Portuguese crown, except in the relatively minor case of his remittances to Dom Duarte in Milan. Amsterdam not Hamburg was the centre with which the Lisbon bankers preferred to deal and even the remittances from Lisbon to the Portuguese resident in Stockholm normally passed through the hands of Duarte's brother, Lopo, at Amsterdam rather than his own, despite the fact that Portuguese diplomatic mail for Sweden did pass through his hands.<sup>55</sup> But while Duarte had no regular part in Portugal's foreign payments system, he certainly did play an important back-up role in the financing of

<sup>53</sup> Ibid. pp. 441, 447-49; Ramos-Coelho, *História do Infante* i, 430-31.

<sup>54</sup> ANTT Misc. da Graca loc. cit. p. 422; Ramos-Coelho, *História do Infante* ii, 186.

<sup>55</sup> Duarte also handled Portuguese diplomatic mail passing between Stockholm and Osnabrück, see "Relações diplomáticas entre Portugal e a Suecia (1644-1650)" in *Revista de Historia* (Lisbon) XIV (1925) pp. 267, 269, 274, 277, 278.

Portugal's undertakings in northern Europe. Scheduled remittances from Lisbon were frequently delayed and it was not infrequently only Duarte's willingness to advance cash in the expectation that the hard-pressed king would find some means of repaying him sooner or later which prevented acute difficulties and embarrassment. The case of Dr Botelho's coach and horses has already been mentioned. Another such instance was the predicament of Dr João de Guimarães, Portuguese resident at Stockholm from 1643 to 1650 who had the important task of helping preserve the Portuguese-Swedish alliance against the Habsburgs but payment of whose salary and expenses was so slow that at one point he had received nothing from Lisbon for over two years.<sup>56</sup> By March 1649, already due to leave Sweden, Guimarães was in despair, believing that he would be prevented from leaving on account of his debts. He wrote to Botelho's successor at Osnabrück, Luis Pereira de Castro, that he did not "dare ask Duarte Nunes da Costa to extricate me from this as I already owe him 3,000 thalers which he advanced me out of friendship and his innate goodness".<sup>57</sup> But it was Duarte who rescued him and by the time Guimarães finally left Sweden and arrived for a stay at Hamburg in the Nunes da Costa household (where, he told his colleagues, he was most lavishly entertained), his debt to Duarte had risen to 6,000 thalers. Even before this latest episode, in February 1649, Guimarães wrote to Pereira de Castro, at Osnabrück, that he considered Duarte a "noble, truthful and courteous man and extremely zealous for the service of His Majesty, such that it seems to me in him Your Excellency has a true friend."<sup>58</sup>

As an entrepôt for arms, gunpowder and naval stores for countries such as Portugal which were unable to produce such *matériel* in any quantity, Hamburg in the mid seventeenth century came second only to Amsterdam. In the early 1640s, Duarte did play a part of some significance but on an appreciably smaller scale than did his brother, Lopo, at Amsterdam. In the opening phase of the Portuguese struggle for independence, Duarte dispatched some 30,000 cruzados worth of military and naval stores to Portugal whereas Lopo, who was supplying muskets, artillery and siege equipment as well as stores and supplies, serviced a contract for 100,000 cruzados worth of arms and munitions in the same period.<sup>59</sup> In any case, in the early stages of the Portuguese revolt, whilst Portugal and the United Provinces remained on friendly terms, those non-Jewish Dutch dealers who ordinarily dominated the arms market but had no particular links with Portugal encountered no difficulty in obtaining licenses from the States General to export arms there. In 1641, for instance, Jan van der Straeten dispatched 4,000 muskets, 2,000 pikes, fifty large guns and 50,000 musket shot to Lisbon.<sup>60</sup> In these early years, Hamburg's role was dwarfed

<sup>56</sup> ANTT Misc. da Graça, loc. cit. pp. 495-96. Duarte Nunes da Costa to Vidigueira, Hamburg, 2 Jan. 1649.

<sup>57</sup> See Guimarães' letter in "Relações diplomáticas" part ii, *Revista de História* XV (1926) p. 29.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid p. 28; in an earlier letter (p. 6), Guimarães describes Duarte as "homem de muita verdade e mais que ordinario primor".

<sup>59</sup> GA Amsterdam NA 1555B, pp. 1103-4; Virginia Rau, "A embaixada de Tristão de Mendonça Furtado e os arquivos notariais holandeses", *Anais da Academia Portuguesa da História* 2nd ser. VIII (1958), 115-116; ANTT Misc. da Graça, loc. cit. pp. 534-36, 401-4.

<sup>60</sup> Algemeen Rijksarchief, The Hague, Verzameling Bisdom vol. 68, pp. 44, 55, 68.

by that of Amsterdam. Only in the late 1640s and 1650s, for a variety of reasons, including the steady deterioration in Dutch-Portuguese relations owing to the struggle in Brazil, did Hamburg's share of the trade become more important.

Duarte's initial round of munitions purchases in 1641-3 included gunpowder, masts, ropes, pitch and, in one case, an entire ship, the *St Pieter* which he hired, manned, fitted out as a warship and sent to Lisbon. But while the king was at pains to pay for his purchases in Holland, he showed not the slightest haste in paying his bills in Hamburg and from 1643 until 1646 Duarte refrained from sending any more *matériel*, concentrating his efforts on securing repayment for what he had dispatched already. And, indeed, he had taken quite a risk for at the time it must have seemed that the still precarious new régime in Portugal might collapse under the weight of Spanish pressure in which case Duarte would never have retrieved a penny. In 1645, he was formally proclaimed "Agent" of the Portuguese crown at Hamburg but still sent no money. He complained over this repeatedly to both Sousa Coutinho and Niza (Vidigueira). It was not until 1646, on Niza's prompting, that a ship-load of 40,000 cruzados worth of East India pepper was sent to Duarte at Hamburg to clear the royal debt.

Duarte made his most vital contribution as a supplier in 1648 when John IV and his ministers were engaged in setting up the new Portuguese Brazil Company.<sup>61</sup> This was the organisation which in the early 1650s put Portugal's trade with southern Brazil back on its feet, despite increasing Dutch privateering at Portuguese expense in the South Atlantic. But its success depended on forming convoys with powerful naval escorts which, in turn, depended on John IV's capacity to attract sufficient investment and acquire additional warships and supplies of naval stores. The king's confidant, the great Jesuit statesman and writer António Vieira was sent to Holland both to woo Portuguese Jewish investment by advertising the king's forthcoming guarantee that all money invested in the Company should be exempt from confiscation by the Inquisition and to supervise the acquisition of new ships, stores and seamen. Prospects for large munitions purchases in Holland by the Portuguese were less good than previously but the way still seemed to be open. What largely paralysed the efforts in Holland was the sudden arrest in December 1647 by the Inquisition in Lisbon of the banker Duarte da Silva who had issued the letters of credit with which the purchases were to be made.<sup>62</sup> Lopo Ramires (who was much less zealous in his support for Portugal than his brother) and other leading Portuguese Jewish merchants in Holland, notably Bento Osorio, refused to step into the gap and advance the necessary funds, and Jeronimo at that time did not possess the means.

When Vieira, Sousa Coutinho, and his son, Jeronimo, all sent letters asking him to take the matter in hand, Duarte at once agreed. Within a few weeks Duarte had bought two large ships, of 220 and 180 lasts, and was fitting them with guns, and was negotiating both at Hamburg and Lübeck, and through his agent in Lübeck, Henrik Bremer, also in

<sup>61</sup> On the Brazil Company, see C.R. Boxer, *The Dutch in Brazil, 1624-1654* (2nd edn. Hamden, Conn., 1973) 208-13; and C.R. Boxer, "Antonio Vieira S.J. and the Institution of the Brazil Company", *Hispanic American Historical Review* XXIX (1949), 474-97.

<sup>62</sup> J. Lúcio de Azevedo, *História dos Cristãos Novos Portugueses* (2nd edn. 1975), 265.

Stockholm, with a view to purchasing more.<sup>63</sup> Several times his sons, Manoel and Jorge, travelled back and forth between Hamburg and Lübeck as they scoured the ports for gunners, surgeons, and other trained personnel willing to serve the king of Portugal at sea against the Dutch. By mid-April, Duarte had bought and was equipping a third vessel. All this activity in the ports of Hamburg and Lübeck naturally caused quite a stir.<sup>64</sup> Manoel Bocarro Frances (Jacob Rosales), Spain's Jewish agent in Hamburg, and thus a political rival of Duarte's, wrote to the Spanish minister, the Conde de Peñaranda, at Brussels, that "in Lisbon the merchants have formed a company for Brazil which is intended to operate thirty-six well-armed warships to Brazil in two squadrons and protect their merchant ships. The ships and supplies they must procure in these parts, for they have no other recourse and already Duarte Nunes da Costa, Agent of Portugal, has bought three good vessels and looks for another three, and will search for more, and has purchased large quantities of munitions".<sup>65</sup>

In Lisbon, the king had promised to remit funds promptly but with his finances in a chaotic state this was easier said than done. By mid April, by which time Duarte had incurred debts and expenditures approaching 100,000 *cruzados*, not a *cruzado* had been received from Portugal. Vieira, at The Hague, following closely what was happening at Hamburg, became seriously concerned. He wrote to the Marquês de Niza at Paris that he was filled with anxiety "out of regard for Duarte Nunes who is courting disaster and I reproach myself for having urged him to do this."<sup>66</sup> Fortunately for Duarte and his family, a few days after Vieira penned these lines two ships out from Lisbon docked at Hamburg bearing letters of exchange and pepper consigned to "Duarte Nunes da Costa" of a combined value of 100,000 *cruzados*.<sup>67</sup>

As Agent of the King of Portugal in Hamburg, Duarte also played a notable part in the propaganda war against the Habsburgs. A variety of manifestos and tracts were printed by the Portuguese outside Portugal during the 1640's as part of the wider campaign against Philip IV of Spain and his allies. We have already noted the case of the Latin tract Duarte had circulated in Germany in 1641. This was followed by a series of others. On Botelho's instructions, Duarte had another Latin tract, presumably denouncing the Spaniards for trying to prevent the Portuguese delegation taking part in the peace congress at Osnabrück, published at Hamburg in August 1644.<sup>68</sup> In June 1645, Pereira de Castro sent Duarte the text of another propaganda sheet from Osnabrück, asking him to have it printed and then distributed not just throughout Germany but in Scandinavia, Poland and Italy as well.<sup>69</sup> As part of the propaganda war, Duarte also had a number of engravings

<sup>63</sup> *Cartas do Padre António Vieira* ed. J. Lúcio de Azevedo (3 vols. Coimbra, 1925-8), i, 161-68; Kellenbenz, *Sephardim*, 151.

<sup>64</sup> Archiv der Hansestadt Lübeck, Nachlass Hagedorn 6, minute of letter from Duarte Nunes da Costa to Lübeck city council, Hamburg, 24 May 1648.

<sup>65</sup> Archives Générales du Royaume, Brussels, SEG 604, fos. 179r-v.

<sup>66</sup> *Cartas do Padre António Vieira* i, 183; see also Bibliotheca municipal de Evora MS VI/2-11, fo. 229. Marquês de Niza to Duarte Nunes da Costa, Paris, 28 March 1648.

<sup>67</sup> *Cartas do Padre António Vieira* i, 187.

<sup>68</sup> ANTT Misc. da Graça, loc. cit., p. 419. Duarte Nunes da Costa to Niza, Hamburg, 19 Aug. 1644.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid. pp. 691-92. Duarte Nunes da Costa to Niza, Hamburg, 17 June 1645.

made of portraits of various Portuguese dignitaries and diplomats for distribution throughout Europe and the Portuguese colonial empire. The technique of engraving, so typical of north-west Europe in the seventeenth century, and so central to the publicity methods of the time, was apparently virtually unknown in Portugal. Duarte, it seems, was especially proud of the engraving which he had made of Dom Duarte in 1643.<sup>70</sup> When Botelho stayed at his house early in 1644, Duarte had his portrait engraved, publishing it alongside an engraving of Queen Christina as a means of publicising Sweden's support for Portugal's aspirations at Osnabrück.<sup>71</sup>

While Duarte showed great constancy and zeal on behalf of Portugal and, on occasion, risked large sums of money where other great merchants were unwilling to do so, it would be wrong to infer that he was unbusinesslike in his approach to his undertakings on behalf of the Portuguese crown. Duarte was an idealist in the sense that he acted largely on trust and had faith in the ultimate success of the House of Braganza, putting up with long delays in recovering his expenses. But his whole attitude was nevertheless infused with a shrewd awareness of the longer-term possibilities and opportunities which his agency duties offered as well as of the higher social status which they afforded. In the autumn of 1644, after years of procrastination, the king finally honoured Duarte by openly and publicly proclaiming him his "Agent" in Hamburg. And this securing of a public title undoubtedly opened up a whole range of new commercial and social opportunities for the Nunes da Costa family. In thanking Niza for interceding with the king on his behalf, Duarte observed that he would be unable to serve the king as he would wish until he was reimbursed for what he had already spent on the king's behalf out of his own pocket and until he was allocated a salary appropriate to his new title:

"To correspond with the honour which His Majesty has now conferred upon me, Your Excellency well knows that it is necessary that I affect the same ostentation as do the agents and residents of other crowns in this city and thus I must ensure that I am respected as they are and keep a carriage with two horses. For we must not show lack of means which would corroborate what our enemies say about the precariousness of our realm."<sup>72</sup>

Duarte did in fact raise his life style appreciably late in 1644, acquiring a carriage which was possibly the first to be owned among the Jews of Hamburg, and adding two male servants to his household. He was still an active merchant. In February of that year a ship arrived from Lisbon carrying forty chests of Brazil sugar, a substantial quantity, for his account.<sup>73</sup> But from around the end of that year, he ceased to frequent the exchange and other business places of Hamburg in the way that he had formerly, doubtless considering that this was incompatible with his new dignity. After 1645, we find cargoes of sugar and

<sup>70</sup> Ibid. pp. 457, 598.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid. p. 416. Duarte da Costa to Niza, Hamburg, 19 Aug. 1644.

<sup>72</sup> ANTT Misc. da Graça, loc. cit., p. 673. Duarte Nunes da Costa to Niza, Hamburg, 7 Feb. 1645.

<sup>73</sup> SAH Admiralitätskollegium F4/13, fo. 2.



pepper consigned to him from Portugal but outward bound cargoes are usually registered in the names of his sons which suggests that he now left the day-to-day details of business to them. In 1647, after receiving his bumper reimbursement of 100,000 *cruzados* from Lisbon, Duarte moved into an imposing new house on the Krayenkamp. As Jews were not allowed to own real estate in Hamburg, he had to lease the premises from a Christian.<sup>74</sup> It was in this princely mansion that Duarte spent his last years and lavishly entertained Dr Guimarães in 1650. After Duarte's death, it briefly belonged to his second son, Manoel Nunes da Costa; but he seems to have moved out in 1666 at the time of the Shabbatian turmoil, perhaps momentarily intending in the intoxication of the moment to emigrate to the Holy Land, and the house was put at the disposal of Queen Christina who was then on one of her lengthy visits to the city. The house was finally sold to the Queen, in 1668, for 17,000 thaler.<sup>75</sup>

In 1648 Duarte had taken a very considerable risk but it is clear that all along he had his eye on a commensurate reward. In May 1649, still in the midst of his munitions purchases for the Brazil Company, Duarte wrote to Pereira de Castro, reminding him of his knowledge of the sugar trade, and asking him to help persuade the king to nominate him "general factor" of the Brazil Company in northern Europe. This was a sweeping request and the king did not meet it in full. But while Duarte and his sons acquired no rights over the sale of Portuguese sugar and Brazil-wood in England and France, he did become the Company's factor for Germany and his son, Jeronimo, for the United Provinces. These commercial agencies were certainly very lucrative and may be seen as the ultimate reward for Duarte's efforts and those of his sons.

John IV's hesitation about conferring public honours on Duarte Nunes da Costa arose, of course, from the family's open allegiance to Judaism. The new Portuguese king was an exponent of *raison d'état* and a *politique*; but, being king of Portugal, he felt that he had to preserve his image as an impeccably Catholic monarch and persecutor of Jews. On one occasion, Sousa Coutinho remarked of Duarte and his sons that "were they not Jews, I do not know how His Majesty would be able to repay what he owes them."<sup>76</sup> Eventually the king did appoint Duarte his Agent in Hamburg, but, had he not been a Jew, he would obviously have received much higher honours. By a special patent of 1646, the king also declared that Duarte's second son, Manoel Nunes da Costa, should succeed to the Hamburg agency, on the death of his father, as a matter of right and receive the same annual stipend of 650 *cruzados*.<sup>77</sup>

By 1650, the difficult early phase of the Portuguese struggle for independence was over, the Brazil Company was established and, in September 1649, Dom Duarte died. Moreover, with the end of the Thirty Years' War, in 1648, and peace between Sweden and

<sup>74</sup> Hugo Valentin, *Judarnas historia i Sverige* (Stockholm, 1924), 51; Hermann Kellenbenz, "Königin Christine und ihre Beziehungen zu Hamburg", in *Analecta Reginensia I: Queen Christina of Sweden. Documents and Studies* (Stockholm, 1966), 190.

<sup>75</sup> Kellenbenz, "Königin Christine", 190.

<sup>76</sup> *Correspondência diplomática de Francisco de Sousa Coutinho* 1, 14.

<sup>77</sup> See patent in favour of Manoel Nunes da Costa, in ANTT livros das matrículas dos moradores da casa real VI unpaginated.

the Emperor, the Portuguese-Swedish alliance lost its former centrality in Portuguese diplomacy. All this, inevitably, tended to diminish the former role of the Agent of the Portuguese crown in Hamburg. Duarte still performed one or two notable functions. In 1650, on the king's orders, he organised the recruitment and dispatch to Portugal of some 2,500 German troops made redundant by the end of the Thirty Years' War who were needed to reinforce the defence of the Portuguese frontiers against Spain.<sup>78</sup> Occasionally, one of Duarte's reports would be discussed in the royal council of state in Lisbon, as occurred in February 1652, when he reported details of Swedish plans to found colonies along the Guinea coast where the Portuguese had traditionally claimed to rule. This led to the lodging of a Portuguese diplomatic protest in Stockholm. Duarte also undertook some notable transactions on behalf of the Brazil Company. Thus, when, in 1650, Duke Jacob of Courland, an eager mercantilist and connoisseur of commercial projects, sought an arrangement with the Company whereby he could invest and participate in the trade via Lisbon with Portuguese Brazil, the agreement was arranged by Duarte who may indeed have been the originator of the whole idea.<sup>79</sup> But, broadly speaking, in the 1650s Duarte's agency duties settled down into an undramatic, largely newsgathering routine. In the last years of his life, Duarte is again most notable for his role in Jewish community affairs.

There is little direct evidence concerning Duarte's role in the communal negotiations in Hamburg in the early 1650s which led to the merging of the three original congregations – *Talmud Tora*, *Keter Tora* and *Neve Shalom* – into one single united community, under the name *Beth Israel*, and the even more difficult process of persuading a reluctant Hamburg Senate to allow, for the first time, the building of a public synagogue in Hamburg.<sup>80</sup> We know that there was much stronger ecclesiastical and popular opposition to this in Hamburg than had been the case at Amsterdam in 1639. And we also know that a few key personalities from among the twenty-two Portuguese Jewish heads of household who signed the founding *hascamoth* (who included, besides Jacob Curiel, Agent of the Crown of Portugal, David and Mosseh de Lima, who had links with the Danish court, and Jacob Rosales, Agent of Spain and therefore an open political rival of Duarte's) played a disproportionately preponderant role in the proceedings. The three separate congregations had each been strongly identified with particular patrician families and cliques. The *Neve Shalom*, for instance, had been founded by Mosseh de Lima, and was presided over by the de Lima family.<sup>81</sup> The forming of a united congregation involved establishing an intricate balance of status and influence between the leading families. And this was largely but not wholly successful. From subsequent reactions, it seems that Jacob Curiel did play a central role and that while this was applauded by many, his ascendancy was also resented by some

<sup>78</sup> "Relações diplomáticas" part ii, *Revistade Historia* XV, 33.

<sup>79</sup> O.H. Mattiesen, *Die Kolonial- und Überseepolitik der kurländischen Herzoge im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert* (Stuttgart, 1940), pp. 97-100.

<sup>80</sup> A. Feilchenfeld, "Anfang und Blütezeit der Portugiesengemeinde in Hamburg", *Zeitschrift für Hamburgische Geschichte* X (1899), pp. 220-22; Max Grunwald, *Portugiesengräber auf deutscher Erde* (Hamburg, 1902), 18-19.

<sup>81</sup> Levi de Barrios, "Vida de Ishac Huziel", p. 12.

and, in particular, by the de Lima clan. Before long the underlying tension between the Curiel and de Lima families was to threaten the entire community with a new split.

While, as always, motivated by the ideals of reconciliation and unity, Duarte had at the same time further advanced his family's standing and prestige. Both elements were present. In the 1654 Spanish edition of his description of Solomon's Temple which he dedicated to "Jacob Curiel of Hamburg", the Dutch Sephardi rabbi Jacob Judah Leon Templo refers to Duarte's glowing reputation as a communal peacemaker and this is hardly likely to allude only to the distant events of 1622 in Amsterdam.<sup>82</sup> But at the same time, the new Hamburg synagogue, the place of worship of some seven to eight hundred Sephardi Jews, was filled with emblems and reminders of the Curiel family. The eternal lamp, the *Ner Tamid*, was provided by Duarte, as was the oil for keeping the lamp burning. And so was the *bimah* that stood at the centre of the synagogue, the shelves which lined it being reserved for the use of Duarte and his family.<sup>83</sup> It seems that these vital accessories were not outright gifts but on loan to the community, remaining in a sense the private property of the Curiel family. Duarte, naturally, was also a central figure in the communal administration, serving a number of times on the *Mahamad*.

The simmering feud between Duarte and the de Limas finally erupted in open scandal on the eve of *Simchat Torah*, in 1662. It began in synagogue, during service, when Duarte, in that year the presiding *parnas*, asked Mosseh de Lima to stop talking during prayers at which de Lima had told Duarte to "go to the devil".<sup>84</sup> At this, Duarte's son, Manoel, had set upon de Lima and punched him in the mouth, causing blood to flow. Several congregants rushed forward to pull Manoel away. De Lima then walked out, precipitating a boycott of the main congregation by the entire de Lima clan and their allies. Next day, a rival service was held in the home of Jacob de Lima. Fearful at the prospect of a permanent split, the *Mahamad* asked Duarte to step down from his presiding chair for the time being and imposed public penances on Manoel; but this did not suffice to heal the rift. Negotiations began which revealed an undercurrent of pressure for some diminution in the role of the Curiels in the community. As their price for rejoining the main community, the de Limas demanded three concessions: firstly, reforms in the method of electing the *Mahamad*; secondly, that the *Ner Tamid* and the oil to keep it burning should no longer be the property of the Curiels; and, thirdly, that the shelves around the *bimah* should not longer be reserved for the Curiels, or any particular family.

To consider these demands, the *Mahamad* convened a special gathering of elders. The community's problems were given a thorough airing. Finally, it was resolved that the procedures for *Mahamad* elections should be changed and that under the new rules the outgoing *Mahamad* would each year nominate the membership of its successor from a

<sup>82</sup> See Jacob Judah Leon Templo, *Retrato del Tabernaculo de Moseh* (Amsterdam, 1654) dedicated to the "muy noble y magnifico señor Iaacob Curiel".

<sup>83</sup> SAH Jüdische Gemeinden 993/i, p. 235.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid, p. 231; see also "Aus dem ältesten Protokollbuch der Portugiesisch-Jüdischen Gemeinde in Hamburg", *Jahrbuch der jüdisch-literarischen Gesellschaft* X (1912), 226-28.

short-list of candidates elected by all the house-holders of the community.<sup>85</sup> Turning to the question of the *Ner Tamid*, the council asked Duarte for his opinion, at which he observed that he “could argue for retaining it (in his family) as it was a very old possession”, but that he had nevertheless decided to donate it outright to the community as a gift.<sup>86</sup> This was followed by a long and inconclusive debate about the *bimah* and its shelves and possession of the keys which opened the latter. To resolve matters, the council turned again to Duarte. He replied by offering most of the shelving for general communal use, reserving only a small section for the exclusive use of his family. The *bimah* itself, he announced, he was donating to the community as a gift.

Everyone was deeply impressed, it seems, and on this basis the *Beth Israel* congregation of Hamburg was re-united. It was a fitting postscript to the career of one of the most outstanding figures of seventeenth century western Sephardi Jewry. Duarte had indeed sealed his reputation as a restorer of harmony with a seigneurial touch. In relief, and out of gratitude for his grand gesture, the *Mahamad* thereupon resolved to enter a special clause commemorating his generosity in the community records where it survives, in the Hamburg city archives, to this day. This codicil ends with the remarkable words “e para que a todo o tempo conste do primor com que neste cazo ouvro Jacob Curiel, paresseo justo fazer este termo no livro da nassão, em Hamburgo, 13 de Sebat 5423.”<sup>87</sup>

<sup>85</sup> SAH Jüdische Gemeinden 993/i, pp. 233-34 and 993/ii, pp. 151-53; the Hamburg Sephardi community retained this somewhat more democratic method of electing its *parnasim* from 1662 down to 1678 when the community reverted to the older system in line with practice at Amsterdam. It is perhaps not without irony that in 1678, the presiding *parnas* was Manoel Nunes da Costa.

<sup>86</sup> SAH Jüdische Gemeinden 993/i, pp. 234-35.

<sup>87</sup> SAH Jüdische Gemeinden 993/i, p. 236.

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## SPAIN AND THE DUTCH SEPHARDIM, 1609-1660

The material progress of the Dutch Sephardim in the seventeenth century was by no means a steady, cumulative process. It was in fact extremely sporadic, marked by two short spurts of spectacular advance in numbers and resources, during the Spanish-Dutch truce of 1609-21, and in the decade following the second Spanish-Dutch war, 1646-55, with a quarter of a century of much slower immigration and actual decline in wealth and economic importance intervening. After 1655, there did not again occur any dramatic, explosive expansion. In material terms, the making of Dutch Sephardi Jewry was, by the 1660s, largely complete. The violent turns in the pattern of growth until the 1660s, which had appreciable effects on Dutch Jewish life in all its aspects, can not be attributed to either the changing social context in which Dutch Jews lived, since conditions for the Jews in Holland were consistently favourable and steadily improving, nor to the rhythm of Dutch economic development generally during the golden age, for its movements were different and considerably less abrupt. Remarkably enough, the explanation lies in the policies of the power that, until December 1640, controlled the three major sources of Sephardi migration to Holland — Spain, Portugal and the Spanish Netherlands, which were also the regions with which the Dutch Sephardim principally traded, and after that date controlled Spain and the Southern Netherlands. More than any other factor, it was the Spanish crown, or rather the considerable shifts in Spanish-Dutch relations that it initiated, which determined the pattern of growth of Dutch Sephardi Jewry during its formative period.

The continuing pre-occupation of the Spanish authorities with the Dutch republic after Spain recognized it, with the truce of 1609, “as if” it were an independent, sovereign state extended also to the Dutch Sephardim. Indeed, Spanish concern regarding the new Jerusalem at Amsterdam from 1609, or rather 1605,<sup>1</sup> marks the first instance in modern

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<sup>1</sup> Peninsula writers subsequently tended to trace back the rise of Dutch Jewry as a significant force to the *perdón general* of 1605 which considerably eased the restrictions on the movement of *conversos* and their capital from Portugal, Brit. Mus. Mss. Eg(erton) 344, “Trahe V. Magd. tanto en los ojos las cosas de la fee catholica” (1621) fos. 64v-5; Duarte Gomes Solis. *Discursos sobre los comercios de las dos Indias* (1622) ed. Moses Bensabat Amzalak (Lisbon, 1943) pp. 12-13.

history that the Jews became a major issue between two European powers. Spanish dissatisfaction with the truce stemmed chiefly from the adverse economic consequences which it was considered to have had for Spain and, in this connection, the Jews were identified as a key factor both in Dutch European carrying, the foundation of Dutch prosperity, and, though perhaps with less justification,<sup>2</sup> in Dutch colonial expansion. The links and contacts of the Dutch Sephardim with the *conversos* of the peninsula were considered, with the utmost seriousness, to constitute a highly dangerous instrument of economic and political subversion. The Inquisition and other Spanish clergy involved in the question, such as Diego de Cisneros, a priest active in the drive, during the 1630s, to bring back Portuguese *conversos* from France to Spain, became as accustomed, in this classic age of Spanish mercantilism, as the *consejo de estado* (council of State) and economic writers such as Duarte Gomes Solis, to present and describe the alleged threat to Spain, posed by Dutch Jewry, essentially in terms of maritime and commercial conflict. "With the help of the Jews of these synagogues (of Amsterdam)", wrote Cisneros, in an important memorial to Philip IV, in 1637, in the midst of the second Spanish-Dutch war, "the Dutch rebels have raised their head and increased their power, the Jews assisting them in their wars, conquests, negotiations and other pretensions and becoming in the lands of Your Majesty, spies of the said rebels, penetrating the centres of trade, administration of the *armadas*, convoys and revenues of Your Majesty. . . sucking out the core of wealth (from Spain and Portugal) and sapping the resolutions of state".<sup>3</sup>

The dissatisfaction of Spanish ministers with the Twelve Years Truce, and their growing concern at the rise of the Dutch Sephardim, sprang primarily from their conviction that the terms had utterly upset the balance of economic power in Europe, weakening Spain, strengthening the republic, and lending vastly increased momentum to Dutch expansion in Asia, Africa and the Americas. "It has always been understood", wrote the secretary to the *consejo de estado*, in 1618, "that the truce was very favourable to the Dutch and that since it was signed, they find themselves unhindered, with excessive wealth, while these realms (Spain, Portugal, Flanders, Naples and Sicily) are much diminished, since the Dutch have taken their commerce, and that this damage, if not remedied, will become daily worse".<sup>4</sup> Besides colonial expansion, what chiefly troubled the Spanish councils of

<sup>2</sup> The anonymous tract, probably by a high Inquisition official, cited above, for example, states that Amsterdam Jews invested so heavily in the Dutch East India Company at a time when it was in difficulties, around 1611, that they saved it, though in fact there is very little evidence to support such claims, loc. cit., fos. 75v-6.

<sup>3</sup> Brit. Mus. Mss. Eg. 343, "El 1<sup>do</sup> Diego de Cisneros, sacerdote y theologo, . . . haze saber a V. Magd. . .", fo. 258: "Con la asistencia de los Judios destas sinagogas han levantado los rebeldes de Holanda cabeza y engrandecido su potencia, ayudandoles los Judios en las guerras y en las conquistas y negociaciones y demas pretensiones suyas y haziendose en las tierras de V. Magd. espías de los dichos rebeldes entremetiendose en las plazas de negocios, en la administration de las armadas, flotas, y hacienda de V. Magd. . . chupando la substantia de la hacienda y sorbiendose las resoluciones de estado. . ."

<sup>4</sup> Archivo General de Simancas (hereafter AGS) Est(ado) leg. 634, fo. 318, memorandum of Juan de Ciriza, 2 Mar. 1618: "Tambien se a entendido siempre que la tregua fue muy favorable para olandeses, y desde que se hizo se allan desempeñados y con hacienda sobrada, y estos reynos muy menoscabados por haver tirado asi olandeses el comercio, y que este daño, sino se remedia, crecera cada dia mas. . ."

State, Finance, War, "Portugal" and "Italy" was that Spain had lost all control over Europe's north-south carrying trade, for under the truce terms the river Scheldt remained closed, leaving Antwerp blockaded, while London and Hamburg were unable to compete effectively with Amsterdam and Rotterdam making Holland the major entrepôt for peninsula and Italian commerce. In consequence, the vast majority of foreign ships entering Iberian ports during the truce, more than 821 annually according to Francisco Rétama,<sup>5</sup> were Dutch, such that Holland completely dominated the supply of the Baltic grain, timber and copper, that Spain could not do without, to the peninsula and the carrying of wool, sugar, salt, dyestuffs, and other Iberian and Ibero-American exports, valued at thirteen to fourteen million ducats annually,<sup>6</sup> to northern Europe. Spain had to import Baltic products and export its own to northern Europe, but with the Dutch dominating the trade, there was no way of preventing a highly adverse balance with great quantities of manufactures and other merchandise pouring into the peninsula draining silver from Spain to Holland. It was this rapid accumulation of Spanish bullion in the republic which Spanish ministers saw as the fundamental cause of the massive enlargement of the Dutch land and naval forces during the truce, the alarming spread of Dutch influence and subsidies in Germany and Italy, and the intolerable impetus of Dutch colonial investment and enterprise. Moreover, the *consejo de estado* was convinced that the trade balance was being made still more unequal by means of various illegal methods such as abuse of grain-importing licenses, evasion of customs duties, and the smuggling into Spain, in return for silver, of counterfeit Spanish copper coinage forged in Holland.<sup>7</sup>

The *consejo de estado*, moved by such considerations, had resolved by 1621, the year of the expiry of the truce, that it would be better for Spain to go to war rather than renew the truce on the terms of 1609. After lengthy consultations at Madrid and Brussels, it was resolved that Spain would only assent to a fresh truce if at least two of three conditions were met: namely, freedom for Dutch Catholics to practice their faith publicly; the lifting of the blockade of Antwerp, the main port and commercial centre of the Spanish Netherlands; and major concessions in colonial navigation including total withdrawal from the Americas and cancellation of steps to establish the West India Company and a large measure of withdrawal also from the East Indies.<sup>8</sup> Toleration for Dutch Catholics was deemed to be a useful means of enhancing Spanish prestige internationally, weakening the republic — for the Catholic minority was extremely large, and extending Spanish influence within the United Provinces; nevertheless, the first demand was of

<sup>5</sup> AGS Est. 2847, Francisco Rétama, "Conssideraciones" of 27 Oct. 1623, fo. 4; the anonymous author of the valuable tract on Dutch commerce of the truce period published by P. J. Blok gives a much higher figure (2,000), but is in accord with Retama that before 1621 approximately two-fifths of all Dutch sea-born trade, measured in terms of tonnage, was with Spain and territories under Spanish rule, P. J. Blok, "Een merkwaardig aanvalsplan gericht tegen visscherij en handel der vereenigde Nederlanden in de eerste helft der 17de eeuw", *Bijdragen en Mededeelingen van het Historisch Genootschap* xix (1898) pp. 15-16, 21-3.

<sup>6</sup> Brit. Mus. Mss. Eg. 344, fo. 72; Retama, "Conssideraciones", fo. 3.

<sup>7</sup> AGS Est. 2309. Memorandum of conde de Benavente, 12 Sep. 1620.

<sup>8</sup> Pieter Geyl. *The Netherlands Divided* (London, 1936) p. 84; J. J. Poelhekke. 'T *Uytgaen van den Treves. Spanje en de Nederlanden in 1621* (Groningen, 1960) pp. 40-2.



rather lower priority than the other two relating to the Scheldt and the Indies.<sup>9</sup> But while insisting on new terms, and in some cases preferring war even to such concessions, neither Spanish ministers nor army leaders at any point envisaged a war of reconquest and, indeed, following the ruinously costly failure of the siege of Bergen-op-Zoom, in 1622, discarded all thought of making extensive use of the Spanish army of Flanders as an offensive weapon.<sup>10</sup> Neither in Brussels or Madrid were there any illusions about the strength of the Dutch land defences. There were only four invasions of Dutch territory by Spanish troops after 1622, those of 1624-5, 1629, 1635, and 1637, all of which had strictly limited aims. The Spanish objective all along was to wear down and reduce the Dutch, disrupting their shipping and ruining their trade, using naval forces and an elaborate system of embargoes. Indeed, before 1621, there were officials, such as Hortuño de Urizar,<sup>11</sup> who pressed for a Spanish-Dutch war in which the army of Flanders would not be utilized at all and the republic overwhelmed by means of economic pressure alone.

Although undoubtedly a good deal of exaggeration entered into most Spanish appraisals of the rôle of the Dutch Sephardim in the rapid rise of the United Provinces to its position as the world's foremost maritime power, on the part of both what might be termed the philo- and anti-semitic groups in the Spanish councils, it remains true that during the truce years they began to play a substantial part in carrying to and from the peninsula and that this trade formed the great bulk of their commercial activity.<sup>12</sup> Martín de Cellorigo, a leading economic writer, asserted in his tract of 1619, which is sympathetic to the *conversos*, that "if those (Jews) that are in the rebel states came to Spain and ceased to live there, the rebels would have less power against Spain, for it is certain that since those of this nation have gone to those states, their power has increased and will continue to increase for since all those of this nation who have contact with them are rich people and powerful, and as they do not oppress them, the rebels, by their regard and the advantages that they obtain from them, become rich and strong".<sup>13</sup> Sir Anthony Shirley, who submitted numerous memoranda at the Spanish court in these years, and who likewise favoured attracting the Jews back from Northern Europe to Spain to live as New Christians, advised Olivares that this was a way to "break the chief strand of the trade of both nations"<sup>14</sup> meaning the English and Dutch. No less excessive was the claim of the

<sup>9</sup> *ibid* p. 41.

<sup>10</sup> AGS Est. 2037, *consulta*, 17 Jun. 1623; *ibid*, 2038. Cueva to Philip IV, Bruss. 4 Jan. 1624 and Isabella to Philip, Bruss. 7 Jan. 1624.

<sup>11</sup> AGS Est. 2847, memorial of Hortuño de Urizar, Madrid, 3 Feb. 1618, in which he refers to the "esfuercos ynfrutuosos de los exercitos por tierra".

<sup>12</sup> This is abundantly clear from, among other sources, the large number of freight contracts that have been studied; it must be conceded that as far as the seventeenth century is concerned, Bloom was as wrong as could be in his claim that "although Dutch Jewish traffic with Spain and Portugal was never entirely abandoned, Jewish merchants applied most of their efforts to other fields". H. I. Bloom. *The Economic Activities of the Jews of Amsterdam in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries* (Williamspore, Penn., 1937) p. 96.

<sup>13</sup> Martín de Cellorigo. *Alegacion en que se fynda la ivsticia y merced que algonos particvlares del reyno de Portvgal. . . piden y suplican* (Madrid, 1619) fo. 22v.

<sup>14</sup> Quoted in José Alcalá-Zamora. *España, Flandes y el Mar del Norte (1618-39)* (Barcelona, 1975) p. 250n.

duke del Infantado, in the *consejo de estado*, that “of the principal merchants and traders that reside in Holland, most are “Portuguese” (ie. Jews)<sup>15</sup> or the statements of Agustín Messia at the same meeting. A more balanced view, though perhaps slightly out-of-date by the latter years of the truce, was put forward by Francisco Rétama, a merchant from Jerez de la Frontera, who, despite having tried unsuccessfully to sell a consignment of oranges at Amsterdam in 1614, subsequently became a leading economic adviser at Madrid. He pointed out in his lengthy treatise on Dutch-Iberian trade, presented to the *consejo de estado* in 1619, that most of the six hundred Jewish heads of families<sup>16</sup> at Amsterdam and Rotterdam were poor and that there were a mere dozen Dutch Jews who were of any account in trade. Nevertheless, he suggested that Spain should foment the ill-feeling that existed in Holland against the Jews so as to obtain their expulsion to Germany or Poland “in order to take away the trade which they conduct by means of contacts with other Jews (i.e. *conversos*). . . with which they defraud Your Majesty of his duties and deprive many businessmen of these realms of their profits and so as to divert this trade, and the contacts in Spain that accompany it, to Flanders so that everything should be to the advantage of the subjects of Your Majesty”.<sup>17</sup> Rétama claimed that even the richest of the Dutch Jews, a reference presumably to Bento Osorio,<sup>18</sup> had less than 60,000 Castilian ducats which was by no means a huge fortune by the standards of several non-Jews of Amsterdam and a number of *conversos* of Lisbon, Madrid and Antwerp.

Rétama was close to the mark in holding that there were scarcely more than a dozen Dutch Sephardim who were trading with the peninsula on any scale during the latter years of the truce, though their number and resources were growing rapidly. Certainly the most important was Bento (Baruch) Osorio, factor of Andres Lopes Pinto of Lisbon, for whom he chartered some two hundred Dutch ships between 1615 and 1618 to carry Setúbal salt to Flanders, Holland and the Baltic; he also imported sugar from Portugal and exported timber to Ceuta and Tangiers. Among the others, were Duarte Fernandes (Joshua Habilho)<sup>19</sup> who had various interests in the peninsula but principally shipped Baltic grain to Oporto, Viana and Pontevedra, Jerônimo Rodrigues da Sousa<sup>20</sup> (Samuel Abrabanel),

<sup>15</sup> AGS Est. 2036, *consulta* 6 Jul. 1622: “porque los principales mercaderes y tratantes que ay en Olanda los mas dellos son portugueses”.

<sup>16</sup> J. G. van Dillen, following Cecil Roth, estimates the number of Portuguese Jews in Amsterdam in 1617 at about 500; undoubtedly, this is much too low though most historians would still regard Rétama's estimate, implying a total of about 2,400 as too high, Cecil Roth, “Het Vreemde Geval van Hector Mendes Bravo”, *Nieuw Israelietisch Weekblad* 7 Aug. 1931, p. 8; E. M. Koen, “The Earliest Sources Relating to the Portuguese Jews in the Municipal Archives of Amsterdam up to 1620”, *Studia Rosenthaliana* iv (1970) pp. 39-41.

<sup>17</sup> AGS Est. 634, exp. 322, fos. 13-14.

<sup>18</sup> E. M. Koen, “Notarial Records in Amsterdam Relating to the Portuguese Jews in that Town up to 1639”, *Studia Rosenthaliana* v (1971) p. 219n; in 1631, Osorio's fortune was assessed for taxation at 40,000 guilders though this may have been an underestimate, see A. M. Vaz Dias, “Over den vermogenstqestand der Amsterdamsche Joden in de 17e en de 18e eeuw”, *Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis* li (1936) p. 166.

<sup>19</sup> E. M. Koen, “Duarte Fernandes, Koopman van de Portugeese Natie te Amsterdam”, *Studia Rosenthaliana* ii (1968)

<sup>20</sup> Koen, “Notarial Records”, *Studia Rosenth.* ii, 263n.

later a *parnas* of the Beth Israel congregation who likewise exported grain, chiefly to Aveiro, and Sebastián Núñez<sup>21</sup> (Isaac Israel Nunes), undistinguished in communal life but an important, if disreputable, trader with Pontevedra and Vigo. Diogo da Silva<sup>22</sup> (Tobiau Israel da Silva), again somewhat disreputable, dealt mainly with Lisbon as did Duarte Esteves da Pina<sup>23</sup> (Isaac Milano) who later organized a synagogue in his home after moving to Hamburg, and Tomas Nunes da Pina<sup>24</sup> (Joshua Sarfati), a respected communal leader and a founder of the Beth Ya'akov congregation, all mainly dealers in Brazilian sugar. Diogo Nunes Belmonte<sup>25</sup> (Ya'akov Israel Belmonte), an active member of Beth Ya'akov, traded in sugar and slaves and had connections in the Spanish Caribbean as well as Portugal. Antônio Martins Viegas<sup>26</sup> (Simeon Viegas), Francisco Ribeiro da Costa<sup>27</sup> (Moses Gadelha) who died in 1616, and Juan de Haro<sup>28</sup> (Rafael Jesurun) dealt mainly with Faro and the Algarve, exporting grain and other products and importing wine, figs, olive oil and wool. Duarte and Jorge Pereira<sup>29</sup> had various connections in Spain and among other activities shipped wool from Alicante to Venice. Jerónimo and Duarte Rodríguez Méndez,<sup>30</sup> who had recently emigrated from Málaga, traded especially with that town. It is remarkable that not one of the leading Jewish merchants of Amsterdam, before 1621, seems to have been involved in the most vital sector of the carrying trade to and from the peninsula, that is with the ports of western Andalusia — Seville, Sanlúcar and Cádiz, linked with the official trade with the Spanish Indies.

Fundamentally, Spanish pre-occupation with the Dutch Sephardim derived from their economic rôle. Yet, this is not to say that Spanish policy was completely unconcerned with the progress of Jewish institutions and the organization of Jewish religious life in the United Provinces. Indeed, as far as Spain was concerned, the growth of organized Judaism at Amsterdam and elsewhere was an additional economic threat, for the more the synagogues succeeded in establishing themselves securely and firmly on Dutch soil, the more Holland would be likely to attract the thousands of wealthy and enterprising *conversos* in the peninsula who dominated Portuguese, and had a large share in Spanish and North African trade, but who felt highly insecure, as Cellorigo and others fearful of such a flight of merchants and capital pointed out, especially in Portugal where Inquisition activity during the truce years was very intense. Moreover, there was a widespread conviction in

<sup>21</sup> *ibid.* vii, 271n.

<sup>22</sup> *Livro de Bet Haim do Kahal Kados de Bet Yahacob* ed. W. C. Pieterse (Assen, 1970) p. 189.

<sup>23</sup> Koen, "Notarial Records", *Studia Rosenth.* v, 244n.

<sup>24</sup> *ibid.* iii, 248n; the fortune of Nunes da Pina was assessed for taxation in 1631, when he was the fourth richest of the Amsterdam Jews, at 25,000 guilders, Vaz Dias, *loc.cit.*, 166.

<sup>25</sup> Koen, "Notarial Records", *Studia Rosenth.* vi, 236n.

<sup>26</sup> *ibid.* x, 215n.

<sup>27</sup> *ibid.* vi, 110n.

<sup>28</sup> *ibid.* v, 123n; though he seems to have traded mainly with the Algarve, Mendez Bravo says that he came from Vizcaya.

<sup>29</sup> Koen, "Notarial Records", *Studia Rosenth.* x, deed nos. 884, 968 and p. 223n.

<sup>30</sup> *Livro de Bet Haim*, 190; Mendez Bravo lists Hieronimo and Duarte Roiz Mendez as "Castilians", originating, he thought, from Sanlúcar; here he clearly means the Rodríguez Méndez of Málaga, C. Roth, "The Strange Case of Hector Mendez Bravo", *Hebrew Union College Annual* xviii (1944) p. 235.

the peninsula that there had occurred, during the first two decades of the seventeenth century, a marked revival of Jewishness and Jewish observances among the peninsula *conversos*<sup>31</sup> and a development such as the emergence of organized Jewish communities in Holland composed largely of former *conversos*, was bound to be regarded as extremely undesirable. Upon receiving word from Amsterdam, in 1612, that the Jews there were constructing their first public synagogue, the Spanish minister at the archduke's court at Brussels, the marqués de Guadaleste, intervened "by secret means" at Amsterdam and The Hague to try to block the attempt. The contract for the synagogue was signed with the builders in January 1612 by a group of leading Sephardim including Duarte Fernandes.<sup>32</sup> By a resolution of 8 May 1612, the Amsterdam city administration, responding to such pressures as from the city *kerkeraad* or church council, ordered construction to cease, forbidding public practice of Judaism in Amsterdam. In June, Guadaleste reported to Madrid that on realizing the significance of the synagogue, he had arranged for protests to be made by certain persons to the "States" representing the harm that would be done should the Jews be permitted to practice their rites and ceremonies so openly at a time when Catholics were so persecuted and that although the pressure was not well received at first, subsequently, the Dutch authorities had forbidden the synagogue.<sup>33</sup> He was implying that this was the result of his own intervention.

Although there were Spanish officials who emphasized the Jewishness of the "Portuguese" in Holland, taking this to imply implacable hostility to the Spanish crown and its interests,<sup>34</sup> a more usual attitude in the early seventeenth century, and especially the period of the ascendancy of Olivares (1621-43), was to regard the Dutch Sephardim as recoverable New Christians who could be drawn back from the republic to the peninsula or at least used to neutralize to some extent those who were more strongly committed to Judaism and the protection of the Dutch. Undoubtedly there was in Holland a pool of New Christian refugees from the Inquisition, sometimes highly unsavoury personages, who covertly rejected their own Jewishness and even looked with loathing on Jewish life and the synagogues, with their relatively exacting demands and standards, and would have preferred to return to the peninsula or settle in the Spanish Netherlands.<sup>35</sup> There

<sup>31</sup> Brit. Mus. Mss. Eg. 344, fos. 64-5; Gomes Solis, *Discursos*.

<sup>32</sup> Koen, "Notarial Records", *Studia Rosenth.*, v, 241-3; J. Zwarts, *De Eerste Rabbinen en Synagogen van Amsterdam naar Archivalische Bronnen* (Amsterdam, 1929) pp. 65-71, 116.

<sup>33</sup> AGS Est. 627, consulta 7 Jul. 1612: "en carta de 17 de Junio escrive el marques de Guadaleste q haviendole avisado de Amsterdam q los judios q alli residen han edificado agora una sinagoga adonde acuden con mucha puntualidad, procuro por medios secretos representar a los Estados lo mal q pareciera q en tiempo q tan perseguidos son los catolicos fuesen admitidos los judios con tanta publicidad al uso de sus ritos y ceremonias q aunque de principio fue mal admitida esta diligencia, despues le han avisado q se ha mandado sobreeser en la obra de la synagoga. . ."

<sup>34</sup> see, for instance, Juan de Mancicidor to Philip III, 1 Dec. 1614 quoted in V. Brants, "Une page de sémitisme diplomatique et commercial", *Académie Royale de Belgique. Bulletin de la Classe des Lettres* (Bruss. 1905) no. vii, 576n.

<sup>35</sup> Rétama reports in his treatise of 1619, fo. 13: "Yo entendi en Olanda que se queria tratar con sus Altezas de traer los judios que han ydo huyendo de Portugal que estan en Amsterdam y Rotterdam. . . para que en Amberes entrassen e yciessen negocios para impedirlo a los olandeses".

were also others who while committed to Jewish life wished, for different reasons, to enter into dealings with Spanish officials. The desire for increased contact was in fact quite strong on both sides and was sometimes to be found even in somewhat unlikely circles. "One of the things with which the Dutch sustain with such force and obstinacy the wars in Brazil", a member of the council of state was recorded as stating in 1639, in the midst of the second Spanish-Dutch war, "are the contributions with which those of the "Nation" (ie. the Jews) help them, their expenditure in the war being of the greatest importance; he (the speaker) had heard it deliberated on other occasions that the "Portuguese" that are here would be capable of drawing off from Holland many of those who have most capital there, if some concession were made to them concerning a pardon for past offences, should they undertake to live in future without offense to the Catholic faith".<sup>36</sup> The author of this proposal was none other than the king's confessor, the Inquisitor-General.

During the truce years, several "Portuguese" resident in Holland were in contact with Spanish officials, notably Luis Vaz Pimentel, Manuel Mendes Cardoso, Duarte Fernandes, his son Bento Enriques, Samuel Pallache, his nephew Moseh Pallache, Gabriel da Costa, Francisco Tomas de Miranda and Bartolomé Méndez Trancoso. Vaz Pimentel,<sup>37</sup> a merchant of Rotterdam whose father, Bento Vaz of Évora had been a victim of the Inquisition, perhaps best represents the type of New Christian in the United Provinces who rejected Judaism, stood at the fringes of Jewish life and was prepared, for money, to supply any information relating to the Jews and their *converso* correspondents in the peninsula. In July 1619, having been approached by an emissary from Brussels, Vaz Pimentel agreed to provide the names of the leading exporters of forged coinage to Spain, but demanded first payment of 200 *escudos* which caused some displeasure in Brussels. "He claims his reward before the result of his *avisos* has been seen", reported the archduke's political secretary to Juan de Ciriza, in Madrid, "which seemed to me very strange, but after all he is a Jew and in order not to be tricked, I have not given him the 200 *escudos*, especially since you wrote that no benefit resulted from the *avisos* that he sent before".<sup>38</sup> In October 1619, Vaz Pimentel communicated to Brussels, via an intermediary, that the major exporters of counterfeit coinage to the peninsula were Sebastián Núñez<sup>39</sup> from Galicia who was sending copper, he declared, concealed in grain shipments to

<sup>36</sup> AGS Est. 3860 *consulta*, 5 Apr. 1639: "Una de la cosas con que los Holandeses sustentan con tanto peso y porfia estas guerras del Brasil son los accidim<sup>tos</sup>(?) con que los socorren los de la nacion, cuyas expensas son de lo mas principal que en el guerra se gasta. Ha oido tratar en otras ocasiones que se podria encaminar que los portugueses de aqui serian poderosos para sacar de Holanda muchos de los que alli tienen mas caudal con tal que se les hiziese alguna comodidad, en orden al perdon de culpas pasadas asegurando ellos para lo futuro vivir sin offensa de la fee cath<sup>ca</sup>".

<sup>37</sup> Vaz Pimentel is mentioned in only one Amsterdam notarial deed found so far, Koen, "Notarial Records", *Studia Rosenth.* x, 224; curiously, he is listed in the Dutch but omitted from the English version of Roth's "Hector Mendez Bravo", "Het Vreemde Geval", p. 11.

<sup>38</sup> AGS Est. 2037 doc. 157, Pedro de San Juan to Juan de Ciriza, Marimont, 31 Aug. 1619.

<sup>39</sup> AGS Est. 2037, doc. 27, "Los que embian quartos de Olanda son las personas seg<sup>tes</sup>" enclosed with San Juan to Ciriza, Marimont, 30 Oct. 1619; there is independent evidence that Núñez was sending large quantities of false copper to Galicia, see E. Stols. *De Spaansche Brabanders of de Handelsbetrekkingen der Zuidelijke Nederlanden met de Iberische Wereld*, 1598-1648 (Bruss. 1971) pp. 15, 71.

Pontevedra for Gonzalo Díaz Pato,<sup>40</sup> Juan Gonçalves,<sup>41</sup> likewise smuggling through Galicia, Diogo da Silva who was exporting copper to Lisbon and Francisco de Mezquita to San Sebastián. He mentioned only Jews. Soon after, Vaz Pimentel was paid 200 *escudos* which he claimed to need to pay the ransom for his brother, Juan Vaz Pimentel, captured by Barbary pirates and taken to Algiers whilst sailing to Spain, in 1619, bearing letters from Luis, and from Brussels, for officials in Madrid.<sup>42</sup>

During 1620, Vaz Pimentel remained in contact with Brussels through the count of Egmont who at the time was regularly travelling between the Southern and Northern Netherlands in connection with family lands confiscated by the republic. Besides adding more details about the forging and export to Spain of coinage,<sup>43</sup> he warned Madrid that Ruy Lopes Homem,<sup>44</sup> who had recently been appointed *arrendador* (tax-farmer) of the royal duties at Madeira, had relatives at Amsterdam and was planning to defraud the king of his duties, in collusion with his relatives, and then flee himself with his capital to Holland and denounced Blas Ruiz Hortuño, Portuguese merchant of Málaga, as a principal trader in false coinage and importer of Dutch East India spices into the peninsula. "This Ruiz Hortuño", he declared, "has come many times to Holland to buy false copper and ship it to Málaga and other ports". He also repeated an earlier offer that he had made to "name all the Portuguese and Spaniards of the Nation that are in Holland and have brothers and relatives in Spain and Portugal", including the latter, in return for suitable payment.

The earlier *avisos* of Vaz Pimentel, referred to by the archduke's secretary are probably the same as a set of anonymous *avisos* that are enclosed with certain letters from the secretary to Juan de Ciriza of 1618. The informant of 1618 was clearly a Portuguese and more familiar with Rotterdam than Amsterdam; almost certainly, he and Vaz Pimentel are the same. In them, he describes frauds in the Brazil trade from Holland via the islands of Madeira and the Azores whereby Dutch ships, as many as ten yearly, avoided royal customs procedures at Oporto and Lisbon, awaited and loaded unregistered merchandise on the official Brazil ships sailing from those ports and later collected unregistered sugar and Brazil wood at the same places when they returned, defrauding the king of his 10% amounting to some 80,000 ducats.<sup>45</sup> He offered, for payment, to send details of all those "who are circumcized" and trading with the peninsula whom he estimated to number

<sup>40</sup> Vaz Pimentel says of Díaz Pato "el qual ha mas de quatro años que trata en este negocio que por ser muy rico, la justicia de la tierra no le prende"; see also H. Kellenbenz, *Sephardim an der unteren Elbe* (Wiesbaden, 1958) p. 130; subsequently, after 1623, Díaz Pato fled to Amsterdam where his fortune was assessed for taxation in 1631 at 20,000 guilders, Vaz Dias, loc. cit., p. 166.

<sup>41</sup> João Gonçalves Valverde (Eliahu Israel Valverde) had been a leading Dutch-Jewish trader with Spain, especially Málaga, but went bankrupt in 1617 or 1618.

<sup>42</sup> AGS Est. 2307 doc. 208, Vaz Pimentel to San Juan, Antwerp, 11th Oct. 1619.

<sup>43</sup> AGS Est. 2308, docs. 15-17.

<sup>44</sup> Mendez Bravo mentions two relatives of Ruy Lopes Homem who was from Lisbon, his son, Manoel Homem Vieira, and a brother, Miguel Lopes Homem who were residing in Amsterdam, Roth, "The Strange Case", loc. cit.

<sup>45</sup> AGS Est. 2305, anonymous "Papel" enclosed with Albert to Philip III, Ghent 18 Aug. 1618: he states that each of the ten ships carried merchandise worth over 50,000 ducats.

more than two hundred,<sup>46</sup> a highly significant figure, specified several illegal shipments including one of forged coinage freighted to Pontevedra by Sebastián Núñez and another to Sanlúcar with copper hidden in barrels of butter and illicit dealings in Brazil ginger at Lisbon by Manuel López de León of Amsterdam. He also warned that Antonio Díaz Pato of Pontevedra, Francisco Dias of Viana, and Antonio Sanches, a wealthy merchant of Lisbon, were planning to flee with their money to Holland. Further, he advised that a merchant had sailed from Rotterdam to San Sebastián under an alias whom he described and named as Isaac de León, "a Portuguese born in Málaga who had come with his parents and uncles to Holland three years ago, to live as Jews and are circumcized"<sup>47</sup> who was travelling with letters for Málaga and Lisbon with which to realize the cash value of goods being held for the family in those places, especially for his uncle, Jerónimo Rodríguez, goods forfeit to the crown. He also specified that a certain Captain Francisco Ribeiro, at Paraíba in Brazil, had relatives living as Jews at Amsterdam and had been corresponding with Dom Manuel, pretender to the throne of Portugal. Vaz Pimentel's leads, evidently, were followed up. Several ships that he identified were detained at Oporto, Sanlúcar and Pontevedra and carefully searched though apparently with little result. Isaac de León was arrested in Madrid. A warning was despatched to the governor-general of Brazil concerning Francisco Ribeiro who, at some point subsequently, seems to have fled to Holland; at any rate, by 1623, Amsterdam Jewry included a Captain Ribeiro.<sup>48</sup>

Other "Portuguese" who stood at the fringe of Dutch Jewish life, rejected the synagogue and were anxious to find favour with the Spanish crown were Gabriel da Costa, Francisco Tomas de Miranda and Bartolomé Méndez Trancoso. The latter particularly desired a "safe-conduct so that he, his wife, children and family should not be punished by the Holy Inquisition" upon returning to Spain.<sup>49</sup> He promised economic information of various kinds that would be of great interest to the Spanish authorities and, to ease his path, named several New Christians in Spain whom he alleged to be receiving false coinage and

<sup>46</sup> *ibid*: "los que son circuncidados que vienen en los dichos reynos y los que tratan en ellos y tienen haciendas son mas de doscientos"; in the same document, he adds "El mayor negocio que aora tienen los Judios en Olanda es la moneda de bellon que por todos los puertos meten en España y sacan plata y oro."

<sup>47</sup> AGS Est. 2305, "aviso" enclosed with San Juan to Ciriza, Ghent, 14 Aug. 1618: "un Portugues nacido en Malaga q vino a Olanda tres anos ha con sus padres y tios a ser judios y estan circuncidados, lleva doze fardos de lienzo de importancia y otra mucha hacienda de sus tios devaxo del nombre de un Juan Perez de Beroy vezino de San Sebastian y muchos papeles y cartas para cobrar otra cantidad de hacienda q ha dexado en Malaga q importa mucho. La principal hacienda q va devaxo el nombre del dho Juan Perez es de un judio tio del sobredho q se llama Geronimo Rodriguez muy conocido en Malaga donde aun tiene mucha hazda; clearly, Isaac de León was a nephew of Jerónimo Rodríguez Méndez (Isaac Israel Mendes), others of the Malaga group that settled in Amsterdam around 1615 or 1616, were Dr. Joseph Israel Mendes who was buried at Ouderkerk in 1618, Abraham Israel Mendes and Samuel de León, *Livro de Bet Haim*, 26, 71, 76, 93, 190.

<sup>48</sup> A. Wiznitzer, *Jews in Colonial Brazil* (New York, 1960) p. 47; *Livro de Bet Haim*, 66, 106; A. Novinsky, *Cristãos Novos na Bahia* (São Paulo, 1972), pp. 41, 122-3, 135.

<sup>49</sup> AGS Est. 2308, doc. 113, "Lo q en sustancia resulta de los papeles q Bartholome Mendez Trancoso a escrito".

engaging in other illegal activity. These were Miguel de Lisboa, a "Portuguese" of Bilbao, Pedro López de Moreyra at Yanguas, Diego Pereira and his brothers of whom one was married in San Sebastián, Bartolomé López and Pedro Álvarez of Valladolid and the *converso arrendador* of the pepper duties at Burgos. Méndez Trancoso succeeded in arousing the interest of Juan de Mancidior, in Brussels, who passed on his proposals to Madrid, but there it was noticed that this *converso* had been identified as a leader in a ring, active in receiving copper from Holland in the Basque country and Northern Castile, in 1615, by a morisco informant who had testified then against Diego and Domingo Pereira.<sup>50</sup> It had been the investigations of 1615 which had forced Méndez Trancoso to flee to Holland and associate himself, albeit with no religious motive, with the Jews. Gabriel da Costa, probably not the famous freethinker, but an older namesake,<sup>51</sup> visited Antwerp in July 1619 where he contacted Manuel Lopes Sueyro, son of Diego, the well-known Portuguese spy-master in the Spanish service who was then at Madrid.<sup>52</sup> Soon after, he wrote to Diego Lopes Sueyro, offering to "show His Majesty the remedy so that *quartos* (copper coinage) should not be brought into these realms from which so many inconveniences result", reveal how grain prices in the peninsula might be kept more stable and means of increasing the yield of various taxes in Portugal.<sup>53</sup> He explained however that he would only do this if he were first granted immunity from the Inquisition enabling him to go to Madrid to explain his points in person. Although he aroused Lopes Sueyro's interest, there was apparently no other response. It is curious that Vaz Pimentel, when he learnt of da Costa's activity in Antwerp, denounced him and his brother, "Francisco Thomas", as utterly untrustworthy persons who had themselves been exporting forged coinage to the peninsula.<sup>54</sup> Though not certain that this brother is the same person as the Francisco Tomas de Miranda who contacted Juan de Mancidior in 1617, it is probable. Tomas de Miranda offered propositions that would, he declared, greatly benefit the Spanish treasury and described himself as "residing in Holland where I live as a Catholic

<sup>50</sup> *ibid.*, doc. 114: "El año 1615 vino a esta corte Gabriel de Carmona. . .aviso largamente de los malos medios y tratos de muchos judios portugueses q entraron y salian destos reynos y los principales eran Domingo y Diego Pereyra. . .", the document goes on to implicate Mendez Trancoso; see also Julio Caro Baroja, *Los Judíos en la España Moderna y Contemporánea* 3 vols. (Madrid, 1962), ii, 55.

<sup>51</sup> According to Vaz Dias, the freethinker was probably in Hamburg at this date while there were two other Gabriel da Costas in Holland, neither of whom was active in Jewish life; Vaz Pimentel describes the da Costa in question as "un hombre viejo" whereas the freethinker at this time was only thirty-four; see, A. M. Vaz Dias, "Uriel da Costa. Nieuwe Bijdrage tot diens Levensgeschiedenis", *Mededeelingen vanwege het Spinozahuis* ii (Leiden, 1936) p. 9.

<sup>52</sup> The Sueyros were business people based in Antwerp presumably of *converso* origin; their singularly uninformative *avisos*, allegedly procured from highly placed correspondents in the republic, make no mention of the activities of the Jews, see J. J. Poelhekke, *Het Verraad van de Pistoletten? Verhandelungen der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen*. afd. Letterkunde n. reeks, dl. lxxxviii.

<sup>53</sup> AGS Est. 2307, doc. 48. Gabriel da Costa to Diego Lopes Sueyro, Antwerp, 3 July 1619.

<sup>54</sup> AGS Est. 2307, Vaz Pimentel to San Juan, Rotterdam, 24 Jul. 1619; no less curious is the statement of Manuel Sueyro, who had no contact with Vaz Pimentel until 1620, when he received *avisos* from him on the trade in false copper, that "pense que residra el que me los dio en Rotterdam y que se llamava Luis Mendes, pero passose de aquel lugar a Delft y es su nombre Luis Vaz, y segun he entendido despues el mismo que los haze fundiendolos para que se parezcan a los que havia en España, AGS Est. 2309. Manuel Sueyro to Philip III, 11th Dec. 1620.



as is well-known and can be checked".<sup>55</sup> Still, being compelled by Dutch circumstances to pose outwardly as a Jew, he had no illusions about his status in the eyes of the Inquisition<sup>56</sup> and requested a safe-conduct so that he would be able to go to Madrid. He elicited at least some interest in Madrid though not enough evidently to procure him immunity from the Inquisition.

Manoel Mendes Cardoso, a former contractor for the duty on playing cards at Lisbon,<sup>57</sup> represents a somewhat more substantial case. He formed links in Brussels, especially with Spinola, commander of the army of Flanders, at roughly the same time as Duarte Fernandes, in 1614. Spinola considered the *avisos* which he brought from Amsterdam in 1614 and 1615 to be of some merit. These dealt with various aspects of commercial policy, including suggested improvements in the method of registering American silver on the Spanish Atlantic convoys. It is unclear whether or not he also supplied information on Jews and *conversos*, quite possibly not. From 1615, there was a lapse in his contacts with Brussels until February 1619 when he again visited Spinola presenting a set of economic propositions and requesting immunity from the Inquisition so that he could explain his points in person at Madrid.<sup>58</sup> The reason for this sudden resumption of contact might well have been Mendes Cardoso's anxiety at the approaching expiry of the Spanish-Dutch truce and desire to avoid its likely aftermath by returning to the peninsula. Spanish officials took Mendes Cardoso seriously and both Spinola and the marqués de Bedmar wrote on his behalf to Madrid describing him as a "*persona inteligente*" and urging that the immunity be conceded since his proposals were likely to be of great benefit to the royal finances.<sup>59</sup> The outline forwarded to the *consejo de estado* deals with suggested savings in the provisioning of the Spanish garrisons in North Africa, means of ending the influx into the peninsula of false coinage, fiscal improvements in Portugal and, still more grandiosely, the supplying of political information from the republic and the Ottoman Empire.<sup>60</sup> Philip

<sup>55</sup> "Estante em Olanda donde vivo catolicamente como he notorio e se podera emformar", AGS Est. 2305, Mancididor to Philip III, 14 Feb. 1618; see also, AGS Est. 2303, Mancididor to Philip III, 13 Nov. 1617 and enclosed "Relacion de los Arbitrios que Franc<sup>o</sup> Thomas de Miranda . . . offrezze", in which, among other things, he offers to show means "para q ningun estrangero meta cobre y saque plata en q gana a 17½%".

<sup>56</sup> In June 1618, the Archduke Albert wrote to Philip III that "en carta de 3 abril deste año di quenta a V. Mag<sup>d</sup>. como Francisco Tomas de Miranda portugues residente en Olanda llego aqui a tratar de sus propuestas y que antes de declararlas desseava una cedula de V. Magd. prometiendole en ella la quinta parte del beneficio que se siguiere a la R I hacienda de V. Magd de sus arbitrios y perdon de lo que se le pudiesse acumular de su vida pasada; agora ha acudido a representarme que supuesto no haver llegado resolucion. . . resuelve yr a essa corte a declarar los arbitrios", Archives Générales du Royaume, Brussels. SEG 182.f.58, letter undated.

<sup>57</sup> Roth, "The Strange Case", loc. cit., 237.

<sup>58</sup> AGS Est. 2306. Spinola to Ciriza, 28 Feb. 1619.

<sup>59</sup> *ibid*; AGS Est. 2309. Bedmar to Philip III, 30 Jun. 1620.

<sup>60</sup> AGS Est. 2306, doc. 11, "Manuel Mendez Cardoso digo. . .", in return for his propositions, he wanted 2% of all resulting improvements in the royal revenues for himself; Alcalá-Zamora, without seeing this document but only the memorandum about it by Ciriza, asserts that "los judios portugueses residentes en Holanda . . . por boca de Manuel Cardoso, propusieron algunas cosas de importancia para la real hacienda", a quite unjustified inference, *op. cit.*, 133, 250.

III sent Mendes Cardoso's memorial to the Inquisitor-General of Portugal requesting details on the person and advice as to how to proceed. By mistake however, the Inquisition provided the *consejo de estado* with details not on Mendes Cardoso but on the two other Manoel Cardosos then in Holland, Manoel Cardoso de Macedo, an Old Christian convert to Judaism,<sup>61</sup> and Manoel Cardoso de Millão, who had lived in Brazil and London before settling in Amsterdam.<sup>62</sup> In any case, Philip was urged by the Portuguese Inquisition that "it would be most scandalous should baptized Christians, living as Jews and circumcized, appear in the Catholic court of Your Majesty."<sup>63</sup> That, however, was not the end of the matter, for in March 1621, the Archduke Albert wrote to Philip III that "Manuel Mendez Cardoso has for some years been giving various papers and *avisos* here of importance to the royal service of Your Majesty which have been sent on to Spain by the marquis Spinola and now, moved by his honest zeal, he is going to that court (Madrid) to represent what he has proposed until now and other matters of which he will give account to Your Majesty to whom I request that orders be given that he be heard and that due favour be shown to him".<sup>64</sup>

Duarte Fernandes, formerly of Oporto, deemed "*inteligente y prudente*" by Guadaleste and a "man of integrity though a Jew", entered the Spanish service in 1614 or early in 1615. He, unlike the other Portuguese in Holland who formed links with Spanish officials in this period, was a committed Jew and active in Dutch Jewish life, having been involved in the attempt to build the public synagogue in 1612 and being a founding member of the *Santa Companhia de Dotar* which provided marriage portions for orphaned and impoverished Portuguese Jewish girls throughout the European Sephardi diaspora.<sup>65</sup> He made several visits to Brussels from Amsterdam taking "*relaciones*" with information on various topics connected with the United Provinces and was paid several hundred ducats by the Spanish crown, mainly as re-imbursement for expenses incurred in travelling to and from Brussels.<sup>66</sup> There is no evidence that he damaged any fellow Jew in this way, though it may be that his activity was detrimental to the Republic. However, in the long run, he failed to please officials in the Southern Netherlands and especially angered the

<sup>61</sup> see B. N. Teensma, "De levensgeschiedenis van Abraham Perengrino, alias Manuel Cardoso de Macedo", *Studia Rosenth.*, x, 1 (1976) pp. 1-36.

<sup>62</sup> Kellenbenz, *Sephardim*, 118, 143; Mendez Bravo lists all three Manuel Cardosos.

<sup>63</sup> AGS Est. 2035, memorandum of Juan de Ciriza, 24 Oct. 1620 and Inquisitor-General of Portugal to Philip III, 27 Dec. 1620: "que sera materia de muito scandalo andar nessa corte de V.M. catolica christãos baptissados sendo publicos judeus circuncidos".

<sup>64</sup> AGR, Bruss., SEG f. 135. Albert to Philip III, 31 Mar. 1621.

<sup>65</sup> Koen, "Duarte Fernandes" *Studia Rosenth.*, ii, 179, 180.

<sup>66</sup> AGS est. 2300, "Papel del dinero dado a Fray Gregorio y a los judios". Fernández's letter to the king produced an inquiry from Madrid to Brussels to which Albert replied in September 1617 that "con la carta de V. Magd. de 29 de Mayo he recibido los papeles de Duarte Fernandez q tratan de las propuestas q ha hecho, este negocio se ha mirado y considerado con atencion y diversas vezes se ha oydo al dho Duarte Fernandez, pero no se halla ni parece q de sus proposiciones puede resultar cosa q importe al servicio de V. Magd. por lo qual se lo ha dado de mano y ordenadole q retire a su cassa q la tiene en Olanda no conviniendo q resida en Amberes por vivir en su secta judaicante de q no resultaria servicio de Dios sino escandolo con su vida y mal exemplo", AGR Bruss., SEG 181, f. 361. Albert to Philip III, 25 Sep. 1617.

bishop of Antwerp, presumably for religious reasons, and, by January 1617, he was writing to Madrid that false reports had been made about him in the Southern Netherlands and that he was being rejected there.<sup>67</sup> This fact suggests that Fernandes never in fact imparted any really significant information. Quite possibly, he had simply responded to the eagerness of Spanish officials to make contacts in the United Provinces, for his own business purposes, without wishing to prejudice either the Jewish community or the republic. He was especially involved in Spanish efforts to win Samuel Pallache back into the Spanish service before the latter's death in 1615. Gondomar, the Spanish ambassador in England, had sought unsuccessfully to recruit Pallache in London, in 1615,<sup>68</sup> as had Gabriel de Roy, Spanish resident at Cologne, subsequently, while on a mission in Holland. Fernandes convinced Guadaleste, after Samuel's death, that he had finally succeeded where the others had failed in inducing Pallache, just before he died, to serve the crown again<sup>69</sup> in connection with North African affairs and afterwards persuaded Samuel's nephew, Moseh Pallache, to follow the same path.<sup>70</sup> Shortly after, in April 1616, Moseh Pallache visited Brussels in the company of Duarte Fernandes and the latter's son, Bento Enriques, entered into talks with Guadaleste and Spinola and undertook, for money, to reveal Dutch and English plans in Morocco and to secure the aid of the Jews of Salé and Fédala should Philip III resolve to occupy those two ports, an eventuality which seemed likely at the time.<sup>71</sup> Spain had in fact occupied the neighbouring ports of Larache and La Mámora, in 1610 and 1614, with the assistance of certain North African Jews and the ambition of completing the line of coastal *plazas fuertes* in North Africa as a barrier between Islam and the Protestant powers and safe-guarding the Straits of Gibraltar and the sea-lane to the Americas by taking Salé was decidedly in the air. However, Moseh Pallache, for all the importance of his family, was an inexperienced youth of twenty-five and his offer caused a sharp split between Guadaleste who was interested, and Spinola who was not inclined to take it seriously.<sup>72</sup> The archduke, who disliked contacts with Jews, supported Spinola and urged Madrid that the offer should be ignored. In Madrid, however, more interest was shown though eventually, in the face of more pressing business, the whole question of Salé was dropped.

During the truce period, there was relatively little that the Spanish crown could do to regulate the Dutch and Dutch-Jewish carrying trade to and from the peninsula and check

<sup>67</sup> AGS Est. 2302 Duarte Fernandes to Philip III, 22 Jan. 1617: "Ha dos anos que ando en servicio de V.M. y por mis relaciones dy cuenta de lo que ahi a passado. . .Estando en Amberes se dieron al obispo contra mi algunos reportes falços, pedille me oyesse para mi descargo que no admitio. . ."

<sup>68</sup> It was at Gondomar's insistence that Pallache was gaoled briefly in London, but equally at his prompting that he was then set free, AGS Est. 2302. "Parecer del marques de Guadaleste", 12 Apr. 1616.

<sup>69</sup> Before entering into their links with the United Provinces, Samuel Pallache and his brother Joseph were in Spanish service for many years, until some unknown occurrence caused them to flee from Madrid in 1608.

<sup>70</sup> AGS Est. 2302, Duarte Fernandes, "Memoria de las cosas tratados y asentados con Samuel Pallache".

<sup>71</sup> *ibid.*, "Memoria que yo Mosen Palache dijo en Bruselas a Duarte Fernandes en 28 Abril 1616".

<sup>72</sup> *ibid.*, consulta of Spinola to Albert, enclosed in Spinola to Philip III, Vintz, 28 Jun. 1616 and Albert to Philip III, Marimont, 27 Jun. 1616.

the evasion of restrictions. Nevertheless, though the Spanish customs machinery was then considerably less formidable than it afterwards became, the Spanish authorities did search numerous Dutch vessels, especially in the years 1616-19 and many detentions and confiscations took place. The pressure took various forms. Some Dutch ships, especially in Sicily and Naples, were seized as a means of political retaliation for Dutch help to Savoy and Venice, Spain's enemies in Italy. In the peninsula, many detentions resulted from suspicions of fraud. But a quite frequent occurrence, especially in Portugal, was the detention of ships on the pretext that they were carrying goods belonging to *conversos* seized by the Inquisition or refugees from the Inquisition that had fled to Holland. Since both Iberian *conversos* and Dutch Jews were heavily involved in Dutch commerce, it was perhaps inevitable that such searches became a considerable nuisance to Dutch shipping and merchants. For their part, the Dutch authorities came to see that the protection of Dutch Jews as a distinctive group whose status in the eyes of the Spanish crown was quite different from that of other Dutch subjects, had become a Dutch national interest. Indeed, the earliest efforts by the States-General to defend the Dutch Sephardim as a group, in the sphere of international relations, can be specifically linked with Dutch determination to safe-guard their burgeoning trade with the peninsula. In the years 1616-19, repeated protests from The Hague were conveyed to Madrid via Brussels<sup>73</sup> and the intervention on behalf of the Jews should be regarded as inherent in this process. The holding of Dutch vessels in Iberian ports became a principal irritant in Spanish-Dutch relations during the truce and there can be no doubt that it was widely and bitterly resented in the United Provinces. Indeed, it was to be a stock answer on the part of propagandists of the Dutch war-party during the 1620s and 1630s, to merchants who complained that the war was disrupting trade, to maintain that trade had been impeded anyway, before 1621, by the intolerable attitude of the Spanish crown to Dutch shipping and cargoes.

It had been obvious, from 1609 onwards, that Madrid had no intention of including the Dutch Jews in the freedom of movement and conscience in Spain and the Spanish European Empire, that the crown was bound, under the terms of the truce, to grant to Dutch Protestants and foreign-born Protestants resident in the republic. In October 1610, at the request of the "Portuguese nation of Amsterdam", the States-General pressed the archduke for the release of Simon Mercado, a Dutch "Portuguese" arrested by the municipal authorities of Antwerp for judaizing, on the ground that his detention conflicted with articles four and seven of the truce.<sup>74</sup> There was no prospect however, that the Spanish authorities would agree to treat the Dutch Jews on the same basis as other Dutch subjects. The major incident of the truce period for the Jews, occurred in 1618 with the arrest of an exceptionally large number of *conversos* by the Inquisition at Oporto, some twenty-six families, an event which had repercussions throughout Portugal, and in Spain

<sup>73</sup> See, for instance, the examples in *Resolutiën der Staten Generaal, 1617-18* RGP 152.

<sup>74</sup> *Resolutiën der Staten Generaal, 1610-12*, RGP 135, p. 239.

and Brazil, as well as Holland.<sup>75</sup> As several of the Oporto victims were their correspondents holding money and goods for them, the Amsterdam Jews appealed to the Dutch authorities for help. The States-General responded with a strong protest to Brussels which, though in it it referred only to its "Portuguese" and not specifically to its "Jewish" subjects, nevertheless, stands out as a remarkable and very early instance of a European government applying pressure in the international arena on behalf of its Jews. The document also marks the beginning of a consistent and definite Jewish policy on the part of the Dutch authorities.<sup>76</sup> The United Provinces refused to accept that it "Portuguese citizens should be treated differently than its other subjects. Goods pertaining to *"marchans de la nation portugaise residens a Amsterdam"*, went the text, had lately been seized at Oporto and Madeira *"sans que leurs facteurs, come estans sous l'obeissance du Roy d'Espagne, les osent defendre ou en procurer. . . la restitution par crainte de l'Inquisition"*; it was urged that this was contrary to the terms of the truce, that the king promptly release the goods and money involved and that *"durant la tresve, leurs marchans ne soyent arrestes, detenus ou molestes en aucune maniere que ce soyt en leurs personnes ou biens"*.

Dutch-Iberian trade, whatever Dutch war propagandists might claim later, was still expanding on the eve of the expiry of the truce. Duties collected on goods passing through the great north Spanish ports of Bilbao and San Sebastián, at Vitoria, the principal customs-house for the north coast, rose each year from 1617 to 1620 from just under 27 million *maravedis* to over 34 million, the equivalent of 272,000 guilders.<sup>77</sup> Nevertheless, even before August 1620, when the Dutch admiralty colleges began warning merchants that maritime communications were likely to be disrupted from April 1621<sup>78</sup> adjustments in preparation for a drastic dislocation of trade were being made and by none more than the Dutch Jews a group almost totally dependent on Iberian and Ibero-American activity. They recollected, in some cases from personal experience, how Philip III's embargoes, in the years 1598-1606, had paralyzed their commerce. Then, however, the effect had been essentially marginal since the Dutch Sephardim had been so few and their activity small. The prospect of Spanish embargoes in 1621 was immeasurably more threatening. Between 1618 and 1623, there occurred a considerable migration of Dutch Sephardim to the Hanseatic towns of North Germany and especially Hamburg<sup>79</sup> which may perhaps be seen as a parallel to the sudden inclination of such figures as Manuel Mendes Cardoso to

<sup>75</sup> Cellorigo, *Alegacion*, fo. 8; AGS Est. 2305, "Avisos de Amsterdam", 4 Oct. 1618: "Los judios de aqui tienen aviso. . . de la prission q se ha hecho por la Inquisicion de veinte seis cassas (de Oporto) en q dicen avia mucha hazienda destos judios, el magistrado desta villa escribe a su Magd. suplicandole se la mande bolber; en manos destos judios esta mucha hazienda de los q ay en Spaña"; probably there is a connection between this sweep in Portugal and the Inquisition visitation to Bahia in 1618-19 during which ninety *conversos* were denounced, Wiznitzer, *op. cit.*, 36-42.

<sup>76</sup> AGS Est. 2306. Albert to Philip III, Terburen, 9 Nov. 1618; *Resolutiën der Staten Generaal, 1617-18*, no. 3634, 20 Oct. 1618.

<sup>77</sup> AGS Contaduría Mayor de Cuentas, leg. 1950, section i, "Relacion de los libros de las aduanas tocantes a la cuenta de los diezmos del mar de Castilla," (1617-26).

<sup>78</sup> *Resolutiën van de Staten van Holland*, 1620, p. 187, 20 Aug. 1620.

<sup>79</sup> Koen, "Notarial Deeds," *Studia Rosenth.*, v. 120n, vii, 271n, x, 223n; Kellenbenz, *Sephardim*, 257-9.

return to the peninsula. Duarte Fernandes' son Gabriel Lopes settled in Hamburg in 1618 and he himself followed, with much of the rest of his family in 1620. Sebastián Núñez left Amsterdam for Hamburg apparently in 1623. Duarte Esteves da Pina moved to Hamburg in 1618, Pedro and Duarte Palacios in 1619 and Manuel Mendes de Castro between 1619 and 1623. Diogo da Silva took his capital and Lisbon connections to Glückstadt, where the king of Denmark was offering the Portuguese Jews favourable terms. Duarte Pereira left Amsterdam in 1621, though it is not known where to. Between 1619, when the number was already swollen by recent arrivals from Holland, and 1623, the list of Sephardi depositors with the Hamburg Bank lengthened from twenty-eight to forty-three.<sup>80</sup>

The setback, when it came, was as abrupt and severe as had been feared and of unprecedented scope and duration. With the expiry of the Spanish-Dutch truce, ended the first, and until 1646, when the Spanish embargoes began to be lifted, the only phase of growth in the worldly activity of the Dutch Sephardim. The Jewish year 5381 marked the commencement of a social catastrophe. Although the land war in the Low Countries began only in the late summer of 1621, the economic conflict began on the very day of the expiry, 9 April.<sup>81</sup> During the weeks before this date, every viceroy, captain-general and *corregidor* from Lisbon to Naples and from Ostend to Oran was instructed to force the departure of Dutch ships and cargoes by 9 April and seize every Dutch asset that came into their hands thereafter. Trade between the United Provinces and the Spanish empire in Europe and North Africa was totally prohibited except for inland river and canal traffic between the Northern and Southern Netherlands. On and around 9 April, a massive exodus of Dutch shipping from ports under Spanish rule took place. At San Sebastián, the entire Dutch contingent left *en masse* on 9 April.<sup>82</sup> Within three days, forty-one Dutch vessels departed from the coast of the viceroyalty of Valencia alone. Despite ample warning, several Dutch Jewish merchants were caught out by the sudden severance of maritime links. The first Dutch ship that entered San Sebastián after the imposition of the embargoes, seized on 14 April, was carrying goods despatched by Amsterdam Jews for Enrique Mendes, Francisco de Mezquita and other merchants of Madrid.<sup>83</sup> A Monnikendam vessel, chartered by Amsterdam Jews to carry grain from Sicily to Lisbon, having taken on grain in Sicily, missed the dead-line owing to contrary winds and, to the consternation of the charterers, returned with its Sicilian cargo to the Zuider Zee.<sup>84</sup>

The obvious response to the Spanish embargoes was to seek to evade them by diverting Dutch Jewish trade through intermediaries at Hamburg, London, Bayonne and other ports. The move of Dutch Sephardim to Hamburg and Glückstadt indeed does not necessarily imply loss of trade to Amsterdam and Rotterdam, for if they were to continue their Iberian and Ibero-American trade at all, and they had nothing else of any significance, the Dutch Jews were now forced to spread out a wide net of correspondents.

<sup>80</sup> Kellenbenz, *Sephardim*, 258.

<sup>81</sup> AGS Est. 2139. Philip IV to Fadrique de Toledo, 10 Apr. 1621.

<sup>82</sup> AGS Guerra 873. Alcalde of San Sebastián to Philip III, 14 Apr. 1621.

<sup>83</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>84</sup> Algemeen Rijksarchief, The Hague, (hereafter ARA) (Admiraliteiten) (Verzameling) Bis(dom) vol. 48, ii, fos. 93-5.

Hamburg moreover, was in this respect particularly suitable, for it was evidently the Spanish strategy to divert the carrying trade in Baltic grain, timber and copper with the peninsula from Holland, to the only feasible alternative, the Hanseatic towns. Except in the case of Emden which, being under Dutch occupation, was included in the embargoes,<sup>85</sup> Hanseatic business with both Spain and Portugal now began to increase spectacularly.<sup>86</sup> Large convoys, usually of from forty to fifty vessels, sailed regularly each year from Hamburg, chiefly for Sanlúcar, Málaga and Lisbon, throughout the 1620s and 1630s, and there was a substantial additional traffic from Lübeck, Glückstadt, Friedrichstadt, Stettin and Danzig itself. However, large though this traffic was, it was nowhere near adequate to compensate for the absence of the Dutch, even as regards the most vital materials, for the Hanseatic towns simply did not possess enough shipping, and severe shortages of timber, copper and grain in the peninsula and southern Italy quickly developed. Despite this, Amsterdam Jews, through their brethren in Hamburg, were in a good position to exploit the opportunity and although Madrid was demanding that all cargoes from Germany, as from Flanders, England and France, be accompanied by testimonials, signed by magistrates of the city administrations, certifying that those despatching goods had validly sworn before them that such goods neither originated in, nor were owned by or bought from persons resident in the republic, provision of these certificates, at least in the early years, was reassuringly lax.<sup>87</sup> In 1622, Jorge Rodrigues da Costa, a *converso* arrested in Lisbon for violating the ban on trade with Holland, was found to have in his possession a letter from Duarte Esteves da Pina at Hamburg revealing that the latter had an order from the Hamburg senate that the city's magistrates were to sign the necessary certificates for him without any oath being taken.<sup>88</sup> However, Spanish ministers, only too well aware of the deficiencies of their system, strove to tighten it. Observers were sent to the Hanseatic towns. From 1627, there was increasing Spanish-Danish co-operation, especially at Glückstadt, which, because of the latter's location, also affected Hamburg. From 1628, Madrid insisted that cargoes from North Germany be accompanied by testimonials issued within a new framework of checks supervised by the Spanish resident on the North German coast, Gabriel de Roy. These additional restrictions were widely blamed in the peninsula, by critics of royal policy,<sup>89</sup> for the further contraction in Iberian trade after

<sup>85</sup> Hence the virtual absence of Sephardim at Emden in the 1620s when their activity in other North German towns was growing so rapidly, AGS Est. 2645, *consulta* 27 Nov. 1621; B. Hagedorn. *Ostfrieslands Handel und Schiffahrt vom Ausgang des 16 Jahrhunderts bis zum Westfälischen Frieden* (1580-1648) (Berlin, 1912) pp. 435, 493, 500-4.

<sup>86</sup> A. Jürgens. *Zur Schleswig-Holsteinischen Handelsgeschichte. 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts* (Berlin, 1914) pp. 197, 203-7.

<sup>87</sup> AGS Est. 2036 *consulta*, 6 July 1622.

<sup>88</sup> AGS Est. 2847. Fernando Alvia de Castro to Philip III, Libon, 19 Sep. 1622 and enclosed copy of the letter from Esteves da Pina, saying that he was sending goods despatched by a correspondent in Holland "aunque todo va en mi nombre y en las certificaciones dicen lo mismo y certifican que yo lo jure solemnemente, yo tengo orden en este senado para me las dar ansi sin lo jurar ni hacer tal juramento y aunque me costo algo aver esto. . ."

<sup>89</sup> For some bitter criticism of Spanish pressure in North Germany, see Brit. Mus. Mss. Add. 14,005, fo. 26 *et seq.*, "Causas por donde crecio el comercio de Olanda."

1627 and although Hamburg activity in the peninsula remained at a much higher level than in the period before 1621, until the 1640s, there was nevertheless a recession accompanied by the drifting back of a few Hamburg Sephardim, such as Duarte de Palacios and Francisco Gomes da Costa, to Amsterdam during the later 1620s.<sup>90</sup>

Besides using intermediaries at, and dubious certificates from, Hamburg and elsewhere outside the republic, it was still possible, after 1621, to sustain some trade with the peninsula from Holland, using Dutch ships, though only with a measure of disguise. The carrying of Setúbal salt by the Dutch to Holland and the Baltic, which was especially vital to the republic in view of the Spanish success in the early 1620s in establishing forts in the Caribbean which prevented the Dutch from again exploiting the American salt-pans that they had turned to in 1598, was continued for a few years using French and especially Scottish crews and documents.<sup>91</sup> There were many lax officials in the peninsula who could be persuaded, with bribes, to close their eyes to such infiltration. Yet, here again, an intensification in the Spanish pressure is discernible, especially from 1623. In November 1623, took place what was perhaps the most sensational step: in an attempt to intimidate neutral shippers and uncover the secret correspondents of the Dutch in the peninsula, an "*embargo general*" was declared on the same day, throughout Andalusia and Portugal, in which 166 neutral ships were seized and systematically searched.<sup>92</sup> Confiscations and arrests followed and in some cases seemed to confirm the suspicions of ministers, such as the duque del Infantado, that Dutch Jews and peninsula *conversos* were playing a leading part in efforts to evade the Spanish system. At Málaga, for example, two St Malo vessels were found to have large consignments of Dutch cloth aboard and 20,000 reales in forged coinage, remitted via St Malo by Jerónimo and Duarte Rodríguez Méndez of Amsterdam while a Glawegian ship was held for having brought timber from Amsterdam forwarded by Antonio Cardoso.<sup>93</sup> Among four merchants arrested at this time at Málaga for having had dealings with the Dutch one was Irish while three were Portuguese *converso* correspondents of Cardoso and other Amsterdam Jews.

Gradually, more stringent boarding and inspection procedures for neutral shipping were introduced, even in relatively remote areas such as Galicia<sup>94</sup> and regions with strong local privileges such as Valencia. In 1624, the crown set up the *almirantazgo* (admiralty college) of Seville with jurisdiction over all the Andalusian ports and a formidable body of customs officers. Prosecutions for commercial offenses were removed from the competence of ordinary courts and placed under that of a new board which was far more

<sup>90</sup> Kellenbenz, *Sephardim*, 259.

<sup>91</sup> *Les Sources Inédites de l'Histoire du Maroc* ser. ii, Archives des Pays-Bas ed. H. de Castries 6 vols. (Paris-The Hague, 1906-23) iii, 261-4, 363.

<sup>92</sup> The largest group in Andalusia, forty-four ships, were embargoed at Sanlúcar, AGS Contaduría Mayor 2267, no. 10 "Instrucción y orden"; V. Rau. *A Exploração e o Comercio do Sal de Setúbal* (Lisbon, 1951) p. 165; H. Kellenbenz. *Unternehmerkräfte im Hamburger Portugal- und Spanienhandel, 1590-1625* (Hamburg, 1954) p. 39.

<sup>93</sup> AGS Guerra 890. Pedro de Arze, undated memorandum, Málaga, Nov. 1623; *ibid.*, 894. Pedro de Arze to Olivares, Málaga, 2 Nov. 1623.

<sup>94</sup> AGS Guerra 898. Captain-general of Galicia to Philip III, Corunna, 26 May 1623; *ibid.*, 901, captain-general to Philip, 19 Feb. 1624.



stringent,<sup>95</sup> known as the *junta de almirantazgo*, set up at Madrid. A large number of protests were made by the city councils of such ports as Seville, Cádiz, and Málaga at what they considered to be the disastrous effect of these measures on trade, but the crown was not to be deflected from its course either by the fact that it could not hope to suppress illicit activity completely, or by the disgruntlement in the ports, or by the massive fall in customs revenues which was the inevitable consequence of its policy. Despite a really enormous increase in the number of English, Scottish, French and German ships sailing to the Spanish north coast in the 1620s, receipts at Vitoria fell from over 29 million *maravedís* in 1621 to only 17 million, or exactly half the figure for 1620, by 1628, as Dutch shipping, previously dominant all but disappeared from the trade.<sup>96</sup>

The results of the *embargo general*, as has been said, tended to confirm Spanish ministers in attributing a special rôle to the Dutch Jews and their *converso* correspondents in Dutch efforts to evade the embargoes. If the Dutch Sephardim were more dependent than Dutch merchants generally on Iberian trade, they were also thereby compelled to strive harder to salvage what they could and undoubtedly had a better chance of succeeding owing to their exceptionally elaborate, resilient and well-concealed network of links with the peninsula. This applied to Andalusia, Portugal, Galicia and the Atlantic islands and also to north-east Castile where Spanish officials located one of the most troublesome contraband systems in the persistent seepage of Dutch textiles, East India spices and forged coinage from the French border ports of Bayonne and St Jean de Luz, overland through the viceroyalty of Navarre, where Spanish authority was markedly weaker than in Castile, and via the *puertos secos* between Navarre and Castile, and Aragon and Castile, to Madrid, Segovia and Valladolid. As early as May, the *administrador* of the customs duties on the Basque coast alerted the *consejo de Guerra* that Dutch cloth, unloaded at Bayonne, was reaching Castile via Pamplona and the *puertos secos*, but it was in September 1621, that this official first suggested that the system was essentially the work of "Portuguese merchants in Holland and at Bayonne", for it was they who had an arrangement with the *arrendadores* who collected the duties at the *puertos secos* who were, as he pointed out, "of the same nation".<sup>97</sup> The viceroy of Navarre confirmed that Pamplona had become a major loophole in the embargoes.<sup>98</sup> In 1622, the council of Finance despatched a commissioner to Navarre and the *puertos secos* who reported that between August 1621 and May 1622, not less than twenty-two Dutch vessels had unloaded cargoes for Castile, sent mainly by "Portuguese merchants who reside at Amsterdam and Rotterdam" to Bayonne

<sup>95</sup> One *almirantazgo* magistrate was said to have dealt with three hundred cases without once ever passing judgment in favour of the defendant, Brit. Mus. Mss. Add. 14,005 "Cavzas por donde", fo. 5.

<sup>96</sup> AGS Contaduría Mayor, 1950, sec. i.

<sup>97</sup> AGS Est. 2139. consulta of consejo de guerra, 23 Jul. 1621 and Miguel de Manchola to Philip IV, 24 Sep. 1621; see also Manchola to Philip. 29 Oct. 1621 and 22 Apr. 1622 in which he touches on the same theme, saying in the former, "ningun genero de gente basallas de V. Magd. se atrevieran en pasar las dichas mercaderias sino es la nacion portuguesa".

<sup>98</sup> *ibid*, Viceroy of Navarre to Philip, Pamplona, 15 Sep. 1621.

and St Jean where "Portuguese" correspondents, notably Alvaro and Jacome Luis,<sup>99</sup> provided them with the necessary false seals and papers and sent them to Madrid through Navarre and the *puertos secos*, especially Logroño, Agreda and Cervera, in collusion with the "Portuguese" *arrendador*, Juan Núñez de Vega,<sup>100</sup> and his brother-in-law, Manuel Núñez de Olivera, who farmed the duties. Eight more Dutch ships were reported to have unloaded merchandise for Castile in and near Bayonne between May and September 1622.<sup>101</sup> Prosecutions followed the investigations, officials were brought from the Basque ports to check procedures at the *puertos secos*,<sup>102</sup> and the viceroys of Navarre and Aragon were instructed to redouble their efforts to close the loophole. Nevertheless, there is evidence that the route from Bayonne remained a key contraband channel. In 1628, a valuable consignment of Dutch goods despatched to Fernando Montezinos,<sup>103</sup> Jorge Enriquez and other *conversos* of Madrid was seized by *almirantazgo* officials in Navarre producing a case in the *almirantazgo* court in Madrid with 100,000 ducats worth of merchandise at stake. Montezinos and Enriquez successfully offered 20,000 ducats to the crown as an indemnity in return for suspension of the case.<sup>104</sup> In 1630, the *junta de almirantazgo* received a report stating that from two to three million ducats worth of Dutch goods were entering Castile yearly, via Navarre and Vizcaya, causing a considerable loss of silver by the same route,<sup>105</sup> an assertion made the more credible by news of the sinking in February of that year, by royal warships, of a Dutch vessel sailing from Bayonne for Holland carrying 100,000 ducats in silver and 400 sacks of Castilian wool.<sup>106</sup>

Possibly even more crucial for the Dutch Sephardim than the situation in Spain itself was that in Portugal, the very heart of their commercial world. Here, it must be conceded

<sup>99</sup> Alvaro "Luiz" of Bayonne is mentioned as a correspondent of Amsterdam Jews in G. Nahon, "Les Rapports des Communautés judéo-portugaises de France avec celle d'Amsterdam au 17<sup>e</sup> et au 18<sup>e</sup> siècles", *Studia Rosenth.*, v, 44; a question that Nahon does not touch on, but which is raised in Manchola's despatches, is whether Dutch Jews were settling in and near Bayonne at this time especially to by-pass the Spanish embargoes, it being highly likely that they were; Cisneros, in his valuable survey of the Sephardi communities in France, shows how great was their concentration in the 1630s on the Franco-Spanish frontier: he estimates that there were then 60 *converso* families at Bayonne, over 40 at Peyrehorade, 10 or 12 at Dax and no less than 80 at Labastide-Clairence while there were only 40 at Bordeaux, 10 or 12 at Paris, 20 at Rouen and less than ten at Nantes, Cisneros, *op. cit.*, Brit. Mus. Mss. Eg. 343, fo. 259.

<sup>100</sup> Núñez de Vega had lived for many years in Vitoria when he received his contract in 1620 to farm the *puertos secos* for the decade 1621-30 after considerable hesitation by the *consejo de hacienda* due to his being a Portuguese *converso*, AGS Hacienda 592, consulta 24 Jul. 1622.

<sup>101</sup> AGS Hacienda 592 consulta, 31 Oct. 1622.

<sup>102</sup> *ibid.*, "ultimamente se pussieron por mandado de V.M. en los dichos puertos secos aduanas de diezmos de la mar con que no se atreben con tanta libertad y desorden a meter por alli las mercaderias de contrabando".

<sup>103</sup> see Caro Baroja, *Los Judíos*, ii, 113.

<sup>104</sup> AGS Hacienda 656, consultas 1 Jan. and 1 Feb. 1629.

<sup>105</sup> AGS Hacienda 664, consulta 15 Sep. 1630.

<sup>106</sup> AGS Est. 2044 consulta, 28 Feb. 1630, "Hortuño de Urizar avisa. . . que algunas vezes ha representado a V. Mag. quan importante seria cerrar aquel passo a olandeses porque negocian por el muy en grueso por medio de los portugueses que residen en Olanda los quales tienen hecha poblacion en Francia de los de su nacion para yr metiendo de mano en mano en España las mercaderias de las islas rebeldes".

that administrative conditions were quite different from in Castile or even southern Italy, for Portuguese officials were notoriously slack in implementing orders from Madrid. Yet, in fact, a point which needs emphasis, developments in Portugal did match those in Spain and southern Italy. Aware that its economic strategy could not work effectively without disrupting Dutch trade with Portugal, and through Portugal with Brazil, the crown took the unprecedented step, in 1623, of sending Castilian commissioners to the Portuguese ports placing them under the jurisdiction not of the council of Portugal, but of the Castilian council of War. Diego López de Haro who introduced the new boarding and inspection procedures at Lisbon and Setúbal reported by May 1623, after a round of arrests and confiscations, that the Dutch, with their false papers and Scottish crews, had been forced to give up Lisbon and were abandoning the salt-pans, though he conceded that in the north at Oporto, Viana and Aveiro the situation was much less satisfactory.<sup>107</sup> It is probable that the embargoes indeed remained at their weakest in Northern Portugal, and the Azores and Madeira, though Castilian officers were also used in those regions at least at intervals.<sup>108</sup> At Lisbon and Setubal, on the other hand, a severe depression set in which was to last for more than two decades, until after the Portuguese secession in December 1640 which cleared the way for a revival in Dutch-Portuguese trade. The Lisbon city council complained incessantly about the Castilian customs officers whom they blamed for the withering away of the city's trade with Northern Europe<sup>109</sup> and there is no reason to doubt that the catastrophic contraction in Lisbon's commerce from 1621 which according to one account produced a fall in the duties collected at the Lisbon *alfândiga* from 500,000 to 60,000 ducats annually,<sup>110</sup> was largely due to the embargoes. At Faro, the heart of the Algarve, Inquisition records show that there was almost a complete absence of Dutch shipping from the port for two decades after 1621 and although there was a large increase in neutral, especially Hanseatic shipping, this matched only a fraction of the Dutch traffic that was absent.<sup>111</sup> Of course, contraband trade continued if it did not thrive. In July 1627, word from Amsterdam disclosed that two ships were then being made ready there for Faro, one by Juan de Haro for his correspondent Manoel Mendes, the other by Pedro Homem for Pedro Machado, both vessels being provided with false papers of Danzig.<sup>112</sup> At the same time, Antônio Martins Vega was reported to be chartering a Hamburg vessel likewise for the Algarve while in 1628, Castilian officials discovered that Francisco de Cáceres at Oporto had for some time been importing quantities of Dutch bays. But obviously this activity amounted scarcely to a trickle of what had gone before. Furthermore, with the bulk of their Portuguese trade, the Dutch Jews also lost their main

<sup>107</sup> AGS Guerra 898. López de Haro to consejo, 19 May, 12 Aug. and 23 Sep. 1623; Brit. Mus. Mss. Eg. 1135, fo. 199v.

<sup>108</sup> AGS Est. 2646. *consultas*, 27 Jan, 24 Feb. and 22 Mar. 1628; early in 1628, Castilian officers were investigating in the Oporto region and at Faro simultaneously.

<sup>109</sup> *Elementos para a História de Lisboa* ed. E. Freire de Oliveira 6 vols. (Lisbon, 1882-91) iii, 154, 417, 450, 525 567, iv, 145; Rau, *A Exploração*, 174.

<sup>110</sup> Brit. Mus. Mss. Add. 14,005, "Cavvas por donde", fo. 4.

<sup>111</sup> V. Rau, "Subsidios para o estudo do movimento dos portos de Faro e Lisboa durante o século xvii", *Anais da Academia Portuguesa de História* 2nd ser. v (1954) pp. 219-27.

<sup>112</sup> AGS Est. 2319, "Aviso de Amsterdam de 21 Julio 1627".

link with Brazil, for like other Dutch and Hamburg merchants they had traded with Brazil principally through Lisbon and Oporto. In Holland, the sugar trade slumped while in Brazil, cut off from the Dutch refineries and market, the *conversos* were likewise severely hit.<sup>113</sup>

The collapse of Dutch-Jewish trade with Brazil was paralleled, on a lesser scale, by the setback elsewhere in the Americas. During the truce years, there had been a persistent interest in Spanish America in the United Provinces, sometimes stimulated by Amsterdam Jews with specific knowledge and experience of the Spanish Colonies, and from 1621, with the setting up of the West India Company, the republic openly challenged Spain for domination of the New World. The Spanish reply was a programme of customs reform, tightening of commercial controls, and construction of forts from Mexico to the Rio de la Plata. If the 1620s were characterized by a major effort to strengthen administration in the peninsula, equally they produced a forceful attempt to increase the royal grip over the American empire and reduce illicit commerce. In Mexico, the marqués de Gelves (viceroy, 1621-4), initiated reforms with exceptional vigour and a particular determination to improve checks in the ports and restrict the rôle of the Portuguese *conversos*.<sup>114</sup> In the Caribbean, the scheme of fortifying the salt-pans, to prevent the Dutch from taking their urgently-needed salt from there, worked well especially at the key pans at Punta de Araya on the Venezuelan coast.<sup>115</sup> On the Rio de la Plata, though the council of the Indies blocked the attempt of the supreme council of the Inquisition to establish an Inquisition tribunal, as a check specifically to the "New Christians of the Hebrew nation of the realms of Portugal", on the grounds that it was unnecessary and would be too costly,<sup>116</sup> new administrative and fiscal machinery was established at Buenos Aires and, in 1623, at Córdoba, which blocked much of the contraband trade between Upper Peru and the South Atlantic pushing Buenos Aires into a sharp recession.<sup>117</sup> As always, during the ascendancy of Olivares, the crown was markedly more concerned to regulate the commercial than the religious activity of the *conversos*.

The Spanish economic warfare against the republic reached its height during the years 1625-9 when the system of embargoes was expanded further to include a ban on communications and trade via the inland waterways, the *binnenstromen*, linking Dutch territory with the Spanish Netherlands and the adjoining areas of Germany under Spanish occupation. This included a blockade on the Lower Rhine, cut by Spanish garrisons at Rheinberg and Wesel, on the Lippe, Ems and above all on the Scheldt.<sup>118</sup> From July 1625, fleets of barges were turned back from Antwerp causing utter disruption in the economic

<sup>113</sup> Evaldo Cabral de Mello. *Olinda Restaurada. Guerra e Açúcar no Nordeste, 1630-54* (São Paulo, 1975) pp. 53-6.

<sup>114</sup> J. I. Israel. *Race, Class and Politics in Colonial Mexico, 1610-1670* (Oxford, 1975) pp. 123, 136-8.

<sup>115</sup> C. Goslinga. *The Dutch in the Caribbean and on the Wild Coast, 1580-1680* (Assen, 1971) pp. 127-36.

<sup>116</sup> In June 1623, the Inquisition was pressing for a tribunal to "atacar (quanto fuera possible) la entrada y comunicacion que los christianos nuevos de la nacion hebrea de los reynos de Portugal hazen por via de Buenos Aires", Brit. Mus. Mss. Eg. 344, fo. 98.

<sup>117</sup> A. P. Canabrava. *O Comércio Português no Rio da Prata, 1580-1640* (São Paulo, 1944) pp. 144-9.

<sup>118</sup> Lieuwe van Aitzama. *Historie of Verhael van Saken van Staet en Oorlogh* 14 vols. (The Hague, 1667-71) ii, 75-9; Alcalá-Zamora, op. cit., 184-6.

life of the Low Countries and dealing yet another damaging blow to the Dutch Sephardim, for business relations between the Antwerp *conversos* and Jews of Holland had flourished on various levels. Since 1621, the Antwerp Portuguese had been unable to charter Dutch ships through factors in Holland, nor could Dutch ships enter Flemish ports, but via the *binnenstromen* they could still import sugar, spices, wines and olive oil, engage in insurance dealings and remit silver. Then suddenly, in July 1625, following a decision in Madrid, this trade collapsed. Not only could Antwerp no longer import from and export to the republic, but even insurance and banking transactions and ordinary correspondence were forbidden and considerably affected.<sup>119</sup> The importing of sugar from Holland by the Antwerp Portuguese virtually ceased.<sup>120</sup> For nearly five years, the Dutch Sephardim, already stripped of their Iberian and Ibero-American commerce, had also, at least partly, to do without their Antwerp connections.

The combined impact of the measures in the peninsula, southern Italy, North Africa, the Americas and the Spanish Netherlands from 1621 was such that the economic rôle and resources of the Dutch Sephardim were inevitably and for a long period severely curtailed. Between 1620 and 1625, the number of Jewish depositors with the Amsterdam Wisselbank, Europe's foremost financial institution, fell spectacularly, by more than 25%, from 106 to seventy-six.<sup>121</sup> In the years 1625-7, helped by the deterioration in North Germany, there was a measure of recovery to ninety-two, but four years later, as the trade depression deepened, the figure was again lower at eighty-nine. By 1631, the proportion of deposits at Amsterdam held by Jews had fallen from nearly 9% to 7%.<sup>122</sup> Furthermore, while the first decade of the Spanish-Dutch war caused the Dutch Jews a sharp setback, the second brought no improvement in nominal terms whatsoever and a further decline in relative importance in which the proportion of Jewish accounts fell from 7% to just under 6%. Apart from the lifting of the river blockade in the Low Countries in 1629, the Spanish pressure was sustained relentlessly through the 1630s and the outbreak of war between Spain and France in 1635 greatly added to the difficulties of the Dutch Jews by cutting all links across the *frontera de Francia*. Two decades after the imposition of the Spanish embargoes by 1641, the number of Jewish bank accounts at Amsterdam still stood at only eighty-nine, clear testimony to the continuing severity of the slump, but, by then, there was at least the promise of recovery in the recent breaking-away of Portugal from Spain. Within a few years, as the Dutch, with their lower freight rates, pushed aside their English and Hanseatic competitors and again crowded the ports of Portugal, the losses of the Dutch Sephardim since 1620 were made good. By 1646, the number of Jewish deposits, nearly all of which were still Sephardi, at last exceeded that for 1620, standing at 126. But

<sup>119</sup> AGS Est. 2316. Cueva to Philip IV, 27 Mar and 23 Apr. 1626.

<sup>120</sup> H. Pohl, "Die Zuckereinfuhr nach Antwerpen durch portugiesische Kaufleute während des 80 jährigen Krieges", *Jahrbuch für Geschichte von Staat, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Lateinamerikas* iv, 355-8; one large sugar consignment for Antwerp turned back on the Scheldt in 1625 was sent by Sebastian Mendes Pimentel, ARA At Zeeland 2455, 26 Nov. 1625.

<sup>121</sup> J. G. van Dillen, "Vreemdelingen te Amsterdam in de eerste helft der zeventiende eeuw. I: De Portugeese Joden", *Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis* 50 (1935) p. 14; Kellenbenz, *Sephardim*, 255.

<sup>122</sup> Van Dillen, op. cit.; the total number of accounts at the Wisselbank increased by 146 from 1202 to 1348 in the period 1620-31.

what could not be recovered was the lost quarter of a century and the innumerable opportunities for growth of which Dutch Sephardi Jewry had been deprived.

During the second Spanish-Dutch war, the Dutch States-General, anxious at the economic recession that resulted and the attendant fall in its own revenues,<sup>123</sup> generally took what action it could to mitigate the effects of the Spanish measures even where this conflicted with the demands of war. The Dutch authorities permitted the supply of foodstuffs, horses and timber to the Spanish Netherlands, except at relatively brief intervals, during crucial sieges and campaigns. Restrictions on trade to the peninsula were likewise kept to a minimum: under the ban of April 1622, which repeated the terms of the edict of 1603, only the supply of arms, munitions, copper, sails, masts larger than a certain size, and Dutch grain to Spain, Portugal and southern Italy was forbidden;<sup>124</sup> the export of other manufactures, Baltic grain and most timber was allowed. It was however also forbidden to insure ships and cargoes belonging to subjects of the king of Spain or freight such cargoes in Dutch vessels.<sup>125</sup> Despite the generally helpful attitude of the Dutch authorities, the Jews experienced certain special difficulties in obtaining States-General support in the face of Spanish pressure precisely because of the exceptional degree of their involvement in peninsula commerce which meant that their needs tended to conflict both with necessities of war and, no less important in the Dutch political arena, the requirements of certain more powerful groups, notably the West India Company and privateering interests. Shortly after the end of the truce, ten Amsterdam Portuguese appealed to the States of Holland that they had sent cargoes to Brazil and were expecting their returns via Portugal requesting safe-guards should their sugar and Brazil wood be captured by Dutch warships or privateers.<sup>126</sup> The States of Holland resolved not to press the States-General to lay down a guide-line at that stage, but to proceed as cases arose. In January 1622, the Amsterdam city council approached the States of Holland and, through the latter, the States-General on behalf of Tomas Nunes da Pina who was contesting 124 chests of captured sugar which had been brought into Rotterdam.<sup>127</sup> The future of the Dutch Brazil trade via Portugal<sup>128</sup> was at stake and became the subject of some intense discussion among the Dutch authorities for some time with considerable sympathy being shown to the Jews especially by Amsterdam. However, interests opposed to those of the Jews proved too strong politically. The States-General refused to sanction trade in Portuguese

<sup>123</sup> On the falling yield of the duties on Dutch trade in the 1620s, see F. Snapper, *Oorlogsinvloeden op de overzeese handel van Holland, 1551-1719* (Amsterdam, 1959) pp. 70-1.

<sup>124</sup> ARA Bis. 49i, fo. 64; Aitzema, *Van Staet en Oorlogh*, i, 374-5; the forbidden masts were "masten dik zynde zestien palmen en daer boven".

<sup>125</sup> As Aitzema puts it, "Item van eenige Spaensche Goederen ofte koopmanschappen d'Ondersaten van de Co. van Spagnien toebehoorende in hare schepen op vrachte ofte andersins niet te mogen laden. . . Desgelijcx is verboden allen kooplieden ende ingesetenen deser Nederlanden niet te moghen versekeren of assureeren op goederen, Koopmanschappen of schepen toebehoorende de subjecten van den koning van Spagnien".

<sup>126</sup> *Resolutiën van de Staten van Holland, 1621*, p. 106.

<sup>127</sup> *ibid.* 1622, 6, 12, 16, 56; ARA Bis. 49i, fos. 8-9.

<sup>128</sup> That is "schepen en ingeladene goederen trafiquerende uit Portugal op Brazil" in which Dutch merchants were interested.

shipping and Nunes da Pina's sugar, and subsequently other consignments, were left to be declared forfeit by the admiralty colleges.<sup>129</sup> In May 1622, the "*coopluiden der Portugeesche Natie tot Amsterdam*" made known to both the States of Holland and the States-General their anxiety concerning the April restrictions which seemed to them to be highly unclear particularly with respect to the insurance of enemy goods carried in neutral shipping, re-export of Baltic grain from the republic and the carrying of Iberian products in Dutch vessels.<sup>130</sup> Both assemblies replied that they considered the *plakkaat* to be definite enough; nevertheless, the States-General ordered that admiralty officials should re-examine it in case adjustments were needed. In fact, the position was somewhat unclear and the debate went on for some time. In October 1623, a committee of the admiralty staffs reported to the States-General on the entire question of the Dutch Jews' involvement in peninsula coast-to-coast trade, carrying between mainland Portugal and the Atlantic islands<sup>131</sup> and the Portuguese Brazil trade. It is remarkable that they identified Jewish merchants as a special group with quite distinctive interests within the general framework of Dutch commerce. The recommendation of the admiralties was that the restrictions prohibiting the activities in question should, despite the fact that they involved some loss of trade, remain in force so as to prevent the Spaniards acquiring munitions through such contacts, so as not to give Spain opportunities for confiscations and so as not to impede or damage privateering.<sup>132</sup> And thus the matter was settled, very much against the interest of the Jews.

During the long war, the mercantile towns of Holland, and especially Amsterdam, were considerably more inclined to make peace with Spain, on moderate terms, than were other parts of the United Provinces. One may safely assume that Dutch Jewry, which suffered still more from struggle than other groups in Holland, must have urgently desired peace and an end to the disruption of communications and trade. The Jewish interest therefore actually conflicted with those of the dominant coalition in Dutch politics — of the *stadhouder*, the great colonial companies and the militant provinces of Zeeland, Friesland and Groningen — although the exigencies of war to some extent forced the Jews to adapt to the changed structure of Dutch commerce, to invest in the colonial companies and deal with the newly conquered Dutch portion of Brazil in lieu of Portuguese Brazil. Con-

<sup>129</sup> Diogo Nunes Belmonte challenged a decision of the Amsterdam admiralty court declaring a consignment of his sugar "*van goede prinse*" in August 1623, ARA Bis. 50, fos. 172v-3.

<sup>130</sup> ARA Bis. 49i, fos. 113v-14v; *Resolutiën van de Staten van Holland*, 1622, 10 May, p. 90: "Is in deliberatie gheleydt een requeste by eenighe Portugeesen aen de Heeren Staten Generael gepresenteert, nopende het asseureren van's vyandts goederen gaende in neutrale schepen, nopende de uytlandsche granen in dese Landen gebracht, of die verstaen werden onder het verbodt van Binnenlandsche Granen; item, nopende het aennemen op vracht van vyandts goederen by schippers en schepen van dese Landen".

<sup>131</sup> "trafique en negotiatie. . . op de havenen vanden Ko. van Spagnien reciproque namentlyk van Port a Port, Vianen ofte andere naer Madeira, Canarien en voorts op Fernabek, Bahias, Rio de Janeiro ofte andere plaatsen, en van den vyand op vyand gedreven", Dutch traffic to Madeira and Canaries during the 1620s was not only a means of continuing to trade with Brazil but a way of obtaining wines and other Iberian products no longer obtainable from the mainland, AGS Est. 2318. Cueva to Philip IV, 28 Aug. 1627.

<sup>132</sup> ARA Bis. 50, fos. 198v-99v.

sequently there is some irony in the fact that one article of the terms put to representatives of the States-General of the Southern Netherlands, and therefore to Spain, during the important though abortive truce talks of 1632-3, one of a set of terms intended by the Dutch side to be very hard, an article which angered Spanish ministers almost more than any other,<sup>133</sup> was that the Portuguese Jews living in Holland should, if a truce were to be agreed on, enjoy exactly the same concessions, including freedom of movement within the European territories of the Spanish king, as would Dutch Protestants.<sup>134</sup> Of course, such a condition, if ever it had been met, would have brought about a revolution in the life of the European Sephardi diaspora and, moreover, since the Jews had been unilaterally excluded by Madrid from inclusion in the terms of 1609, in the face of Dutch objections, their exclusion did represent a genuine political grievance on the part of the republic as well as of the Sephardim themselves. Certainly article nine was exactly in accord with the States-General's representation of 1618 following the Oporto arrests and indeed of later representations made after the signing of the treaty of Münster in 1648. Yet, it can not be said that, in the circumstances of 1632-3, article nine served Jewish needs in any way. Curious though it seems, it may well be that the initiative for this clause came not from Amsterdam or any town of Holland,<sup>135</sup> but from groups in the republic which had few links with the Jews and which were primarily concerned to prevent a truce with Spain.

The Archduchess Isabella, governess of the Spanish Netherlands, when she learnt of the Dutch terms, instructed the Flemish delegates to the talks with respect to article nine to obstruct it, pointing out that it ran counter to the fundamental laws of Spain "*déclarant néanmoins que son Altièze escriroit à sa Majesté, pour estre esclaircie de ses intentions*".<sup>136</sup> To this the Dutch retorted that the "Portuguese" were subjects of the United Provinces and should therefore be included in the terms of the truce and "*converser et négocier librement en Espagne, n'y ayant en tout cas aucune raison de confisquer les marchandises et denrées qu'ilz y envoyeroient, sans y estre en personne, veu que la justice droicturière ne permectoit aucunement que l'on procédast par voy de confiscation sur les denrées et marchandises de personnes sur lesquelles l'on n'at aucun droict ou jurisdiction, outre ce que les autres subjects desdictes provinces en pâtissoient une infinité des molestations en leurs propres denrées soubz prétexte de recherche qu'ellex appartenoyent à quelque Portugais*".<sup>137</sup>

<sup>133</sup> AGS Est. 2048, *consulta* 16 Mar. 1634, fos. 4v-10v; the marqués de Leganes commented "que no se debe por ningun casso dar las ventajas a Portugueses que piden, pero bien se ajustaria a que en los nabios donde van sus haziendas, no fuese confiscado mas de lo que les pertenece, punto que seria de gran satisfacion para los rebeldes".

<sup>134</sup> Aitzema, *Van Staet en Oorlogh* xii, 78, "Dat die van de Portugeesche Natie, Inwoonders ende ingesetenen van de vereenichde Provintien die zijn ofte naemals sullen komen, van wat religie of geloof die soudén mogen wesen, so wel als andere Ingesetenen van de voorsz. Provintien het effect van 't jegenwoordigen Trataet soo in Nederlandt, als in Spaegnien ende alomme in 't Spaensche gebied, volkomentlick sullen genieten"; M. G. de Boer. *Die Friedensunterhandlungen zwischen Spanien und den Niederlanden in den Jahren 1623 und 1633* (Groningen, 1898) pp. 67, 89-90.

<sup>135</sup> From the published resolutions it would seem that the matter was not discussed by the states of Holland.

<sup>136</sup> *Actes des Etats Généraux de 1632*. ed. M. Gachard (Brussels, 1853) pp. 95, 202.

<sup>137</sup> *ibid.*, 106, 215.



With this, the Dutch hinted that they might settle for assurances that the goods of Dutch Sephardim sent to the peninsula would not longer be interfered with.

Predictably enough, Philip IV's response to article nine was to reject it altogether as "*implacable*".<sup>138</sup> Subsequently, in the talks of 26-29th March 1633, the Dutch delegates considerably modified their position on a number of points, including article nine, following heavy pressure in the States-General by the peace party for dilution of the Dutch terms. The Dutch gave up their insistence that Dutch Jews be able to visit the peninsula, on the same basis as other subjects of the republic, demanding only that "*les biens de la nation portugaise, . . . inhabitants des Provinces-Unies, de quelle religion ou creance qu'ilz estoient . . . seroyent reglez comme les biens des autres inhabitans desdictes provinces, sans aucune distinction, mais quant à ce qui touchoit les provinces obéissantes du Pays-Bas, devroyent ceux de la nation portugaise, tant au regard de leurs personnes, que biens, y estre traictez et reglez comme les autres inhabitans desdictes provinces*".<sup>139</sup> Isabella did in fact authorize the Flemish delegates, in May 1633, to concede that the goods of Dutch Jews found in ships together with goods of other subjects of the Republic "*qualifiez a jouir du benefice de la tresve*" would not be forfeit.<sup>140</sup> The point was not actually conceded, however, for the truce talks broke up in June 1633 in total disagreement over a number of issues, especially Brazil and the future of Venlo and Maastricht. After June 1633, although there were many further rounds of talks until the break-through in 1646 which led eventually to the signing of the treaty of Münster in 1648, the question of the Dutch Sephardim was not again specifically raised. The Dutch Jews were however firmly entrenched as a factor in international politics.

The Dutch peace party was overruled in 1633 and again in subsequent talks right through until 1646 and thus the conflict, with its serious drawbacks for Amsterdam and ruinous consequences for the Sephardim was prolonged. Despite the establishment of a thriving Jewish colony during the 1630s in Dutch Brazil, and the attendant revival of the sugar trade, the economic position of the Dutch Jews generally, as has been seen, continued to deteriorate until the early 1640s. The subsequent gains, following the resumption of trade with Portugal, in the period until 1646 when at last the Spanish embargoes began to be lifted, compensated for what had been lost since 1620; but this did not in itself lay the foundation or open the way for the extraordinarily vigorous and rapid advance which began in 1646 with the return of Dutch ships to Spanish, Flemish and south Italian harbours. In the decade 1646-55, despite the collapse of Dutch Brazil and the evacuation of its Jewish community in 1654, despite the blow to Dutch commerce as a whole dealt by the Anglo-Dutch war of 1652-4, circumstances which make the process all the more remarkable, Dutch Sephardi Jewry received, chiefly from the Spanish territories, an infusion of enterprising and wealthy immigrants so massive that it dwarfed anything that had gone before or came after. Indeed, the transformation in Spanish-Dutch relations, from 1646, caused Dutch Sephardi commerce to develop as much faster than

<sup>138</sup> AGS Est. 2240. Philip IV to Pierre Roose, Madrid, 6 Mar. 1633.

<sup>139</sup> *Actes des Etats Généraux*, 134, 144.

<sup>140</sup> *ibid.*, 294.

Dutch trade generally, in fact even more, as the previous war had caused it to grow more slowly. In 1646, the Jews constituted 8% of the depositors at Amsterdam, slightly less than in 1620. By 1661, there had been a considerable increase in the total number of accounts, but the number of Jewish depositors had shot up from 126 to 243, nearly doubling, while in proportion to the total, they expanded from 8% to 12½%,<sup>141</sup> with an increase in capital resources which was still more spectacular. During the third quarter of the seventeenth century, the Dutch Sephardim were to be at the very peak of their influence on Dutch economic life. However, the way in which this came about was complex.

## II. 1640-1660

The treaty of Münster, ending the second Spanish-Dutch war in January 1648, marked not only the end of a prolonged struggle, but the beginning of a remarkable transformation of Spanish-Dutch<sup>142</sup> relations and, linked with it, a decisive change in the relationship between Spain and Dutch Jewry. Although an almost identical threat to Spanish interests was posed by the rapid expansion of Dutch trade with Spain, its European dependencies and, to some extent, its American colonies, from 1646 onwards, as during the Twelve Years Truce of 1609-21,<sup>143</sup> the entirely altered general circumstances of the 1650s led the Spanish crown to proceed in a markedly different way in relation to the United Provinces than it had done in 1621. Threatened still more by the growing power and ambitions of Mazarin's France and Cromwell's England than by the effects of Dutch commercial supremacy, Philip IV's ministers contrived a *volte-face* in their Dutch policy and, abandoning confrontation, attempted, though until the 1670s with only limited success, to forge a special Spanish-Dutch relationship. It was calculated in Madrid that only by this means could the Southern Netherlands be defended from the French, Portugal weakened and a European axis formed robust enough to check Anglo-French aspirations and prop up the waning Spanish empire. The price of this policy was a lenient stand in relation to Dutch commercial interests in Philip IV's European dominions and a muted reaction even to Dutch penetration of Spain's American preserve. In large measure, Madrid deliberately gave way to the republic on matters of trade in the hope of thereby gaining political rewards. This major shift in Spanish-Dutch relations co-incided with what was by far the most crucial and rapid phase of growth in wealth and numbers sustained by the Dutch Sephardim during the seventeenth century. In a mere fifteen years, from 1646 to 1661, the number of Jewish depositors with the Amsterdam Wisselbank jumped from 126 to 243 rising, at a time when the total number of depositors was increasing appreciably faster than during the period of the war with Spain, from about 7% to 12½% of the total.<sup>144</sup> By the 1660s, the Dutch Sephardim were at the very peak of their

<sup>141</sup> Van Dillen, loc. cit., 14.

<sup>142</sup> see J. I. Israel, "A Conflict of Empires: Spain and the Netherlands, 1618-1648", *Past and Present* lxxvi (Aug. 1977), 73-4; see above, 40-1.

<sup>143</sup> See above, 3-5, 41.

<sup>144</sup> J. G. van Dillen, "Vreemdelingen te Amsterdam in de eerste helft der zeventiende eeuw I: De Portugeesche Joden", *Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis* Vol. 50 (1935) p. 14.

influence on Dutch and European economic life. There are, it would seem, several significant connections between the transformation in Spanish-Dutch relations and this spectacular advance of the Dutch Sephardim and it is the object of this part of the study to throw some light on these.

Of course, there were at any rate two other major causes of the sudden expansion in resources of Dutch Jewry during the years 1640-60 — the resumption of Dutch-Portuguese trade from 1641, following the secession of Portugal from Spain in December 1640, and the collapse and loss of Dutch Brazil, in the years 1646-54, which produced a large influx of Brazilian Jewry to Holland. Almost certainly, it was the loss of Portugal by the Spanish king which actually reversed the process of economic decline suffered by the Dutch Sephardim from 1621 onwards as a result of the Spanish embargoes against the Dutch which were implemented in Portugal as in all parts of the Spanish Monarchy. The years 1641-6, the figures for numbers of Jewish depositors at Amsterdam suggest, were a period of modest but definite recovery preceding the much faster expansion of the decade 1646-55. In 1641, the number of Jewish accounts at the Wisselbank was only eighty-nine, as compared with 106 in 1620, the Jews having declined, as a proportion of the total, from nearly 9% to about 6%.<sup>145</sup> The ending of Spanish rule in Portugal opened Lisbon and other Portuguese ports to Dutch shipping for the first time for two decades, enabling the Dutch to exploit the very high prices fetched by Baltic grain, timber and copper in Portugal and the urgent need for armaments and naval stores with which the rebel king, João IV, hoped to fight off Spain and revive Portuguese navigation with Brazil and West Africa.

The Dutch, with their greater resources in shipping and lower freight rates, speedily outstripped their English and Hanseatic competitors who had dominated the carrying trade to Portugal from 1621 to 1641. In the three years 1643-5, the Dutch accounted for over 50% of all foreign ships docking at Lisbon while in 1647, forty-nine out of 107 foreign vessels entering Lisbon were Dutch.<sup>146</sup> In the general carrying trade, the Dutch Sephardim undoubtedly played an important part and although most of the contracts for weaponry and ammunition for Portugal, like those for Catalonia, were handled by non-Jews such as Gerrit Trip, Jan van der Straaten, Pieter Outgers and Abraham Hartooge,<sup>147</sup> several Jews, notably Lopo Ramires (David Curiel)<sup>148</sup> and his renowned

<sup>145</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>146</sup> V. Rau, "Subsidios para o estudo do movimento dos portos de Faro e Lisboa durante o século XVII", *Anais da Academia Portuguesa de História* 2nd ser. vol. v (1954) p. 241.

<sup>147</sup> Algemeen Rijksarchief, The Hague, verzameling Bisdom vol. lxxviii, 44-5, 55, 59, 112, 232-3, 294, 436, 437.

<sup>148</sup> Lopo da Fonseca Ramires is well known as a leading figure in Dutch Jewry of this period, especially for his various connections with the Iberian peninsula. From 1641, he worked, if somewhat uneasily, with the Portuguese, supplying timber and naval stores and handling cash remittances for the crown from Manoel Rodrigues de Mattos of Lisbon. In the middle and later 1640s, he acted also as an agent in Holland of the conde de Peñaranda, Spanish minister at the Münster negotiations, and resumed, if he had in fact ceased, what he had been doing unofficially in the later 1630s and possibly earlier, despatching naval timber and supplies to Cádiz and Sanlúcar. This increasing involvement with Spain caused the Portuguese ambassador in Holland, Sousa Coutinho, to call him "o mais mau perro que ha em toda a judearia". However, curiously, he played no real rôle in the great expansion of contact

nephew, Jerônimo Nunes da Costa (Moses Curiel), who served the king of Portugal as his Amsterdam agent over a long period, played a leading part in the supplying of naval stores and munitions and in handling cash payments remitted from Lisbon to Amsterdam on behalf of the crown. However, though shipping figures for Lisbon are lacking for the period after 1648, it is reasonably certain that Dutch-Portuguese trade contracted in some degree for there was a serious slump in the Baltic grain trade during the 1650s, much of which was geared to the Portuguese market.<sup>149</sup> Portuguese-Dutch relations deteriorated sharply as the Portuguese intensified the pressure on Dutch Brazil, impeding the flow of sugar to Holland, while finally the English profited from the tension to gain a larger slice of the Portugal trade for themselves. Also, since this period was a relatively good one for leading *conversos* in Portugal, with a sustained effort on the part of João IV, who was in urgent need of resources with which to fend off Spanish attempts to reconquer the kingdom, to afford the richer *conversos* and their capital a measure of protection from the Inquisition, as is shown by the constitutions of the *Companhia Geral do Brasil* set up in 1649, it is likely that pressure on the *converso* élite to emigrate from Portugal to the Sephardi diaspora in Northern Europe, or transfer major resources to Amsterdam, was generally slight.<sup>150</sup>

The collapse of Dutch Brazil was also a key factor, one indeed that van Dillen was inclined to think might be the most important.<sup>151</sup> During the years 1646-55, approximately 200 Jewish families returned to the United Provinces from Brazil and, although many then left again, the increase in numbers and resources at Amsterdam was undoubtedly considerable. Of the twelve largest Dutch Sephardi bank accounts in 1661, at least two, and possibly more, were of Brazilian origin.<sup>152</sup> However, it is arguable that the

between Dutch Jewry and Spain after 1649. His fortune declined markedly and it seems that he was not employed as an agent by either the first two Spanish ambassadors at The Hague, Brun or Gamarra, or by the Spanish consul in Amsterdam. His omission from the list of Jewish firms trading with Spain of 1655 (see appendix I) is perhaps less due to any desire by Spanish diplomatic staff in Holland to protect him than to his having largely withdrawn from trade with Spain. Though he retained his account at the Wisselbank, he seems to have spent much of his time, during the 1650s, at Antwerp; see, E. M. Koen, "Notarial Records", *Stud. Rosenth.* viii, 301n; H. Kellenbenz, *Sephardim an der unteren Elbe* (Wiesbaden 1958) pp. 167-9; *Correspondência diplomática de Francisco de Sousa Coutinho durante a sua embaixada em Holanda* ed. E. Prestage. 3 vols. (Coimbra-Lisbon, 1920-55) i, 165, ii, 47-8, 265, iii, 10, 26, 39, 83.

<sup>149</sup> J. A. Faber, "The decline of the Baltic grain trade in the second half of the seventeenth century", *Acta Historiae Neerlandica*, i (1966) p. 117, graph B.

<sup>150</sup> A. Wiznitzer, *Jews in Colonial Brazil* (New York, 1960) pp. 120-1; João IV's stance caused a remarkable friction to develop between himself and the Portuguese Inquisition, see Anita Novinsky, *Cristãos Novos na Bahia* (São Paulo, 1972) pp. 49-55; there was a discernible decline in the number of *autos de fe* in Portugal in the 1640s (34), as compared with the 1620s (46) and 1630s (44), however, in the 1650s, the number was much higher again (55), see E. N. Adler, *Auto de Fe and Jew* (Oxford, 1908) p. 165.

<sup>151</sup> Van Dillen, remarking on the spectacular rise in the number of Jewish depositors at Amsterdam from 125 in 1646 to 243 in 1661, says that "deze gegevens vestigen den indruk, dat — hoewel het verlies van Brazilië menigeen groote verliezen heeft berokkend — over 't algemeen de handel der Amsterdamsche Portugeezen zich op een behoorlijk peil heeft kunnen handhaven", loc. cit. p. 26.

<sup>152</sup> *ibid.* pp. 25-6, Wiznitzer, op. cit., 136-8, viz. the joint account of Mosen and David Judah Leon and that of Salomon Senior Coronel.

return of the Brazilian Jews with their savings could not possibly have co-incided with a period of sustained expansion in Dutch Sephardi European trade had circumstances in Europe not altered drastically. The remarkably rapid growth of Brazilian Jewry, during the 1630s and early 1640s, must after all have been essentially the result of the contraction of, and increasingly severe limitations to, Dutch Sephardi European trade. Jews had migrated in strength to Brazil because there had been no opportunities for them in Holland or anywhere in Europe. Thus, the fall of Netherlands Brazil which, as far as future opportunities were concerned, was a disaster for Dutch Jewry rather than a gain, can in no way have stimulated the economic growth of the Sephardi settlement in Holland had the Portuguese secession, and the lifting of the Spanish embargoes against the Dutch in the years 1646-7, not taken place and transformed prospects for European trade.

Without in any way denying the importance of the Brazilian exodus or the revival in Dutch-Portuguese trade, the object in this study is to suggest that the changes in Spanish-Dutch relations during this period, and the accompanying movement of *conversos* and their capital from the Spanish territories to Amsterdam and Rotterdam in the years 1646-55, firstly gave rise to the most substantial accumulations of Jewish capital in seventeenth century Holland and secondly provided a vital part of the necessary framework for the impressive flowering of Sephardi society and culture in the United Provinces in the third quarter of the century by providing the Dutch Sephardim with what they had conspicuously lacked before 1646, a major rôle in European commerce.

Part of this crucial process was the recovery by the Dutch Sephardim of unimpeded contact with Spain. During the protracted Spanish-Dutch negotiations of the 1640s, which paved the way to the signing of the treaty of Münster, there was no mention of Dutch Jewry by either side despite the fact that the question of the Jews had been an issue of some importance during the abortive Spanish-Dutch talks of 1632-3. Nevertheless, the Jews soon again became a point of contention between The Hague and Madrid. Inevitably, they were left in a state of uncertainty by the terms of 1648 not only as to what might now be their rights and privileges in the Spanish territories, but also as to their merchandise intercepted by Spanish naval forces in ships of France and Portugal, both of which were still at war with Spain, and in the case of seizure of their assets found in the possession of prisoners of the Spanish Inquisition. The Jews consequently put pressure, through the Amsterdam city council, on the States of Holland<sup>153</sup> which led in turn to the matter being raised with the Spanish ambassador at The Hague by the States-General. Antoine Brun, the Spanish minister, was asked to transmit to Madrid the request of the States-General "*que de la part du Roy d'Espagne soit accorde au plustost un Acte portant declaration que les Juifs inhabitants de cest estat puissent traffiquer en Espagne, et autres lieux de l'obeissance de S.M<sup>te</sup>. soit par leurs facteurs ou autres personnes de leur party*

<sup>153</sup> *Resolutiën van de Staten van Holland*, 27 Jul, 1649; H. J. Koenen. *Geschiedenis der Joden in Nederland* (Utrecht, 1843) pp. 151-2; J. S. da Silva Rosa. *Geschiedenis der Portugeesche Joden te Amsterdam, 1593-1925* (Amsterdam, 1925) pp. 84-5.

*employez*"<sup>154</sup> and that if Dutch Jews should have, owing to storms or other mishaps at sea, to put into Spanish ports they would be treated "*de la mesme facon*" as other subjects of the United Provinces. The missive, though somewhat vaguely worded, seems to imply that the States-General were not then insisting that Dutch Jews be treated in, and by, Spain as exactly equivalent to other Dutch subjects, but only almost so. This first approach was evidently dealt with tardily in Madrid, for in February 1650, Brun wrote to the council of state that the Dutch, who apparently had not yet received any reply, were pressing him that the

"Jews who reside in Amsterdam and other towns of those provinces should be able to come to trade (in Spain) with the same facility and security as their other subjects, in virtue of the general provision contained in article two of the peace treaty, insisting that the said ambassador should make a specific declaration on this point in the name of Your Majesty".<sup>155</sup>

Brun suggested that the crown communicate to the States-General that the Jews living in the republic could openly and legitimately trade with Spain by means of factors of another religion, that is Catholic or Protestant, and also that Dutch Jews compelled by tempest or other mishap to enter Spanish harbours "should receive no harm as regards either their persons or goods". Brun's proposal, though meeting less than the whole of the Dutch demand of February 1650, would seem to correspond closely enough with what had been demanded in August 1649. However, the crown, while willing to acknowledge formally the right of Jews in the republic to trade with Spain, including by implication former subjects of the king, refused the concession concerning mishaps at sea on the ground that such occurrences could not be readily checked.<sup>156</sup> Brun's subsequent statement to this effect to the States-General<sup>157</sup> was not well received. He was confronted with a declaration

<sup>154</sup> Archivo General de Simancas (hereafter AGS), (Libros de la Haya, vol. 284, "Copie de la lettre escrite par les Etats Gnaux. a M. L'Ambassr. de Brun a la Haye 12e Aoust 1649 en faveur des Juifs leurs sujets a ce qu'ils puissent trafiquer en Espagne".

<sup>155</sup> AGS Estado 2072, consulta, 27 Jun. 1650: "Antonio Brun, en carta que ha escrito a Vuestra Magd. de 7 febrero deste año, refiere las instancias que Olandeses le hazian para que los Judios que residen en Amsterdam y demas villas de aquellas provincias pudiesen venir a comerciar con la misma facilidad y seguridad que los demas burgeses dellas, en virtud de la generalidad que contiene el articulo segundo del tratado de las pazes, insiendiendo con el dicho embaxador para que en nombre de Vuestra Magd. les diese declaracion particular en este punto, conforme a su intento, y juzga en este caso se podria declarar que dichos judios pudiesen dirigir las cosas de su trafico por factores de otra religion y caso que por algun accidente de temporal arribasen a los puertos de Vuestra Magd. que no se les haria daño ni en sus personas, ni en sus bienes, y que la resolucion que Vuestra magd. se sirviese de tomar se le embiase en claro para que pudiendola mostrar a los Estados pasase por declaracion".

<sup>156</sup> AGS Haya xxxii, Philip IV to Brun, 9 July 1650: "(los judios) pueden dirigir sus mercancias por factores de otra religion, y no de otra manera, sin que les pueda ser permitido el que entren en mis puertos por ningun accidente de temporal que subceda porque las provanzas del... en estos casos son poco averiguables".

<sup>157</sup> Aitzema records the statement thus: "Item d'ordrē die den koningh had gestelt dat de Joden, Ingesetenen deser Landen in de Rijcken ende Landen van sijn Majesteyt door Factoren soudē mogen handelen ende blijven van soodanige gelegentheyt als die van d'andere Ingesetenen deser Landen, maer dat sy voor haer personen daer buyten soudē moeten blijven", *Van Staet en Oorlogh* vii, 178.

that the king's stand was in open violation of articles two, four and eleven of the peace treaty and was visited by a deputation from the States that put him under some pressure. "The pensionary of Amsterdam", Brun reported to Madrid

"began to speak, defending the said Jews vigorously, maintaining that Christianity was much in their debt for their having been so loyal a guardian of Holy Scripture and that to think of doing away with that nation was against the will of God who had said through his prophets that remnants of that people should be converted at the end of time, and that likewise Saint Augustine had taught in *The City of God* that the Jews worshipped one God as do Christians and that believing in Moses and other prophets they were that much more capable of receiving the texts of the Christian faith."<sup>158</sup>

He concluded with pointing out that the authorities in Amsterdam, Rotterdam and other towns had received them and regarded them as their own subjects and were well content with them and that even the Pope, head of the Catholics, and the Emperor admitted Jews into their territories.

To this Brun answered that each realm had its own laws for its own particular reasons and that, besides, the Dutch plenipotentiaries at Münster had never once raised the question of the Jews. In addition, he drew attention to the States' recent additional provisions against Catholic ecclesiastics in the republic which, among others, applied to subjects of the king of Spain. To this, the deputation replied that in the province of Holland where the Jews lived, the new *plakkaat* against Catholic priests had neither been ratified nor published. Following this encounter, Brun suggested to the council of state that some concession be made and it was in fact conceded in Madrid, by Philip IV, that thenceforward Jewish subjects of the republic, forced by bad weather into Spanish or south Italian ports, would be treated as would other Dutch subjects except when they had been baptized or were former vassals of the king.<sup>159</sup> The States-General, Amsterdam city council and the Jewish community all remained dissatisfied with this,<sup>160</sup> but at this point the matter stood and no further concession was obtained.

The question of the status of the Dutch Jews on Spanish territory arose again in a different form in the years 1653-4 in connection with the Spanish Netherlands. It was brought to the attention of the council of state, in February 1654, that Philip IV's governor

<sup>158</sup> AGS Haya xxxii, Brun to Philip IV, 30 Sep. 1650: "y tomando la palabra el pensionario de Amsterdam pleyteo mucho en favor de los dichos judios diciendo que harto les devia la Cristiandad por haver hecho tan fiel guardia de las sagradas escrituras, y que pensar perder toda aquella nacion, era contra la voluntad de Dios que decia por sus prophetas que las reliquias de aquella gente se convertirian al fin un dia, y que tambien lo enseñava San Agustin en su libro de la ciudad de Dios que los judios adoravan un solo Dios como los cristianos y que creyendo en Moysen y otros prophetas tanto mas eran capaces de recibir los documentos de la religion cristiana".

<sup>159</sup> AGS Estado 2076, consulta 30 Nov. 1650; AGS Estado 2259, Philip IV to Brun, 4 Dec. 1650: me he conformado como que los que aportaren a los puertos de mis reynos, tanto de España como de Italia, no hayan sido Christianos bautizados ni vasallos mios estando advertido que estos judios se hecharon destos reynos desde los reyes Catholicos y desde este tienen prohibicion de entrar".

<sup>160</sup> AGS Haya xxxiii, Brun to Philip IV, 16 Sep. 1651: "No desisten estos señores", wrote Brun, "de apretarme sobre lo de los judios".

at Brussels, the Archduke Leopold, had taken a remarkably independent initiative and negotiated with certain Dutch Jews over the re-admission of the Jews into the Southern Netherlands.<sup>161</sup> The papal nuncio in Madrid represented to the council that discussions had taken place between Leopold and Amsterdam Sephardim seeking permission for the establishment of a community and erection of a synagogue at Borgerhout near Antwerp. The Pope had learnt of this through his nuncio in Brussels and wished to see the proceedings stopped.<sup>162</sup> A royal letter was despatched to Brussels expressing surprise and concern, and requiring an explanation, to which the archduke replied that talks had taken place, following an initiative by the Jews to Antoine Brun, with a substantial sum being offered in return for the privilege of a synagogue.<sup>163</sup> In the extremely harsh financial circumstances in which he found himself, Leopold had supposed that every means of obtaining money should be considered and had accordingly convened a council consisting of the archbishop of Mechelen, the chancellor of Brabant, the treasurer-general of the Southern Netherlands and three additional councillors.<sup>164</sup> Thus it was that the same urgent pressure on the Dutch Jews in the 1650s to found offshoot communities outside Holland, caused by the excessive influx of refugees, resulting especially from the fall of Netherlands Brazil, the same pressure that produced the various Caribbean ventures of these years and the drive to gain re-admission into England, gave rise to a secret conference in Brussels which seriously deliberated the return of the Jews into Spanish Brabant. Moreover, the Brussels council concluded that there was no fundamental law barring Jewish settlement in Brabant and advised the archduke that they should be admitted, in return for a large payment, but under the condition that they should live in a tightly regulated ghetto modelled on those of Italy and Catholic Germany. The substance of the conference was duly transmitted to Madrid. The crown soon put an end to the proceedings however and laid down that there could be no question of permitting Jewish entry into Brabant or anywhere in the Southern Netherlands, for money or on any basis, and that neither Leopold, his successors, nor the Spanish diplomatic staff in the republic were to listen to such proposals in the future.<sup>165</sup>

Although in general the Spanish crown wished to avoid friction with the republic over the Jews as over other issues, both during the intricate Münster negotiations and subsequently, and Spanish officials at all levels were made well aware of this, some incidents were bound to occur owing to Madrid's refusal to consider the Jews as equivalent to other

<sup>161</sup> AGS Estado 2185, consulta 7 Feb. 1654.

<sup>162</sup> *ibid*: the consulta refers to a memorial "del nuncio de su Santidad residente en esta Corte, en que da quenta a Vra. Mgd. de haverse avisado a su Santidad por el internuncio de Flandes que se havia comenzado a trater en aquellos estados de abrir una sinagoga de Hebreos en un lugar llamado Burgero pocas millas distante de Amberes, y supplica a Vra. Mgd. se sirva de mandar se prohiba qualquiera resolucion sobre esto sino que se arranque y quite de echo todo tratado en esta materia como lo espera de la rectitud y christiano celo de Vra. Mgd".

<sup>163</sup> Mocatta Library, University College London, Lucien Wolf Papers, Netherlands (hereafter LW Neths) xi (transcripts from Archives Générales, Brussels, SEG reg. 257), Philip to Leopold, 19 Feb. 1654 and Leopold to Philip, 17 Apr. 1654.

<sup>164</sup> *ibid*, "Protocole d'une jointe composée de l'Archevêque de Malines, etc. 11th Dec. 1653".

<sup>165</sup> *ibid*, Philip to Leopold, 24 Jun. 1654.



Dutch subjects on Spanish territory and to Dutch Jewry's intimate and increasing links with the *conversos* in Spain, and the *conversos* and Jews in countries at war with Spain, especially Portugal and France, but during the years 1655-1660 also England. The most serious occurrence during the period of the Münster talks arose from the agreement of 1646 between Spain and the republic over the returning of prisoners. Under the terms of the exchange, a general order was issued in Spain, in July 1646, that all Dutch prisoners being held in the Spanish territories were to be promptly released and most were. However, for various reasons a small number were not handed over, causing considerable annoyance in the United Provinces and at Münster, the most serious case being that of four Dutch Jews of Portuguese origin, Jacob and Abraham Bueno and David and Moseh Cohen.<sup>166</sup> Several reminders reached Madrid, both from Brussels and from Peñaranda, at Münster, urging that the Dutch were determined to retrieve the four Jews, that they kept on raising the question due to the efforts of the Jews' relatives in Holland<sup>167</sup> and that the States-General were holding Colonel Ambrosio Mexia and three Spanish cavalry captains until they should be released. The crown was willing enough to produce the four who had been captured at sea some years before, but for some time was unable to locate them. At length, having found that they had been placed with Franciscan friars in Andalusia and later taken to Ceuta to be exchanged for four friars being held by the Muslims at Tetuán, but, following the non-occurrence of the exchange, then brought back to Gibraltar, the *corregidor* of that town was written to.<sup>168</sup> It was learnt that in January 1647, Jacob Bueno, the principal of the four, a personage born at Lisbon and taken many years before by his parents to Amsterdam, having been subjected by the friars to every pressure so as to reduce him to Catholicism, had, "in despair and always constant in the error of the law of Moses", committed suicide at Gibraltar. He had stabbed himself shouting out "*ni ay mas Dios que el Dios de Israel*" and uttering "many foul blasphemies against Christ our redeemer" which had compelled the Franciscans to place him in a box as he lay dying.<sup>169</sup> The other three Jews had converted and no longer wished to return to Amsterdam. Thus eventually, it was communicated to The Hague via Brussels that one of the four had died while the other three preferred to remain in Spain.

In the sphere of Inquisition confiscations of goods in the care of *conversos* belonging, or allegedly belonging, to Dutch Jews, probably the most delicate instance, politically, during this period, was the seizing in 1655 of Manuel de Aledo and Manuel Jorge de

<sup>166</sup> AGS Estado 2167, marqués de Castel-Rodrigo to Philip, Bruss., 28 Mar. 1647: "he representado a Vra. Mgd. repetidas veces quanto conviene no diferir mas la soltura de los quatro judios llamados Jacob y Abraham Bueno y David y Moisen Cohen, como se deve hazer segun los tratados hechos".

<sup>167</sup> AGS Estado 2167, Francisco de Galarreta to Pedro Coloma, 25 Sep. 1647, refers to the urgent need to set free "esos honrrados judios pues tanto instan por su libertad los parientes que tienen en Holanda".

<sup>168</sup> *ibid*, Andres Marin to Coloma, Gibraltar, 29 Mar. 1647; AGS Estado 2257, Philip to *corregidor* of Gibraltar, 18 Jun. 1647.

<sup>169</sup> AGS Estado 2167, 'Relacion verdadera del fin y muerte de Jacob Bueno en el convento de S. Pablo de Labrena', 26 Jan. 1647.

Acosta, "Portuguese" partners in the Indies trade at Seville.<sup>170</sup> After the arrests, Isaac Swanenburg, the Dutch consul at Seville, petitioned the council of state that Aledo and Acosta were factors of various Amsterdam merchants and that he was anxious lest Dutch interests be harmed and requested that the Dutch parties should have their goods promptly restituted by the Inquisition. The council of state shared the consul's concern to shield Dutch interests and following its discussion of the matter, the king instructed the Inquisitor-General to ensure that the Dutch merchants concerned, that is by implication the Jews concerned, for it was clear that the correspondents of the arrested men were such, had all their possessions speedily returned. The inquisitors at Seville, however, by arrangement with Aledo, Acosta and their partner, Manuel de Mercado, who had not been seized, had released the cloth consignment for shipment to Mexico so as to prevent deterioration of the merchandise and obtain the anticipated profits. There was a considerable delay before this was explained to the Dutch causing mounting annoyance to the Amsterdam parties<sup>171</sup> who were named as Manuel Centeno, Melchor Méndez Franco and Francisco Gómez Barbossa. Again the Jews, through the Dutch consul at Seville, had recourse to the council of state, in Madrid, in October 1656, and again they received assurance that the Inquisition would eventually restitute all that was due.

Several incidents arose as a result of interception by the Spaniards of Portuguese and other enemy shipping involving capture of goods which were subsequently claimed by Jews at Amsterdam. One minor but long-drawn-out dispute arose from the capture, in June 1648, of a cargo of silk *en route* from Livorno to Lisbon claimed by the Jewish merchant Jerônimo Rodrigues da Sousa at Amsterdam, a claim pressed by the States-General.<sup>172</sup> Another arose from the taking in 1658, of a cargo of sugar *en route* from Madeira to Amsterdam consigned to several Jews.<sup>173</sup> One rather serious incident followed the capture, in 1657, by an Irish privateer in the Spanish service, of the vessel *Perel* or *Pearl* which was brought in to San Sebastián. The ship was carrying twenty-seven Jewish emigrants from Amsterdam to Barbados, merchandise valued at f 1,295,400, a very valuable stock, belonging evidently to Amsterdam Jews, and both Dutch and English papers. Spanish *almirantazgo* officials were uncertain whether to classify the ship as Dutch or English and as a result of the ensuing delay, there was heavy pressure by the Jewish community on the Dutch authorities, including an official visit to The Hague by

<sup>170</sup> AGS Estado 2088, consulta, 18 Oct. 1656 and enclosed consulta of the Inquisition suprema; these were, possibly, two of the four referred to in Barrionuevo's entry for 17 April 1655: "en Sevilla prendieron cuatro mercaderes portugueses riquísimos a primeros de Abril", *Avisos de D. Jerónimo de Barrionuevo* (1654-1658) 4 vols. (Madrid, 1892-4) i, 278; neither merchant is included among the Seville correspondents of Amsterdam Jews in the lists of 1655 (see appendix i), unless the latter is the same as Manuel Gomez de Acosta.

<sup>171</sup> Of the three, which are doubtless all aliases, only the second is given in the lists of 1655, being the alias of Abraham Franco Méndez.

<sup>172</sup> AGS Estado 2669, Jacome van de Hove, Dutch consul at Cádiz, to Philip, 14 Sep. 1648; *ibid* 2670, consulta 31 Jan. 1650; Aitzema, *Van Staet en Oorlogh*, vii, 165.

<sup>173</sup> Mocatta LW Netherlands vi, V. Richard to Baron de Batteville, The Hague, 21 Aug. 1658.

the Amsterdam *parnassim*, in June 1657, to present a petition to the States-General.<sup>174</sup> The States' response to the petition of the Jewish elders was the famous resolution of 17 July 1657 which became the classic formulation in the collective memory of Dutch Sephardi Jewry, though, as has been seen, there had been earlier similar declarations that "those of the Jewish nation who live in these provinces are true subjects and inhabitants of these provinces and that they must enjoy the conditions, rights and privileges stipulated in the treaties of peace and commerce (with Spain)".<sup>175</sup> This was followed by several subsequent and increasingly threatening statements to the Spanish ambassador that the United Provinces was determined to uphold this principle.<sup>176</sup> Commenting on the strength of the Dutch reaction to the *Pearl* affair and the unequivocal resolution which the Jews had obtained from the States-General, the secretary of the Spanish embassy at The Hague, Vincent Richard, wrote to the council of state that the Dutch "will not suffer in any case that the Jews, born in these provinces and inhabiting them, should be worse treated than their other subjects, since it is a fact that this nation has very great power with the magistrates of the city councils, and especially that of Amsterdam, since they are the ones who, without doubt, have the greatest commerce and consequently bring the greatest advantage".<sup>177</sup>

The principal stress between the Spanish crown and Dutch Jewry in the 1650s however, derived from the clash of interests involved in Spanish determination to preserve something of the system of tight commercial control that had prevailed in the Spanish ports from 1621 until 1646, when the embargoes against the Dutch began to be lifted, and in particular the means to prevent illegal export of American silver from Spain and to

<sup>174</sup> Mocatta LW Neths vi, J. Richard to Gamarra, Amst. 26 Jun. 1657; he says that he undertood from a "Jew who is an enemy of his nation" that the Parnassim were also proposing to see the Spanish ambassador in The Hague and that their leader was Abraham Perrhan (*sic*), presumably Pereyra. Though he was not a parnas in that year.

<sup>175</sup> AGS Haya xl, fo. 186, Gamarra to Philip, 30 Jul. 1657; Mocatta LW Neths vi, "Extrait du registre des resolutions des Hauts et Puissants seigneurs les Etats Generaux" undated enclosed with Gamarra to Philip, 31 Oct. 1658 which quotes the resolution of 17 July 1657; David Franco Mendes in his *Memorias do Estabelecimento e Progresso dos Judeos Portuguezes e Espanhoes nesta famosa cidade de Amsterdam* (5529-1772), published in *Studia Rosenth.* ix, no. ii, p. 63 states that "No A (nno) 5417 (3 July 1657) resolverão os Estad (o)s de Holanda e o rateficarão os Estad(o)s gerais em 17 d(it)o que serão reputad(o)s os Judeos dahi em diante por verdadeiros subditos da Republica e que como tais gozerião de todos os privilegios".

<sup>176</sup> AGS Haya xli, fo. 45, Gamarra to Philip, 4 May 1658; Mocatta LW Neths vi, V. Richard to Don Luis de Haro, The Hague, 26 Jul. 1658 in which he states that the Jews were pressing the States-General to retaliate against Spanish shipping, on account of the *Pearl* and a number of other Dutch ships taken by Biscayan privateers, and that Cromwell's resident in Holland was supporting them in this with the intention of creating friction between Spain and the United Provinces.

<sup>177</sup> AGS Estado 2091, Vincent Richard to Philip, The Hague, 3 Sep. 1658 (duplicate in AGS Haya xli, fo. 66): "que no sufriran por ningun caso que los hebreos naturales destas prvincias y moradores dellas sean peor tratados que los demas vasallos suyos siendo cierto que tiene esta nacion grandisimo poder con los magistrados de las villas y especialmente con el de Amsterdam por ser los que tienen sin disputa el mayor comerzio y por consiguiente que les causan el mayor provecho y assi sera muy del servicio de Vra. Magd. que se les administre no solo recta justicia pero que se les haga la mayor gracia que se pudiera".

exclude the merchandise of enemies of Spain, that is of France, Portugal and, after 1655, of England. The Dutch Sephardim were distinguished, in the economic sphere, especially by their remarkable framework of contacts linking Amsterdam with Rouen, Bordeaux, Bayonne, London, Lisbon and the Spanish ports and had a natural desire to exploit it. The difficulty of Spanish ministers in this regard was that whatever their distaste for the Dutch Jews, which remained intense, they could not afford to antagonize the Dutch authorities who were all but bound, since it was greatly in the Dutch interest, to support the Jews in disputes with Spain. Much of the activity of the Dutch Jews in Spain was undoubtedly illegal under Spanish laws, but then it is not to be expected that Dutch Jewry, confronted by a persecuting crown whose so-called Holy Office was imprisoning Spanish crypto-Jews, often relatives of the Dutch Sephardim, by the dozen and appropriating their belongings, should not have felt justified not only in disregarding the plans of Spanish ministers to damage the commerce of their enemies but in actually retaliating against Spain using their commercial power and an influence with the Dutch authorities which Spanish officials were inclined to regard as rather formidable.

This tension showed itself less in any specific incidents that occurred than in the general approach and attitude of Spanish officials to the problems of Spanish-Dutch commerce. Vincent Richard's assertion that the Sephardim played the leading rôle in Dutch commerce of the 1650s is perhaps a rather extreme example of the emphasis placed by Spanish officials on the importance of the Jews, but it is typical. The Dutch Sephardim had come to represent an extremely imposing reality in the world of Spanish trade and certainly not only in the minds of Spanish diplomats. In October 1654, the council of state, having received a flood of reports in recent years from Seville, Cádiz, Málaga, Alicante and the north coast ports instancing examples of violation of regulations and fraud,<sup>178</sup> debated the highly unsatisfactory state of affairs that had arisen in the Spanish ports, following Münster, and especially since the concession<sup>179</sup> made to the Dutch in the Spanish-Dutch commercial treaty of August 1650, whereby Dutch vessels in Spanish ports were no longer subject to boarding and inspection, as all foreign ships in Spanish and south Italian ports had been since the early 1620s, but, instead, to avoid fraud, were merely required to bring certificates signed by officials of the Dutch admiralty colleges testifying that their cargoes were not of French or Portuguese origin. It was maintained that it was especially the Jews

<sup>178</sup> AGS Estado 2083, consulta 27 Oct. 1654; some of the most worrying reports related to illegal export of silver from Cádiz to Amsterdam; one was received by Peñaranda, from Lopo Ramirez, in November 1649 that four ships had entered Amsterdam from Cádiz carrying 3 million ducats of unregistered silver, AGS 2070 consulta 26 Dec. 1649; see also *ibid*, consulta 5 Feb. 1650.

<sup>179</sup> In rendering the terms of the agreement, Aitzema records that the Dutch "alleenlijk sullen gehouden sijn over te leveren ende te thoonen aen de Officiers van de Havenen van Spaegniën, ofte andere staten van den meer hoogst gemelten Heere Koningh van waer sy sullen vertrecken, hare Passepoorten, inhoudende de specificatie van de Ladinge harer schepen, geattesteert ende gemerct met het Ordinaris-zegel ende Hantteecken, ende erkent van de Officiers van de Admiraliteyt, in de Quartieren van daer sy het gemunt hebben, alle te samen in een ordinairise ende gewoonelijcke forme: Naer welcker vertooninge harer Passepoorten in de gemelte forme, ende sullen sy in hare Reyse niet ghemolesteert nochte ondersocht, opgehouden, ofte verachtet mogen werden onder wat decksel het soude mogen wesen," *Van Staet en Oorlogh*, vii, 181.

who were exploiting the obvious weaknesses of this provision and the fact that in practice the certificates were signed not by Dutch admiralty officials, who gave out that they knew no Spanish, but by ordinary notaries. In his various letters touching on the subject of fraud in Spanish-Dutch commerce, Gamarra repeatedly urged Madrid that the only remedy for the insufferable extent of Dutch subversion of Spanish trade controls was to press the States-General to accept the need for certificates to be checked and signed, as an assurance of their authenticity, by the Spanish consul in Amsterdam and another Spanish consul which it was hoped to establish at Rotterdam. "For no-one will oppose this", he confidently though wrongly claimed,<sup>180</sup> "except the Jews and a few (other) Amsterdam merchants lest their villainies should be discovered". Like Gamarra, Jacques Richard, the consul at Amsterdam, repeatedly asserted that it was the Jews in particular who were breaking the Spanish regulations and defrauding the crown.<sup>181</sup>

These claims were supported with some specific examples. Gamarra, for instance, sent to Madrid a copy of a false certificate, obtained by Richard in Amsterdam, made out by the notary Benedict Baddel, for a shipment to Málaga, being sent by a non-existent merchant named Francis Hendriksen, and witnessed by non-existent witnesses, Hendriksen having been found to be the alias of the Dutch Jewish merchant Simon Rodríguez Núñez.<sup>182</sup> Richard also sent Gamarra a certificate, again made out by Baddel, for a shipment of 10,000lb of Portuguese Brazilian tobacco being despatched by Jacob Ferro López<sup>183</sup> to Betanzos, in Galicia, for his relative Manuel Ferro; Portuguese Brazilian tobacco being contraband in Spain, the consignment was falsely declared to have proceeded from the sale of a Portuguese prize captured by a Zeeland privateer. Ferro López appeared in the document under the alias Bernard Jan Armer while Baddel styled himself N. van den Berg. Richard also uncovered a master forger among the Jews at Amsterdam whom he refers to as "Judas Maccabeo" and who, he says, during the second Spanish-Dutch war, had made a speciality of forging documents for Dutch merchants seeking to evade the Spanish embargoes and who was still busily manufacturing sets of false papers for the Spanish territories at fifty guilders a time. This may well be the same person who

<sup>180</sup> AGS Estado 2089. Gamarra to Philip, 31 Aug. 1656: "pues no hay quien se oponga a ello sino los judios y algunos mercaderes de Amsterdam, para que no se descubren sus villanias"; in fact, there was heavy opposition from all sides and the scheme had to be dropped; see also *ibid.*, consulta 16 May 1656, which refers to Gamarra's view that the scheme was workable "y dice que lo que mas lo repugnaban eran los judios por introducir sus mercancias con testimonios (que suelen ser falsos)".

<sup>181</sup> AGS Estado 2092, consulta 22 Mar. 1657, again claims on the basis of the advice of Gamarra and Richard that the scheme would not be opposed "excepto algunos judios que eran los que e orinari hazian os mayores fraudes".

<sup>182</sup> AGS Estado 2089, consulta 16 Nov 1656.

<sup>183</sup> Jacob Ferro López may be the same as, or a relative of, Jacob Semah Ferro who was a *parnas* in the year 5416 (1656) and presumably a relative of the famous Cortizos family of Madrid; his Spanish correspondent, Manuel Ferro, may indeed have been the nephew of Manuel Cortizos who had this name, see Mocatta, *LW Netherlands*, vi J. Richard to Gamarra, 13 Jan. 1656; J. Meijer, *Encyclopaedia Sephardica Neerlandica* (Amst. 1949) bijlage ii; and C. Rubens, "Joseph Cortissoos and the War of the Spanish Succession", *Transactions of the Jewish Historical Society of England* (TJHSE) xxiv (1975) p. 132.

was referred to in the Spanish council of state in February 1661 as the Jew of Amsterdam who was forging numbers of permits for trade in the Spanish Indies.<sup>184</sup>

The fact that Dutch Jews trading with Spain regularly employed aliases to veil themselves and their factors from the Spanish authorities in general, and the Inquisition in particular, and to further their avoidance of Spanish regulations, led Jacques Richard, who heartily detested the Jews, to try to penetrate their web of aliases and learn more about their activities. His major coup was to gain the assistance of the chief clerk of one of the Amsterdam notaries who had most to do with the Jews, an Antwerp Catholic named Emmanuel Laville who was of partly Portuguese *converso* origin.<sup>185</sup> This person, at some risk to himself, provided the Spanish consul with the two highly important lists of thirty-three Dutch-Jewish firms trading with Spain set out in the appendix below and various other pieces of valuable information probably including the discovery, in 1655, that one of the leaders of the Amsterdam community, who styled himself "Cortez", was in fact named Cortizos.<sup>186</sup>

The fact that the Dutch Sephardim were clearly much more extensively involved, both in commerce with Andalusia and with the Spanish north coast, in the period 1646-60, than had been the case during the Twelve Years Truce (1609-21), should cause the historian little surprise despite the clear evidence for the economic decline of the Dutch Sephardim during the decades 1621-41 and the extreme difficulty of maintaining relations with Spain until at least 1646. The three major Spanish exports during the 1650s, as during the Twelve Years Truce, were silver, wool and colonial dyestuffs, but while the Dutch in general still had the same advantages, with their lower freight rates and better Baltic connections, over non-Dutch merchants as previously, the Dutch Jews now had certain particular advantages over other Dutch traders that they had not possessed before. In the wool trade, whereas in the years 1609-21, the Portuguese *conversos* migrating to Spain were only beginning to penetrate the arena and handled only a small part of the trade,<sup>187</sup> by the 1640s and 1650s, after two decades of domination of the financial structure of the country, most of the major wool dealers, including Sebastian Cortizos, Fernando Montezinos and

<sup>184</sup> Mocatta LW Nets, vi, J. Richard to Gamarra, 20 Dec. 1656; AGS Estado 2198 consulta, 1 Feb. 1661, refers to letters of Gamarra in which "da cuenta de ir creciendo cada dia mas el comercio que introduzen los subditos de aquellas provincias en las Indias . . . valiendose de pasaportes falsos por haver alli un judio que los contrahaze". The man referred to as Judas Maccabeo by Richard is clearly the same personage as the highly skilled calligrapher of Amsterdam, Iehudah Machabeu, who principally rendered Jewish texts into a very fine Spanish script; see L. Fuks and R. G. Fuks-Mansfeld, *Hebrew and Judaic Manuscripts in Amsterdam Public Collections*, ii (Leiden, 1975) pp. 47, 93-4; Chimen Abramsky gives the name, from a different manuscript, as Iehudah Machaben'lo, see his catalogue "Thirty-eight Highly Important Hebrew and Samaritan Manuscripts from the Collection formed by the late David Solomon Sassoon" for the auction arranged by Sotheby in Zürich, in November 1975, p. 99.

<sup>185</sup> Laville's father was Italian while his mother was a sister of Gaspar Fernández de León of Paris, Mocatta LW Nets, xi, J. Richard to Gamarra, 12 Sep, 3 Oct, 31 Oct. 1655; V. Brants, "Une page de sémitisme diplomatique et commercial" *Academie Royale de Belgique. Bulletin de la Classe des Lettres*, Brussels 1905, no. vii, p. 587.

<sup>186</sup> Mocatta LW Nets, xi, Richard to Gamarra, 16 Dec. 1655.

<sup>187</sup> The author hopes to publish a separate study on the Spanish wool trade of the early seventeenth century shortly.

his sons, Manuel and Bartolomé, and Francisco Duarte Méndez, were *conversos*<sup>188</sup> and *conversos* in whose families crypto-Judaism was evidently deeply ingrained, and since these men combined their wool business with a variety of financial operations which they generally wished to conceal from Spanish officialdom and the Inquisition, they preferred to deal with the Amsterdam Jews among whom they had an increasing number of relatives and who could provide the connections and secrecy which they needed. The importance of the traffic in wool and of the contraband route, through the *puertos secos* between Castile and Navarre, to Bayonne, a speciality of the Dutch Jews since 1621, and one extensively used for illicit export of wool, is shown by the strikingly large proportion of Jewish firms trading with Spain from Holland which had more than one correspondent in the San Sebastián, Bilbao and Santander area. One Bayonne Jew who was particularly active as an intermediary between the Madrid *conversos* and Amsterdam Jewry was Diego Rodríguez Cardoso who specialized in sending North European cloth from Bayonne to Madrid and remitting Castilian wool from south-western France to Amsterdam, notably to such recent immigrants from Spain as Simon Francisco Bernal and Manuel Núñez Méndez.<sup>189</sup> As regards dealing in silver, Mexican cochineal and Guatemalan indigo, a similar argument applies as with wool. The major entrepôt in Europe for American products were the west Andalusian ports, Cádiz, Sanlúcar and Seville especially. At the end of the Twelve Years Truce, the Portuguese *conversos* in Andalusia who, like those in Madrid, had only begun to enter in significant numbers during the reign of Philip III (1598-1621), had scarcely even begun to penetrate the framework of American trade. By the 1640s however, the position was very different with a considerable concentration of Portuguese *conversos* at Seville and Cádiz which included numerous leading Indies merchants such as Captain Esteban Luis Diamante and his brothers-in-law, Gaspar and Alfonso Rodríguez Pasarino who had their own network of factors in Mexico and Peru and at Cartagena and Buenos Aires. Thus the transformation in Spanish-Dutch relations in the crucial years 1646-50, culminating in a commercial treaty which was decidedly favourable to the Dutch, not only made inevitable a return to the position of Dutch dominance in Spanish commerce, such as existed before 1621, but produced a Dutch dominance with a much more pronounced Jewish rôle than formerly.

The sudden rapid advance of the Dutch Sephardim in the decade 1646-55, within the framework of changing Spanish-Dutch relations, was not however only a matter of an exceptionally favourable trading opportunity, owing to the superiority of Dutch shipping and the collapse of Spanish controls over commercial procedures, in conjunction with the new prominence of the *conversos* in Spanish finance, wool and colonial trade. There is still more to the impact of Spain on the economic and cultural life of the Dutch Sephardim

<sup>188</sup> In October 1658, the crown ordered a sudden *embargo general* on wool due for export in order to force the *asentistas* into compliance over matters concerning the remitting of cash to Flanders; the largest consignments were those of Sebastián Cortizos and Manuel and Bartolomé Montezinos who had wool held up at Málaga, Seville, Alicante and Bilbao, see AGS Estado 4165, Philip to *corregidor* of Guipúzcoa, 9 Nov. 1658 and following documents.

<sup>189</sup> Julio Caro Baroja. *Los Judíos en la España moderna y contemporánea* 3 vols. (Madrid, 1961) ii, 132-46; see also, for Núñez Méndez and Bernal, appendix I below, nos. 21 and 22.

during these years even than all this, considerable though these factors were. For besides the burgeoning of trade, the decade 1646-55 was also precisely that in which a major migration of *converso* financiers and tax-farmers from the Spanish territories to Holland took place bringing an accumulation of capital which, in its splendour, had no precedent in the relatively modest resources of the pre-1646 period. It is, arguably, exactly the combination of the opening up of impressive new trading opportunities with the sudden injection of massive resources at Amsterdam which governed and determined, possibly more than any other cause, the extraordinary extent and speed of the progress of the Dutch Sephardim during the middle years of the seventeenth century.

Historians have remarked that a number of financiers involved with the Spanish crown departed from Antwerp and settled in Holland and other centres of the North European Sephardi diaspora during these years. Best known is the case of the three prominent Antwerp bankers Diego Teixeira de Sampayo (Abraham Senior), Gil Lopes (Abraham de) Pinto and his brother Rodrigo Alvares (David de) Pinto, who fled Antwerp almost together in July 1646, the first becoming at once the leading Jew at Hamburg while the brothers Pinto established themselves at Rotterdam as heads of what was at once the richest Jewish family in the United Provinces.<sup>190</sup> João da Rocha Pinto<sup>191</sup> (Zacharias a Cohen), another Antwerp financier, also, at about this time, joined the community at Hamburg whilst João Ribeiro (Jacob Guedalla),<sup>192</sup> uncle of Gil Ribeiro de Olivares, a leading Antwerp banker, and a close relative of the Pintos preceded them to Rotterdam. Antonio (Isaac) Lopes Suasso,<sup>193</sup> whose massive fortune later rivalled that of the Pintos left the Spanish Netherlands for Rotterdam at the end of 1652. Somewhat less well-known is the case of another Antwerp financier, Adam Díaz Solís, a close associate of both Teixeira and the Pintos to whom the latter transferred their remaining Antwerp business when they left, who was arrested by the governor of the Spanish Netherlands, in 1647, on suspicion of complicity in the Portuguese secession but who, at some point before 1655,

<sup>190</sup> "The De Pinto Manuscript". A 17th century Marrano family history", ed. H. P. Salomon, *Studia Rosenth.* ix, i (Jan. 1975) pp. 7, 30-1; J. Denucé, "Iets over Spaansch-Portugeesche geslachten in Nederland", *Antwerpsch Archievenblad* 1927 pp. 37-52; Mozes Heiman Gans, *Memorboek* (Baarn, 1971) p. 110, 227.

<sup>191</sup> "The De Pinto Ms", p. 11n; Rocha Pinto is listed as a leading Antwerp *pagador* in 1633, J. Denucé, "Thomas de Sampayo en het Spaansch Legerarchief", *Antwerpsch Archievenblad* 1926, p. 312.

<sup>192</sup> *ibid.* p. 318n; "The De Pinto Ms", p. 26; Gil Ribeiro de Olivares was the son and Antwerp factor of the Madrid *asentista*, Duarte Díaz de Olivares whose wife, Isabel, was an aunt of Abraham de Pinto, being a daughter of Branca (Sarah) Ribeira the elder, sister of de Pinto's grandmother.

<sup>193</sup> "The De Pinto Ms", 42-4; Lopes Suasso became the second husband of Abraham de Pinto's daughter Violante (Rachel) who became known as Rachel Suasso de Pinto, combining the two wealthiest Jewish names in Holland; in the 1675 tax assessment at Amsterdam, though Lopes Suasso, assessed at f 231,000 which in any case was certainly a drastic underestimate, had the largest single fortune of any Dutch Jew, the combined totals of Abraham de Pinto's son, Isaac, and his immediate relatives was much higher, see A. M. Vaz Dias, "Over den vermogenstoestand der Amsterdamsche Joden in de 17e en de 18e eeuw", *Tijd. voor Geschied.* li (1963) p. 170.



settled as a Jew at Amsterdam.<sup>194</sup> These various movements from Antwerp, however, have not been considered, as they might, as part of a larger migration involving the flight of several Madrid *asentistas*, and partners of *asentistas*, of whom the Antwerp financiers were both factors, and, in several cases, relatives. In 1646, a key figure, Thomas Rodríguez (Abraham) Pereyra fled with his immediate family from Madrid to Amsterdam, where his brother Isaac had preceded him by several years, bringing a sizeable treasure that could be compared with that of the Pintos with whom indeed the Pereyras soon became intimately connected.<sup>195</sup> In 1647, a leading Madrid *asentista*, Salvador Vázquez Martínez, knight of Alcántara, and apparently another brother of Abraham Pereyra, fled to Rouen owing, according to Spanish reports, about 70,000 ducats to the crown.<sup>196</sup> In the same year, or shortly after, Manuel de Pinto, second cousin of Abraham de Pinto, son of the Madrid *asentista* Manuel Álvarez Pinto and nephew of the great Madrid financier, Manuel de Paz, fled with his family from Madrid to Holland.<sup>197</sup> Meanwhile, certain members of the immensely wealthy and ennobled Cortizos family were leaving Madrid for Amsterdam, notably Isaac Semah Cortizos (alias Cortez) who became parnas in 1649 and Jacob Semah Ferro, while Manuel Cortizos himself, former farmer of the Spanish wool revenues and one of the greatest financiers in Europe, was reported to have remitted part of his huge fortune, some 600,000 ducats (about f 1,800,000) to held for his family in Amsterdam by David Osorio, who had previously held a vast sum for the Pintos before their departure from Antwerp, Abraham del Pardo and Juan de Paz.<sup>198</sup> At the same time, relatives of yet other Madrid financiers, such as Diego Méndez de Brito, were appearing among Dutch Jewry. Yet more Madrid financiers fled during the early and middle 1650s, notably the salt *arrendadores*, Gaspar and Balthasar Rodríguez Cardoso, and, after his appearance in

<sup>194</sup> Díaz Solís was the Antwerp factor of his father Francisco Fernández Solís, a Sevillian *asentista* who, during the 1640s, was a one of the *converso* syndicate farming the *almojarifazgo de Indias de Sevilla*, the most important customs duty in Spain and indeed in Europe; eight years after his arrest in Antwerp, he is mentioned by Jacques Richard as a "rich Jew of Amsterdam", Mocatta LW Neths xi, J. Richard to Gamarra, Amst., 21 Oct. 1655; *Memorial Histórico Español. Colección de documentos, opúsculos y antiguédaes que publica la Real Academia de la Historia* 47 vols. (Madrid, 1851-1915) xix, p. 195 mentions Adam's arrest and describes Francisco as "tesorero del almojarifazgo de Sevilla".

<sup>195</sup> AGS Estado 2070. Brun to Geronimo de la Torre, Cambrai, 27 Aug. 1649; Cecil Roth is thus shown to have been correct in his suggestion that Abraham's brother, Isaac Pereyra, who set up, in 1644, the yeshiva to which Abraham subsequently also handsomely contributed, Preceded him to Amsterdam by at least two years, Cecil Roth. *A Life of Menasseh ben Israel. Rabbi, Printer and Diplomat* (Philadelphia, 1934) pp. 62-3, 102, 317; see also, Silva Rosa, *Geschiedenis*, 31, 67-8.

<sup>196</sup> Mocatta LW Neths vi, Gamarra to Luis de Haro, II May 1655; Caro Baroja, *Los Judíos*, ii, 140; in 1644, Vázquez Martínez held the second largest *asiento* in Madrid, of any Portuguese, after Jorge de Paz de Silveira, AGS Estado 2062, "Relacion de la provision . . . para Flandes y Alemania este año de 1644"; his son, Antonio Martínez, was later seized by the Inquisition in Seville. However, an undated memorandum drawn up by one of the King's secretaries, in about 1650, mentions that it had come to Brun's attention that Salvador Vázquez Martínez was then in Holland, see AGR, Bruss., SEG. 675, Brun Papers, "Sobre lo de Tomas Pereyra".

<sup>197</sup> "The De Pinto Ms.", p. 18.

<sup>198</sup> Caro Baroja, *Los Judíos*, ii, 112.

the *auto de fe* at Cuenca in January 1656, Fernando de Montezinos, a principal merchant and *asentista* whose wife was a cousin of the Cortizos.<sup>199</sup>

This remarkable transfer of a whole group of Europe's leading financiers and bankers from Madrid and Antwerp to Hamburg, Rouen, Rotterdam and Amsterdam within the space of a few years is perhaps best attributed to two specific pressures on the *conversos* in Spain arising from the crisis of the later 1640s and early 1650s. If the flight of Teixeira and the Pintos is treated, as it has been,<sup>200</sup> in isolation, then it might be convincing to explain it in terms of their fears that the city would fall to the Dutch army under Frederik Hendrik which was then operating in its vicinity. This was the explanation given in contemporary reports from Brussels to Madrid<sup>201</sup> and clearly derived from the pretext offered by the families themselves, in accounting for their preparations, which were too considerable to pass unnoticed. But if it was their pretext, it may not have been their motive and it must surely be admitted that fears for the fate of Antwerp are a most implausible reason for the passing of these bankers over to open Judaism. It is decidedly odd that financiers who had resided in Antwerp since before the start of the second Spanish-Dutch war in 1621 should flee, after a quarter of a century of conflict and several Dutch advances to the vicinity of Antwerp, during the very last campaign, when the break-through to peace in the talks at Münster, as they must have known, had been made.<sup>202</sup> Besides, if apprehension for Antwerp was their motive, unless they wished for some other reason to break with the Spanish crown, moving to Brussels, Liège or Cologne would have been far more logical and reputable than flight to Rotterdam and it is significant that Abraham de Pinto's son later recalled, in his family history, that, just before their departure, his father and uncle had intimated to Brussels that they were preparing to move temporarily to the very Catholic city of Cologne.<sup>203</sup> But in any case, the flight of Teixeira and the Pintos should not and can not be dealt with separately from that of their Antwerp colleagues, such as Lopes Suasso and Díaz Solís, who departed shortly after the end of the war or from the various departures from Madrid. Abraham Pereyra and his son, Isaac, who had been engaged in forwarding cash, in connection with the royal *asientos* to Antwerp, left Madrid at almost the same time that the Pintos and Teixeira left Antwerp and their subsequent remarkable intimacy with the Pinto family suggests at least the possibility of previous collusion. Vázquez Martínez, before fleeing Spain, had been the Madrid correspondent of

<sup>199</sup> Caro Baroja, *Los Judíos*, ii, 78, 80, 113.

<sup>200</sup> The editor of the "De Pinto Ms.", H. P. Salomon, maintains, I believe wrongly, that the Pintos fled to Rotterdam chiefly out of fear that Antwerp would fall to the Dutch and without any specific commitment to Judaism. In my view, only a strong leaning toward Judaism could have swayed them to adopt so drastic and otherwise improbable a course as flight to Holland, the De Pinto ms., p. 7 *et seq.*

<sup>201</sup> AGS Estado 2066, consulta, Zaragoza, 27 Sep. 1646 quotes Castel-Rodrigo that "los hombres de negocios de mas caudal de aquella villa (Antwerp) y que mas havian ganado con los asientos de Vra. Mgd. se havian retirado temerosos del enemigo"; see also Mocatta LW Neths. x, Castel-Rodrigo to Philip, 19 Jul. and 4 Aug. 1646.

<sup>202</sup> AGS Estado 2065. Junta de estado, 3 Jun. 1646 records the break-through of several months before in the peace talks with the Dutch.

<sup>203</sup> "The De Pinto Ms.", p. 30.

Diego Teixeira, while Manuel de Pinto, as has been seen, was a relative of the Pintos of Antwerp.

After the fall of the conde-duque de Olivares in Spain, in 1643, the *conversos* remained for a time as prominent in Spanish finance and commerce as they had been through the period since 1627, the year of Philip IV's first suspension of *asientos* and the partial break with the clique of Genoese financiers which had previously handled cash transactions for the crown. After 1627, the *conversos*, or the "Portuguese" as they were known in official parlance in Spain, surpassed the Genoese in importance, in most sectors of Spanish finance, including the remitting of cash from Madrid to Antwerp to finance the extremely costly Spanish army of Flanders. The figures for remittances to Antwerp in 1646, the last full year before Philip IV's second suspension of *asientos* and the year of the flight of the Pintos, Pereyras and of Teixeira, serves to illustrate this continuing preponderance and also the formal links between the Madrid *asentistas* and their Antwerp factors. The crown experienced exceptional difficulty in meeting its commitments to its bankers in 1646 and thus the amounts actually paid to the army paymasters in Antwerp lagged badly behind the agreed schedule.

Table 13: The Flanders *asientos* for 1646<sup>204</sup>

Asentistas in Madrid.	Antwerp Correspondents.	Scheduled Payments.	Actual Payments
1. <i>The Genoese</i> (A. Piquenoti, A. Palavesin, L. Imbrea, N. Buenaventura, etc.)	J. E. Spinola, J. P. Dorchi, etc.		In Castilian duats, paid in twelve monthly installments.)
		total: 1,139,062	770,123
2 <i>Others</i> : Benjamin Ruit (Wright?) and others neither Genoese or Portuguese		335,179	325,853
3 <i>The Portuguese</i> :			
i. Salvador Váz Martínez, knight of Alcántara.	Diego Teixeira and Adam Díaz Solís.	189,300	104,650
ii. Duarte Díaz de Olivares	Gil Ribeiro de Olivares	151,909	85,832
iii. Duarte Brandon Suárez	Manuel Suárez Ribeiro	121,125	54,166
iv. Juan Silva de Lisboa	Doña Isabel Franco and Antonio Rodríguez Franco	137,168	78,307.
v. Felipe Denis Pacheco y Medina. <sup>205</sup>	Gil López and Rodrigo Alvarez Pinto	121,125	53,610.
vi. Baron Jorge de Paz de Silveyra, knight of Santiago.	Simon Díaz Váz.	300,000	160,656.
Baron Jorge de Paz	Francisco López Franco y Feo.	50,000	50,000
Baron Jorge de Paz	Francisco López Franco y Feo.	300,000	183,000.
vii. Duarte Fernández	Lic. García de Yllan	159,271	98,857
Duarte Fernández	Lic. García de Yllan	24,379	24,379.
Duarte Fernández	Francisco Sánchez de Sousa	165,000	84,500

<sup>204</sup> AGS Contaduría Mayor de Cuentas, leg. 937. Thomas López de Ulloa, "Letras de España, 1646-8".

<sup>205</sup> Felipe Denis was a nephew of Manuel de Paz of whom the Pintos had for many years been the Antwerp correspondents; after Paz's death, Denis continued his business.

viii. Francisco Fernández Solís (at Seville).	Adam Díaz Solís	100,000	100,000.
ix Enrique Méndez Quiros	Simon Díaz Váz	49,992	19,317.
totals for the Portuguese:		1,869,269	1,097,320.
grand totals			

The year 1646 was the last in which the financial circuit created by Olivares and dominated by *conversos* continued to function. Undoubtedly various signs of the pending crash of October 1647 were already visible for it was perfectly clear that the crown, with its revenues exhausted, was unable to find the money to pay its bankers. It needed no particular acumen to discern that the level of royal expenditure on the three major military fronts of the 1640s, Flanders, Catalonia and Portugal, was much too high in relation to available income and especially as the general trade depression in Spain and the decline in Spanish-American commerce was becoming increasingly severe during these years. From 1647, the situation deteriorated sharply. A run of bad harvests, caused by several years of exceptionally bad weather, spread famine and furthered the most terrible outbreak of plague in seventeenth-century Spain.<sup>206</sup> This in turn, besides the great suffering and misery that it caused, involved a sharp setback to royal income, for the sales and consumption taxes which provided the bulk of the crown's revenues were severely hit as a result of the paralysis of Castilian agriculture and economic activity generally. If the years 1647-53 were years of "general crisis" throughout Europe, then nowhere was it more pronounced than in Castile. Not surprisingly, perhaps, the deepening gloom of these years was accompanied by a marked resurgence of antisemitism which must be seen as being partly a reaction to years of crushingly heavy taxation, initiated by the crown perhaps, but handled and operated mainly by Portuguese *conversos*. The notion that the *conversos* were partly responsible for the ruin and misfortunes of the country and should be harshly stamped upon was very much in the air.<sup>207</sup> Turning upon the "Portuguese" was, perhaps, Philip IV's only remaining financial expedient.

In October 1647, the crown suspended the *asientos*, cancelling existing arrangements with its bankers, in such a way as to damage the *conversos* especially. Some Genoese suffered also, but it was the "Portuguese" who took the brunt of the losses. "The king of

<sup>206</sup> J. Lynch. *Spain under the Habsburgs* 2 vols. (Oxford, 1965-9), ii, 127-8; Antonio Domínguez Ortiz. *Alteraciones Andaluzas* (Madrid, 1973) pp. 48, 54, 64-5, 161.

<sup>207</sup> Caro Baroja, *Los Judíos*, ii, 40-8; several references of Matías de Novoa reveal his feelings on the subject including his likening of the crown's suspension of the *asientos* in 1647 to the Cid Campeador's deceiving of the Jews asserting "Y no es mal consejo engañar a quien engaña"; the Aragonese, José Pellicer de Ossau, in his anonymously published *Comercio Impedido* (1640) represents a striking instance of specifically economic antisemitism asserting, for instance, that "el asentista de España es compañero del Bibentebre de Amsterdam, y unos y otros caminan a nuestra ruyna sin diferenciarse el vezino de Sevilla del de Amsterdam, ni el de Amsterdam del de Sevilla." op. cit., f5v.

Spain", wrote Matias de Novoa, "shook off the Portuguese, took their assets and left them with debts which were said to be substantial, indeed very large and some of a million. The groans and laments were great, they talked of their utter and total ruin in wealth, trade and government (finance)".<sup>208</sup> The collapse of *asentistas* in turn affected many others who had invested with them and badly disrupted the business of their Antwerp correspondents. Antwerp indeed now ceased to provide the major opportunities for *conversos* that it had formerly.<sup>209</sup> The year 1647 marked the beginning of the decline of Antwerp as a key centre of *converso* activity. In Spain, the specifically punitive aspect of the suspension with respect to the "Portuguese", is illustrated by Philip IV's orders to the council of state, of October 1647, in which ministers were instructed to pass over the *conversos* as far as possible in the awarding of *arrendamientos* in the future, even to the extent of accepting less advantageous terms than might have otherwise been obtained.<sup>210</sup> After the crash, the crown turned again to the Genoese and arranged a new set of *asientos* from which the "Portuguese" were largely excluded.<sup>211</sup> In later years, some *converso* firms returned to the scene of government finance, notably those of Cortizos, Montezinos and Simon de Fonseca Pina, but they never regained quite the same prominence that they had had during the years 1627-47.

The flight of Teixeira, the Pintos and the Pereyras, then, immediately preceded, and that of Vázquez Martínez, Manuel de Pinto and others followed, what, for the *conversos*, was an economic catastrophe. But besides the financial crisis, there was yet another potent factor effective at least as early as 1646, the intensification of Inquisition activity in Spain during the 1640s and 1650s. The downfall of Olivares, who had sought to make Spain more secure for the *conversos*, was soon followed by the appointment of a more rigorous Inquisitor-General, Don Diego de Arce Reynoso, than had been active since the mass immigration of "Portuguese" into Spain had begun at the turn of the century.<sup>212</sup> Whereas in the 1620s there were eighteen *autos de fe* in Spain, and in the 1630s only ten, in the 1640s there were nineteen and in the 1650s, a peak of Inquisition persecution in Spain, no less than forty-three. Admittedly, it may be that the very sharp increase in the actual number of Inquisition arrests of *conversos* in Spain, during the 1650s, may not yet have begun in the later 1640s.<sup>213</sup> However, although at least three major *asentistas* had been seized

<sup>208</sup> Matias de Novoa. *Historia de Felipe IV, Rey de España* iii. Colección de documentos inéditos para la Historia de España 112 vols. (Madrid, 1842-95) lxxxvi, 365; see also Antonio Domínguez Ortiz. *Política y Hacienda de Felipe IV* (Madrid, 1960) pp. 66, 69, 108.

<sup>209</sup> "The De Pinto Ms.", pp. 21, 49; Isaac de Pinto, in referring to the brilliance of Antwerp in the early seventeenth century, mentions the subsequent decline of the "Portuguese" there: "sendo então Anueres praça de muito negocio que florescia naquella tempo altamente, como muitas cazas ricas da nação que depois se forão estenguido".

<sup>210</sup> Archivo Histórico Nacional, Madrid, Estado leg. 727. Philip to consejo, 31 Oct. 1647.

<sup>211</sup> AGS Estado 2068, "Relacion de las letras de las mesadas de Febrero y Marzo" (1648).

<sup>212</sup> Antonio Domínguez Ortiz: "Los conversos de origen judío después de la expulsión", *Estudios de Historia Social de España* iii, ed. C. Viñas y Mey (Madrid, 1955) p. 343; see also Adler, op. cit., p. 165.

<sup>213</sup> The list of judaizers taken by the Toledo tribunal of the Holy Office, largely in Madrid, suggests that there were in fact less arrests in the 1640s than in the 1630s with a sudden very sharp increase from 1650, see Archivo Histórico Nacional. *Catálogo de las causas contra la fe seguidas ante el Tribunal del Santo Oficio de la Inquisición de Toledo* (Madrid, 1903).

during the Olivares years,<sup>214</sup> it does seem that leading *conversos* did become decidedly more vulnerable during the later 1640s. In July 1646, three important *conversos* were taken in Madrid including the cashier of a leading *asentista*.<sup>215</sup> Also in 1646, the elderly financier Manuel Enrique was seized while the assets of Captain Estevan Luis Diamante, a principal Sevillian financier, were sequestered.<sup>216</sup> In the early summer of 1646, the *asentista* Alfonso Rodriguez Pasarino, who was Diamante's brother-in-law and also from Seville, was taken, just as he was establishing himself at Madrid, and his brother Gaspar moving to Antwerp, to service a newly arranged royal *asiento* whereby, using the Diamante assets, the brothers undertook to forward 400,000 ducats (f 1,200,000) to Flanders in 1647.<sup>217</sup> The arrest of Pasarino is particularly significant, for it demonstrates very clearly that by 1646, no financier, however important he might be to the crown, had any measure of immunity from the Inquisition. Yet another *asentista*, it is not clear which, was arrested in June 1647. Following the death of Manuel Cortizos, soon after his having transferred much of the family's wealth to Holland, the Inquisition increased its investigations with respect to his family and seized his widow endangering many others of his relatives.<sup>218</sup> Fernando de Montezinos was taken by the Inquisition in 1654, while Gaspar and Balthasar Rodriguez Cardoso, who fled in 1655, were evidently fleeing from the Inquisition which had been collecting evidence against them since 1650.

The ending of the second Spanish-Dutch war and the resumption of Spanish-Dutch trade, therefore, co-incided with a resurgence of Inquisition activity in Spain and a financial crash which adversely affected the *conversos* in both Spain and the Spanish Netherlands. Together, arguably, these circumstances constituted the crucial element which served to transform the economic position of the Dutch Sephardim so quickly. Amsterdam and Rotterdam, from being far inferior to Madrid and Antwerp as centres of Jewish and New Christian capital accumulation, suddenly, in the later 1640s, outstripped them making Holland, for the first time, the economic centre of the *converso* and European Sephardi world. The transference of great financiers and merchants with their funds, from the Spanish territories, did not of course go unnoticed by Spanish officials in the Low Countries who showed at least a measure of concern. They were to some extent interested in checking the process of migration and also in possibilities for recovering certain sums of money which in the official Spanish view had simply been stolen. "I am advised", reported Brun to Madrid in August 1649,

"that a personage named Thomas Pereyra left Madrid three years ago and came to Amsterdam, having bankrupted there and taken from His Majesty a large sum that had been entrusted to him for remitting to Flanders and that this man, who is a Jew

<sup>214</sup> These were Juan Núñez Saravia, Manuel Fernández Pinto and Antonio Diego Méndez Ximénez who, interestingly, was listed in 1635 as Madrid correspondent of the Pintos in Antwerp, Mocatta LW Neths x, Pierre Roose to Philip, 6 Feb. 1635.

<sup>215</sup> *Memorial Histórico Español* xviii, 360.

<sup>216</sup> Henry Kamen. *The Spanish Inquisition* (London, 1965) p. 221.

<sup>217</sup> *ibid*; AGS Hacienda consulta 10 May 1646; AGS Estado 2066, consulta, Zaragoza, 27 Sep. 1646.

<sup>218</sup> Caro Baroja, *Los Judíos*, II, 107-12.

and lives now in Rotterdam and is very rich, if I had the necessary papers and especially those of the obligations that he undertook, I could pursue him through legal process here and recover, if not all, at least part of what he has stolen and owes to His Majesty; also I am assured that there are others that fled (from Spain) as well, and came to the United Provinces, concerning whom, if I had enough information, I would do my duty not to let them enjoy with impunity the royal revenues of His Majesty".<sup>219</sup>

The council of state considered this, but nothing was done, perhaps because in the aftermath of the 1647 suspension, it would have been difficult to justify the crown's own financial conduct in any foreign court. The fact that the case was just dropped may also indicate that Pereyra's misconduct was rather less cut and dried than Brun took it to be. There are a number of other references by Spanish officials to real or alleged stealing from the crown by fleeing crypto-Jews. These however were either very general in character, though this may not mean that they were unfounded, or referred specifically to Abraham and Isaac Pereyra and their relative, Vázquez Martínez. No accusations were made, evidently, against the Pintos, Teixeiras, Lopes Suasso and others. In October 1655, Jacques Richard, having only recently learnt about the Pereyras, from a certain Simon de Suasso, suggested to Gamarra that the king, so as to retrieve what was owing to him, should seize the goods of Pereyra's Spanish correspondents whose identities Richard's diligence had lately uncovered.<sup>220</sup> but again no action was taken.

Slightly more energy was shown by the crown in the cases of Fernando Montezinos and the brothers Rodríguez Cardoso. When Montezinos was seized by the Inquisition, in 1654, he held the farm for the salt duties of Galicia and Asturias and an *asiento* for supplying the garrison of the Spanish *plaza fuerte* of Ceuta in North Africa. His immediate assets, worth 474,096 ducats were confiscated but it was found that this was not enough to pay his creditors, as his debts, including 400,000 ducats owing for grain purchases for Ceuta made in 1653, amounted to an even larger sum.<sup>221</sup> It was noted that Montezinos had further assets, worth over 100,000 ducats in the Low Countries, mainly at Amsterdam, and it was to obtain these that the crown, at the prompting of the Inquisition, instructed the administration in Brussels and its ambassador at The Hague to seek to have a court order placed

<sup>219</sup> AGS Estado 2070, Brun to Geronimo de la Torre, Cambrai, 27 Aug. 1649: "tengo aviso que un particular llamado Thomas Pereyra salio tres años ha de Madrid y vino a Amsterdam, haviendo quebrado alli, y quitado a su Magd. gran suma de dinero que se avia encargado remitir en Flandes, Y como este hombre, que es un judio, vive agora en Roterdam muy rico, si yo tuviera los documentos y particularmente las obligaciones que hizo, yo podria apretarle por via de justicia, y cobrar sino todo, por lo menos parte de lo que ha hurtado y deve a su Magd., me aseguran que otros ay que se huyeron tambien, y se retiraron en las Provincias Unidas, de que teniendo bastantes informaciones haria mi dever para no dejarles gozar con impunidad la rl. hazienda de su Magd".

<sup>220</sup> Mocatta LW Netherlands, xi, Richard to Gamarra, Amst. 31 Oct. 1655; see also vol. vi, Richard to Gamarra, 14 Jul. 1657.

<sup>221</sup> Kamen, op. cit., pp. 222-3.

on his possessions with the claim that the money was owed to his creditors in Spain.<sup>222</sup> Information was sent from the Inquisition *suprema*, in Madrid, via the council of state, to the Spanish embassy at The Hague, that Montezinos had recently despatched 1,745 sacks of Castilian wool, through Thomas de Santa Coloma in Bilbao and Francisco López de Fonseca at Cádiz, to the brothers “Gerardo and Carlos van Narden,<sup>223</sup> Dutchmen”, and Melchor Méndez and Geronimo Rodríguez Pérez,<sup>224</sup> all of Amsterdam, and 500 pipes of olive oil, despatched from Sanlúcar by his son Manuel Montezinos to the van Nardens. Richard succeeded in tracing the bulk of Montezinos’ Dutch assets to the warehouses of “Francisco and Antonio de Agurre”, that is of Abraham and Isaac Pereyra, and had them placed under distraint in September 1654.<sup>225</sup> The Pereyras challenged the order, but the Amsterdam city authorities upheld it until it was removed, in May 1655, in favour of Montezinos’ sons in Andalusia, following orders from Madrid, resulting from steps taken by Manuel and Bartolomé Montezinos to satisfy the crown.

Gaspar and Balthasar Rodríguez Cardoso, though reported by Barrionuevo to have fled to Amsterdam, in June 1655, taking 200,000 ducats worth of wool and 250,000 (f 750,000) in cash,<sup>226</sup> are more likely in fact to have fled to Bayonne. Subsequent Spanish references to the brothers, at any rate, do not make it clear whether they themselves were in Holland, while it is clear that they had close connections with Bayonne. However, they certainly did transfer some assets to Amsterdam. In August 1655, Gamarra was informed from Madrid that the brothers owed 30,000 ducats to the royal treasury in unpaid installments arising from their farming of the salt duties of Atienza and Espartinas and that they had recently shipped two cargoes of wool to Amsterdam to correspondents named as “Francisco and Antonio de Agurre” and remitted 4,000 *escudos* by letter of exchange, issued by Simon Méndez Soto,<sup>227</sup> in Madrid, payable by “Jacob Bademburgh”, in Amsterdam, and another 1,000 *escudos* by Doña Isabel de Miranda again payable by “Bademburgh”. The wool in the hands of the Pereyras was duly brought under court order, by Richard, while Gamarra requested Madrid to provide the necessary documents so that he could press the case against the Cardosos at Amsterdam. This however proved

<sup>222</sup> AGS Estado 2083, consulta of Inquisition *suprema*, 9 May 1654; *ibid*, 2185, Archduke Leopold to Philip, Bruss., 12 Sep. 1654: “en entrambas partes (Northern and Southern Netherlands) se estan haziendo diligencias secretas con los motivos que da la rl. carta de vra. Mgd. pero como este genero de gente vive de un trato tan poco llano y se entiende mudarse los nombres siempre que tratan de haziendas en encomienda es dificultoso topar con ella”.

<sup>223</sup> This being the alternative alias of the Pereyras, see appendix I.

<sup>224</sup> That is, Enrique Mendes da Silva, see appendix i.

<sup>225</sup> Curiously, the notary who acted for Richard in the matter of the distraint and subsequent release of the Montezinos assets in the Pereyras’ warehouses, was none other than Benedict Baddel, see AGS Estado 2085, “Desembargo que se ha hecho en Amsterdam”, 5 May 1655.

<sup>226</sup> Barrionuevo, *Avisos*, i, 332; however, see also *ibid*, p. 325 where he says the Cardosos “se han pasado a Francia”; in 1646, Gaspar had competed unsuccessfully against Montezinos for the Ceuta *asiento*, at the time he was residing in Osuna, Andalusia, serving as “administrador de las rentas y estado” of the duke of Osuna, AGS Hacienda 894, consulta 29 Oct. 1646.

<sup>227</sup> Méndez Soto was the Madrid correspondent of Jacob del Monte, alias Jacob Bademburgh, and connected also with Diego Rodríguez Cardoso of Bayonne nephew of Gaspar Rodríguez Cardoso; see appendix i and Caro Baroja *Los Indios*, ii, 139.



slow work. In March 1656, the secretary of the council of state in Madrid informed Gamarra that although he had repeatedly pressed the *consejo de hacienda* for the Cardoso accounts, they had still not been produced though he did not think that they could be much longer delayed.<sup>228</sup> In the end, however, it would seem that no accounts were ever sent.

Spanish officials in Holland had little reason to show restraint in the terms that they used in describing the conduct of the Sephardi immigrants whose activities were so sharply at odds with their own and one may take it that Richard's assertion, in a letter to Gamarra of July 1656,<sup>229</sup> that all *conversos* who fled from Spain to Holland had stolen from the crown was considerably exaggerated. Nevertheless, it is doubtless true that some funds were removed from Spain in questionable circumstances, notably by the Pereyras and Cardosos, and it is perhaps pertinent to ask whether this wealth which in any case was a substantial part of that sudden infusion which was, in the decade 1646-55, transforming Dutch Jewish life, was regarded in any special light by the Dutch Sephardim. Probably, there was no serious moral problem here. In Jewish eyes, the Spanish crown, which sanctioned the seizure, torture and despoliation of hundreds of *converso* relatives of Sephardi families scattered from Italy, to England, and further, was the most oppressive and criminally perverse in Europe and even the sternest rabbis were, perhaps, likely to regard pilfering from such a government as a rather special misdemeanour bordering on being allowable, especially when funds thus resulting were then employed for Jewish uses. There was certainly much new spending on Jewish religious, scholarly and social institutions in Holland during these years, spending in which the Pereyras played a notable part, and although this would doubtless to a great extent have occurred anyway, it may just be that some of this expenditure was expected by the community from certain persons as a sort of conscience money. Manasseh ben Israel who was in such financial straits previous to the coming of the Pereyras, that he was contemplating emigration to Dutch Brazil, and was named head of the new yeshiva that Isaac Pereyra set up at Amsterdam almost at once after his arrival, referred perhaps, in 1647, when thanking the borthers in print, rather pointedly to the great wealth that they had brought with them from Spain.<sup>230</sup> In 1656, the "debotissimo y bienaventurado Abraham Pereyra", as Levi de Barrios later called him, established, together with Ephraim Bueno, the Amsterdam yeshiva known as *Tora Hora* and, most remarkable of all, endowed in 1659 the yeshiva known as *Hesed-le-*

<sup>228</sup> AGS Haya xxxix, fo. 87, Ger. de la Torre to Gamarra, 22 Mar. 1656.

<sup>229</sup> Mocatta LW Neths vi, J. Richard to Gamarra, Amst., 14 Jul. 1656; he adds however, "as Abraham Pereyra did particularly".

<sup>230</sup> Meyer Kayserling, *Menasse ben Israel. Sein Leben Und Wirken* Berlin, (1861) p. 46; "Vierão Vs. Ms. de Espanha, e avendo tirado hũa tão consideravel riqueza, lhes pareceo, que esta seria tanto mais acreditada e nobre, quanto mais empregada em bons vsos. Intituem Vs. Ms. logo hũa ilustre iessiva, e com muytos salarios a enriquecem de Baale Tora", Manasseh ben Israel, *Thesovro dos Dinim que o povo de Israel, he obrigado saber e observar* (Amsterdam, 5403-5) dedication to the final section.

*Avraham* at Hebron, in the Holy Land.<sup>231</sup> In this way, funds originally intended for the maintaining of Spanish infantry, instead sustained Jewish scholars. The Pinto family similarly distinguished itself in the sphere of scholarly endowments, founding the celebrated *Jesiva de los Pintos* at Rotterdam, in 1650, later referred to by the Italian Sephardi writer Isaac Cardoso in dedicating his *Excelencias de los Hebreos* to Jacob de Pinto, as a “*gloriosa academia*”.<sup>232</sup>

Spanish concern at the process of migration from the Spanish territories to Holland, in the period 1646-60, also related to some extent to the flight of *conversos* as such. With the great boom in Dutch carrying to Spain after 1646, the *conversos* had an unprecedented opportunity not only to tighten their links with Dutch Jewry, but to flee themselves to the United Provinces in greater numbers. By 1650, every Spanish port from San Sebastián to Barcelona, then still in rebellion, was filled with Dutch shipping almost to the exclusion of any other, much of it being chartered, and in some cases owned, by Dutch Jews. This in combination with the new pressures on the *conversos* in Spain confronted Spanish officials with a new situation. In July 1650, Brun reported to Madrid that he had received extensive information on families that were planning to flee the Spanish territories for Holland “in order to have liberty to profess Judaism openly”. He named a whole group who were planning to migrate from Seville: Francisco Hurtado, Francisco Méndez, Jacob Correa, Manuel Antonio, Simon Gómez, Don Luis de Cuña and Antonio de Belmonte. Of those intending to flee Madrid, he named Sebastian Méndez, Doña Isabel de Belmonte, Jerónima Suárez, Juana Ribera, Don Fernando Correa and his brother-in-law Antonio Méndez, Jerónimo Henríquez and Jerónimo Hurtado. In the Indies, he advised that Francisco de Olivera in Mexico and Manuel de Olivera and Antonio Méndez Indiano, at Quito, were likewise planning to flee to Amsterdam. In Madrid, this list was seen by the council of state and copies were sent to the Inquisition *suprema* and, in case any of the personages named was involved in any *asiento* or *arrendamiento*, to the president of the *consejo de hacienda*.<sup>233</sup>

Another remarkable, if slightly absurd, instance of Spanish concern at *converso* migration to Holland in the 1650s, was the instruction of 1656 from Madrid to the Spanish ambassador at The Hague to lodge a formal protest with the States-General concerning two “Portuguese” merchants of Málaga alleged to have been illegally taken aboard a Dutch vessel with their families and possessions and brought, to the loss of their creditors, to Holland. Gamarra answered the council of state that he could not possibly protest to the States-General unless he were given the names of the merchants and of the ship and

<sup>231</sup> Silva Rosa, *Geschiedenis*, 39; W. C. Pieterse. *Daniel Levi de Barrios als geschiedschrijver van de Portugees-Israëlietische Gemeente te Amsterdam* (Amsterdam, 1968) p. 110; “hizo benigna sombra”, as Levi de Barrios put it, “aun a la distante yesiba que mantuvo de la Tierra Sancta”, Levi de Barrios. *Triumpho del Gobierno Popular y de la Antigüedad Holandesa* (Amsterdam, 5443), “Epistola al muy Ilustre Señor Jacob Pereira”.

<sup>232</sup> Levi de Barrios, *Triumpho*, “Yesiba de los Pintos”; Isaac Cardoso. *Las Excelencias de los Hebreos* (Amsterdam, 5438) dedication to Jacob de Pinto.

<sup>233</sup> AGS Estado 2072, consulta 6 Sep. 1650.

skipper concerned and complained of the negligence of the authorities at Málaga.<sup>234</sup> The king thereupon requested the *corregidor* of Málaga, Don Diego Fernández de Córdoba Ponce de León, to be more specific. He reported that two *conversos*, Juan Enriquez and Simon Núñez, had bankrupted in January 1656 and been taken in a Hamburg ship not to Amsterdam but Livorno.<sup>235</sup>

"The city of Hamburg", he wrote, "is one of the German Hanseatic ports which have the same privileges as the Dutch enjoy under the peace treaty<sup>236</sup> and orders respecting contraband, and both these and those of that nation are the ones, it is known, who take the "Portuguese" who leave these realms both to Livorno and Amsterdam; and they achieve this very easily considering that the exemption and freedom conceded to these nations is such that their ships enter and leave these ports in whatever manner they like without being accountable".

To emphasize the seriousness of the situation at Málaga, he added that, in May 1654, Luis de Acosta, Manuel de Olivera and his wife Doña Justa Correa and "many other Portuguese" had been taken aboard a Dutch ship named *The White Horse* that had arrived from Amsterdam freighted by Matheo Butelar (Mathew Butler?) and brought to an unknown destination while, in February 1655, an Italian vessel, *Nuestra Señora de Montenegro*, skipper Julian Regulino of Livorno, had attempted to take several families of "Portuguese" and much merchandise from Málaga to Livorno but that he had managed to intercept two families and hand them over to the Inquisition.<sup>237</sup> The ship had however taken some Portuguese and picked up others, he believed, at Cádiz.

A particularly emotional incident relating to *converso* migration from Spain to Holland in the 1650s, one that greatly aroused Gamarra and Richard, involved a girl brought to Amsterdam from Seville by a "Jewess" named Leonarda Nunes. According to the Spaniards, this girl was taken among the Jews against her will and that of her mother who subsequently requested an Antwerp merchant, named Maldonado, to try to retrieve her.<sup>238</sup> The parrassim, to protect her from the danger of abduction, used their influence with the city authorities to have two Spanish merchants briefly imprisoned to which Gamarra protested in the strongest terms asserting that it was insufferable that Jews

<sup>234</sup> AGS Estado 2089 consulta 18 Jul 1656 and 2673 consulta 6 Mar. 1656; Gamarra considered the laxness at Málaga a serious matter "pues los que destos reynos pasaban a Holanda era para profesar publicamente la religion que tienen en el corazon".

<sup>235</sup> AGS Estado 2673, *corregidor* of Málaga to Philip 29 Aug. 1656.

<sup>236</sup> After the Spanish-Dutch commercial treaty of 1650, the same concessions were subsequently extended to the Hanseatic towns.

<sup>237</sup> One group of *conversos*, including Domingo and Jorge Rodríguez Francia, wine merchants, fled Málaga in 1655 and sailed directly to London, see Haim Beinart, "The Jews in the Canary Islands: a re-evaluation" TJHSE, xxv, p. 65.

<sup>238</sup> AGS Haya 295, Gamarra to city council of Amsterdam, 12 Jul. 1656: "A mon retour en cette ville (The Hague) d'un petit voyage, que j'ay fait aupres de son Alteze sme. j'ay appris l'accident survenu a deux marchands espagnols nommes Antonio de Beynefar et Jacome Otarié qui ont estes fort mal traittes par les juifs dans la vostre, et ce dernier de plus mis a leur instance dans une estroite prison sous une fausse impression que les dits juifs vous ont donne que ces deux marchands seroient familiers de l'Inquisition et auroient voulu retirer en telle qualite une fille de Seville qui y a este emmenee contre le gre de la mere

should thus "seduce" a Christian girl and that the like would be tolerated nowhere in the world. The Amsterdam city council retorted in a cold and unco-operative manner, though one of its members intimated unofficially to Richard that should a letter be shown from the mother demonstrating that she was sincerely Catholic and wished her daughter to be returned to Seville this would be arranged, but otherwise not.<sup>239</sup> Richard in fact attempted to obtain such a letter from Seville, but it would seem that the affair went no further.

The obvious influence of the Sephardim with the Amsterdam *vroedschap*, or city council, during the 1650s, and through it on the States of Holland and the States-General itself, an influence which was frequently exasperating to Gamarra and Richard, was, as has been seen, a constant theme of their reports to Madrid. They were in no doubt that it was the political offshoot of the Jews' growing and excessive rôle in Spanish-Dutch trade. The Dutch Sephardim were thus not simply an annoyance to Spanish officials, but a serious matter of state for Spain at a time of difficult transition in relations with the United Provinces. It is of course true that the relations of the Spanish ambassador and consul with the Dutch Jews were not only characterized by friction, that they had contact with several Jews, such as Samuel Pinto and Isaac Mocatta, in respect of various economic and financial transactions, that there was the precedent of the understanding with Lopo Ramirez, and that after 1660 such contacts developed into the permanent arrangements with Andrés and Manuel de Belmonte. But such connections were of relatively minor importance before 1660, and insofar as they developed into the link with the Belmontes do in fact form material for a separate study.

To conclude this study, it may be said that the Spanish documentation relating to the Dutch Sephardim of the mid seventeenth century does require the historian to adjust his view of the rôle of the latter in certain respects. The thesis once put forward, by such historians as Graetz, Sombart and Dubnow, that the Jews were a crucial factor in the initial stages of seventeenth-century Dutch commercial dominance in both European and colonial navigation, and criticized, in particular by van Dillen, as having been largely misplaced, is confirmed as being wide of the mark.<sup>240</sup> The Sephardim incontestably played a modest, if not meagre, rôle in the rise of both the Dutch north-south carrying trade, in Europe, and that of the East and West India Companies. Yet, despite this, in a way Graetz, Sombart and Dubnow are vindicated in their claim that the Jews were crucially important to Dutch prosperity in the seventeenth century and van Dillen is shown to have been in error in attributing a largely peripheral part to the Jews throughout the period of

par une juifve nommee Leonarda Nunes et y vendue de la mesme religion. Il me conste Messieurs que cette accusation est une pure invention et imposture des juifs, ayant este informe par un marchand d'Anvers nomme Maldonado, que c'estoit luy qui les avoit requis a la priere de la mere de tascher de retirer cette fille de cette abominable secte et de luy delivrer une lettre de sa part, que le mesme Maldonado leur envoya, de quoy s'il est besoing, il est prest a donner tesmoignage juridique, et qui meritera plus de foy que les faussetes de cette meschante race; cette une chose intolerable qu'ils seduissent ainsi impunement une fille Chrestienne et qui ne se souffre en aucun lieu du monde".

<sup>239</sup> Mocatta LW Neths, vi, Richard to Gamarra, Amst. 15 Jul. 1656.

<sup>240</sup> Van Dillen, loc. cit., pp. 10-11; Werner Sombart. *Die Juden und das Wirtschaftsleben* (Leipzig, 1911) p. 18; Simon Dubnow. *Die Geschichte des jüdischen Volkes in der Neuzeit* 10 vols. (Berlin, 1925-9) vol. VI, pp. 430-1.

the Dutch commercial ascendancy. There is a mounting body of evidence, including such statistical indices as the varying tempo of increase in the total number of depositors with the Wisselbank,<sup>241</sup> that the Dutch world trade supremacy had in fact two formative, dynamic phases, both of which were short but crucial, separated by a quarter of a century of relative stagnation (1621-45) caused, arguably, chiefly by Spanish policies and measures. If the years 1590-1620 were those of the making of Dutch commercial greatness and in which the Jews took rather little part, the years 1645-60 were vital to the prolonging, through new trade patterns and a resumption of growth, of the Dutch preponderance into the second half of the seventeenth century. Moreover, the fact is that the Dutch trade boom of 1645-60 took place in what was in several respects a highly unlikely and uncondusive context: the Baltic grain trade, for so long the mainstay of Dutch European navigation, though still important, was on the decline; the North Sea fishing industry which was so vital in the early seventeenth century was waning year by year; Dutch Brazil, the most valuable of the Dutch colonies, was collapsing with its trade destroyed, while English rivalry and pressure, in both European and colonial commerce, was proving increasingly formidable and costly to the Dutch. How then can there possibly have occurred during these years a considerable expansion in Dutch trade and a rapid acceleration in the accumulation of wealth at Amsterdam? The answer surely must be that during the 1640s, a revived and immensely profitable carrying trade to the Iberian peninsula, and after 1646 especially to Spain, reversed the traditional emphasis in Dutch trading patterns from north to south, becoming the *primum mobile*, the driving force of the Dutch mercantile economy. And in Iberian trade, the Dutch Sephardim were chiefly active and owing to the clear dominance of the *conversos* in many areas of Spanish finance and commodity dealing, played what was at any rate a major, and in the view of Spanish officials, the leading rôle. Thus, it may be held, the historian has now to attribute to the Dutch Sephardim of the 1640s and 1650s an extremely important function in the forming of what may be termed phase B of the golden age of the early *modern Dutch economy*.

#### APPENDIX I

The two lists of Dutch-Jewish firms trading with Spain, complete with aliases and Spanish correspondents, the first containing eighteen firms, and the second fifteen, procured from Emmanuel Laville in Amsterdam by Jacques Richard, sent by Richard to the Spanish embassy at The Hague, and enclosed by Gamarra with his despatches to Madrid of 16 October and 16 November 1655,<sup>242</sup> have a rather curious history of their own. They have, it would seem, never been published in a full and correct version, though the first only was given, from what was presumably a very poor copy, with major errors and with seven of the seventeen names missing, by E. N. Adler and subsequently reproduced with the same

<sup>241</sup> Van Dillen. loc. cit. p. 14; between 1620 and 1641, the total number of Wisselbank depositors grew from 1202 to 1508 and between 1641 and 1661, from 1508 to 2102, almost exactly twice as fast.

<sup>242</sup> AGS Haya xxxviii, fos. 143, 150.

errors by H. I. Bloom.<sup>243</sup> A full and corrected rendering of the lists is given below. Finding references to these lists in the *consejo de estado* records at Simancas is, as for instance Alvaro Castillo found,<sup>244</sup> somewhat frustrating, for apparently no copies of the actual lists were kept by the council. Instead, the council advised the king to send the first list to the Inquisition *suprema*, whence it was sent enclosed with a letter of Philip IV to the Inquisitor-General dated 30 December 1655.<sup>245</sup> The other list, seen by the *consejo* in January 1656, was sent in the first instance not to the Inquisition but to the *consejo de hacienda*.<sup>246</sup> It may be that no copy of the second list came into the hands of the Inquisition, at any rate at that stage, despite the keen satisfaction that the *suprema* had expressed on receiving the first. If so, this would explain how it was that Adler, whose version of the first list derived from Inquisition sources, came to reproduce the first list without the second. The present version is taken from the records of the former Spanish embassy at The Hague, formerly deposited with the Archives Générales at Brussels, but now transferred to Simancas.<sup>247</sup> Lucien Wolf received a transcript of the lists, from the embassy records whilst they were at Brussels, which is now in the Mocatta Library at University College London.<sup>248</sup> The Mocatta version is largely correct but also has one or two small errors which are pointed out below.

"Los Nombres de los principales judios de aquella ciudad que contratan en los reynos de vra. Mgd. en España y de sus correspondientes."

	Jewish merchants of Amsterdam trading with Spain	Aliases	Correspondents
1.	David Osorio <sup>249</sup>	Bento Osorio	<i>in Santander,</i> Fernando Antonio Herrera Calderon <i>in Bilbao,</i> Matheo y Agustin de Montiano <sup>250</sup> <i>San Sebastian,</i> Francisco de Verois <sup>251</sup> y Fagola

<sup>243</sup> E. N. Adler, "The Jews of Amsterdam in 1655", TJHSE iv (1899-1901) pp. 224-9; H. I. Bloom. *The Economic Activities of the Jews of Amsterdam*, pp. 92-3.

<sup>244</sup> Alvaro Castillo, "Dans la Monarchie Espagnole du XVIIe siècle: les banquiers portugais et le circuit d'Amsterdam", *Annales* xix (1964) pp. 311-16.

<sup>245</sup> AGS Estado 2085 consulta, 26 Dec. 1655; Adler, loc. cit.

<sup>246</sup> AGS Estado 2089, consulta 18 Jan. 1656.

<sup>247</sup> AGS Haya xxxviii, fos. 145-6v, 152-3.

<sup>248</sup> Mocatta LW Netherlands. xi, Gamarra to Philip, The Hague, 16 Oct and 16 Nov. 1655; I am indebted to Mr. Edgar Samuel for drawing my attention to this copy as well as for the general benefit of exchanging ideas with him on the subject of the trade of the Dutch Sephardim during this period.

<sup>249</sup> Whereas Bento Osorio the elder had, it would seem, no significant dealings in Spain, his son David, after the Spanish-Dutch Peace, clearly became involved in trading in Castilian wool.

<sup>250</sup> Adler and Bloom give Montiano; the Mocatta copy confirms that it is Montiano.

<sup>251</sup> The Simancas lists give both Vernis and Verois, the Mocatta copy gives Verois, Adler and Bloom give Beron.

	Amsterdam	Aliases	Correspondents
2.	Jacob del Monte	Jacobus Vandenberg	the same factors as above and, <i>Madrid</i> , Simon Mendez Soto Luis Flores de Valdes
3.	Abraham Isaac Perera <sup>252</sup> (sic)	Francisco y Antonio da Gurre <i>alias</i> Gerardo Carlos van Narden <sup>253</sup>	<i>Madrid</i> , Fernando Montezinos and Balthasar Rodriguez Cardoso <i>Seville</i> , Manuel and B. Montezinos and Bartolomé Lopez Tellez <sup>254</sup> <i>Santander</i> , Herrera Calderon <i>Bilbao</i> , — the Montianos <i>San Sebastián</i> — Verois y Fagola <i>Madrid</i> — Flores de Valdes <i>San Sebastián</i> — Verois y Fagola <i>Bilbao</i> , Juan Baptista de la Rossiunda <i>Madrid</i> — Flores de Valdes <i>Cádiz</i> Antonio Perera Torres
4.	Joseppe de los Rios <sup>255</sup>	Michiel van der Rivieren	<i>Seville and Cádiz</i> , Juan del Soto Martinez
5.	Antonio Lopes Suazo <sup>256</sup>	Willem del Monte	<i>Santander</i> , — Herrera Calderon <i>Cáceres</i> , Laurenzo Pan y Agua <sup>258</sup> <i>Bilbao</i> , — the Montianos <i>San Sebastián</i> — Verois y Fagola <i>Seville</i> , Manuel Gomez de Acosta and Fernando Nunes
6.	Abraham Franco Mendez	Melchor Mendez Franco	
7.	Andrea Christoval Nunes	Henrique and Robert Moyenberg. <sup>257</sup>	

<sup>252</sup> This should presumably read Abraham y Isaac Perera.

<sup>253</sup> Adler and Bloom give van Narden as Bangardel.

<sup>254</sup> Adler and Bloom give this as Tello; López Téllez would be a relative of Montezinos.

<sup>255</sup> This merchant is missing from the Adler-Bloom list, while his San Sebastián and Madrid factors are wrongly given as additional correspondents of the Pereyras; "Il y a un riche Juif qui a présent se trouve à Anvers", Richard informed Gamarra in October 1655, "c'est un nommé Miguel de los Rios, alias Miguel van der Rivieren. . . il va y epouser une demoiselle de Tovarre, fille d'un Portugais defunt qui demeurait à Anvers. Ce Miguel a environ 30 ans, il est né et a été baptisé à Rouen paroisse de Saint Denis. Il a été circoncisé à Amsterdam, il y a 14 ou 15 ans. Son père s'appelle Martin Rodriguez (alias Joseph de los Rios) dont la fortune est estimée à trois ou quatre tonnes d'or", Mocatta LW Neths xi, Richard to Gamarra, Amst. 20 Oct. 1655; Joseph was a parnas at Amsterdam in 1654.

<sup>256</sup> This is the celebrated merchant and financier Lopes Suasso; the Adler-Bloom list gives him as Lopes Majo.

<sup>257</sup> Given in Adler-Bloom as Modemberg.

<sup>258</sup> The person with this unlikely name is mentioned as an *asentista* of a minor sort in 1646, Dominguez Ortiz, *Política y Hacienda*, 149.

	Amsterdam	Aliases	Correspondents
8.	The widow of Diego Netto de Paiva <sup>259</sup>		<i>Santander</i> — Herrera Calderon <i>San Sebastián</i> — Verois y Fagola <i>Seville</i> — Gomez de Acosta and Nunes. <i>Cáceres</i> — Pan y Agua <i>Bilbao</i> — the Montianos <i>San Sebastián</i> — Verois y Fagola <i>Madrid</i> , Manuel Serrano Montero and Pedro del Prado
9.	Duart(e) and Manuel Faro <sup>260</sup>		<i>Bilbao</i> — the Montianos. <i>San Sebastián</i> — Verois y Fagola <i>Madrid</i> — Montero <i>Alicante</i> — Gaspar and Francisco de Moxica. <sup>262</sup>
10.	Fernando Alvarez and Antonio Correa de Mesquita	Hendrik and Robert van der Sterre. <sup>261</sup>	<i>Bilbao</i> — the Montianos <i>San Sebastián</i> — Verois y Fagola <i>Madrid</i> — Montero <i>Alicante</i> — Gaspar and Francisco de Moxica. <sup>262</sup>
11.	Baltasar de Acuña <sup>263</sup>		<i>Bilbao</i> — the Montianos <i>San Sebastián</i> — Verois y Fagola <i>Madrid</i> — Montero
12.	Manuel Toralta <sup>264</sup>	Albert Dirksen den Ouden	<i>Bilbao</i> — the Montianos <i>San Sebastián</i> — Verois <i>Madrid</i> — Montero and Don Antonio de Anaya <sup>265</sup> <i>Seville</i> — Bernardo Estendorpe

<sup>259</sup> Given as Netto de Paina in the Mocatta transcript.

<sup>260</sup> Given as one name, Duartes Manuel Faro in Adler-Bloom and as Duart and Manuel Faco in the Mocatta transcript.

<sup>261</sup> Adler-Bloom gives "Bandersterre"; in or just before 1650, "Enrique Roberto Bendeestar" of Amsterdam was stated by Diego Rodriguez Idaña, a prisoner of the Inquisition at Cuenca, to have received from him 132 sacks of wool of Ciudad Real and to have paid him by letters of exchange of Simon Díaz Váez of Antwerp on Felipe de Nis in Madrid, Caro Baroja, *Los Judíos*, ii, 148.

<sup>262</sup> Adler-Bloom gives "Morica".

<sup>263</sup> Balthasar de Acuña (da Cunha), who imported wool from Santander, employed the alias "Albert van de Bergh", see Gemeentearchief Amsterdam. Not. Arch. 1537, ff. 118, 130.

<sup>264</sup> The Mocatta transcript gives Emmanuel Foralta; Toralta and the rest of the first list are omitted from Adler-Bloom; but see Bloom, op. cit. p. 90, where he gives nine names of Dutch merchants and their aliases taken from references in Samuel Oppenheim's study of the Jews in Western Guiana in the years 1658-66, aliases employed in trading with the Spaniards mainly in the Caribbean, the names are Diego Mendes de Brito (Jacques Albert), Antonio Henriques de Granada (Carlos Guemp), Samuel Dias (Michel Smit), Antonio d'Elgado (Antonio van Duren), Manuel Toralto (Albert Dirksen), Joseph Penha (Carlos de Water), Abraham Antunes (Dirck Janssen), Isaac Aboab (Dennis Jennis) and Isaac Henriques Marao (Spycker Veth).

<sup>265</sup> Anaya is mentioned as a Madrid correspondent of Diego Rodriguez Cardoso of Bayonne in Caro Baroja, *Los Judíos*, ii, 139.



Amsterdam	Aliases	Correspondents
13. Sebastian Coutinho	Andres Martensen <i>alias</i> Julian Galles	<i>Bilbao</i> – the Montianos <i>San Sebastián</i> – Verois y Fagola <i>Madrid</i> – Montero and Anaya
14. Geronimo Nunes d'Acosta <sup>266</sup>	Guiglio Bentivoglio	<i>San Sebastián</i> – Verois y Fagola <i>Alicante</i> – the Moxicas
15. Diego Enriquez and Juan de Castro	Hendrik and Jan van Leeuw	<i>Bilbao</i> – the Montianos <i>San Sebastián</i> – Verois y Fagola <i>Madrid</i> – Montero and Anaya <i>Seville</i> – Bernard Hustendorpe
16. Manuel Coutinho		<i>San Sebastián</i> – Verois y Fagola <i>Madrid</i> – Montero
17. Isac del Prado	Jacques del Prado	<i>Cádiz</i> and <i>Seville</i> , Vicente Zegers and Comp.
18. Baltasar Alvarez Noguera	Albert Dirksen den Jonghen	<i>Bilbao</i> – the Montianos <i>San Sebastián</i> – Verois y Fagola <i>Madrid</i> – Montero
end of the first list		
Second List		
19. Juan Gonzales	Albert Wighman alias Jacobus and Abraham van Gruenendal	<i>Málaga</i> , Rodrigo and Bernardo Elers. <i>Cádiz</i> – Perera Torres
20. Benjamin de Chaves	Gaspar de Chavarria	<i>Madrid</i> , Alvaro de Mora
21. Simon Francisco Bernal	Simon Frans	<i>San Sebastián</i> Santiago de Tilleria <i>Seville</i> , Pedro Fernandez de Tobar
22. Manuel Nunes Mendez	Hector Henriquez de Leon	<i>Bilbao</i> – the Montianos <i>San Sebastián</i> – Verois y Fagola <i>Alicante</i> – Enrique de Figueredo
23. Manuel Mendez de Crasto	Manuel Henriquez de Aguilar	<i>Bilbao</i> – the Montianos <i>San Sebastián</i> – Verois y Fagola
24. Diego Mendez de Brito <sup>267</sup>	Jacob Alberts	<i>Bilbao</i> Baptista de la Rosiunda <i>San Sebastián</i> – Verois y Fagola

<sup>266</sup> This was the celebrated agent of the Portuguese king at Amsterdam; the fact that he used an Italian alias and had factors at Alicante might suggest that he was involved in the carrying of wool and other products from Alicante to Italy, possibly Livorno or Venice, or both; however, the same alias was undoubtedly used by Antonio López Suasso in several of his freight contracts for the carrying of wool from Santander to Amsterdam in 1654, so the attribution might also be a mistake, see Gemeentearchief Amsterdam, Not. Arch., 1537, ff. 118, 124.

<sup>267</sup> Presumably a relative of the crypto-Jewish Madrid *asentista*, Francisco Díaz Méndez de Brito, who in turn was close to Antonio Núñez Gramajo, *arrendador* of the Spanish wool taxes in the years 1651-1657.

	Amsterdam	Aliases	Correspondents
25.	Manuel Mendez Enriquez	Fernando de Baeca <sup>268</sup>	<i>Bilbao</i> — the Montianos <i>San Sebastián</i> — Verois y Fagola <i>Santander</i> — Herrera Calderon <i>Madrid</i> — Anaya
26.	Juan de Paz and Andres de Acevedo.		<i>Santander</i> — Herrera Calderon <i>Madrid</i> — Fernando Montezinos <i>Seville</i> — Lopez Tellez and Manuel and Bartolome Montezinos
27.	Henrique Mendez de Silva	Geronimo Rodriguez Perez	<i>Madrid</i> — Fernando Montezinos <i>Seville</i> — Lopez Tellez and Manuel and Bartolome Montezinos
28.	Francisco de Medina <sup>269</sup>	Frederick Wolf	<i>Tenerife</i> — Don Diego Perera
29	Francisco Mendez Chilon <sup>270</sup>		<i>Málaga</i> — Antonio de Silva
30	Christoval Mendez	Manuel Franco Mendez	<i>San Sebastián</i> — Verois y Fagola <i>Seville</i> — Agustin Garcia
31	Antonio Luis		<i>Bilbao</i> — the Montianos <i>San Sebastián</i> — Verois y Fagola
32	Joseppe Mendez d'Acosta		<i>Bilbao</i> — the Montianos
33	Isaac Serrano		<i>San Sebastián</i> — Verois y Fagola

<sup>268</sup> There was probably some confusion here on the part of Laville, for Fernando de Baeca appears in the Amsterdam notarial records as a real merchant who used the alias "Joris van Krempen" in importing wool from Santander to Holland, see Gemeentearchief Amsterdam, Not. Arch. 1535, ff. 19, 20, 60.

<sup>269</sup> This is the father of Sir Solomon de Medina, the first practising Jew to be knighted in England; Francisco left Bordeaux for Amsterdam in or around 1649; according to the testimony of his brother-in-law, Gaspar de Perera, before the Canariote Inquisition, in 1662, he subsequently resided and traded in Middelburg and had also strong connections in Antwerp; his wife, Gaspar's sister, was named Gracia Perera; according to Lucien Wolf, the Canariote Inquisition was probably alerted to the judaizing of the members of the Perera family, in the Canaries, by this present list which he refers to under its former Brussels catalogue number (Reg. 2305), though the document is dated to 1665 in what is probably a misprint, and that as a result Diego Perera, an important merchant and *arrendador* of Canaries customs duties, was forced to flee; the Canaries being one of the principal loopholes in the structure of the official Spanish Atlantic trade, it is highly probable that Perera and Medina were extensively involved in shipping unregistered American silver to Holland, see Beinart, *op. cit.*, 61n; Lucien Wolf, *Jews in the Canary Islands* (London, 1926) pxxxiii; O. K. Rabinowicz, *Sir Solomon de Medina* (London, 1974) pp. 1, 82.

<sup>270</sup> An Antonio Méndez Chilón, residing at Veracruz, in Mexico, received a *naturaleza*, naturalization as a Castilian, as one of the terms of a royal *asiento*, in 1643, with the great Sevillian "Portuguese" Indies merchants, the brothers Rodríguez Pasarino, Antonio Domínguez Ortiz, "Los extranjeros en la vida española durante el siglo XVII", *Estudios de Historia Social de España* IV, no. 2. ed. Carmelo Viñas y Mey (Madrid, 1960) p. 408.

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## THE ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTION OF DUTCH SEPHARDI SEPHARDI JEWRY TO HOLLAND'S GOLDEN AGE, 1595-1713

'This nation', declared the Spanish ambassador's secretary, at The Hague, in a report sent to Madrid in 1658, 'has very considerable power with the magistrates of the city councils, and especially that of Amsterdam, for without doubt it is they who have the greatest commerce and who, consequently, yield the greatest advantage'.<sup>1</sup> He was referring to the 3,000 or so Sephardi (Iberian) Jews then living at Amsterdam and the few hundred or so more resident at Rotterdam, Middelburg, and two or three small inland towns. His assertion is an obvious exaggeration. Holland was then not just Europe's but all the world's entrepôt and many distinct groups and factors contributed to its commercial ascendancy. Even so, contemporaries, Dutch and foreign alike, make enough sweeping claims about the Sephardi Jewish role in golden age Holland to persuade us of the wholly unparalleled position of this particular Jewish community in the wider context of seventeenth-century Europe. The wide-ranging economic activity of this group was so manifestly exceptional, so distinct from the usual pattern of things, that it invariably made a vivid impression on the contemporary mind, compelling some departure from the habitual notion of the lowly Jew. And, indeed, it is arguable that no other Jewish community has ever exerted so appreciable an economic influence, over several continents, as Dutch Sephardi Jewry in the seventeenth century. It was one manifestation of this altogether exceptional economic role that during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Dutch Sephardi Jewry was the only European Jewish community, at least outside Ottoman territory, which exerted political influence of the sort taken notice of by diplomats.

Of course, the special importance of Dutch Sephardi Jewry in the economic sphere was long ago taken note of by historians. Not infrequently, at least until the publications of J. G. van Dillen, their contribution was also exaggerated.<sup>2</sup> There were

\* A short version of this article was read at the 2nd International Conference on the History of Dutch Jewry held at Tel Aviv and Jerusalem in December 1982.

<sup>1</sup> Archivo General de Simancas (AGS), Estado inv. nr. 2091, Vincent Richard to Philip IV, The Hague, 3 Sept. 1658; in the early seventeenth century, the Ibero-Jewish community in the Dutch Republic was known officially as the 'Portuguese nation' but later, from around 1640, as the 'Portuguese Jewish nation'. The term 'Sephardi', nowadays used increasingly in English as well as Dutch, derives from the Hebrew for 'Spanish' or 'Iberian'.

<sup>2</sup> Werner Sombart took the lead in publicizing exaggerated ideas of the historical significance of Dutch Jewry in his *Die Juden und das Wirtschaftsleben* (Leipzig 1911), but see also M. Wolff, 'De eerste vestiging der Joden in Amsterdam, hun politieke en economische toestand', *Bijdragen voor Vaderlandsche Geschiedenis en Oudheidkunde* 9 (1910) 365-400, 10 (1912) 134-182, 354-369, 11 (1913) 88-101, 350-376. Van Dillen set out to correct earlier assumptions in two essays: J. G. van Dillen, 'Vreemdelingen te Amsterdam in de eerste helft der zeventiende eeuw 1. De Portugeesche Joden', *Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis* (TvG) 50 (1935) 4-35; J. G. van Dillen, 'De economische positie en betekenis der Joden in de Republiek en in de Nederlandsche koloniale wereld' in: H. Brugmans and A. Frank ed., *Geschiedenis der Joden in Nederland* (Amsterdam 1940).

those who imagined that they were a major factor in the rise of the Dutch colonial companies or that it was they who first generated Dutch trade with Italy and the Levant. But, oddly enough, once the more fanciful notions were disposed of, by Van Dillen, very little further discussion or research ensued. Until recently it was not noticed that Van Dillen in turn had distorted the picture, albeit in the opposite direction from Sombart, almost to the point of missing the essential significance of the Dutch Sephardi role altogether.<sup>3</sup> What for many years was the only detailed survey of the subject, that by H. I. Bloom, supplied some useful new data but, unfortunately, introduced still more distortions.<sup>4</sup> Eager to show that in a liberal and tolerant atmosphere Jews readily adapted to virtually any kind of economic activity, Bloom was chiefly concerned to catalogue as many different sorts of enterprise as he could document. He gave little thought to order of importance. The result has been that up to the present no serviceable account of the Dutch Sephardi economic role was to be found anywhere in the literature on Holland's golden age and even the best general survey of modern Jewish history, the work of Salo Baron, is entirely unsatisfactory on this particular topic.<sup>5</sup>

Far from dispersing their efforts far and wide, the trade, industry and financial activity in which Dutch Sephardi Jews engaged was confined to only a few routes, products and forms of investment. Indeed, the commercial base of the community was extremely narrow in the early stages and only somewhat broader in the later seventeenth century. Furthermore, the manufacturing and retailing activities open to this group were always very few and invariably closely tied to the restricted commercial base. In effect, the Portuguese-speaking Jews of Holland and Zeeland<sup>6</sup> constituted an exceptionally tightly-knit economic grouping as wholly distinctive in trade and industry as in religion and life-style.

It is a great mistake to think in terms of long-term structures.<sup>7</sup> There were two main stages in the evolution of Dutch Sephardi economic activity down to 1713 – the period from 1595, when the first Portuguese crypto-Jews (as they then were) settled at Amsterdam, until the end of the Thirty Years War, a period in which the community was of some, but by no means fundamental, importance in the workings of the Dutch economy, and, secondly, the phase from 1648 onwards when, as I shall argue, they functioned as one of the vital components in the imposing edifice of Holland's global commerce. However, both these main stages subdivide into four lesser phases, constituting a sequence of eight in all. The generally abrupt shifts which characterise this series are mainly, though by no means entirely, attributable

<sup>3</sup> D. M. Swetschinski, 'Kinship and Commerce: the Foundations of Portuguese Jewish Life in seventeenth-century Holland', *Studia Rosenthaliana* (SR) 15 (1981) 55-57.

<sup>4</sup> H. I. Bloom, *The Economic Activities of the Jews of Amsterdam in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries* (2nd edn. 1969) (1st edn.; Williamsport 1937).

<sup>5</sup> S. W. Baron, *A Social and Religious History of the Jews* XV (New York 1973) 41-45.

<sup>6</sup> On the small Sephardi community of Middelburg, see J. H. van 't Hoff, 'De vroegere Portugeesch-Joodsche gemeente en de kerkeraad der hervormde gemeente te Middelburg', *Archief uitgegeven door het Zeeuwsch Genootschap der Wetenschappen* 1922, 14-28.

<sup>7</sup> I mean this specifically as a criticism of the Braudelian *longue durée*, adopted by A. M. van der Woude in his general introduction to the *Nieuw Algemeene Geschiedenis der Nederlanden* vols. 5 to 9 as the best available contemporary approach to Dutch social and economic history of the early modern era; in my own view, this approach is in fact neither convincing nor helpful in the context of seventeenth-century Dutch economic history.

to the impact of international political pressures and events. Any serious attempt to elucidate the role of Sephardi Jewry to the Dutch economy must, in my view, carefully investigate these phases each of which in turn significantly altered the structure and character of Sephardi activity.

Thanks to the fairly abundant evidence which has survived in the notarial archives of Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Antwerp, it is possible to reconstruct the patterns of Dutch Sephardi enterprise in some detail. Among other batches of evidence, over three hundred surviving freight-contracts covering the years 1595-1619 signed by Amsterdam Sephardi merchants have been published in extract and many hundreds more have been preserved for the post-1619 period, including a compact block of 661 contracts signed by Jewish merchants in the period 1638-76 taken by the notary J. V. Oli.<sup>8</sup> During the first main period in the evolution of Dutch Sephardi activity, down to 1648, this evidence proves beyond question that the community's overseas trade was based essentially on dealings with Portugal and its colonies, or rather, the indirect traffic in Brazil sugar and other Portuguese colonial wares via Lisbon, Oporto, Madeira and the Azores. Initially, in the two opening phases, from 1595<sup>9</sup> to 1608, and 1608 to 1621, this trade with Portugal was indeed overwhelmingly preponderant. Subsequently, during the next two phases, from 1621 to 1641 and 1641 to 1648, the ascendancy of the Portugal trade gradually waned as two other trades expanded. In the long run, these other two routes, to Morocco and Spain, were so basic as to justify our categorising them along with the Portugal trade as *moedernegoties*, or mothertrades, of Dutch Sephardi Jewry. In the period to 1648, virtually all Dutch Sephardi foreign trade involved the routes to Portugal, Morocco and Spain and everything else of any significance – carrying to and from Livorno and Venice being the chief additional item – was essentially an offshoot of one or more of these, and especially of the Portugal trade. It is thus evident that the question whether or not Dutch Jewry contributed significantly to the rise of the Dutch East India Company, over which much ink was spilled in the 1930s, is almost completely irrelevant to the real concerns of the Dutch Sephardim of the early seventeenth century.<sup>10</sup> Where Dutch Sephardi Jewry played a notable part in Amsterdam's trade with the Far East, in the early period, was in importing, via Lisbon, commodities such as Indian diamonds, Ceylon cinnamon and, for a time, Indian cotton cloth, from regions which as yet were beyond the reach of the East India Company.

The initial phase in the growth of Dutch Sephardi commerce, that of 1595-1608, the years in which the Jewish communities of Amsterdam and Rotterdam were established, largely co-incided with the first round of economic warfare between the

<sup>8</sup> The published extracts appear in the journal *Studia Rosenthaliana* vols. 1-16; the Oli contracts are located in Gemeentearchief (GA) Amsterdam, Notarial Archive (NA) inv. nrs. 1525-1546; hundreds more such contracts and other relevant notarial deeds are to be found in the books of notaries B. Baddel, P. Padthuysen, D. van der Groe, A. Lock and others.

<sup>9</sup> The year 1595 is the first for which there is notarial evidence of Portuguese marranos residing in Amsterdam. It is also noteworthy that there is a reference in the Amsterdam Sephardi synagogue minutes for 1685 which states that Jews had then practised their religion in Amsterdam for ninety years, see GA Amsterdam, Archieven der Portugees-Israelietische Gemeente (APIG) inv. nr. 20, f.92v.

<sup>10</sup> see H. Wätjen, *Das Judentum und die Anfänge der modernen Kolonisation* (Stuttgart 1914); A. M. Vaz Dias, 'De deelname der marranen in het oprichtingskapitaal der Oost-Indische Compagnie', *Jaarboek van het Genootschap Amstelodamum* 33 (1936) 43-58.

Spanish crown and the Dutch. For most of the period from 1598 to 1608, Dutch shipping and cargoes were officially excluded from Spain and its dependencies which then included Portugal.<sup>11</sup> It may seem surprising that a Jewish community principally involved in commerce with Portugal should have formed precisely when contact between Holland and Portugal was disrupted by action of the Spanish crown, but actually this remarkable fact is highly revealing about Dutch Sephardi Jewry in its infancy. Until 1595 almost the whole distribution of Portuguese East India spices and Brazil sugar to northern Europe was handled by the Portuguese New Christians (that is descendants of Portuguese Jewry forcibly baptised *en masse*, in 1497, many of whom were crypto-Jews) residing in Antwerp.<sup>12</sup> Despite the turmoil in Flanders and Brabant during the 1570s and 1580s, it is evident that for a time these Antwerp Portuguese were able to persist in their former role, distributing to Hamburg, Amsterdam, London and Rouen. Thus the rise of Dutch Sephardi Jewry did not originate in the mass migration from Antwerp, Ghent and other South Netherlands towns to Holland and Zeeland which began in the 1580s. By and large, the infant Amsterdam community around 1600 did not consist of migrants from Antwerp – though there were some, but of fresh immigrants from Portugal. What changed in 1595 was that whereas previously only Antwerp's bulk trades had been hindered, by the Dutch closure of the Scheldt, now Antwerp's traffic in high-value merchandise through Dunkirk and other Flemish sea-ports was cut off as a result of the general maritime blockade of the South Netherlands imposed by the States General, for the first time, in that year.<sup>13</sup> It was this extended blockade, preventing Dutch and neutral ships from entering the Flemish sea-ports, not the events of the 1580s, which was the political and economic midwife of Dutch Sephardi Jewry. Indeed, the founding of the Amsterdam community was virtually simultaneous with that of other new Sephardi communities at Hamburg, Emden and Rotterdam, and new New Christian groups at Rouen and also at Nantes,<sup>14</sup> all of which sprang from the same cause: the 1595 Dutch ban on maritime trade to Flanders which compelled the Lisbon dealers to send their own agents to the main distribution points.

The first Portuguese Jewish merchants of Amsterdam and Rotterdam were thus primarily acting for exporters of colonial wares from Portugal, in much the same way that the Antwerp Portuguese had been doing for decades, except that pepper and other East India Spices, which played a key role until 1605, subsequently faded from the picture following the Dutch East India Company's rapid gains in Indonesia and

<sup>11</sup> J. H. Kernkamp, *De handel op den vijand, 1572-1609* (2 vols.; Utrecht 1931-34) II, 227-228, 234, 252, 260; F. Pollentier, *De Admiraliteit en de oorlog ter zee onder de Aartshertogen (1596-1609)* (Brussels 1972) 127-134.

<sup>12</sup> This community numbered around 400 in 1571 declining to around 250 by 1591, see E. Schmidt, *L'histoire des Juifs à Anvers* (2nd edn.; Antwerp 1969) (1st edn. 1963); I. S. Revah, 'Pour l'histoire des marranes à Anvers: recensements de la 'Nation Portugaise' de 1571 à 1666', *Revue des Etudes Juives (REJ)* 122 (1963) 123-147; H. Pohl, *Die Portugiesen in Antwerpen (1567-1648). Zur Geschichte einer Minderheit* (Wiesbaden 1977) 153-162.

<sup>13</sup> Kernkamp, *Handel op den vijand* II, 153-156, 212.

<sup>14</sup> H. Kellenbenz, *Sephardim an der unteren Elbe. Ihre wirtschaftliche und politische Bedeutung vom Ende des 16. bis zum Beginn des 18. Jahrhunderts* (Wiesbaden 1958) 26-31; I. S. Revah, 'Le premier établissement des marranes portugais à Rouen (1603-1609)', *Mélanges Isidore Levy. Annuaire de l'Institut de Philologie et d'histoire orientale et slaves XIII* (1953) 539-52; Léon Brunschvigg, *Les Juifs de Nantes et du Pays Nantais* (Nantes 1980) 13-14.

the Moluccas. But during the years 1599-1608 only a small part of their business consisted in importing Portuguese colonial merchandise direct from either Portugal or Antwerp. The Spanish embargoes against the Dutch, and the reciprocal ban of river traffic between the North and South Netherlands in force during the same years, were substantial obstacles. Whereas there are twenty-two surviving freight-contracts drawn up by Amsterdam Sephardi Jews for the years 1595-8, all but one of which concern voyages to and from Portugal, there are only twenty such contracts for the seven years 1599-1605 and where previously all the ships were Dutch and most were chartered to sail to Lisbon or Oporto, from 1599 several were Hanseatic and the majority were chartered to sail to smaller ports such as Portimão, Faro, Buarcos and Aveiro where prospects for evading Philip III's embargo were better.<sup>15</sup> But in these years most of the sugar and other Portuguese colonial products shipped to Amsterdam arrived on Hanseatic or French vessels via Hamburg, Rouen and especially Emden.<sup>16</sup> Also several Portuguese ships crossed straight from Brazil to Holland on instructions from Lisbon merchants, carrying false papers designating Portugal as their destination.<sup>17</sup> Both the risks and value of this traffic were high. In May 1603, six Amsterdam Jewish merchants, headed by Duarte Fernandes (Joshua Habilho), authorised two London merchants to reclaim from the English crown sugar, pepper, cinnamon, Brazil-wood, pearls and diamonds, which had been loaded onto a fleet of six Emden vessels *en route* from Lisbon to North Germany but intercepted by an English squadron in the Channel.<sup>18</sup> London admiralty officials valued the cargo at over £ 28,000.

The embargoes were lifted in the summer of 1608 and from then until the expiry of the Twelve Years Truce, in April 1621, there were no political hindrances to a rapid growth in Dutch trade with the Iberian Peninsula. There was also some recovery at Antwerp where the Portuguese New Christians for a time worked in parallel with their Jewish counter-parts in Holland, despite the Dutch restrictions which remained in force at the mouth of the Scheldt. The Twelve Years Truce, indeed, was the phase of most vigorous and dramatic growth of the entire golden age for Amsterdam in general and one of the most vigorous for its Sephardi community.<sup>19</sup> As can be seen from Table 14, the number of Sephardi Jewish accounts with the Amsterdam Exchange Bank rose from 24, in 1609, to no less than 114 or 9.5% of the total by 1620, a most remarkable phenomenon.

<sup>15</sup> E. M. Koen, 'Notarial Records in Amsterdam relating to the Portuguese Jews in that town up to 1639', *SR* 1 (1967) 110-122 and 2 (1968) 111-115.

<sup>16</sup> Koen, 'Notarial Deeds', *SR* 2 (1968) 116-126, 257-272 and *SR* 3 (1969) 113-125, 234-254; H. Kellenbenz, *As relações econômicas entre o Brasil e a Alemanha na época colonial* (Recife 1961) 18-19.

<sup>17</sup> Koen, 'Notarial Deeds', *SR* 3 (1969) 114, 118, 235, 241.

<sup>18</sup> E. R. Samuel, 'Portuguese Jews in Jacobean London', *Transactions of the Jewish Historical Society of England (TJHSE)* 18 (1958) appendix. 2.

<sup>19</sup> J. I. Israel, 'Spain and the Dutch Sephardim, 1609-1660', *SR* 12 (1978) 5-6, 15-18; J. I. Israel, *The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World, 1606-1661* (Oxford 1982) 46-47. See above, 359-60, 369-72.



Table 14: *Numbers of Dutch Jewish Depositors with the Amsterdam Exchange Bank, 1609-1674*<sup>20</sup>

	<i>Jews</i>	<i>Total</i>		<i>Jews</i>	<i>Total</i>
1609	24		1641	89	1508
1615	57	850	1646	126	1579
1620	114 (106)	1202	1651	197	1875
1625	76	1301	1661	243	2102
1631	89	1348	1674	265	2031

At Venice, the Portuguese Jewish community was able to expand its role at this time, though less dramatically, largely owing to the steady withdrawal of old-established Christian merchants from commerce.<sup>21</sup> Venetian Jewry began to gain ground around 1600, having been unable to do so before, only because a vacuum had appeared. But at Amsterdam the position was just the opposite. The Sephardi Jews greatly advanced their position during this dynamic second stage just when the city's mercantile body as a whole enjoyed its most sustained boom of the seventeenth century. The explanation for this striking contrast lies in the fact that while Amsterdam had for centuries traded with Portugal, exchanging Baltic products for Setúbal salt, the trade in Portuguese colonial wares, recently diverted from Antwerp, was something quite new so that there was little resistance to Jewish penetration of this sector. There was no entrenched group barring the way to Sephardi ascendancy over Amsterdam's sugar trade, rather appreciation of this fresh asset on the part of the city fathers. The rise in sugar imports, the driving force of Dutch Sephardi trade during the Twelve Years Truce, was such that over twenty new sugar refineries were established in Amsterdam in the space of ten or twelve years.<sup>22</sup>

During the Truce period, as before, the vast majority of the freight-contracts signed by Dutch Sephardi Jews were for voyages to and from Portugal.<sup>23</sup> Several Amsterdam Jewish merchants also acquired shares in ships employed on the Lisbon route. Nevertheless, a significant number of voyages were, arranged to Morocco and Spain while Manoel Carvalho, apparently the most active in Italian trade, chartered at least eleven ships to sail to and from Livorno and Venice.<sup>24</sup> Moreover, there can be little doubt that freight-contracts on their own, without other notarial evidence, yield an exaggerated notion of the preponderance of the Portugal trade. In reality, Dutch Sephardi dealings with Italy were more substantial than seems to be the case from the freight-contracts, being essentially an extension of the Portuguese and Spanish trades. Amsterdam Sephardi merchants shipped sugar and other Portuguese colon-

<sup>20</sup> Van Dillen, 'Vreemdelingen', 14; Van Dillen slightly underestimated the number of Sephardi depositors in 1620 and probably also other years, E. M. Koen, 'The earliest sources relating to the Portuguese Jews in the Municipal Archives of Amsterdam up to 1620', *SR* 4 (1970) 27.

<sup>21</sup> B. Pullan, *Rich and Poor in Renaissance Venice* (Oxford 1971) 570-575.

<sup>22</sup> Algemeen Rijksarchief (ARA), Archive of the States of Holland, inv. nr. 1358, 'Deductie' of January 1622, f.6v.

<sup>23</sup> Koen, 'Notarial Records', *SR* 5 (1971) 206-241, 6 (1972) 107-117, 229-233 7 (1973) 118-122, 266-279 8 (1974) 140-143, 302-307 *et passim*.

<sup>24</sup> S. Hart, 'Die Amsterdamer Italienfahrt, 1590-1620', *Wirtschaftskräfte und Wirtschaftswege. Festschrift für Hermann Kellenbenz* (4 vols.; Nuremberg 1978) II, 163.

ial wares from Lisbon to Livorno and Venice – and Italian silks, Venetian glass and rice, and Mediterranean red coral back to Lisbon – using Genoese and other vessels signed on in Italy or Lisbon and which consequently do not figure in the Amsterdam freight-contracts.<sup>25</sup> To cite a key example, Lopo Ramires (David Curiel), a leading Dutch Sephardi merchant of the first half of the century, regularly remitted sugar, diamonds, dye-woods and spices from Portugal to his brother who lived during the Truce years at Florence and who shipped Italian silks and red coral to Lisbon.<sup>26</sup> The red coral was for re-export on the Portuguese East India galleons to Goa where it was exchanged for diamonds, both Lopo and his brother being major diamond dealers as well as general merchants. At least eight or ten Dutch Sephardi merchants were active during the Truce in dispatching merchandise, often of Italian origin, via Lisbon, to Goa, Cochin and Ceylon, that is to areas of the East Indies where the Dutch as yet had no sway, importing a wide variety of Indian products both on their own account and that of their Lisbon correspondents. Besides spices and diamonds, Lopo Ramires also imported Indian musk and other essences for perfumes.

Structurally, Dutch Sephardi trade with Portugal during this second phase differed from that of the pre-1608 period in that there was now no obstacle to using the direct sea-lane to Lisbon, or exploiting the abundance and cheapness of Dutch shipping. This encouraged a measure of encroachment into the traditional Dutch bulk trades with Portugal, dispatching grain and timber and importing salt, fruit and olive oil as well as colonial wares. Even so, Dutch Jews never attained the preponderance in this sector that they did in the field of sugar, cinnamon (before the 1630s) and diamonds. The outstanding Dutch Jew in the salt trade at this time was Bento Osorio, a man very active in synagogue affairs who, on the evidence of his tax assessments, was in fact the richest Hebrew in Holland before 1640. In the three years 1615–18, Osorio chartered over 200 vessels on behalf of his Lisbon correspondent, Andrea Lopes Pinto, to ship Setúbal salt not just to Holland and Zeeland but also Flanders, Norway and the Baltic.<sup>27</sup> A dozen or so other Sephardi merchants imported Portuguese salt into Holland on a lesser scale.

Before 1621, Dutch Jewish trade with Spain was altogether less important than the trade with Portugal and was of relatively slight significance in relation to Dutch commerce with Spain overall.<sup>28</sup> Nevertheless, there was a noticeable upsurge in transactions with Spain at the end of the Truce period, in the years 1616–21, which laid something of a basis for later Dutch Jewish penetration of Spanish trade. The chief components of this early Spanish activity were grain shipments to Galicia<sup>29</sup> the importing of wine, syrup and raisins from Málaga with which port four or five Amsterdam Sephardi merchants had a regular trade by 1620<sup>30</sup> and the shipments of Castilian wool eastwards from San Lúcar de Barrameda, Alicante and Cartagena to

<sup>25</sup> In 1614, for instance, Gabriel Lopes of Amsterdam authorised a correspondent in Florence to collect payment for several sugar consignments which he had shipped to Livorno on vessels chartered in Lisbon. Koen, 'Notarial Records', *SR* 7 (1973) 122.

<sup>26</sup> See above, 333–53.

<sup>27</sup> Koen, 'Notarial Records', *SR* 5 (1971) 219n.

<sup>28</sup> See above, 359–60.

<sup>29</sup> Koen, 'Notarial Records', *SR* 16 (1982) 72, 202, 205, 206, 208, 209, 210 and *SR* 17 (1983) 76.

<sup>30</sup> Koen, 'Notarial Records' *SR* 16 (1982) 62, 69, 70, 74, 78, 209, 213, 215 and *SR* 17 (1983) 68, 72, 78, 79; Israël, 'Spain and the Dutch Sephardim', 10, 19; see above, 364, 373.

Livorno (for Florence) and Venice.<sup>31</sup> The thriving Portuguese Jewish communities of Livorno and Venice were already collaborating with Amsterdam Jewry in importing Portuguese colonial merchandise from Lisbon, whether in Portuguese, Genoese, or Dutch ships, and it was a natural extension of the same system to enter into the transportation of Spanish wools eastwards to supply the fine quality woollen cloth industries of Florence and Venice. On the outward voyages to Spain, besides grain to Galicia, cargoes consisted mainly of timber, textiles and spices. Several of the ships owned at this time by Dutch Jews were employed in the carrying of Castilian wool to Italy, one such, the *St Jan* belonging to Luis Dias Silva of Amsterdam, being lost in 1619, running aground off Cartagena. As yet, Dutch Jews had no very significant role in the official Spanish Indies trade via Seville, San Lúcar, and Cadiz, though they arranged a few voyages to those ports towards the end of the Truce period, bringing back olive oil, wine and silver.

Likewise rather tentative and sporadic during the Truce period were Dutch Sephardi dealings with Morocco. It is true that as early as 1609, one Christian merchant who exported textiles to Barbary complained to the States General over the impact of recent new Dutch Jewish competition on his business.<sup>32</sup> But we may take it that it was of the newly arrived Moroccan Jewish merchant, Samuel Pallache, sent by Sultan Moulay Sidan to act as his envoy at The Hague, that he complained. Bento Osorio and one or two other Portuguese Jews did remit cargoes, mostly of wheat and timber, to Tangiers, Tetuan and Mazagan before 1621, but Dutch Sephardi involvement in the Morocco trade then had nothing like the significance which it acquired as from 1621.

Much more considerable during the Truce period, as the notarial evidence makes clear, was the Dutch Sephardi role in the burgeoning Dutch traffic to Guinea. It is estimated that the total volume of Dutch trade with equatorial West Africa grew from about twenty to forty ships annually during the Truce.<sup>33</sup> Of these, the freight-contracts show that at least two or three sailed each year on account of Sephardi merchants who, evidently, also sent goods to Guinea via Lisbon, on Portuguese vessels.<sup>34</sup> The Guinea trade involved gold, ivory, São Thomé sugar, civet-cats, and slaves. Several vessels chartered by Amsterdam Jews to fetch slaves from West Africa are known to have sailed directly on to deliver their cargoes in Brazil and the Spanish Caribbean. In 1611, one of these Dutch Sephardi Jews, Diogo Dias Querido, or David Querido as he was known in the synagogue, a native of Oporto who had lived for some years in Brazil, was named in the *Council of State*, in Madrid, as one of the chief Dutch interlopers in the Guinea trade.<sup>35</sup> He was said to keep black servants in his Amsterdam house to whom he taught Dutch and Portuguese so that they could

<sup>31</sup> Koen 'Notarial Records', SR 16 (1982) 68, 84, 207 and SR 17 (1983) 66, 67.

<sup>32</sup> ARA, Archive of the States General (SG) inv. nr. 4918 i, petition of B. Jacapse, The Hague, 23 Apr. 1609.

<sup>33</sup> J. K. de Jonge, *Oorsprong van Nederlands bezittingen op de kust van Guinea* (The Hague 1871) 10-17; F. Binder, 'Die Goldeinfuhr von der Goldküste in die Vereinigten Provinzen, 1655-1675', *Precious Metals in the Age of Expansion. Papers of the XIVth International Congress of the Historical Sciences*. H. Kellenbenz ed. (Stuttgart 1981) 131-132.

<sup>34</sup> Koen, 'Notarial Records', SR 5 (1971) 110-111, SR 6 (1972) 107, 109, SR 7 (1973) 119, 266, SR 8 (1974) 140, 143.

<sup>35</sup> A. Wiznitzer, *Jews in Colonial Brazil* (New York 1960) 46-7; in 1604, Querido had fl 1,900 invested in the Dutch East India Company.

serve as interpreters on his African ventures. From notarial evidence it is known that this same Querido imported São Thomé as well as Brazil sugar and that he shipped sugar from both Guinea and Lisbon to Livorno and Venice, as well as to Amsterdam.<sup>36</sup>

By 1620, Dutch Sephardi Jewry numbered approximately 1,200 souls, at least 1,000 of whom dwelt in Amsterdam.<sup>37</sup> But, as we have seen, this sizeable community as yet dominated only the trade in sugar, Brazil-wood, cinnamon and diamonds and had a large share only in trade with Portugal and perhaps Guinea. In the traditional Dutch traffic to the Baltic, Scandinavia, Britain and France, there was no room for newcomers and Dutch Jewry played little or no part. Their role in Spanish and Italian trade was still marginal. But the principal obstacle to the growth of a large Jewish population in Holland, as in all western and central Europe, was exclusion from the retail trades and crafts. Where Jews were tolerated, in northern Italy, Bohemia and the German lands, they were permitted to reside only in small groups and to enter a very limited number of occupations. Virtually nowhere, and certainly not in Holland, did the right to settle include permission either to become shopkeepers or practice most traditional crafts. The Amsterdam grocers shut the Jews right out of the retailing of spices and sugar. On various occasions exclusion from individual guilds was upheld by the burgomasters and, in March 1632, the city council confirmed the general debarment of Jews from the Amsterdam guilds.<sup>38</sup> Of many dozens of guilds only two or three did admit Jews notably the physicians, apothecaries and book-sellers.

The evolution of Amsterdam Jewry, Sephardi and Ashkenazi,<sup>39</sup> into what, by the later seventeenth century, was certainly the largest Jewish community in Christendom, possibly exceeding the 10,000 mark, representing six or seven per cent of the city's population, was possible only because entirely new industries arose during the seventeenth century which were based on the recently arisen colonial trades and for which there existed no previously established guild structure. Thus precisely the same connections with the Portuguese overseas empire which enabled Dutch Sephardi Jewry to become a force in Holland's commerce also gave rise to a phenomenon otherwise unknown in western Europe since the expulsion of the Jews from Spain, in 1492, namely a relatively numerous Jewish artisanate. In this respect, the large numbers of generally impoverished Ashkenazi Jews who migrated to Holland, from Germany and Poland, from around 1620 onwards, gained from Sephardi Jewish overseas enterprise as much as did poor Sephardi Jews. For this new Jewish artisanate which was now evolving in Amsterdam was essentially a mixture of Sephardi and Ashkenazi workmen often working side by side in the same workshops. Indeed, probably, before the middle of the century, the Yiddish-speaking element

<sup>36</sup> Koen, 'Notarial Records', *SR* 5 (1971) 236.

<sup>37</sup> Van Dillen seriously underestimated the size of Amsterdam Sephardi Jewry in 1620, following Cecil Roth in supposing a total of only 500; in fact, there were at least 300 grown men alone in the Amsterdam community by that date, see Koen, 'Earliest Sources', 39-41.

<sup>38</sup> Van Dillen, 'Vreemdelingen', 13-14; Van Dillen, 'Economische positie', 571-572; Koen, 'Earliest Sources', 28-9.

<sup>39</sup> Dutch Ashkenazi Jewry consisted of Yiddish-speaking Jews from Germany, Bohemia and Poland of which there were some 5,000 in Amsterdam, by 1674, and an equal number, possibly more, in the rest of the country, Bloom, *Economic Activities*, 31.

became predominant. This undoubtedly was a major facet of the Sephardi contribution to the evolution of Amsterdam.

With the exception of sugar-refining, the Jews brought few craft skills with them to Holland. Most of the manual skills which later became typical of Dutch Jewish life were acquired on the spot, from Christians, once the opportunity to enter these new crafts arose. This process is first discernible during the expansion of the Truce years. There exists, for example, a series of notarial deeds of that period which record the apprenticing of Sephardi Jewish youths to Christian master diamond cutters and polishers most of whom were themselves immigrants from the South Netherlands.<sup>40</sup> Thus, processing of diamonds and pearls was something new not only to Amsterdam but also to the Jewish community. In Antwerp, the Portuguese New Christians of the sixteenth century do not appear to have been much involved in the jewellery crafts as such.<sup>41</sup> But the fact that virtually all rough diamonds entering Europe in the first half of the seventeenth century came from India, via Goa and Lisbon, not only assured Dutch Jewry control over Amsterdam's diamond trade but an early predominance in the diamond crafts.

Tobacco-spinning was the other major Dutch Jewish craft though it would seem to have attained real importance only in the 1630s and 1640s. Yet though, from the first, Sephardi and later also Ashkenazi Jews controlled much of the wholesale trade and the manufacture of tobacco, under the ruling of 1632, they were debarred from retailing the product, a restriction which proved impossible to enforce in the long run and which was removed in 1668.<sup>42</sup> Silk-weaving was apparently introduced to Amsterdam in the first decade of the seventeenth century by Sephardi immigrants from northern Portugal where the old medieval Castilian Jewish tradition of silk manufacture survived among the refugees who moved from Spain, in 1492, and were subsequently forcibly baptised. The Amsterdam city fathers were keen enough to encourage Sephardi enterprise in this field initially, but in the 1650s a silk-producers guild was formed, largely in order to exclude Jews from the business, and Sephardi silk-weaving in Amsterdam ceased.<sup>43</sup> For a few years, however, some Jews did continue to practice the industry at Maarssen, a village near Utrecht where several rich Amsterdam Sephardi merchants had summer houses and where a small organised Jewish community was formed at that time. This Maarssen Jewish silk-mill apparently employed twenty-five workmen, at least some of whom were Jews.

Sugar-refining, one of Amsterdam's most important industries during the golden age, was originally listed among the *poortersneringen* or 'citizen's trades' from which Jews were debarred despite the fact that this was a new industry recently transferred from Antwerp.<sup>44</sup> Only in 1655 did one of the then wealthiest Jews in Holland,

<sup>40</sup> Koen, 'Notarial Records', *SR* 5 (1971) 228, *SR* 6 (1972) 108, *SR* 7 (1973) 269; L. C. Fabião, 'Subsídios para a história dos chamados 'judeus portugueses' na indústria dos diamantes em Amsterdão nos séculos XVII e XVIII', *Revista da Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisboa* ser. III no. 15 (1975) 475-480.

<sup>41</sup> Pohl, *Portugiesen in Antwerpen*, 122-126.

<sup>42</sup> Bloom, *Economic Activities*, 31; *Bronnen tot de geschiedenis van het bedrijfsleven en het gildewezen van Amsterdam* (3 vols.; The Hague, 1929-74) J. G. van Dillen ed. II, 690-691.

<sup>43</sup> J. Zwarts, 'Portugeesche Joden te Maarssen en Maarsseveen in de 17de eeuw' *Jaarboekje van het Oudheidkundig Genootschap 'Niftarlake'*, (1922) 61-62.

<sup>44</sup> J. J. Reesse, *De suikerhandel van Amsterdam van het begin der 17de eeuw tot 1813* (Haarlem 1908) 127.

Abraham Pereira, secure permission, on his own and the community's behalf, to own and operate sugar-refineries. But while very little is known about the score or so early refineries that mushroomed during the Twelve Years Truce, it is clear that quite a number of Dutch Sephardi Jews of that period, including several immigrants from Brazil, were expert in sugar-refining and it seems more than probable that they played some substantial part in the industry. In 1611, three Amsterdam Portuguese Jews were invited by the magistracy of Stade, in the Bishopric of Bremen, to set up a sugar-refinery in the town, the Jews being entrusted with supplying the supervisors and trained workmen.<sup>45</sup> Similarly, in the years around 1620, several Amsterdam and Hamburg Sephardi Jews established sugar-refineries at Glückstadt on the Elbe, the new-town founded in Holstein, in 1616, by Christian IV of Denmark as an intended rival to Hamburg.<sup>46</sup>

Another industrial novelty based on Dutch colonial trade was the extraction of civet from the anal glands of civet-cats, a precious substance much esteemed as a base by the *parfumeurs* of Paris, Venice and Spain. The essence sold at Amsterdam at eighteen or twenty guilders per ounce and sometimes, for the best quality, much more. The cats were imported in large numbers from India, Java and especially from Guinea. By the 1620s, several Sephardi firms such as Michael and Lopo da Luna Montalto, in Amsterdam, and Francisco Fernandes de Pas, at Alkmaar, were importing and keeping these cats by the thousand.<sup>47</sup> A number of poor Jews were employed scouring the environs of Amsterdam for cheap meat with which to feed them and in extracting and processing the civet. Evidently, there was a certain amount of friction between Christian and Jewish civet dealers at least in the 1650s and 1660s, particularly over exports of civet to Spain which, apparently, was the most valuable market. Chocolate-making, which was to become another typical Amsterdam Jewish industry, began on a significant scale, as we shall see, only after the rise of the Curaçao trade in the 1650s'. Printing shops owned and operated by Jews, as distinct from production of Jewish books by Christians, began at Amsterdam in 1627 when Menasseh ben Israel set up his press but acquired real significance only towards the middle of the century. From the 1640s, Hebrew texts and other Jewish books, in Spanish, Portuguese, and Yiddish were produced in large quantities and sold all over Europe and the Near East.<sup>48</sup> Amsterdam indeed soon usurped Venice's former role as the chief centre of Jewish book production. Once again, Sephardi and Ashkenazi workmen worked side by side, together with Christian employees, and in this case some of the presses were in fact owned by Ashkenazi businessmen, though before 1700 the leading firms were Sephardi. The most eminent Dutch Jewish publisher, Joseph Athias (d. 1700), produced, in addition to his famous Hebrew Bible, rabbinic and Talmudic works, very appreciable quantities of English Bibles. Indeed, he surpassed any other Dutch publisher in this field and once boasted that he had sold over one million bibles in England and Scotland. For some

<sup>45</sup> Koen, 'Notarial Records', *SR* 6 (1972) 116-117.

<sup>46</sup> Kellenbenz, *Sephardim*, 62; Kellenbenz, *Relações econômicas*, 22.

<sup>47</sup> I. Prins, 'Gegevens betreffende de 'oprechte Hollandsche civet', *Economisch-Historisch Jaarboek* 20 (1936) 1-329; Koen, 'Notarial Records', *SR* 15 (1981) 16, 210, 248, 252; in October 1619, Elias Pereira bought three civet-cats from a cobbler called Gerrit Henricks for the sum of 307 guilders.

<sup>48</sup> Bloom, *Economic Activities*, 46-53.

years, in the 1670s, he held an official monopoly, conferred by the States General, of the production of English Bibles in the United Provinces.<sup>49</sup>

The third phase in the evolution of Dutch Sephardi commerce began in April 1621, with the expiry of the Twelve Years Truce, and ended in December 1640 with the secession of Portugal from Spain. For two decades Dutch shipping and cargoes were again officially excluded from Spain, Portugal, the Flemish ports and southern Italy by decree of the Spanish monarch. Philip IV's embargoes certainly caused a general recession in Holland, for the severing of Dutch Iberian trade also had adverse effects on Holland's commerce with the Baltic.<sup>50</sup> But while much of the economy suffered, the Sephardi Jews of Amsterdam and Rotterdam were undoubtedly the hardest hit, for they specialized above all in trade with Portugal. As is shown in Table 14 the number of Jewish depositors with the Amsterdam Exchange Bank fell back sharply, from 114, in 1620, to only 76, or 5.9% of the total by 1625. A sizeable part of the Dutch Sephardi community now migrated, mostly to Hamburg and Glückstadt.<sup>51</sup> Some three to five hundred people, or over a quarter of the total, emigrated.

The severity of the slump generated heavy pressure on the remaining community to diversify its activities. But Dutch Sephardi Jewry's economic base was still so narrow that this proved extremely difficult. In most of the European carrying trade there were simply no openings. Despite the existence of Portuguese crypto-Jewish communities at Rouen, Nantes, Bordeaux and Bayonne, Dutch Jewish trade with France, for example, remained negligible except for the contraband transit trade, via Bayonne, with northern Spain. Dutch Sephardi trade with Italy at least partly collapsed because Amsterdam Sephardi merchants could no longer participate effectively in the route between Lisbon and Livorno. Only the Dutch Jewish Morocco trade expanded in the 1620s and this in itself could not reverse the process of contraction. Unemployment and distress within the Dutch Sephardi community mounted. In 1622, the governing boards of the then three Sephardi synagogues in Amsterdam jointly erected a co-ordinating council to find ways of coping with the sudden massive expenditure on community poor relief and, despite the heavy emigration that had already taken place, to encourage further emigration of poor Jews abroad.<sup>52</sup>

Lack of alternatives ensured that the Portugal trade remained the hub of Dutch Sephardi activity despite the formidable obstacles involved in continuing business with Portugal. To an even greater extent than in the years 1599-1607 the community's merchants now switched to using Hanseatic, French and English, instead of Dutch ships, to sail to Portugal, via Hamburg, or some other neutral port where the skippers collected certificates purporting to show that their cargoes contained nothing of Dutch origin and had not been loaded on Dutch soil. However, this time

<sup>49</sup> Ibidem, 48-50.

<sup>50</sup> A. T. van Deursen, *Het kopergeld van de Gouden Eeuw* (3 vols.; Assen 1979) III, 84-6; Israel, *Dutch Republic*, 134-154.

<sup>51</sup> Israel, 'Spain and the Dutch Sephardim', 370-3; Sephardi depositors with the Hamburg Bank increased from 28 tot 43 in the years 1619-23, see Kellenbenz, *Sephardim*, 254-258.

<sup>52</sup> GA Amsterdam, APIG inv.nr. 13 'Libro dos termos da ymposta da nacao'; D. M. Swetschinski, 'The Portuguese Jewish Merchants of seventeenth-century Amsterdam: a Social Profile' (unpublished Brandeis University Ph. D. thesis; 2 vols. 1979) I, 357-367.

Emden was discarded as its ships were now included in the Spanish embargo.<sup>53</sup> The Hamburg Senate and other local authorities co-operated in supplying false papers, but the notarial evidence shows that the whole process was time-consuming and expensive as well as risky. Lopo Ramires, for instance, chartered several Hanseatic vessels to fetch Setúbal salt for the Dutch market in 1622-3, paying freight charges more than twice as high as those that had prevailed until 1621.<sup>54</sup> Inevitably, the community's leading merchants suffered some spectacular losses. In 1626, for instance, three Hamburg ships loaded with Dutch and English textiles by Francisco Lopes d'Azevedo and other Amsterdam Sephardi Jews were seized in Lisbon and confiscated by the *Almirantazgo* high-court in Madrid.<sup>55</sup> Throughout this turbulent period, Indian rough diamonds were shipped to Amsterdam from Lisbon via Hamburg and in Hanseatic ships.<sup>56</sup>

Yet, paradoxically, the harsh pressures of the 1621-40 period tended to reinforce Jewish predominance in the Dutch Portugal trade and evidently enhanced their role in Spanish trade. Relying on local Portuguese New Christian factors who, indeed, were often relatives, rather than on expatriate Netherlanders, their traffic was less exposed than other Dutch trade to Spanish scrutiny, harder for the *Almirantazgo*, Spain's newly introduced 'inquisition of commerce' to eradicate. Indeed, in view of the modest role played by Dutch Sephardim in Castilian commerce before 1621, it is arguable that it was precisely Philip IV's embargoes which rendered the Spanish trade one of the mother-trades of Dutch Sephardi Jewry much as it was the 1599-1608 Spanish embargoes which occasioned Jewish penetration of Dutch-Portuguese trade. Since Dutch ships could no longer enter the Spanish north coast ports, exports of Castilian wool from Bilbao, San Sebastian and Santander were now carried exclusively in neutral ships and (except in the years 1625-30) handled chiefly by English merchants.<sup>57</sup> But, from 1621, there also arose a thriving contraband trade between Amsterdam and Madrid, chiefly textiles in exchange for silver and wool, via Bayonne, the Pyrenean passes and Navarre. There are various extant Spanish reports about this overland transit business in the 1620s and 1630s and they invariably stress that the traffic was essentially the work of Amsterdam Jews collaborating with Portuguese New Christians in Bayonne, the French inland towns close to the Pyrenean frontier (particularly Peyrehorade and Labastide-Clairance) and Madrid.<sup>58</sup>

Amsterdam Sephardi merchants also chartered some neutral vessels furnished with false papers to sail to Andalusian ports, particularly Málaga.<sup>59</sup> But this was very risky and there was relatively little contact with Seville or its outports, Cadiz and San Lúcar. The chief means by which Dutch Jewry won its place at this time in the highly

<sup>53</sup> AGS Estado inv.nr. 2645, Consulta, Madrid, 27 Nov. 1621.

<sup>54</sup> GA Amsterdam, box-index 'Portugees-Israëlitische gemeente', 'Soutvaart'.

<sup>55</sup> Van Dillen, 'Vreemdelingen', 32.

<sup>56</sup> GA Amsterdam NA inv.nr. 257, f. 703v-704v.

<sup>57</sup> A point much emphasised in *A Brief Narration of the Present Estate of the Bilbao Trade* (np and nd) (London? 1650?).

<sup>58</sup> AGS Estado inv.nr. 2139, Consulta 23 July 1621; AGS Hacienda inv. nr. 592, Consulta, 31 Oct. 1622; AGS Hacienda inv.nr. 664, Consulta, 15 Sept. 1630; on the sizeable Portuguese New Christian colonies then existing at Bayonne, Peyrehorade and Labastide, see British Library, London, Egerton MSS inv. nr. 343, f. 259.

<sup>59</sup> Various Scots and German ships were employed by Amsterdam Sephardim in the Málaga contraband trade during the 1620s, especially by the firm of Duarte and Jeronimo Rodrigues Mendes, see GA



competitive trade in Spanish American products, including silver, was through Morocco. In the 1620s, though Morocco was by no means the only Islamic country with which Dutch Jewry traded, their business with Morocco so far overshadowed the rest as to be in a class of its own. Of course, Morocco was the one part of the Islamic world with which European Sephardi Jews could not more conveniently deal from Livorno or Venice. But it seems fairly clear from the Amsterdam notarial evidence that Dutch Jewish trade with Morocco came to eclipse the rest of Dutch trade with that country specifically in the 1620s. It is also noticeable that Dutch Sephardi merchants conducting business in Morocco mostly dealt through European Sephardi agents, usually Dutch relatives sent out to Saleh, rather than local Jews.<sup>60</sup> It is well-known that Dutch Jews became the chief arms suppliers to the corsair base at Saleh and generally provided a large part of the munitions and naval stores consumed in Morocco.<sup>61</sup> What has not been noted is that during the Thirty Years War, whilst Dutch shipping was excluded from Spain, Dutch Jews regularly used Saleh and Tetuan as depots for Spanish American products and particularly silver.<sup>62</sup>

This merchandise would seem to have percolated from the Andalusian ports on local vessels to the Iberian enclaves in North Africa – Ceuta, Tangiers, Melilla, Oran and Larache – and from there to neighbouring Moroccan ports.<sup>63</sup> Most of the Dutch ships chartered by Amsterdam Jews to collect silver at Saleh and Tetuan during the 1630s and 1640s then sailed on to Livorno and Venice where, presumably, the price of silver was higher than in Holland.

The old clash of interests as between the Dutch colonial companies and Dutch Sephardi Jewry continued down to the 1630s. The East India Company's intermittent blockades of Goa and Malacca severely squeezed the traffic between Portugal and the Far East.<sup>64</sup> In the late 1630s, the East India Company conquered parts of Ceylon and took control of the cinnamon trade which was hitherto routed via Lisbon and in which Dutch Jewry had earlier been active.<sup>65</sup> Meanwhile leaders of the Amsterdam Sephardi community failed in their bid to secure official immunity from confiscation by the West India Company of sugar transported from Brazil to Portugal in Portuguese vessels on behalf of Dutch Jews.<sup>66</sup> But the picture was

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Amsterdam NA 628, fos. 497-498, 503-505, 510-512, 513-517, NA 632, pp. 184-186; NA 1526, p. 142, NA 1527, p. 288; AGS, Archive of the Consejo de Guerra, inv. nr. 894, Pedro de Arze to Conde-Duque de Olivares, Málaga, 2 Nov. 1623.

<sup>60</sup> Bloom, *Economic Activities*, 76-78.

<sup>61</sup> Ibidem; *Bronnen tot de geschiedenis van den Levantschen Handel, 1590-1660 II* K. Heeringa ed. (The Hague 1910) 1109.

<sup>62</sup> For examples from the years 1638-42, see GA Amsterdam NA 1525, 31, 99, 104, 108, 149, 184, NA 1526, 35, 223, 227, NA 1527, 39, 125, 128, 229, 237.

<sup>63</sup> It is significant perhaps that the former Spanish Jews permitted by the Spanish crown to reside at Tangiers, Ceuta and Oran possessed licenses to trade (without personally setting foot on Spanish soil) with Cadiz, San Lúcar, Málaga, Cartagena and Alicante, see J. I. Israel, 'The Jews of Spanish North Africa, 1600-1669', *TJHSE* 26 (1979) 77.

<sup>64</sup> A. R. Disney, *Twilight of the Pepper Empire. Portuguese Trade in southwest India in the early seventeenth century* (Harvard 1978) 51, 162.

<sup>65</sup> K. W. Goonewardena, *The Foundation of Dutch Power in Ceylon (1638-1658)* (Djambatan and Amsterdam 1958) 9, 11-20, 28, 37.

<sup>66</sup> ARA Verzameling Bisdóm inv. nr. 49 i, fos. 8-9, 113v-114; *Resolutiën van de Staten van Holland en West Vriesland* (277 vols. np.nd.) 1621, p. 106, 1622, pp. 6, 12, 16, 56, 90.

transformed in the 1630s by the West India Company's subjugation of north-east Brazil. The sugar plantations of the Pernambuco region were devastated in the fighting, but production began to recover in the late 1630s and, with this, arose a thriving, if temporary, direct traffic between Brazil and Holland, handled by private merchants paying fees and tolls to the Company.

From the outset, Dutch Sephardi Jewry was pre-eminent in the carrying trade between Holland and the Dutch zone of Brazil.<sup>67</sup> Thus they continued to distribute sugar, tobacco and Brazil-wood from Amsterdam just as they had formerly done except now under the aegis of the Company. Their ascendancy in this business was natural given their long experience of the Brazil trade, their fluency in both Dutch and Portuguese, and the fact that they evinced greater capacity to colonize in Brazil than did the rest of the Dutch population. Indeed, the Company's conquests in Brazil reversed the trend of Sephardi emigration from Holland to Germany. Like the later Sephardi colonies in Curaçao and Surinam, the Jews of Pernambuco, while the region was under Dutch rule, in the years 1630-54, were always closely tied to the mother community in Amsterdam, acknowledging the latter's pre-eminence in religion, politics and trade. The rise of Netherlands Brazil thus ended the contraction of Dutch Sephardi Jewry, facilitating the absorption of hundreds of poor immigrants from the Sephardi diaspora in Europe. By 1644, the professed Jews of Dutch Brazil, most of whom were emigrants from Holland, though some were former local New Christians, totalled 1,450 or roughly one third of all the white civilians in the territory including the Portuguese Catholic planters.<sup>68</sup>

But while the Company's gains in Brazil undoubtedly strengthened Dutch Sephardi Jewry and, for the first time, made it into a truly trans-Atlantic network of a kind which it was to remain for the rest of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the change did not significantly alter or enlarge the community's traditional commercial base. Nor, as the figures in Table 14 indicate, was there any significant improvement in the number of Sephardi deposits with the Exchange Bank. On the contrary, by 1641 when Dutch Brazil was thriving, the proportion of deposits belonging to Dutch Sephardi merchants had fallen to a low-point of 5.9%, reflecting the decline in their importance since 1621. But there was a rapid increase in the consumption of tobacco in the Netherlands during the Thirty Years War period, not least because Amsterdam was supplying the armies marauding in Germany with this product, as well as the troops entrenched in the Low Countries. Whether or not the new Brazil trade was a factor encouraging increased use of the plant, there was undeniably a massive growth in domestic tobacco production, the home-grown leaf usually being processed in Amsterdam and frequently mixed, with the better quality tobaccos imported from Brazil and Virginia.<sup>69</sup> This large-scale domestic tobacco production, and expanding tobacco industry centred in Amsterdam, perceptibly

<sup>67</sup> Wiznitzer, *Jews in Colonial Brazil*, 120-138; I. S. Emmanuel, 'Seventeenth-Century Brazilian Jewry: A Critical Review', *American Jewish Archives* 14 (1962) 32-68; see also C. R. Boxer, *The Dutch in Brazil, 1624-54* (2nd edn.; Hamden, Conn. 1973) (1st edn. 1957) 133-134.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>69</sup> H. K. Roessingh, 'Tobacco Growing in Holland in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries: A Case Study in the Innovative Spirit of Dutch Peasants', *The Low Countries History Yearbook* (1979) 25-27, 43.

stimulated the growth of the Jewish artisan class. It also gave Dutch Sephardi Jewry for the first time something of a role in the inland provinces of the country. Jewish tobacco buyers became a regular feature of life in and around Amersfoort and Nijkerk, two of the main centres of domestic tobacco culture, and in some cases, they invested heavily in the conversion of suitable land from other uses to tobacco culture.<sup>70</sup>

During the brief fourth phase in the evolution of Dutch Sephardi Jewry's economic activity, that of 1641-8, the direct trade with Pernambuco continued, though it dwindled rapidly following the revolt of the Portuguese planters in Netherlands Brazil, in 1645.<sup>71</sup> At the same time, unhindered contact with Portugal itself was resumed, more or less on the pre-1621 basis, during 1641. The re-opening of Portuguese ports to Dutch ships meant that Dutch Sephardi Jewry could revert to the bulk trades with Portugal and once again began exporting grain and timber in quantity and importing salt and fruit. As before, the salt was procured mainly from Setúbal and the figs, olive oil and almonds from the Algarve, usually Vila Nova or Faro. There was some change though in the pattern of the indirect traffic in Brazil products via Portugal to Holland as compared with that of the pre-1621 period. It is striking that from 1641 few of the vessels chartered by Dutch Sephardi merchants sailed to the ports of northern Portugal – Oporto, Viana and Aveiro – which in the earlier period had been the pivot of this trade. Now Lisbon was the main depot, the principal alternatives being Madeira and especially the Azores which had developed into a flourishing contraband centre during the 1620 and 1630s as a result of the imposition of the Spanish embargoes on Portugal.<sup>72</sup> As from 1645, this indirect commerce via Lisbon and the Azores largely replaced the direct traffic between Pernambuco and the Netherlands.

Since the 1620s Sephardi Jews had been active in the arms trade, shipping all manner of munitions and naval stores to Morocco. During the 1641-8 period they broadened the scope of their arms dealings responding to the new Portuguese monarch's urgent need for weapons and supplies with which to fight Spain. Neither England nor France, both of which were buyers rather than sellers of most kinds of munitions at this time, could provide what João IV needed. In effect, Holland and Hamburg were the only available sources of war supplies. Large arms purchases were placed at Amsterdam with both Jewish and non-Jewish dealers and João IV also relied on several Dutch and Hamburg Sephardi Jews to help finance these purchases. In this way certain of the leaders of the Jewish communities derived an enhanced political status and became involved in the workings of international mercantile politics. What was probably the largest of João IV's arms buying contracts, for 100,000 *crúzados* worth of gunpowder, muskets, rigging and siege equipment, was signed in Amsterdam in July 1641 with Lopo Ramires.<sup>73</sup> Ramires also acted in the 1640s as the chief north European correspondent of the Lisbon bankers

<sup>70</sup> J. J. Herks, *De Geschiedenis van de Amersfoortse tabak* (The Hague 1967) 70, 84, 90-93, 96-98; C. Reijnders, *Van 'Joodsche Natiën' tot Joodse Nederlanders* (2nd edn.; Amsterdam 1970) 138-139.

<sup>71</sup> F. Mauro, *Le Portugal et l'Atlantique au XVIIe siècle, 1570-1670* (Paris 1960) 140-141.

<sup>72</sup> GA Amsterdam NA 1527, pp. 85, 118, 153, 234; NA 1528, pp. 27-28, 274; NA 1530, pp. 137, 259; NA 1531, pp. 83, 109.

<sup>73</sup> GA Amsterdam NA 1555B, pp. 1103-1104, 1563; Virginia Rau, 'A embaixada de Tristão de Mendonça Furtado e os arquivos notariais holandeses', *Anais da Academia Portuguesa de História* 2nd ser. VIII (1953) 115-116.

and, among other things, was therefore entrusted with forwarding cash for most of the Portuguese diplomatic service.<sup>74</sup> In 1645, Lopo's nephew, Jeronimo Nunes da Costa (Moses Curiel), who, like his uncle and father, was knighted by the Portuguese king (his father had been condemned to be burned in effigy by the Lisbon Inquisition only a few years before his ennoblement) became official 'Agent of the Portuguese Crown in the United Provinces' and from then until the end of his long life, in 1697, handled the bulk of the purchases made in Holland of gunpowder, arms and naval stores for the Portuguese army and navy and the Brazil fleets sailing from Lisbon.<sup>75</sup> Jeronimo also received commercial privileges which for several decades assured his primacy as the leading Dutch merchant trading with Portugal.

The second main stage in the economic evolution of golden age Dutch Sephardi Jewry, from 1648 to 1713, is characterised above all by the gradual eclipse of the Portugal trade and the emergence of Spain and the Caribbean as the principal zones of activity. The first phase of the new stage, from 1648 to 1657, was one of fundamental shifts and restructuring. On the one hand there was the collapse of Netherlands Brazil in the years 1648-54, a disaster for Dutch Jewry which caused the total dispersal of the Sephardi community which had briefly flourished at Pernambuco. But this setback was more than compensated for by the sudden break-through in Spanish trade which occurred at this time. The transformation of Dutch-Spanish political and economic relations following the treaty of Munster, in 1648, heralded a new era in Dutch history generally and nowhere more so than in Dutch Sephardi history. Several different factors contributed to the sudden massive boost to the community's status, resources and prospects. It was not simply the re-opening of Spanish ports to Dutch shipping and Philip IV's somewhat reluctant but explicit agreement to permit Jewish subjects of the United Provinces to trade with Spain, through either Catholic or Protestant correspondents, which produced this dramatic effect.<sup>76</sup> It is rather the fact that these important changes coincided with certain shifts within Spain itself and the Spanish Netherlands which proved decisive, namely the resurgence of vehement Inquisition pressure on the Portuguese New Christians in Castile, following Olivares' downfall, and the Spanish state bankruptcy of 1647 which was deliberately aimed by Spanish ministers against the Portuguese New Christian financiers of Madrid and Antwerp.<sup>77</sup> The result was an appreciable exodus of leading merchants and bankers, and their relatives and capital, as well as poorer New Christians from both Castile and the Spanish Netherlands. This exodus began in or around 1645, though it took a little longer for its effects to be felt, and continued into the 1660s.

<sup>74</sup> Francisco de Sousa Coutinho, *Correspondência diplomática de Francisco de Sousa Coutinho durante a sua embaixada em Holanda* (3 vols.; Coimbra 1920-55) I, 12, 17, 46, 195.

<sup>75</sup> Public Record Office, London, State Papers 89/6 f. 200; ARA SG inv. nr. 7015, ii, Jeronimo Nunes da Costa to States General, The Hague, 20 Aug. 1689 and 28 Aug. 1691; see also J. I. Israel, 'The Diplomatic career of Jeronimo Nunes da Costa: an Episode in Dutch-Portuguese Relations of the Seventeenth Century', *Bijdragen en Mededelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden* 98 (1983), 167-190.

<sup>76</sup> AGS Libros de La Haya inv. nr. 32, Philip IV of Spain to Antoine Brun, Madrid, 9 July 1650; L. van Aitzema, *Historie of verhael van saken van staet en oorlogh in, ende ontrent de Vereenigde Nederlanden* (14 vols.; The Hague 1667-71) VII, 178; J. S. da Silva Rosa, *Geschiedenis der Portugeesche Joden te Amsterdam, 1593-1925* (Amsterdam 1925) 84-85.

<sup>77</sup> Antonio Domínguez Ortiz, *Política y hacienda de Felipe IV* (Madrid 1960) 66, 69, 108; Julio Caro Baroja, *Los Judíos en la España moderna y contemporánea* (3 vols.; Madrid 1978) (1st. edn. 1962) II, 49-58, 66-68, 81-90; Israel, 'Spain and the Dutch Sephardim', 401-2.

A glance at Table 14 shows that the second major jump in the numbers of Dutch Sephardi depositors with the Amsterdam Exchange Bank in the seventeenth century occurred in the extremely brief span from 1646 to 1651. The numbers soared from 126 to 197. But the figures reveal only part of the picture. The increase in total resources was certainly much more dramatic. Almost all of the very rich families which were to dominate Dutch Sephardi community life and politics for the rest of the seventeenth and much of the eighteenth century arrived at this time bringing prestige, quasi-aristocratic life-style and international connections such as Dutch Jewry had never previously known. Of the leading Dutch Sephardi families of the later seventeenth century – the De Pinto, Pereira, Lopes Suasso, Nunes da Costa (Curiel), Teixeira, Nunes Henriques and Bueno de Mezquita – most of which were ennobled at one time or another by foreign monarchs, the Nunes da Costa were the only one which were present or made any mark on Dutch Jewish life before 1645. The rest arrived from Spain or Antwerp in the 1645-54 period or else, like the Teixeira, in 1646, moved from Antwerp to Hamburg, migrating to Holland later.<sup>78</sup>

In addition there is evidence that several of the principal Portuguese New Christian banking houses that remained in Madrid remitted a portion of their relatives and capital to Holland during the 1640s and 1650s, as a kind of insurance, whilst continuing to participate in the Spanish royal *asientos*. This is evident, for instance, in the case of two of the best-known Portuguese mercantile families in Spain, the Cortizos and Montezinos.<sup>79</sup> It is also known, from a detailed record left by a member of the family, that the De Pintos, the wealthiest of all the Dutch Jewish families of the later seventeenth century, transferred very large sums to Holland at least several years before its dramatic move from Antwerp to Rotterdam, and from feigned Catholicism to open Judaism, in 1646.<sup>80</sup> Thus, it emerges that Menasseh ben Israel's statement in his famous *Address* to Oliver Cromwell that the

'Jewish Nation dwelling in Holland and Italy trafficks with their own stock but also with the riches of many others of their own Nation, friends, kinds-men and acquaintance which notwithstanding live in Spaine, and send unto them their moneys and goods, which they hold in their hands . . .'<sup>81</sup>

was entirely true at least as regards Holland in the 1640s and 1650s. In effect, much of the wealth accumulated in Spain and Spanish America by Portuguese New Christians under Olivares' protection, in the 1620s and 1630s, was subsequently

<sup>78</sup> On Pereira's migration see GA Amsterdam NA 1557A, pp. 221-222; on the De Pinto, Lopes Suasso and Teixeira, see J. Denucé, 'Iets over Spaansch-Portugeesche geslachten in Nederland', *Antwerpsch Archievenblad* (1927) 35-52; H. P. Salomon, 'The De Pinto Manuscript. A 17th Century Marrano Family History', *SR* 9 (1975) 7-10, 30-31.

<sup>79</sup> AGS Estado inv.nr. 2083, Consulta of the Inquisition Suprema, Madrid, 9 May 1654; Caro Baroja, *Judios II*, 123-4; Julio Caro Baroja, *La sociedad cryptojudía en la corte de Felipe IV* (Madrid 1970) *passim*.

<sup>80</sup> Salomon, 'De Pinto Manuscript', 6-18.

<sup>81</sup> Menasseh ben Israel, *To His Highnesse The Lord Protector of the Commonwealth of England, Scotland and Ireland* (Amsterdam 1655) p. A2; contrary to the view expressed by Alvaro Castillo, at no stage did the Portuguese New Christian bankers in Madrid ever draw Dutch Jewish funds into Spain, for this mistaken notion, see Alvaro Castillo, 'Dans la monarchie espagnole du XVIIe siècle: les banquiers portugais et le circuit d'Amsterdam', *Annales E.S.C.* (1964) 311-316.

transferred, after his downfall, to Spain's traditional enemy. None of this was foreshadowed before Olivares' downfall. The flight of capital from Spain to Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Hamburg was due purely and simply to the undermining of the Portuguese New Christians' position in Castile and the fierce upsurge of popular antipathy against them co-inciding with the restoration of trading links between Spain and Holland.

Some of the more opulent newcomers were content to withdraw from trade and live chiefly off accumulated investments, initiating a trend towards a leisured, *rentier* existence which became more pronounced as the century wore on. The De Pintos, previously immensely active businessmen, first in Lisbon and later in Antwerp, took over the leadership of the Rotterdam Sephardi community, established a small Jewish religious college and continued to sustain a luxurious life-style, but made no real contribution to Dutch trade other than investing heavily in state funds and in the East and West India Companies. Antonio Lopes (Isaac Israel) Suasso who arrived from Antwerp in 1652 and who amassed numerous investments including what, in 1674, was the largest single Jewish stake in the West India Company, amounting to 107,000 guilders, did engage in the jewel trade but was otherwise remote from active commerce, particularly after being made a baron by Charles II of Spain for financial services on behalf of the Spanish army in the Low Countries during the war against France in the 1670s. However, the main group of newcomers not only brought capital but active commercial connections with Spain which rapidly transformed the whole character of Dutch Sephardi economic activity.

This new Spanish trade which blossomed in the 1650s consisted essentially of four strands – Santander, Cadiz, Málaga and the Canaries – only two of which, the routes to Santander and Málaga, involved bulky goods. For this reason, the great majority of freight-contracts signed by Dutch Jews for voyages to Spain concern these two particular destinations, except during the 1648-52 period when large quantities of grain were shipped by Amsterdam Jews to Cadiz and neighbouring ports.<sup>82</sup> The total volume of Dutch trade with Spain in the 1650s was extremely large, far larger than that of England or any other European country and the Jews certainly did not dominate it in the way that they did the Morocco or aspects of the Portugal trade. Indeed, some of the most important non-Jewish Amsterdam firms, such as those of Coymans, Dommer and Van Collen, were heavily involved in this traffic. Even so, the Sephardi Jewish share in what was fast becoming one of the most vital sectors of Dutch trade was, as numerous Amsterdam notarial deeds attest, substantial, in the region according to one modern estimate of 20%.<sup>83</sup>

The temporary English dominance over wool exports from northern Spain during the Thirty Years War ended almost as soon as the Dutch re-entered the field, in 1648. From then until 1702, roughly two-thirds of all wool exported from Spain was conveyed to the Low Countries in Dutch shipping.<sup>84</sup> In the 1650s, a dozen or fifteen Amsterdam Sephardi Jews regularly imported wool from northern Spain, usually

<sup>82</sup> GA Amsterdam NA 1531, pp. 222, 230; NA 1532, pp. 35, 98; J. I. Israel, 'Some Further Data on the Amsterdam Sephardim and their trade with Spain during the 1650s', *SR* 14 (1980) 7-19.

<sup>83</sup> D. M. Swetschinski, 'The Spanish Consul and the Jews of Amsterdam', *Texts and Responses. Studies presented to Nahum N. Glatzer* (Leiden 1975) 165-166.

<sup>84</sup> H. C. Difere, *De geschiedenis van den Nederlandschen handel tot den val der Republiek* (Amsterdam 1908) 206-207; H. Kamen, *Spain in the later Seventeenth Century, 1665-1700* (London 1980) 71.

Santander, and then sold their supplies in Leiden or on the Amsterdam exchange to dealers from Flanders, Liège, Jülich and neighbouring parts of Westphalia. At that time, the leading Dutch Jewish importers of Spanish wool were Abraham Pereira who had arrived in Holland with a large fortune from Madrid, in 1645, and who maintained a Jewish religious college at Hebron, in the The Holy Land, Jacob del Monte, Baltasar da Cunha, Isaac de Prado, Fernando Alvares, Fernando de Baeza and Andrea Cristobal Nunes.<sup>85</sup> What is especially significant is that virtually all of these were 'Spaniards' who had only recently migrated to the Jewish quarter of Amsterdam but who were nevertheless all of them among the dozen or so richest Jews in Holland.<sup>86</sup>

While the Spanish trade thrived, the older links of Dutch Sephardi Jewry with Portugal and Brazil began to weaken. On the one hand, the collapse of Netherlands Brazil liquidated the former direct trade between Brazil and Holland while, on the other, the gradual deterioration in Dutch-Portuguese relations which characterises the 1650s began to have an adverse effect on trade.<sup>87</sup> But most significant of all in reducing the importance of Dutch Jewish dealings with Portugal was the sudden vigorous upsurge of sugar imports into Europe from various parts of the Caribbean, notably Cuba, Martinique and especially Barbados, a process which began in the late 1640s, was the direct outcome of the devastation of the plantations of Netherlands Brazil by the Portuguese insurgents in that territory, and which, from the first, was intimately linked with the activities of the Sephardi Jews of Amsterdam and Hamburg.<sup>88</sup> The flow of new Caribbean sugar combined with the recovery in shipments from Brazil in the 1650s soon led, however, to a flooding of the European market. The inevitable result was a collapse in sugar prices on the Amsterdam Exchange.<sup>89</sup> This drastic fall in sugar prices took place in the years 1655-7 and proved a decisive turning-point in the history of Europe's commerce with the New World: prices never again approached their former levels; the sugars of Brazil and São Thomé never recovered their former ascendancy on the Dutch market. Nevertheless, Dutch Sephardi Jewry continued to play a prominent part in Holland's somewhat dwindling trade with Portugal. For most of the 1650s, following the withdrawal of the Portuguese embassy from the United Provinces, Jeronimo Nunes da Costa was simultaneously Portuguese *chargé d'affaires* in The Hague, Agent of the Portuguese Crown in Amsterdam and the Amsterdam representative of the newly founded Portuguese Brazil Company.<sup>90</sup> He handled the bulk of the Brazil-

<sup>85</sup> GA Amsterdam 1532, pp. 13, 15-16, 89, 92, 114; Israel, 'Some Further Data', 16-18.

<sup>86</sup> Bloom, *Economic Activities*, 175-176; it is also noteworthy that almost all came from Madrid, see Swetschinski, 'Portuguese Jewish Merchants', II, 101.

<sup>87</sup> Thus, many of the ships and supplies for the Portuguese Brazil Company set up in 1648, were purchased through Jeronimo Nunes da Costa's father, Duarte, Portuguese, 'Agent' in Hamburg, rather than in Holland, see J. Lúcio d'Azevedo *Cartas do Padre Antonio Vieira* (3 vols.; Coimbra 1925-28) I, 161-2, 168, 183; Kellenbenz, *Sephardim*, 151.

<sup>88</sup> Ibidem, 94, 162; Modesto Ulloa, 'The Sugar Industry in the Havana District (Cuba), 1641-1667', *Wirtschaftskräfte und Wirtschaftswege* IV, 75-91; on Hamburg Sephardi trade with Barbados see Hamburg Staatsarchiv, Archive of the Admiralitätskollegium F4/15 f. 94 *et passim*.

<sup>89</sup> N. W. Posthumus, *Inquiry into the History of Prices in Holland* (2 vols.; Leiden 1946-64) I, 119, 139 and II, 277-279, 724.

<sup>90</sup> D. M. Swetschinski, 'An Amsterdam Merchant-Diplomat: Jeronimo Nunes da Costa alias Moseh Curiel (1620-1697), Agent of the King of Portugal', in L. Dasberg and J. N. Cohen eds, *Neveh Ya'akov. Jubilee Volume presented to Dr. Jaap Meijer on the Occasion of his Seventieth Birthday* (Assen 1982) 15-20.

wood entering Holland as well as large quantities of Brazil sugar and tobacco, and Portuguese salt and figs. Among the other leading Dutch Sephardi merchants trading with Portugal during this fifth phase were Francisco Lopes d'Azevedo, Simon and Luis Rodrigues da Sousa, Antonio Lopes Gomes, Manoel Gomes da Silva and João Rodrigues Nunes.<sup>91</sup> It is worthy of note that of the dozen largest accounts of Dutch Sephardi Jews with the Amsterdam Exchange Bank, in 1661, the only deposit which belonged to a merchant whose links were mainly with Portugal was that of Jeronimo Nunes da Costa.<sup>92</sup>

A distinctive feature of the fifth phase in the economic evolution of Dutch Sephardi Jewry is that the dispersal of some 1,500 Jews from former Netherlands Brazil in the years 1648-54 greatly enhanced the manpower and colonizing capacity of Dutch Jewry at a moment when its resources dramatically increased and new opportunities arose in the Caribbean. There are various reasons why Sephardi Jews were able to play a fundamental role in the early development of the non-Spanish Caribbean, but none was more significant than the sheer availability for Caribbean colonization, at a crucial time, of a substantial body of merchants, planters and artisans expert in sugar, tobacco, dye-woods and the other products of tropical South America. It is true that the bulk of the refugees were shipped back from Pernambuco to Holland but a portion migrated directly to the Guyanas, Barbados (which was the main centre before the rise of Curaçao), Martinique, Jamaica and New Amsterdam (later New York) while many of those who returned to Holland afterwards crossed back to the Caribbean along with other Dutch Jews.<sup>93</sup> There is not the slightest doubt that the Jewish colony which flourished on Barbados during the second half of the seventeenth century was established and sustained mainly by the Jews of Amsterdam and not by the fledgling community of London.<sup>94</sup> It was also during the 1650s that Amsterdam Sephardi Jewry established the Jewish colony on Curaçao which was shortly to become the most important of all the Jewish communities in the New World.<sup>95</sup>

The sixth phase, that of 1657-72, was one of further fundamental restructuring. This period, which opens with the Dutch-Portuguese war of 1657-61 and the rise, in the late 1650s, of a regular Dutch transit trade to the Spanish Indies via the Caribbean, the old Portugal trade receded further into the background while the Caribbean traffic emerged as the second main pillar of Dutch Sephardi Jewish economic activity alongside Spanish commerce. Assuredly, the effects of the 1657-61 war should not be exaggerated. There was little fighting except in the East where the Dutch completed their conquest of Ceylon and took over the Cochin district of South India. But the States General did forbid its subjects to trade with Portugal for

<sup>91</sup> GA Amsterdam NA 1532, pp. 32, 45, 107, 137, 178, 274; NA 1540, pp. 3, 51, 55, 62, 99, 176-177, 183, 268.

<sup>92</sup> Bloom, *Economic Activities*, 176.

<sup>93</sup> Boxer, *Dutch in Brazil*, 243; A. Cahen, 'Les juifs de la Martinique au XVII<sup>e</sup> siècle', *REJ* II (1881) 93-7; Egon and Frieda Wolff, *A Odisseia dos judeus de Recife* (São Paulo, Brazil, 1979) 214, 242, 248, 251, 254-256, 259.

<sup>94</sup> AGS Libros de La Haya inv. nr. 40, f. 186; Wolff, *A. Odisseia*, 213-214, 216-217, 226, 230, 232, 237.

<sup>95</sup> I. S. and S. A. Emmanuel, *A History of the Jews of the Netherlands Antilles* (2 vols.; Cincinatti 1970) I, 40-41, 46-47.



the duration and, despite extensive evasion, the struggle undoubtedly accelerated English penetration of the Portugal trade, further reducing the share of the Dutch. After the 1661 Dutch-Portuguese peace treaty, Dutch Jews imported only a fraction of the Brazilian products from Lisbon that they had previously while Dutch Sephardi dealings with northern Portugal declined almost to insignificance.<sup>96</sup> However, a few of them did continue importing salt from Setúbal and figs from the Algarve and sustained a lively business with Madeira and the Azores, exchanging cloth and barrel staves (for the famous Madeira wine) chiefly for contraband Brazil sugar and tobacco.

Earlier, during the fifth phase, the rise of a network of Jewish colonies on islands English, French and Dutch but all closely tied socially, culturally and economically to Amsterdam Jewry had created the conditions in which Dutch Sephardi merchants might, or could, assume a leading part in Caribbean commerce. What was lacking was that as yet there was no regular traffic between the Dutch islands and the Spanish Indies. As late as 1660, the Amsterdam notarial deeds show that the main alternative to the Cadiz route was the trade to the Canaries.<sup>97</sup> Curaçao, the island which was soon to develop into the principal depot for the Caribbean transit trade to the Spanish American colonies had been occupied by the Dutch as far back as 1634. Yet for decades Curaçao yielded virtually no profit whatever.<sup>98</sup> In the 1640s, the West India Company actually considered abandoning what subsequently became its most valuable possession, because it then had no trade. Even after 1648, Dutch ships venturing to the coast of the Spanish American mainland with slaves, cloth and spices, the three items most in demand with the Spanish colonists, at first enjoyed only a very sporadic success in evading the obstacles set up by Spanish bureaucracy and garrisons.<sup>99</sup> Regular contact between Curaçao and the neighbouring South American mainland began only in or around 1657, setting in motion the shift which was soon to transform Curaçao into the Amsterdam of the Caribbean. What began as a trickle soon gathered greatly increased momentum as a result of Philip IV's signing of the famous 1662 slaving *asiento* with a consortium of Genoese businessmen, stipulating that the slaves to be shipped to the Spanish Indies under the contract were not to be obtained from the Portuguese with whom Spain was still at war.<sup>100</sup> To meet this commitment, the Genoese *asentistas*, Grillo and Lomelin, turned to the Dutch West India Company which in a series of contracts signed in Amsterdam agreed to act as an agency licensing individual Dutch merchants to send ships to West Africa for slaves and transport them to Curaçao where they were to be received and sold off to local Spanish buyers by factors of the Genoese.<sup>101</sup> From

<sup>96</sup> On Dutch Jewish trade with Portugal, Madeira and the Azores in 1661-4, see GA Amsterdam NA 1541, pp. 28-29, 71-72, 97-98, 102, 103, 111, 126, 156, 160, 215-216, 223, 296; NA 1542, pp. 9, 32, 70, 72-73, 93, 97, 100-102, 105, 110, 133, 136, 146-148, 158, 198-199, 209, 227, 260.

<sup>97</sup> GA Amsterdam NA 1540, pp. 147, 210; NA 1541, pp. 39-40; ARA SG inv.nr. 7044, Antoine Brun to States General, The Hague, 1 Feb. 1652; Israel, 'Some Further Data', 14-16.

<sup>98</sup> S. van Brakel, 'Bescheiden over den slavenhandel der West-Indische Compagnie', *Economisch-Historisch Jaarboek IV* (1918) 49.

<sup>99</sup> Archivo General de Indias, Seville, Papers of the Audiencia de Santa Fé, *legajo* nr. 215, Consulta of the *Junta de Indias*, Madrid, 31 Jan. 1654; W. R. Menkman, *De Nederlanders in het Caraïbische zeegebied* (Amsterdam 1942) 44-45, 67; W. S. Unger, 'Bijdragen tot de geschiedenis van de Nederlandse slavenhandel', *Economisch-Historisch Jaarboek XXVI* (1956) 143, 148, 150.

<sup>100</sup> Georges Scelle, *La Traite négrière aux Indes de Castille* (2 vols.; Paris 1906) I, 484-485, 501, 527.

<sup>101</sup> Van Brakel, 'Bescheiden', 61-66.

1662, for the rest of the century, the great majority of slaves entering the Spanish Indies were shipped by the Dutch via Curaçao.<sup>102</sup>

From the moment that Spanish colonial officialdom conceded this 'legal' flow of traffic between Curaçao and the mainland, supposedly to obtain slaves, there existed a viable cover for a regular, flourishing contraband trade in every other sort of merchandise in demand among the Spanish colonists. The main trade was with the nearby commercial centres of Coro, Cartagena, Maracaibo and Caracas but in the 1660s there also arose a brisk commerce between Curaçao and the relatively distant Spanish islands of Cuba, Santo Domingo and Puerto Rico.<sup>103</sup> Spanish diplomats and agents in Holland were not slow to see the significance of this new development. Even before the signing of the *asiento*, in March 1661, the Spanish ambassador in The Hague warned Philip IV about the

'trade which is now being introduced by way of Curaçao . . . as I understand that they have now established large stores with every kind of merchandise there which they deliver during the night using long boats, taking back silver bars and other products of those parts . . .'<sup>104</sup>

In this way, the Dutch effectively captured the Caribbean transit trade with the Spanish Indies and continued to enjoy the lion's share well into the eighteenth century. From the outset, Dutch Sephardi Jewry played a central role in this lucrative traffic and though their share can never be quantified exactly, we can be fairly sure that it amounted to considerably more than their 20% or so share in Dutch trade with Spain. Substantial numbers of Sephardi Jews settled on Curaçao from the late 1650s and they dominated dealings with the Spanish American mainland through their contacts with the local Portuguese New Christian communities. By 1702, the Dutch Sephardi community on Curaçao numbered around 600 and accounted for 34.5% of the taxable wealth on the island.<sup>105</sup> But they themselves had relatively little wealth. Few had much capital of their own, or owned many slaves or much property; some were poor. Most were agents, factors and brokers earning their livelihood by providing the link-up between the Sephardi Jewish merchant body of Amsterdam with the markets for slaves, cloth and spices in the Spanish Caribbean. Curaçao also served as the mother-community for the neighbouring Sephardi colonies which arose even on some of the lesser islands such as Grenada, Nevis and

<sup>102</sup> This is assumed by Scelle, Van Brakel and Menkman and is confirmed by the statistics of Franz Binder whose monumental study of the Dutch Atlantic slave trade during the third quarter of the seventeenth century will shortly be published.

<sup>103</sup> 'Proposiciones del marques de Variñas sobre los abusos de Yndias' in *Colección de documentos inéditos relativos al descubrimiento, conquista y organización de las antiguas posesiones españolas de América y Oceanía* (25 vols.; Madrid 1885-1932) XIX, 243-244, 245-247.

<sup>104</sup> AGS Libros de La Haya inv.nr. 43, f. 94, Don Esteban de Gamarra to Philip IV of Spain, The Hague, 8 March 1661; see also AGS Libros de La Haya inv.nr. 47, f. 109 and nr. 50, f. 115, in the latter report the new Curaçao traffic is described as the 'destrucción del comercio de las Indias y de los tesoros de ellas'.

<sup>105</sup> Emmanuel, *Jews of the Netherlands Antilles* II, 763-768; Barbados Sephardi Jewry numbered around 300 in 1680 and was assuredly the second in rank of the Caribbean Sephardi colonies until Surinam surpassed it around 1690, see W. S. Samuel, 'Review of the Jewish Colonists in Barbados in the Year 1680', *TJHSE* 13 (1936) 17, 21.

Tobago.<sup>106</sup> From the outset, many and perhaps most of the leading Sephardi Jewish merchants of Holland involved themselves in the Curaçao trade and there were soon at least twenty of thirty Jewish firms regularly engaged in the traffic. Some of the best known names were deeply engaged in the slaving business, including, in the 1670s, Baron Manuel de Belmonte, Agent of Spain in Amsterdam.<sup>107</sup> There is no proof that he was also a contrabandist but this seems likely despite his official functions on behalf of the Spanish crown. More ironic still is the fact that one of those most active in initiating this traffic in the early 1660s, when Spain was still intent on excluding slaves procured from Portuguese sources, was Jeronimo Nunes da Costa, Agent of the Portuguese Crown in the United Provinces: Jeronimo issued passes for at least several Dutch vessels to collect slaves destined for the Spanish Indies from the Portuguese colony of Angola and, for good measure, remitted thousands of pesos worth of Ceylon cinnamon, purchased from the East India Company in Amsterdam, to Curaçao to be smuggled into Maracaibo and Cartagena.<sup>108</sup>

The rise of the Curaçao trade tended to reinforce the characteristic concentration of the Dutch Jewish 'common man', whether Sephardic or Ashkenazic, into jewel and tobacco preparation. Among the most typical tobaccos processed by Jewish manufacturers in Holland in the late seventeenth century were Puerto Rican and 'Bariñas' tobaccos from Venezuela. As with the Brazil, Virginia and Martinique tobaccos these were often or usually mixed with the home-grown leaf and the increase in the quantity and variety of American tobaccos handled by Dutch Jews went hand-in-hand with continued Jewish investment in tobacco culture around Amersfoort and Nijkerk.<sup>109</sup> Pearls which were second only to diamonds in importance in the European jewellery trade of the later seventeenth century came in part from the East Indies but significant quantities were imported also from the Spanish Caribbean via Curaçao.<sup>110</sup> The new transit traffic to the Spanish Indies via the Caribbean also added another manufacture – the making of chocolate – to the Amsterdam community's growing industrial repertoire. A very high proportion of the returns from Curaçao to Amsterdam consisted of so-called 'Caracas' cacao and in the late seventeenth century no commodity figured more frequently than this in Jewish dealings on the Amsterdam exchange.<sup>111</sup> Indeed, Amsterdam's hold on the international cacao trade became so total that there are even cases of Venezuelan cacao being shipped from Holland to Cadiz!<sup>112</sup> It is amusing to note that Gamarra, the Spanish ambassador in The Hague during the 1660s, and an incorrigible gour-

<sup>106</sup> GA Amsterdam NA 2901 unpag. deed of 3 Jan. 1670 (notary P. Padthuysen); G. Merrill, 'The role of Sephardi Jews in the British Caribbean Area during the Seventeenth Century', *Caribbean Studies* IV (1964) 33.

<sup>107</sup> Emmanuel, *Jews of the Netherlands Antilles* I, 75-76.

<sup>108</sup> AGS Libros de La Haya inv.nr. 47, f. 196v and nr. 53, f. 268; see also D. M. Swetschinski, 'Conflict and Opportunity in "Europe's other Sea": the Adventure of Caribbean Jewish Settlement', *American Jewish History* 72 (1982) 236.

<sup>109</sup> GA Amsterdam NA 2898, p. 633; NA 2901, deed of 3 Feb. 1670; NA 3589, f. 343; NA 3592, deed 11 April 1673.

<sup>110</sup> GA Amsterdam NA 4084, deed 6 April 1677.

<sup>111</sup> see the registers of cargoes consigned to Amsterdam Jews on ships returning from Curaçao to Holland in ARA Archive of the West India Company inv.nrs. 567, 568, 569 and 570.

<sup>112</sup> J. Everaert, *De internationale en koloniale handel der Vlaamse firma's te Cadiz, 1670-1700* (Bruges 1973) 420.

met, was assured by his own officials that the best *chocolatiers*, including a man named Pacheco who flavoured his chocolate with vanilla, were the Jews of Amsterdam.

The seventh phase, that of 1672-1702, corresponds to the period when the United Provinces were embroiled in open conflict with France but in alliance with Spain. It is a period in which loss of momentum in the Dutch economy as a whole was unmistakable. Not without reason have historians traditionally dated the waning of Dutch economic power from the shock of Louis XIV's invasion in 1672.<sup>113</sup> The dwindling of the old bulk trades – grain, timber and salt – which characterises Dutch commerce overall in the 1672-1702 period certainly applies also to Dutch Sephardi commerce. But Jewish involvement in bulk carrying had been confined largely to the Portugal trade and withdrawal from shipping grain and timber to, and salt from, Portugal, which seems to have occurred in the 1670s and 1680s only confirmed the eclipse of Portugal in the overall pattern of Dutch Sephardi activity and the consolidation of the Spanish and Caribbean trades as the twin pillars of their business and prosperity. Even the leading Amsterdam Portugal merchant, Jeronimo Nunes da Costa, largely ceased dealing in grain and salt, concentrating increasingly in his later years on importing Brazil sugar, tobacco and dye-woods from the Azores, Lisbon and São Thomé.<sup>114</sup>

But what chiefly deserves to be noticed about the Sephardi contribution to the Dutch economy during the last third of the seventeenth century is that its importance relative to the rest continued to grow. Indeed, there can be no question that the greatest Sephardi contribution to Dutch economic influence overseas, and well-being at home, came precisely in the period of Holland's decline not during its rise. As can be seen from Table 14 the number of Jewish depositors with the Amsterdam Exchange Bank continued to increase after the figure for the total number of accounts had begun to fall so that as a proportion of the whole the number of Jewish depositors rose to no less than 13% by 1674. This was part of a more basic shift in the 1672-1702 period. The reasons why Jewish activity became more fundamental to Dutch well-being at this time than previously are much the same as those which explain the relative increase, after 1672, of Amsterdam's weight within the Dutch economy overall. For a central feature of Dutch economic decline in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is that Amsterdam lost ground more slowly than the rest. What apparently was happening was that while the fisheries and Baltic trade, in which many towns participated, suffered severely, the Spanish and colonial trades held up much better and, in some sectors, continued to grow. Thus while Amsterdam accounted for some 50% of the value of Dutch trade, in 1650, by 1700 this figure had risen to 64%.<sup>115</sup>

The continued vitality of its Spanish and Caribbean trade were of such vital importance to the Republic that it amounted almost to dependence. For it was these,

<sup>113</sup> see, for instance, Jan de Vries, *The Dutch Rural Economy in the Golden Age, 1500-1700* (New Haven, Conn. 1974) 95, 242.

<sup>114</sup> J. I. Israel, 'An Amsterdam Merchant of the Golden Age: Jeronimo Nunes da Costa, Agent of the Portuguese Crown in the United Provinces', *SR* (forthcoming).

<sup>115</sup> J. de Vries, *De economische achteruitgang der Republiek in de achttiende eeuw* (Amsterdam 1959) 40-41.

together with the East India commerce, which chiefly explain Amsterdam's continued preponderance as the world's leading commercial and financial centre for sixty or eighty years after the rest of the country had begun to lapse into provincial torpor. The English diplomat Onslow Burrish, writing of the Dutch economy in the 1720s considered that

'without the bullion which Holland receives annually from Spain, it would be impossible for the Dutch to carry on their commerce with other nations where the ballance of trade is against them, as in the case of Muscovy, Norway, England, France and the Levant. I do not think myself guilty of exaggeration therefore when I say that a Revolution in this single branch of commerce would probably draw on the ruin of the Republic, and consequently the States General would hazard a war rather than submit to it.'<sup>116</sup>

As to Amsterdam's ascendancy over the supply of Spanish silver there is little room for doubt.<sup>117</sup> In some years it rivalled or even exceeded the two-thirds control that the Dutch enjoyed over Spanish wool exports. In this respect, the Dutch would seem to have profited from Louis XIV's aggression against themselves and Spain, for the French share which was substantial between 1659 and 1672 seems to have been considerably reduced thereafter.<sup>118</sup> In 1685, of the four million *pesos* shipped directly to northern Europe on the return of the New World fleet, three-quarters was consigned to Holland and much of the silver remitted to Italy went to Livorno on account of Dutch firms trading with the Levant; of the bullion brought back on the 1698 Indies fleet, four million *pesos* was consigned to Holland, less than half of this to France and only 600,000 *pesos* to England which, before 1713, never succeeded in rivaling France or the United Provinces in this key traffic.

During the 1672-1702 period, Dutch Jewry continued a regular trade with most parts of Spain, including Málaga, Alicante and the Canaries as well as the Basque ports and Cadiz. At the same time, they continued to use the old contraband route from Madrid bringing silver and wool periodically, during bouts of peace with France, via Pamplona and Bayonne.<sup>119</sup> The main items shipped to Cadiz for reshipment to the Indies, we learn from the notarial documents signed by Amsterdam Jews, were linens Silesian, Flemish, Dutch and French, Leiden woollens and East India pepper and cinnamon.<sup>120</sup> On the Cadiz convoys escorted home by the Dutch navy, Dutch Sephardi Jews imported silver, tobacco, dye-stuffs, vanilla and jewels. Clearly this traffic was engaged in by a relatively large number of merchants,

<sup>116</sup> O. Burrish, *Batavia Illustrata: or a view of the Policy and Commerce of the United Provinces* (2 vols.; London 1728) I, 503; a Dutch observer remarked in the 1690s that the 'commerce d'Espagne est le plus considerable que nous ayons après ceux de la Mer Baltique, des Indes et des peches', but whereas the Baltic trade and fisheries were in decline, the Spanish trade was of relatively increasing importance, see the 'Memoire touchant le negoce et la navigation des Hollandois (1699)' ed. P. J. Blok, *Bijdragen en Mededelingen van het Historisch Genootschap* 24 (1903) 267, 268.

<sup>117</sup> Henry Kamen's views as to the predominance of France in the Spanish trade of the later seventeenth century are entirely incorrect, see H. Kamen, *Spain in the Later Seventeenth Century, 1665-1700* (London 1980) 118-121; and the exchange between Kamen and myself in 'Debate. The Decline of Spain: A Historical Myth?', *Past and Present* 91 (1981) 170-185.

<sup>118</sup> A. Girard, *Le commerce français à Seville et Cadix au temps des Habsbourg* (Paris and Bordeaux 1932) 447-450, 451-452.

<sup>119</sup> GA Amsterdam NA 2901, p. 693; NA 6677A, p. 237.

<sup>120</sup> GA Amsterdam NA 2898, pp. 139, 205; NA 2901 unpaginated, deeds 26 Jan. 1670, 6 Feb. 1670; NA 6677A, p. 237; NA 6677B, pp. 415, 419, 429.

including the Pereira dynasty, the De Los Rios family, Abraham and Isaac Henriques Faro (alias Antonio and Jacques Boeckelaar), Henrique Mendes da Silva, Isaac de Prado, Fransisco Nunes da Costa (Aaron Curiel), 'Carolus and Jacobus Schoonenburg' and many other names. Little research has yet been conducted into the activities of the wealthy ship-owning De La Penha family which headed the Sephardi community of Rotterdam in the late seventeenth century, but they were of Spanish rather than Portuguese background and it seems likely that they too engaged in this commerce.<sup>121</sup> It is remarkable that in Spain even Portuguese New Christian merchants residing in such inland provincial centres as Valladolid and Antequera corresponded directly with Amsterdam Jews.<sup>122</sup>

Apart from Spain and, to a dwindling extent Portugal, most of the rest of Dutch activity in the Old World was confined, as before, to Morocco and Livorno. The only new item was the increasing tendency, after 1670, to import rough diamonds from India via London.<sup>123</sup> With regard to the Morocco trade, it is noticeable that whereas Saleh and Tetuan were the chief ports of call used by Dutch Jewish merchants during the Thirty Years War, by the 1670s Saleh and especially Agadir were the main foci of the traffic. In the 1670s, the leading Dutch Jewish Morocco merchants were Jacob Bueno de Mezquita, Abraham Telles, Francisco Pereira de Castro, Aaron Mendes and David Ferreira.<sup>124</sup> Regarding Livorno, numerous Dutch Sephardi Jews had close business as well as family ties with the city in the late seventeenth century for by then this Tuscan port had usurped most of Venice's former functions as an entrepot for the Levant trade. Apart from sugar, Amsterdam Jewry's exports to Livorno were very similar to the goods shipped to Spain, consisting chiefly of linens, Leiden woollens, pepper and cinnamon. Most of this merchandise was clearly intended for reshipment to the Levant, Tunisia and Algeria.<sup>125</sup>

**Dutch Sephardi Jewry's Caribbean trade continued to flourish during the 1672-1702 phase despite the persistent efforts of the English and French to penetrate the transit business with the Spanish colonies and to drive the Dutch out of the traffic to Barbados and Martinique. Despite the Navigation Acts, and Colbert, it is obvious that much of the commerce of both islands was still handled by Amsterdam Jews in the 1670s.<sup>126</sup> However, the efforts of the English and French crowns, including Louis XIV's expulsion of the Jews from the French Caribbean colonies in 1683, did eventually have the intended effect. This pressure in turn caused a major shift in the pattern of Dutch Sephardi activity in the Caribbean towards concentrating on the**

<sup>121</sup> D. Hausdorf, *Jizkor. Platenatlas van drie en een halve eeuw geschiedenis van de joodse gemeente in Rotterdam van 1610 tot 1960* (Baarn 1978) 17-20.

<sup>122</sup> GA Amsterdam NA 2898, p. 999; NA 2901, deed 26 June 1670; on the correspondence between the Alicante New Christian merchant, Felipe de Moscoso, and various Amsterdam Jews in the 1670s, see Kamen, *Spain in the Later Seventeenth Century*, 143-144.

<sup>123</sup> G. Yogeve, *Diamonds and Coral. Anglo-Dutch Jews and Eighteenth-Century Trade* (Leicester 1978) 84-102.

<sup>124</sup> GA Amsterdam NA 1544, p. 260; NA 1545, pp. 48-49, 50, 200-201, 274.

<sup>125</sup> GA Amsterdam NA 2898, p. 769; NA 2901, pp. 884, 1009 and deeds 28 Jan. 1670, 6 Feb. 1670; NA 7350, p. 1034; and GA Amsterdam APIG inv.nr. 334, lists of goods remitted by Amsterdam Jews to Livorno.

<sup>126</sup> GA Amsterdam NA 2898, pp. 57-59, 185, 197; NA 2901, deeds 3 Jan. and 11 March 1670; I. S. Emmanuel, 'Les juifs de la Martinique et leurs coreligionnaires d'Amsterdam au XVIIe siècle', *REJ* 123 (1964) 511-516.

resources of the Dutch colonies themselves. Though there were instances of Amsterdam Jews investing heavily in sugar plantations and mills in Surinam, even before the Dutch captured the colony from the English, in 1667, it was whilst the Republic was at war with both France and England, in the years 1672-5, that Jewish involvement in Surinam assumed appreciable proportions.<sup>127</sup> By 1694, the Surinam Dutch Sephardi community was the second largest in the Caribbean after that of Curaçao, numbering around 500, owning forty sugar plantations and some 9,000 slaves.<sup>128</sup> Thus by the end of the century, Amsterdam Sephardi Jewry had become the European corner of a trans-Atlantic triangle linked to the Dutch Jewish colonies on Curaçao and in Surinam. By 1730, 115 of the 400 plantations in Surinam belonged to Sephardi Jews, the area along the much extolled Surinam river being virtually a Jewish autonomous region, the religious and communal nerve-centre of which was the synagogue at Joden Savanneh, three or four hours by boat up river from Paramaribo.

But while, at the end of the century, the Jews of Amsterdam were, as the English consul, William Carr, expressed it 'verie considerable in the trade of this citie',<sup>129</sup> and relatively more so than previously, a smaller and smaller proportion of the Sephardi community were actively engaged in overseas trade. Though still well ahead of the German Jews in sophistication and wealth, the Sephardi community already showed a marked loss of momentum and initiative compared with the now more dynamic Ashkenazi merchant class who were visibly narrowing the gap between themselves and the Sephardim, entering increasingly into sectors of foreign and colonial commerce in which they had previously played little or no part. By and large, the Sephardi elite was content to stick to the now easy routine of Caribbean and Spanish trade, fading more and more from the traffic with Portugal which had once been their mainstay. In the upper echelons of the community, many or most Sephardi patricians joined the ranks of the Dutch *rentier* class along with a good many former Protestant and Catholic merchants, living off investments, adopting a strikingly luxurious life-style and spending much time engaged in community and synagogue affairs, the Jewish equivalent to the participation of the Dutch regents in municipal government.

That the accumulated financial power of Dutch Sephardi Jewry was now of considerable importance to the functioning of the Republic and its institutions generally, as well as to the East and West India Companies, can be seen on several levels but perhaps most obviously in the field of army contracting. Well before 1672, Moroccan emirs and (after 1640) the Portuguese crown employed Dutch Sephardi Jews to help finance their purchases of arms, ships and munitions. But it was during the 1672-8 Franco-Dutch war that a consortium of leading Dutch Sephardi patricians, headed by Baron Lopes Suasso, Jacob Pereira and Antonio Machado entered the field of army contracting proper. Most of this group together with their respective entourages moved at this time from Amsterdam to The Hague where they

<sup>127</sup> GA Amsterdam NA 2898, p. 442; F. O. Dentz, *De kolonisatie van de Portugeesch-Joodsche natie in Suriname* (Amsterdam 1927) 13-16.

<sup>128</sup> Ibidem, 53-5; R. A. J. van Lier, 'The Jewish Community in Surinam: A Historical Survey' in: R. Cohen ed. *The Jewish Nation in Surinam* (Amsterdam 1982) 19-23.

<sup>129</sup> William Carr, *The Travellers Guide and Historian's Faithful Companion* (London 1691) 23.

formed the nucleus of a small but soon flourishing satellite Sephardi community.<sup>130</sup> William III employed the firm of Machado and Pereira as the main suppliers of grain, horses and munitions to his armies fighting the French and retained their services as his principal provisioners down to his death in 1702.<sup>131</sup> In collaboration with Baron Belmonte, the Sephardi 'Agent' of Spain at Amsterdam, this firm and others also assisted with provisioning the Spanish army of Flanders in years when it combined with the Dutch against the French. Machado and Pereira were also made responsible, after William III became king of England, in 1688, for provisioning the English armies in Ireland and Flanders.<sup>132</sup> One of Pereira's agents, Sir Solomon de Medina, the first professing Jew to be knighted in England but who was Dutch rather than English, continued to supply Marlborough's armies in Flanders and Germany until he went bankrupt, in 1712.<sup>133</sup> At least four or five Dutch Sephardi Jews were named 'Agents' on behalf of German princes and collaborated in financing various German armies which entered into William III's coalitions against Louis XIV.<sup>134</sup> Jeronimo Nunes da Costa was one of those who participated in this Dutch financing of German courts. In 1688, for instance he handled the pay and transit costs of the contingent contributed by the Duke of Württemberg to the army William gathered for his invasion of England.

In the middle ranks of the Sephardi community, a trend away from direct involvement in trade to related commercial services, noticeable since the middle of the century, became more pronounced from the 1670s onwards. Indeed, nothing was more typical and distinctive of Dutch Sephardi economic life in the late seventeenth century than the large numbers of brokers. These Jewish brokers fell into four or five categories including specialists in commodities, handlers of money bills and bills of exchange, stock-brokers, and shipping and insurance agents. It is noticeable that in the field of commodities Sephardi brokers concentrated on such merchandise as Sephardi merchants tended to import, especially sugar, chocolate, Spanish wool and raisins.<sup>135</sup> The shipping agents scoured the city seeking to match merchants looking for cargo space with partially filled ships preparing to sail to specific destinations. But it was the Sephardi stock-brokers who most caught the eye of foreign visitors and who were most preponderant in their field. One English observer alleged in 1701 that Jews handled seventeen out of every twenty East India Company shares which changed hands in Amsterdam.<sup>136</sup> The pre-eminence of Sephardi brokers in the exchange of stocks and shares continued over many decades and it was one of their

<sup>130</sup> M. Henriquez Pimentel, *Geschiedkundige aantekeningen betreffende de Portugeesche Israelieten in Den Haag* (The Hague 1876) 9, 15, 22.

<sup>131</sup> A. M. Vaz Dias, 'Losse bijdragen tot de geschiedenis der Joden in Amsterdam III: Het approvierende der legers van den Stadhouder, Prins Willem III', *De Vrijdagavond* (Amsterdam) VII (1931-2) 413-415.

<sup>132</sup> Swetschinski, 'Portuguese Jewish Merchants' I, 260-266, 280-284; O. K. Rabinowicz, *Sir Solomon de Medina* (London 1974) 14-16, 61-62.

<sup>133</sup> *Ibidem*, 61-70.

<sup>134</sup> These included David Bueno de Mezquita, Agent of the Duke of Brunswick, and Samuel Gomes Coutinho (alias 'Pieter la Court') 'Resident' of the Duke of Mecklenburg.

<sup>135</sup> Swetschinski, 'Portuguese Jewish Merchants' I, 311-316.

<sup>136</sup> V. Barbour, *Capitalism in Amsterdam in the 17th Century* (Ann Arbor 1976) (1st edn, Baltimore 1950) 78.



number, Joseph Penso de la Vega, who composed the first ever detailed account of the workings of a stock exchange.<sup>137</sup>

As active involvement in foreign trade waned, bouts of feverish speculation in stocks, shares, bonds and foreign funds became an ever more characteristic feature of Dutch Sephardi economic life. The period of the War of the Spanish Succession (1702-13) marked a new phase in that for the first time since 1648, Spain was ranged on the side of France against the Dutch. All Dutch traffic to and from Spain was thus heavily disrupted and there was some squeezing also of the transit trade to the Spanish Indies via Curaçao. While the West India Company's Curaçao registers for these years show that some thirty or forty Dutch Sephardi merchants continued to import Spanish American cacao, dye-woods, tobacco and silver, via Curaçao, regularly, throughout the 1702-12 conflict,<sup>138</sup> it does seem likely that there was some reduction in the level of activity. Indeed, the serious obstacles and obstructions of the 1702-13 phase probably mark a further step in the gradual withdrawal from active trade into finance and financial services.

The Treaty of Utrecht, of 1713, which restored peace to western Europe, signalled the resumption of normal links between the Dutch Republic and Spanish lands. We know that Holland's trade with both Spain and the Caribbean recovered to something like their former levels and were undoubtedly fundamental to Amsterdam's continued role as a world entrepôt in the mid-eighteenth century. But, as yet, not enough is known about Sephardi activity after 1713 for us to be able to say how far Dutch Sephardi merchants retained a significant share in the traffic. The evidence of the West India Company's Curaçao books suggests that Sephardim did continue to dominate a large part of Dutch commerce with the West Indies.<sup>139</sup> Moreover, it is clear that the Surinam Sephardi colony continued to flourish down to the 1770s or thereabouts, while a third thriving Dutch Sephardi colony arose in the post-1713 period on St Eustatius, numbering around 400 souls in 1780.<sup>140</sup> But it does seem that by the mid eighteenth century Caribbean trade was the only significant element in Dutch Sephardi overseas commerce. Thus what had once been a trading network based overwhelmingly on Lisbon and Oporto finally ended up, after a series of dramatic oscillations and upheavals, as a system based essentially on Curaçao, Surinam and St Eustatius.

Of course, numerous gaps remain to be filled by further research. But enough is now clear for us to be able to assert with some assurance that the widespread conviction, deriving from Van Dillen, that the Dutch Sephardi contribution to Holland's commercial greatness was marginal is incorrect. A wide variety of evidence would seem rather to indicate that this group, of some significance from the beginning of the seventeenth century, were of central importance in the prolonging

<sup>137</sup> Joseph Penso de la Vega, *Confusion de confusiones* (Amsterdam 1688) and M. F. J. Smith ed. *Confusion de confusiones van Josseph de la Vega. Herdruk van den spaanschen tekst met nederlandsche vertaling* (The Hague 1939).

<sup>138</sup> ARA Archive of the WIC inv.nrs. 567, 568, 569, lists of cargoes shipped from Curaçao to Sephardi merchants of Amsterdam.

<sup>139</sup> see for instance ARA Archive of the WIC, Curaçao books relating to the 1740s.

<sup>140</sup> Emmanuel, *History* I, 522-527; J. Hartog, *The Jews and St Eustatius* (St. Maarten? 1976) 2, 4, 11.

of Holland's commercial ascendancy in Europe and the Indies after 1648. Moreover, the rapid sequence of phases, the constant restructuring of Dutch Sephardi activity during Holland's golden age, may well point to additional lessons for the economic historian. The fashion nowadays is for the Braudelian *longue durée*, basic shifts which are supposed to take place without reference to political events over long spans of time. What we learn from the evolution of Dutch Sephardi activity, however, is the almost total inapplicability of such concepts to the early modern period. Patterns of trade in the seventeenth century, the age of mercantilism, were so profoundly influenced by the facts of political and military power, by treaties, truces, embargoes and blockades, that any attempt to trace economic evolution without heavy emphasis on such events, however much in vogue, is apt, perhaps even bound to be shallow and unhelpful.

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